Is it? I thought sex was physical. You mean to tell me that I've been having conceptual sex with my wife and not physical sex this whole time? Does that mean that my offspring are conceptual outcomes of my conceptual sex as well? I thought that they are physical outcomes of physical processes. Im really confused now. — Harry Hindu
Interesting that you're from a linguistics background. I'm curious to know what you think about the adequacy and/or sufficiency of the three principles proposed for successful communication/interpretation. — creativesoul
Ambiguity is an example: often the ‘same’ word has more than one semantic role, and so the interpretation of utterances in which it occurs is not uniquely fixed by the features of the interpreter’s competence so far mentioned.
nterpreters certainly can make these distinctions. But part of the burden of this paper is that much that they can do ought not to count as part of their basic linguistic competence.
In linguistic communication nothing corresponds to a linguistic competence as often described: that is, as summarized by principles (1)–(3). The solution is to give up the principles.
I take for granted, however, that nothing should be allowed to obliterate or even blur the distinction between speaker’s meaning and literal meaning. In order to preserve the distinction we must, I shall argue, modify certain commonly accepted views about what it is to ‘know a language’, or about what a natural language is. In particular, we must pry apart what is literal in language from what is conventional or established. — p. 252
The trouble is that Donnellan’s original distinction had nothing to do with words changing their meaning or reference. If, in the referential use, Jones refers to someone who did not murder Smith by using the description ‘Smith’s murderer’, the reference is none the less achieved by way of the normal meanings of the words. The words therefore must have their usual reference. All that is needed, if we are to accept this way of describing the situation, is a firm sense of the difference between what words mean or refer to and what speakers mean or refer to. — p. 258
The speaker wants to be understood, so he intends to speak in such a way that he will be interpreted in a certain way. In order to judge how he will be interpreted, he forms, or uses, a picture of the interpreter’s readiness to interpret along certain lines. Central to this picture is what the speaker believes is the starting theory of interpretation the interpreter has for him. The speaker does not necessarily speak in such a way as to prompt the interpreter to apply this prior theory; he may deliberately dispose the interpreter to modify his prior theory. But the speaker’s view of the interpreter’s prior theory is not irrelevant to what he says, nor to what he means by his words; it is an important part of what he has to go on if he wants to be understood. — p. 260
Every deviation from ordinary usage, as long as it is agreed on for the moment (knowingly deviant, or not, on one, or both, sides), is in the passing theory as a feature of what the words mean on that occasion. Such meanings, transient though they may be, are literal; they are what I have called first meanings. — p. 261
He uses "first meaning", and I'm not quite sure what that means, so that's an additional difficulty I have. — Dawnstorm
When you start out studying any of the humanities, one thing you learn pretty quickly, is none of the terms probably mean what you think they mean, and different people use them differently, so knowing roughly what sort of theoretical background to expect helps you a lot in understanding a text. That's why it matters to me that I'm not very knowledgable about the philosophy of language. I have all the caution but none of the background when it comes to interpreting the text. — Dawnstorm
We want a deeper notion of what words, when spoken in context, mean; and like the shallow notion of correct usage, we want the deep concept to distinguish between what a speaker, on a given occasion, means, and what his words mean. The widespread existence of malapropisms and their kin threatens the distinction, since here the intended meaning seems to take over from the standard meaning.
I take for granted, however, that nothing should be allowed to obliterate or even blur the distinction between speaker’s meaning and literal meaning. In order to preserve the distinction we must, I shall argue, modify certain commonly accepted views about what it is to ‘know a language’, or about what a natural language is. In particular, we must pry apart what is literal in language from what is conventional or established.
Here is a preliminary stab at characterizing what I have been calling literal meaning. The term is too incrusted with philosophical and other extras to do much work, so let me call what I am interested in first meaning.
And, yes, you have to learn a language before you can use it. — Dawnstorm
And, yes, you have to learn a language before you can use it.
— Dawnstorm
Is that right?
I rather suspect we use it, regardless, and become more adept over time.
That is, learning a language and using it are the very same thing. After all, have you stoped learning English? — Banno
Except when you mistakenly ask for a socket and I know you meant to ask for a wrench (or should have meant to ask for a wrench), I know what object you actually need because my understanding is aligned with reality, despite what you said. If I were to describe my understanding, my semantic engine will produce "wrench", because it is aligned with -- my understanding? reality? — Srap Tasmaner
"first meaning" — Dawnstorm
If Davidson wishes to preserve a purported distinction between what a speaker means and what their words mean then literal meaning cannot ever be what a speaker means(but it quite often is). — creativesoul
Is that right?
I rather suspect we use it, regardless, and become more adept over time. — Banno
That is, learning a language and using it are the very same thing. After all, have you stoped learning English? — Banno
But further, and deeper, if you could learn a language before you used it, that would imply that there was a difference between knowing a language and using it. I can't see what that could be like - how could you show that you know a language without using it? — Banno
If Davidson wishes to preserve a purported distinction between what a speaker means and what their words mean then literal meaning cannot ever be what a speaker means(but it quite often is).
— creativesoul
I think that's wrong. Preserving the distinction merely means to preserve the analytical category. If you do that, you can say that what the speaker means is what the words mean. If you don't preserve the categories, you can't say that in terms of this particular theory, because you lack the tools. He's just describing the analytical framework, here. (The sentence Srap Tasmaner pointed out and I missed about making a distinction between what is "literal" and what is "conventional"... that is really odd, though. I'm not sure what to make of this.) — Dawnstorm
...The sentence Srap Tasmaner pointed out and I missed about making a distinction between what is "literal" and what is "conventional"... that is really odd, though. I'm not sure what to make of this. — Dawnstorm
Then an infant that learned its first word, "Mamma", now knows English even though it can't write the word nor even understands what words or language or English is?But further, and deeper, if you could learn a language before you used it, that would imply that there was a difference between knowing a language and using it. I can't see what that could be like - how could you show that you know a language without using it? — Banno
how could you show that you know a language without using it? — Banno
But why would you do such a thing? What purpose would naming objects only for yourself, that you already know, be? Do you have to name a rock to know about rocks?If I had lived amongst the Neanderthals, I could looked around me and named every object I saw - rock, water, gazelle, etc. This would be my language, albeit simple. — RussellA
(The sentence Srap Tasmaner pointed out and I missed about making a distinction between what is "literal" and what is "conventional"... that is really odd, though. I'm not sure what to make of this.) — Dawnstorm
Do you have to name a rock to know about rocks? — Harry Hindu
Wittgenstein said in sect. 43 of Philosophical Investigations that “For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” — RussellA
It seems to me to be aimed at a mooted argument that there is such a thing as the meaning that can be derived in a fairly direct way from a set of words, exclusively by making use of a catalogue of conventions. — Banno
This talk of error or mistake is not mysterious nor open to philosophical suspicions. I was wrong about what a good dictionary would say, or what would be found by polling a pod of experts whose taste or training I trust. But error or mistake of this kind, with its associated notion of correct usage, is not philosophically interesting. We want a deeper notion of what words, when spoken in context, mean; and like the shallow notion of correct usage, we want the deep concept to distinguish between what a speaker, on a given occasion, means, and what his words mean. The widespread existence of malapropisms and their kin threatens the distinction, since here the intended meaning seems to take over from the standard meaning. — p. 252
He (Wittgenstein) everywhere undermines the notion of the meaning of a word, of a sentence — Banno
The argument proceeds by showing that it is not possible to give a coherent account of first meaning. — Banno
First meanings are shared. For speaker and interpreter to communicate successfully and regularly, they must share a method of interpretation of the sort described in (1). — p. 254
In small, isolated groups everyone may know the names everyone else knows, and so have ready in advance of a speech encounter a theory that will, without correction, cope with the names to be employed. — p. 259
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