I then cited my dictionary and provided a lengthy excerpt from it, confirming that "quality," "property," "characteristic," and "attribute" all refer to the same basic concept. I still fail to see how particularity does not qualify. You claim that matter/structures/processes (and everything else) are all particular; in other words, that is what they are "like." I am not trying to aggravate you here; I am honestly not seeing the distinction that you seem to be making. — aletheist

Oaky, so a few examples:

The property of being ionized obtains via an atom or molecule gaining a positive or negative charge via gaining or losing an electron.

The property of being blue obtains via atoms/molecules reflecting electromagnetic radiation between the range of 450 and 495 nanometres.

The property of being phaneritic obtains via being igneous rock with a microstructure consisting of crystals large enough to be distinguished by the unaided human eye.

So, just what would you suggest that a "property of particularity" obtains via?

Anything that you can state as a proposition will include predicates, which you acknowledged is a synonym for properties. — aletheist

I'm not saying that properties have something to do with the grammatical analysis of sentences.

Oaky, so a few examples: — Terrapin Station

Those are all excellent examples of pragmatic explications of concepts, which (from where I sit) demonstrate the reality of generals. Possessing a positive or negative charge via gaining or losing an electron is what it means to instantiate the general, "ionized." Having the disposition to reflect electromagnetic radiation in a wavelength between 450 and 495 nm is what it means to instantiate the general, "blue." Being igneous rock with a microstructure consisting of crystals large enough that they would be distinguished by the unaided human eye is what it means to instantiate the general, "phaneritic." Many different things really are "ionized," "blue," or "phaneritic" in accordance with these definitions, regardless of whether they are ever actually observed to be so.

So, just what would you suggest that a "property of particularity" obtains via? — Terrapin Station

As a first attempt, in accordance with your view: The property of particularity obtains via having no other property that is identically instantiated in anything else.

I'm not saying that properties have something to do with the grammatical analysis of sentences. — Terrapin Station

Does this indicate that we are now starting to run up against your (self-described) idiosyncratic views about propositions, truth, etc.? I have been studiously trying to avoid that landmine throughout this long discussion.

The property of particularity obtains via having no — aletheist

"Having no" isn't a property that things have, though. It has to be something that's present, not something that's absent.

"Having no" isn't a property that things have, though. It has to be something that's present, not something that's absent. — Terrapin Station

That seems rather arbitrary; having the property not-F is equivalent to lacking the property F. I suppose that your reply would be that F in this case is not something that you recognize as a real property. As you could probably tell, I was just quoting your own definition of particularity; I was hoping to avoid quibbling over what exactly it is.

As a second attempt: The property of particularity obtains via being absolutely determinate with respect to every conceivable predicate.

If this is unsatisfactory, then I have to ask - is there any positive definition of particularity that you would endorse, or is it strictly a negation of generality on your view? The latter, of course, would effectively beg the question.

That seems rather arbitrary; having the property not-F is equivalent to lacking the property F. — aletheist

I don't think it's arbitrary at all. There are no properties that are absences of something period. The only way that there's a property of not-F is if not-F equals G, in which case G is the property something exhibits. The idea that something has a property that's (a) nonexistent is ridiculous.

absolutely determinate with respect to every conceivable predicate. — aletheist

First off, what the heck would we be talking about there re the matter in question and its structure and the processes the matter/structures are engaging in?

is there any positive definition of particularity that you would endorse, or is it strictly a negation of generality on your view? — aletheist

Well, ontologically, it's strictly another way of saying that something doesn't exist. It's a fact that that thing doesn't exist, but it's not a property of anything that it doesn't exist.

Re being question-begging, what is the argument and conclusion you have in mind?

The idea that something has a property that's (a) nonexistent is ridiculous. — Terrapin Station

It sounds like I was right - your reply is that F in this case is not something that you recognize as a real property, so not-F is also something that you do not recognize as a real property. How convenient.

Well, ontologically, it's strictly another way of saying that something doesn't exist. — Terrapin Station

Particularity is strictly a way of saying that generality does not exist? There is no other way to explain particularity that does not amount to explicitly denying generality?

Re being question-begging, what is the argument and conclusion you have in mind? — Terrapin Station

The reductio that I have proposed is along these lines.

• Everything real possesses particularity.
• By definition, if everything real possesses x, then x is a real general.
• Therefore, particularity is a real general.
• But by definition, if everything possesses particularity, then nothing is a real general.
• Therefore, the first premiss is false; something real does not possess particularity - i.e., something is a real general.

Your objection is to the designation of particularity as a property that something real possesses, on the basis that it (supposedly) can only be defined as the absence of generality, which you deny to be a property that anything real possesses.

It sounds like I was right - your reply is that F in this case is not something that you recognize as a real property, so not-F is also something that you do not recognize as a real property. How convenient. — aletheist

I didn't say anything like that. First off, F is a variable--it depends on what we're even talking about whether I'd say that it's a real property or not.

Re not-F, I already explained this above. It would only be a property if not-F is identical to something we're saying is present, G. Properties aren't absences. They're present qualities that obtain via what matter/structures/processes are like (not what they're not like).

Particularity is strictly a way of saying that generality does not exist? There is no other way to explain particularity that does not amount to explicitly denying generality? — aletheist

There are other ways to explain it. What you'd been asking about, however, is what it is as a real (read extramental) fact. As a fact, it's strictly that the inventory of the world doesn't contain any universals (on the traditional sense of universal as explained above).

Your objection is to the designation of particularity as a property that something real possesses, on the basis that it (supposedly) can only be defined as the absence of generality, which you deny to be a property that anything real possesses. — aletheist

Wait--first, I objected that that particularity is a property that anything possesses on the basis that particularity is not a property, based on what properties are--which I defined above. There's nothing circular about that, not to mention that it's not actually a logical argument per se (and circularity only pertains to logical arguments per se, and even then it's only fallacious in a logical argument when it's framed as an explanation for something and it's not a simple case of P therefore P for example).

I didn't say anything about "particularity can only be defined . . ."

Again, you asked me what particularity is as a real/extramental fact.

And the denial of universals has nothing to do with definitions of anything or whether they're properties or anything like that. They would be properties if there were any universals. The denial has to do with (a) empirical evidence--everywhere we look, we can't find any (real) universals of the traditional sort, and (b) the fact that the very idea of them is incoherent, as for one it requires real nonphysicals, and even aside from that, no one will even suggest how in the world universals are supposed to work (in the sense of how it is, exactly, that particulars "participate" in them to fully instantiate them identically to other particulars).

First off, F is a variable--it depends on what we're even talking about whether I'd say that it's a real property or not. — Terrapin Station

F is generality, not-F is particularity. You reject not-F as a real property because you reject F as a real property. Basically, your contention (as I understand it) is that F is a real property if and only if some real things are F and some real things are not-F. That actually seems reasonable to me, so I am now willing to concede the point.

The denial has to do with (a) empirical evidence--everywhere we look, we can't find any (real) universals of the traditional sort ... — Terrapin Station

Again, I consider the undeniable fact of ubiquitous predictable regularities to be empirical evidence of real generals; namely, the laws of nature.

... and (b) the fact that the very idea of them is incoherent, as for one it requires real nonphysicals ... — Terrapin Station

This just privileges physicalism, which I reject.

... and even aside from that, no one will even suggest how in the world universals are supposed to work (in the sense of how it is, exactly, that particulars "participate" in them to fully instantiate them identically to other particulars). — Terrapin Station

I have tried to lay out an alternative to the traditional notion that a real universal is one thing that is identically instantiated in multiple individuals, which I agree is problematic. Instead, I have suggested (following Peirce) that a real general is an inexhaustible continuum of potential individuals that is non-identically instantiated in multiple actual individuals. I find this conceptually more plausible (YMMV).

This seems like a good summary of our positions, and I will be traveling over the next couple of days anyway, so I think that we have carried the thread out about as far as we could - unless you want to go back and address this post. Thanks again for the good discussion.

F is generality, not-F is particularity. You reject not-F as a real property because you reject F as a real property. — aletheist

Properties are particulars on my view, and there are real particular properties. I'm only rejecting properties as universals. F would presumably represent a property, and using "real" as "extramental," it could very well be an extramental (particular) property.

that F is a real property if and only if some real things are F and some real things are not-F. — aletheist

F is a real property iff F is what some particular matter/structure(s)/process(es) is/are like.

If you're referring instead to the concept of F, the concept can't be real (concepts are mental constructs), And the concept would be applied by an individual just in case we're talking about something or somethings that their concept "ranges over." In other words, just in case we're picking out things that fit their concept per the necessary and sufficient properties they've settled upon for bestowing the name "F."

Again, I consider the undeniable fact of ubiquitous predictable regularities to be empirical evidence of real generals; namely, the laws of nature. — aletheist

And I don't because that's how particulars behave on my view. If you ask "why" again, I'd just ask why universal/particular relations work as they do again. And that would go nowhere.

This just privileges physicalism, which I reject. — aletheist

The problem is that I don't believe that the idea of nonphysical existents makes the slightest lick of sense. It's completely incoherent on my view. That obviously privileges physicalism, because it's sense being privileged over complete nonsense. ;-)

I have suggested (following Peirce) that a real general is an inexhaustible continuum of potential individuals — aletheist

One simple problem with that is that if a continuum can't be distinguishable, you can't have a plural there--you only have individuals if they're distinguishable. You could only have an "inexhaustible" contiuum of one thing, potential or not.

Anyway, re "an inexhaustible continuum of potential individuals that is non-identically instantiated in multiple actual individuals. I find this conceptually more plausible" I'd not be asking for some abstract-level description that seems conceptually plausible to you. I'd be asking for a description of how it works, on the level of "Well, atoms come into proximity and electromagnetic force is a factor . . . " and so on. Presumably the description like that isn't going to be about atoms, but whatever it's about, it needs to be an account of exactly how the relations in question work.

One simple problem with that is that if a continuum can't be distinguishable, you can't have a plural there--you only have individuals if they're distinguishable. — Terrapin Station

One quick clarification - it is not that the potential individuals in a continuum are indistinguishable, it is that they are potentially distinguishable but actually indistinct. In other words, they only become distinct once they are actualized.