We ought add Davidson's own semantic theory. It looks to me to be the best candidate for a prior interpretation. — Banno

As far as I can tell, Davidson wasn't very influential when it comes to developing pragmatics as a field, even though this article would have fit to some degree, so maybe I just never came across the name. (Wittgenstein was the only one I knew before studying linguistics.)

Is it worth setting it out here? — Banno

It'd definitely help me understand the article. I've done a little research on truth-conditional semantics, and the most glaring omission is that I can't seem to find out how it deals with word meaning, since truth claims seem to require sentences/clauses. I actually meant to ask, but I forgot.

It doesn't provide a theory of meaning so much as replace it with truth; after all, if you know when a statement is true, what more could you want?

Nothing. That's why it is the perfect reply. And in so doing, reinforces the point that language does not rely on rules. — Banno

I agree that language does not rely on rules, and there is a fairly simple argument for that. If it was, through and through, merely a matter of following rules, then you would need rules to tell you how to follow the rules, which would introduce an infinite regress. There has to a be a point where we "just get it" and understanding malapropisms exemplifies that.

I'm not seeing how your not understanding Srap's nonsense sentence (even though you said it was understood) supports the contention that language does not rely on rules, though.

This getting a little far afield, nevertheless...

You can also describe the regress as needing first to understand the language in which the rules are expressed, and needing before that..., etc.

For all that it's still clear to me that rules play an enormous role in language use, so we need a way around the regress.

The beginning of that is to note that the 1 or 2 year old learning 'apple' (or being taught it) is doing something noticeably different from the 13 or 14 year old learning 'momentum'.

(Recommended: "Some Reflections on Language Games" by Wilfrid Sellars.)

At any rate, Davidson does not make a regress argument against conventions or rules, so perhaps he too feels the regress can be gotten around.

At any rate, Davidson does not make a regress argument against conventions or rules, so perhaps he too feels the regress can be gotten around. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, well of course I am going to agree that the regress is gotten around; it must be. I also agree that rules (or at least conventions which can be explicated as rules) play an enormous part in language practices. But to me it seems obvious that getting around the regress problem involved with rules cannot simply involve the application of more rules.

Regarding the ability to understand some malapropisms; in such cases we know from experience which word or words usually fit where the malapropism has been substituted, and our general familiarity with the great range of conventional sentences allows us to understand what is being said despite the substitutions. Imagine an alternative situation where a blank is left instead of substituting a misappropriate word .

But to me it seems obvious that getting around the regress problem involved with rules cannot simply involve the application of more rules. — Janus

No, of course not.

PI §201

(Recommended: "Some Reflections on Language Games" by Wilfrid Sellars.) — Srap Tasmaner

Thanks, will take a look at it.

I am aware.

When you start out studying any of the humanities, one thing you learn pretty quickly, is none of the terms probably mean what you think they mean...

This is one of the problems with academia in general, I think. Davidson's notion of "first" being a prime example. The historical notion of "necessary" being another. Language use limits what can be said without sacrificing coherency/consistency...

Just drawing it into the discussion. There is a way of following a rule that is not given by stating the rule but seen in the implementation of the rule...

hats how I would answer @Janus

Interesting response from Ernest Lepore and Matthew Stone:

So, what, then, is our take-home lesson? It is that, as semanticists, we should reject Davidson’s explanations in “Nice Derangement.” There is no reason to believe in Davidson’s passing theories, i.e., in improvised meanings! — Convention before Communication

truth claims seem to require sentences/clauses — Dawnstorm

As regards Davidson's semantic theory, Wikipedia's article on "Truth-Conditional Semantics" describes meaning as the same as, or reducible to, its truth condition. But truth is a concept that only exists within language, from which it follows that "a proposition has meaning IFF a proposition is true", agreeing with Scott Soames that this has become circular.

Also, most readers of Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, for example, will not know the truth condition of most of the propositions in the book, and many of the propositions will be untrue anyway, and thereby, in Davidson's terms, find the novel meaningless. But this is to define "meaning" in a way totally contrary to conventional use.

Just drawing it into the discussion. There is a way of following a rule that is not given by stating the rule but seen in the implementation of the rule... — Banno

I'd say this kind of what you call rule following is simply imitation. Humans (and other animals) seem to have a powerful instinct to imitate others of their own kind. Perhaps this ties in with Chomsky's idea that we are "hard-wired" to learn language.

I'm not sure we ever squarely faced Davidson's central claim. Take Lepore and Stone's example:

That's a nice soup latrine.

I think everyone would agree

1. You said "latrine" when you meant to say "tureen".

Lepore and Stone describe the situation as

2. You mispronounced "tureen" as "latrine".

What's still not perfectly clear is whether

3. By "latrine" you meant "tureen"'.

That is, whether you were, consciously or not, assigning the meaning of the word "tureen" to the word "latrine".

And then, finally, there's the question of whether the interpreter must say

4. In this sentence the word "latrine" means "tureen".

Strangely my first thought was "soup kitchen". It's all a matter of associations I guess.

"Tureen" associates the idea of two kinds of vessel or container and it rhymes. "Kitchen" associates the ideas of production and disposal, eating and defecating.

How would we know which is right? This goes back to the alternative scenario I mentioned earlier, where instead of using a different word a blank is left.

I'd say this kind of what you call rule following is simply imitation — Janus

That doesn't harmonise with the context in PI.

There's a way of sidestepping the regress that is not dissimilar to a certain Nike slogan.

The "just doing it" is not in question, obviously; it's the explanation for that ability which is in question.

...the explanation for that ability... — Janus

What could that mean?

Well, the explanation for our ability to understand malapropisms that Davidson seems to be rejecting is that it could be merely a matter of following rules.

So this is taken to mean that learning language cannot be a matter of learning a comprehensive set of semantic rules. Instead then, I suggest learning language is a matter of imitation, for which we have a powerful natural bent.

It's by imitation that conventions become established, not by people consciously seeing them as sets of rules to be followed, but by people's natural tendency to imitate. This means language is an open-ended, often improvisational, practice, not a hidebound practice involving adherence to sets of rules.

...and how would imitation account for our capacity to understand malapropisms? What is it we could be imitating, given that the situation is novel?

As I already suggested, I think we understand malapropisms through association. Association is basically a form of imitation; where one idea resembles or mimics another in some way or other.

We also see people accidentally, and sometimes on purpose, using a wrong word, which is usually associated, in some more or less obscure way, with the word we would expect to be used in the context of the utterance. An example of is the so-called "Freudian Slip".

Probably that "slippage" starts as an accidental malpractice, which can then be deliberately imitated, or even seen as a kind of game.

There is much of play in language I would say.

It's by imitation that conventions become established, not by people consciously seeing them as sets of rules to be followed — Janus

Imitation alone clearly couldn't establish language. That doesn't even make sense.

Big part of learning it, sure.

Imitation alone clearly couldn't establish language. That doesn't even make sense.

Big part of learning it, sure. — Srap Tasmaner

Say someone uses a novel expression; it could become established as convention or not. If others don't imitate, then it won't become established, and if enough do imitate then it will.

I'm not claiming that imitation alone establishes language; obviously there must be something there to begin with; something to imitate.

I think you've missed the point. Imitation is yet more rules.

Imitation is yet more rules. — Banno

Imitating is just imitating. If no one is judging whether you've correctly copied or how good the copy is, I'm not sure what you're worried about.

How is imitation just more rules? Are you claiming that is so in animals too? If you call following instinct following a rule, then your usage of "rule" is so broad as to render the idea of a rule fairly useless, as far as I can see. As the old adage goes " if your only tool is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail".

So your imitation does not have to be correct in order to be understood?

Then it could be anything.

Imitation is as much a part of a language game as ostension.

Looks like a backward step - explaining games by more games, rules by more rules.

So your imitation does not have to be correct in order to be understood? — Banno

I don't know what you were talking about, but I was talking about just plain imitating, like the babbling of pre-linguistic children.