Surely, on the basis that 'language' is a necessary aspect of 'consciousness', the central problem is that 'language' is trying to 'explain itself'.
If (as at least one writer has suggested) that 'languaging' is merely a form of complex behaviour which serves to organise other behaviours, and to coordinate joint actions, then 'the problem' is deflated.
But of course, this pov would also tend to deflate 'philosophy' to the level of social dancing !

Surely, on the basis that 'language' is a necessary aspect of 'consciousness', the central problem is that 'language' is trying to 'explain itself'.
If (as at least one writer has suggested) that 'languaging' is merely a form of complex behaviour which serves to organise other behaviours, and to coordinate joint actions, then 'the problem' is deflated.
But of course, this pov would also tend to deflate 'philosophy' to the level of social dancing ! — fresco

Yes I agree, but the main question is, are all these theories commensurate? What would it take to prove who is right? Are they all right? Can they be combined into some grand theory that incorporates all of them or are they not amenable to each other?

Theories are not 'provable'. They are paradigms which are offered 1. to fulfil explanatory criteria and 2. to yield new applications. In terms of the first, Occam's Razor would seem to mitigate against placing 'language' in a behavioral category of its own, and in terms of the second, both 'systems theory' and the anchoring of language in 'context' ( both physiological and social) have been fruitful.

In terms of the first, Occam's Razor would seem to mitigate against placing 'language' in a behavioral category of its own, and in terms of the second, both 'systems theory' and the anchoring of language in 'context' ( both physiological and social) have been fruitful. — fresco

That's great, so all these incomensurable ideas that don't seem to fit together to explain this phenomena? If you can explain a theory in one way, and then in a totally different way, they are just thought experiments and "just so" theories and don't really tell us much other than the answer can be thought of in various different explanatory models. But we already knew that much.

If you can explain a theory in one way, and then in a totally different way, they are just thought experiments and "just so" theories and don't really tell us much other than the answer can be thought of in various different explanatory models. — schopenhauer1

But any finite set of observations can be explained in many totally different ways. Our current mainstream theories are not the only possible explanation, they are simply the commonly accepted explanation.

But any finite set of observations can be explained in many totally different ways. Our current mainstream theories are not the only possible explanation, they are simply the commonly accepted explanation. — leo

Sure but predictable models like relativity, quantum mechanics, the clotting process, protein formation, etc. can actually be verified in outcomes. Not so with consciousness and language theories. No doubt theories can change, but that is not the problem here, rather if any theory can actually be applied to the case in the world, how would that be verified, and would all these incommensurate theories be combined, some dropped, reinterpreted, whole fields disappear? It seems like these theories and avenues of reflection are more art in some ways and philosophy rather than having any mappable explanatory power (like the examples I mentioned).

Surely, on the basis that 'language' is a necessary aspect of 'consciousness', — fresco

what do you mean by consciousness here? I don't think being aware, having subjective experiences, is dependent on language. I think even not particularly smart animals are conscious. But perhaps we are using terms with different meanings.

Just to clarify, in my OP, I meant language AND consciousness theories. They do not have to relate with each other, but they are examples of theories that are not amenable to verify or falsify.. there are hundreds of theories of how both a) language evolved AND b) how consciousness evolved. These theories for each of these phenomena are what are in question.

The OP puts 'language' and 'consciousness' in the same context. From the pov of the strong form of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (language determines thought) and from the pov that 'all reported experience involves verbalization' so it easy to see why 'theories' using one term or the other are considered to be interrelated irrespective of other concepts like 'awareness'. But given that 'theorizing' is essentially a linguistic activity transcendent of 'perception' per se we have either the problem of 'non anchored verbiage' (words about words) or we look for a reductionist approach to language/consciousness which can be evaluated in terms of its functionality, like other theories. Such an approach (Maturana) tends to deflate, all three concepts (language, consciousness, awareness) as anthropocentric culs-de-sac with respect the more general concept of 'cognition' (which Maturana equates to that interractive system we call 'the general life process').

Sorry I should change the wording of this whole thread.. It isn't that language and consciousness theories at odds, but WITHIN the context of their respective fields of EITHER studying language evolution OR consciousness, the theories WITHIN their OWN respective frameworks are talking past each other.. Thus consciousness theory 1 and consciousness theory 2 are talking past each other. Similarly, language evolution theory 1 and language theory 2 are talking past each other. The only reason I put the two in the same topic is that they are both examples of the same thing..theories within their respective fields that are not commensurable to other theories in the same field. It does not have to do with linguistics in relation to consciousness. They are meant to be taken as separate fields that have various theories that are not agreeing how to explain the phenomena (whether that be consciousness or language, respectively).

There are many theories of how language evolved in humans and how consciousness evolved, but none of them seem commensurate. These theories are self-encapsulating and often not ammenable to incorporate broader theories. — schopenhauer1

Some thoughts:

• People have always complained that psychology is not a real, hard science. That's changed a lot over the past few decades with the advent of cognitive science and technologies like PET scans and MRIs letting us look directly at the working of the brain, but it's not there yet.
• Everybody thinks they know what consciousness is. It's a very personal thing.
• Consciousness is also mixed up with religion, morality, philosophy, the supernatural, and other phenomena which are difficult to study in a rigorous manner.
• It's not unusual for scientists studying different aspects of the same phenomena to use different tools, terminology, and concepts. I think that's partly because of the way scientific evaluations tend to pull out little chunks of the universe in isolation from the rest. You end up with a lot of little snapshots until someone finally gets around to unifying the views into a comprehensive approach. It's probably also caused by historical coincidence and scientists not reading each other.

Language is a subterranean conspiracy we engage in together, or that engages us together, against such terms and theories as stated here. One way to make this as explicit as possible is to apply the method Socrates taught us, by refuting each other in the most honest and rigorous ways possible, until we recognize in each other the personal character to the dynamic changes to our convictions. That recognition does not come in pieces that somehow get put together later. It is always the totality of who we each are, and only grows in the completeness with which we only recognize ourselves in the dynamic we share in the changing of our convictions. We think we navigate the world by its fixed markers, but what rebels against this navigation is more real still if its community of rebels only know each other as opposed to each other as to such an idee fixe. And even though it seems we wrangle and never agree, if we are successful in breaking through the maze of fixed points we are rationally bound to convince ourselves is the ways of the world, then we can know each other more completely as opponents to that fixation than as partisans to it. Language, then, is not the terms and grammar of that dynamic of our convictions, but the recognition of ourselves in the changes to our convictions others help us with, even as we seem to wrangle with them. And consciousness is not a state of perception, but a dynamic to it that our more subterranean powers of recognition manages to jog those states away from a fixation on prior convictions and habits of thought and navigation.

How is one supposed to sort out what is the case? How does a wide-spanning theory like language evolution or consciousness ever get explained in a way that we have a theory of genetics, or the immune system response and other concrete areas of knowledge? Are these theories forever simply abstract exercises or will they ever coalesce into a unified theory? Is there even a way to do that? If so, would anyone be willing to give up their approaches for the others? — schopenhauer1

I'm contemplating the idea that scientific theories have, or ought to have, a left-hand side and a right-hand side, separated by an "=" sign.

On the left, we have the prediction or equation. On the right, we have the observation, experimental outcome, or data of whatever kind.

Empirical theories rely a lot on being able to correlate predictions with outcomes, either positively or negatively. The further you get from being able to do that, in principle, the further you are from an empirically-testable theory.

For that reason, a lot of these theories will never be practically verifiable. So I question whether they are really theories in any useful sense, so much as thought-experiments or speculative inventions. Or whether they will ever be usefully in scope for science at all. After all, to explain speech and reason is in some sense to explain what it is that does the explaining. There's a certain circularity in that.

the blind men and the elephant — schopenhauer1

It's worth recalling that this parable, which is found in Buddhist, Hindu, and Jain sources, presumably all have a figure who can, at least, 'see the elephant' (that being the Buddha or sage of the respective tradition.)

That's changed a lot over the past few decades with the advent of cognitive science and technologies like PET scans and MRIs letting us look directly at the working of the brain, — T Clark

Do you believe in God, or is that a software glitch?

It's not unusual for scientists studying different aspects of the same phenomena to use different tools, terminology, and concepts. I think that's partly because of the way scientific evaluations tend to pull out little chunks of the universe in isolation from the rest. You end up with a lot of little snapshots until someone finally gets around to unifying the views into a comprehensive approach. It's probably also caused by historical coincidence and scientists not reading each other. — T Clark

It would be very bizarre for something like Corbalis' theory of gestural speech/mirror neurons to conflate with Terrence Deacon's semiosis theory of the "symbolic species". They are just two very different takes on language formation. One is starting from anthropology/neurobiology and the other is starting from physics/anthropology/neurobiology/semiosis/entropy and more integrated approach. I can see how it may be combined, but do these approaches talk to each other and inform each other and recognize each other more than a passing reference perhaps in a paper or in conferences? Unlike philosophy proper, which is always handled theoretically more-or-less, these fields would purportedly want to actually provide THE explanation for a phenomena (knowing that it can be changed later of course through verification/falsification methods).

I'm sorry, but having trouble interpreting this. This is almost stream-of-consciousness.

For that reason, a lot of these theories will never be practically verifiable. So I question whether they are really theories in any useful sense, so much as thought-experiments or speculative inventions. Or whether they will ever be usefully in scope for science at all. After all, to explain speech and reason is in some sense to explain what it is that does the explaining. There's a certain circularity in that. — Wayfarer

Yes, I guess what I find annoying is that I invest a bit of stock in these theories, and they give a good "just so" understanding of the phenomena, but you know that there is no way that this is verifiable to the point where it would be accepted to say, "Deacon's empirically verified theory of language evolution". All of these ideas are like thought-experiments. They are abductive reasonings, giving us best explanations from the evidence. But if these theories do not start working together, they are not going to lead to anything other than thought-experiments. It is jarring how epistemologically different the takes are on phenomena like language evolution. I do get that this touches on so many fields with very different approaches and methodologies, but then how can the answer to this phenomenon be taken seriously when everyone isn't even in the same ballpark of epistemological explanations. The goal then would be to move the theories from abduction to a more inductive approach.

Do you believe in God, or is that a software glitch? — Wayfarer

That kind of article is just a reworking of the old mind/brain kerfuffle and we know how productive discussions about that usually are.

these fields would purportedly want to actually provide THE explanation for a phenomena — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure that is a realistic expectation. I have no faith in any kind of "theory of everything," even in such hard science disciplines as particle physics. Actually, I have my own theory of everything - have I told you about the Tao? Don't get me started.

Schop1,
Which just goes to show that too much "philosophy" poisons the mind. The only induction is the failure of rigorous deduction (entailed extension) to preserve its trajectory between antecedent and "conclusion". Language is the triumph of the qualifier over the quantifier. Since that triumph is the final term of the completest and most rigorous extension of entailment (which relies on the quantifier for "certainty") there simply can be no primitive or inchoate form. Every effort to subsume language under the rules of quantification results in unresolvable contrariety that cannot be grasped at all in received terms. There must be a break-out to a moment of recognition in which the contrary term is more operative than continuity between premise and extension. There is no locus to mind. Consciousness is not perception ("representation", as any fan of Schopenhauer must know), it is a constant jarring away from such representation. The brain, during a boring commute, might accept everything seen along the way a ho-hum and everyday, but the mind will frequently interrupt with sudden impressions of something out of place off in the periphery. The brain is then directed to the thing and, mostly, sees nothing it does not have an immediate correlate for. And yet, as the brain, in tow to the body, goes on its hum-drum way, the mind teases, as if to say: "Made you look!". In that difference you will find the necessary clue to understanding what consciousness really is. Brain science will not avail you. Mind is not outside the brain, but any decent neurologist will tell you it has no locus there.

It would be very bizarre for something like Corbalis' theory of gestural speech/mirror neurons to conflate with Terrence Deacon's semiosis theory of the "symbolic species". They are just two very different takes on language formation. One is starting from anthropology /neurobiology and the other is starting from physics/anthropology/neurobiology semiosis/entropy and more integrated approach. I can see how it may be combined, but do these approaches talk to each other and inform each other and recognize each other more than a passing reference perhaps in a paper or in conferences? — schopenhauer1

I am not at all familiar with the theories you reference, but it seems like you and I are talking about the same thing.

Unlike philosophy proper, which is always handled theoretically more-or-less, these fields would purportedly want to actually provide THE explanation for a phenomena (knowing that it can be changed later of course through verification/falsification methods). — schopenhauer1

I think that's probably not a realistic expectation, given the atomized nature of science and the idiosyncrasies of individual scientists.

I think that's probably not a realistic expectation, given the atomized nature of science and the idiosyncrasies of individual scientists. — T Clark

So these fields are essentially inert just so theories then and will remain so?

So these fields are essentially inert just so theories then and will remain so? — schopenhauer1

Let me revise a bit - I think that's probably not a realistic expectation the way things are now.

Are there really any theories of either how language or consciousness evolved? What they are, sure, but not how they evolved. Fact is, there are no "primitive" languages, nor any signs in the historical record that can give any evidence of such. Like stereo vision, it's not something that can exist in some incomplete form.
One of my favorite TV personalities, Bianca De Groat, does a little skit in which she teaches small children how to use a map. She wanders about the Bronx Zoo aimlessly for a bit, until she relents and asks the staff-member for a complementary map. She spends a few moments getting lost again, to give herself a reason to go over how to orient a map to landmarks. But then she shows her audience the rewards of proper usage of the map by standing, with her copy, in front of a sign of an enlargement of it. That sign has an arrow pointing to a spot on the map, with the caption "you are here", which Miss De Groat reads out loud. "I am here...., I'm Here!" But, sadly, and with regrets for deflating her charming enthusiasm, she's wrong. We do not come to be and know where we are by a map. A map only tells us how to not be there. If you've ever really been lost you may know what I mean. Only completely lost do we really experience where we are. And only when we realize how little the maps and other means of navigation, of not being here but on our way elsewhere, do we even begin to know where we are. And I my view, only when we are so much a part of a place that now one else can know it without knowing you are you really there at all. The navigational aids, at least in terms of our being there at all, are only availing as a foil to what can only be recognized in loss.
What all the theories have in common is precisely the, rather dishonest and even dogmatic, commitment to fail to see this. Perplexity is the essential character and termini of consciousness and language. All that we hope to guide us away from that truer experience of where we are only serves to underscore the moment of perplexity always more complete than any theory can be. Photons, it turns out, are chaotic and unresolvable communities of highly improbable events that, helpfully for us and conveniently for physicists, are comprised of roughly balancing contraries that can be added up into an arguably coherent trajectory as readily calculated, in most cases, as the motions of pool balls. But the hidden deception is that at the core of these calculations is a false presumption, the presumption that the incoherent chaotic value is so minuscule, and its balancing contrariety so much more complete, that it can simply be ignore. That is to say, dogmatic ignorance is at the heart of modern physics, and all related sciences. But the project fails if the contrariety at the heart of the equations of quantum matter is in fact a kind of rebellion against the supposed completeness of those calculations. Genetics is hardly the rigorously perfected system. It can only explain replication, it cannot explain differentiation. And if that differentiation occurs at a cellular level, if every cell division is dynamic to the organism as a whole (and surely there can be no credible thesis of a predetermining blueprint!) then a kind of contrariety between sister cells as contrary amongst them as to any mere replicated form, is what makes an organism an individual life. And if consciousness lives its life recurrently thrown back into the maelstrom of lost theories, and yet all our theories serve only as a foil to recognize ourselves and each other in that loss, then consciousness and language are perfectly explicable, as explicable, that is, as our hopeless and yet ceaseless effort to escape loss. But that effort always comes in to form of denying our humanity, when our humanity is precisely what we pretend we are trying to understand. And so, of course there are endlessly proliferating theories that perennially elude an coherent unification, even though unity is the mission of the founding dogma. The dogma, that is, that we will find our humanity in dehumanizing ourselves. Philosophy should be the art of being human, and yet gets dominated by dehumanization. There is a pernicious history in this.
I reluctantly assume that unexplained references are meant to intimidate. I must admit that I am easily intimidated. By little kids who seem to know everything Potter, by teens who can solve a Rubik's cube in seconds, by old ladies making lace at blinding speed. But practice brings such abilities, and yet etches the map into us, a kind of surreptitious dogma that resists inquiry and therapeutic perplexity.

To me, consciousness is simple. It's a complex form of auto responce. Language is the cause of our evolution to human language based consciousness. Try thinking without language. All you get is feelings and emotions, and it's hard to get there. Best way is learn meditation: the quiet mind. You can enter states of bliss, but the second you think in language, it's gone.

That's the consciousness of other animals: our subconscious.

Animals use sound to communicate, but for us each word is a concept and filled with information. We can even understand all the relationships in Mid Summer Night's Dream Animals can't do that. Why? We get told in language what's going on. How did our languages develop? Mainly because we have billions more neurons than other animals, have ability to make a variety of sounds with our vocal chords, and we have a far more developed frontal lobe.

I think it's development and the development and evolution of language went hand in hand.