You have my apologies for having received so much help from you and for not returning it in equal measure; please understand that given my alternative commitments, I have a limited amount of time to dedicate to philosophy and have the need to focus almost all of it into my own work given its subject and scope. — TVCL

Not a worry! This was your thread, not mine. The intention was mostly to show you a different approach, and that I took the topic seriously. I had a lot of enjoyment going over your work, it was not time wasted.

What I might ask - if your still willing - is to double-check the "chapters" of my argument as and when I complete them with the understanding that this may be over a period of some time. How does that sound to you? — TVCL

Absolutely. I would like to see where you take this further. And good luck on your new career! I'm glad we were able to get this to a nice conclusion in time. I wish you well, and it will always be a pleasure to speak with you on these forums. If I am not around these forums at a later date, feel free to message me directly.

Here is the result of our discussion thus far: revised, re-formulated and condensed:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1aF6uYKp3-Q8ee3X-8QDuBg17cc1cuMi9hdvwUengjdY/edit?usp=sharing

*Try this link instead

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZLiQgp2pJTbxbvMXppGuwTF8ZrkUTPHmYD6EgmLPXLY/edit?usp=sharing

I can see it now! I won't be able to get to it tonight, but hopefully tomorrow.

A happy weekend! I can finally sit down and type this out.

First, I understand this is a draft, so won't be commenting on the order of things. Just on the ideas.

To sum up, I believe you've stated we have a search for a goal. Our beliefs regarding that goal must be applicable and consistent. Applicability means it must be able to be used in regards to one's goal. Consistency means it must not be a contradiction within one's set of beliefs, and in its application.

I think applicability and consistency works. I'm still a little hesitant on what a goal entails. Like this:

"Goals are hierarchical. Criteria of lesser goals are void if fulfilling them hinders the pursuit of goals that are designated with a higher status. As such, any sub-goal that does not include the adherence to consistency cannot be pursued whilst pursuing the search for knowledge."

I think you have a germ of an idea here, but I think it needs clarification.

Goals are the journey's start, and as such, they are not a criteria for evaluating knowledge itself. If a contradiction happens within your goals, you have to decide to throw something out. But there is nothing within the goals that you've put forward at this time that clarifies which contradictions we should throw out. So all that we are seemingly left with is our own personal belief system as to which goals are more important than others.

As an example, lets say that I have it as my primary goal to prove the Earth is flat. Lets say I encounter a contradiction to this by having a lesser goal of "Going into space". So I do, and it "appears" that the Earth is curved. So I just say, "This is a contradiction to my main goal, so I'm just going to invalidate this lesser goal." Maybe you say, "Well its obvious that space bends our viewpoint of the Earth the farther away from it we are," or even "Space must just be beyond our understanding," then you don't pursue that goal anymore because it contradicts your primary one.

If you are to claim a hierarchy on goals, I believe this must be fleshed out to avoid conclusions like above.

"Provisional knowledge". A good breakdown showing that knowledge is provisional. But I wouldn't classify a "provisional knowledge" and "final knowledge". The only thing we can conclude so far is that knowledge is provisional. Since "final knowledge" does not exist, there is no separation within knowledge. I think noting that knowledge is provisional is enough.

Just a little add, when comparing knowledge versus beliefs, you can note that beliefs are also provisional, but they lack the order and structure that reinforces knowledge.

Your unicorn argument is fantastic, nice job.

The unfalsifiability section just needs a second pass to clarify the idea you're positing. It seems like you're implying what is "unfalsifiable" is based on context. Like the unicorn, it is a belief that has been constructed with a context that we cannot apply. If we could somehow create a context in which it could be applied, it would no longer be falsifiable.

In the beginning, you note how you will explain how we can know definitions once the theory is explored. You don't follow up on this at the end.

My final thoughts are this is a nice start. The only thing which I think still needs some clarity is "What a goal is". If I did not have the knowledge of our past conversations, I'm sure I would not be able to understand exactly what a goal entails from reading this paper alone. But this is a good draft. Feel free to clarify or correct my assumptions here.

Hello my friend, good to hear from you.

Thank you for giving my work your time. I hope that your week went well and that you've had the chance to enjoy your weekend.

What I'd like to do is tweak the draft, highlighting my changes and then run it passed you and see if it corrects for your concerns.

First, I'd like to check whether I completely understand your criticisms.

To begin with, I'm not sure whether "goal" needs to be defined because I'm not attempting to use it in an especially philosophical way; I'm using the basic dictionary definition (the result or achievement toward which effort is directed; aim; end)...

Goals are the journey's start, and as such, they are not a criteria for evaluating knowledge itself. If a contradiction happens within your goals, you have to decide to throw something out. But there is nothing within the goals that you've put forward at this time that clarifies which contradictions we should throw out. — Philosophim

I'm not sure about this. Goals are the start of the journey and the end. A goal sets the initial context for the test of applicability, but the test of applicability only passes once a goal can be pursued. Therefore, because applicability is a test for knowledge, the given goal is also a test for knowledge (or a "criteria for evaluating knowledge itself.")

As for the rest of your point regarding goals, you're right - something is amiss and it does need expansion, especially in light of your flat earth example.

Okay, so here's the idea: the model applies on a meta-level in that it not only concerns intra-goal applicability (as has been shown) but in inter-goal applicability too. What I mean is that consistency and applicability do not only tell us what beliefs we can regard as knowledge but which goals we can or cannot have (after all, how do we know that we can pursue a given goal? Answer: in the same way that we know anything else...)

And so, let's say that you're mapping a hierarchy of goals. First of all, you already have the goal-map of pursuing knowledge and so, if my argument thus far holds you adhere to applicability and consistency as standards for regarding knowledge. Now, you believe that all kinds of things can be your priorities and all kinds of things can be regarded as secondary but the question is: how do you know?

The answer is: you throw out those goals that are contradictory and inapplicable with applicability being applied to the goal itself.

It's pretty simple if we look at the example: you find that going into space (proving curvature) voids the primary goal of proving that the earth is flat. Now, we can model this:

Goal
“To prove that the earth is flat"
Belief
“That Space travel can be a sub-goal of this"
Effect
“Space travel disproves that the earth is flat"
Outcome
“I cannot pursue space travel if I want to prove that the earth is flat (the two goals cannot be mutually pursued)"

[Verdict]
The belief that "I can have space travel as a sub-goal of proving that the earth is flat" is not knowledge.

By such means we can discover which goals can be pursued, can compliment each other and can be arranged hierarchically, and which ones cannot. The idea is that the criteria of applicability and consistency follow from the initial goal of searching for knowledge and that this acts as a keystone for everything else.

Now, let's look at this issue:

As an example, lets say that I have it as my primary goal to prove the Earth is flat. Lets say I encounter a contradiction to this by having a lesser goal of "Going into space". So I do, and it "appears" that the Earth is curved. So I just say, "This is a contradiction to my main goal, so I'm just going to invalidate this lesser goal." — Philosophim

Yes. You find that this is what you are forced to do by Truth/"Reality" if you are pursuing knowledge. This does not prove or disprove that the earth is flat (as of yet undecided by this argument), but reveals what you can or cannot do. If you cannot determine that the earth is flat by looking at it from space, perhaps you have to revaluate what you mean by "earth" or, hey, maybe you have a goal that cannot be pursued...

Okay, so the next point:

"Provisional knowledge". A good breakdown showing that knowledge is provisional. But I wouldn't classify a "provisional knowledge" and "final knowledge". — Philosophim

A little confused here. I never mention "final knowledge" in the draft and am not sure why it is a point of issue.

The unfalsifiability section just needs a second pass to clarify the idea you're positing. It seems like you're implying what is "unfalsifiable" is based on context. Like the unicorn, it is a belief that has been constructed with a context that we cannot apply. If we could somehow create a context in which it could be applied, it would no longer be falsifiable. — Philosophim

I was going to respond to this by saying "exactly" but I know that doesn't clarify much. As such, could you re-phrase or expand the issue with this section?

In the beginning, you note how you will explain how we can know definitions once the theory is explored. You don't follow up on this at the end. — Philosophim

Good point. Perhaps I'll do a "Definitions Part 1 & 2"

Finally,

I understand this is a draft, so won't be commenting on the order of things. — Philosophim

Out of interest (and if you have time) could you comment on the order of things? My aim is to make this as clear as possible and so your thoughts on structure could be useful.

Anyway, its great to be getting back into the swing of things. I don't want to start overplaying my thanks but understand that you have it in droves. I'll try to keep my responses regular but please understand that due to my current workload I must relegate philosophy to the weekends when I have the right amount of time and energy to dedicate to it.

Take care and I look forward to your reply.

Hello,

Couldn't we conclude that a useful true idea (based on one's logic and experience) is 'relative' to the person who was seeking it? I mean; it doesn't need to be so for all other humans.

In fact, I used noticing that while the ideas with which I have built my set of knowledge with time (for about 55 years) are real useful to me, most of them are not necessarily so to others.

By the way, in my philosophy, while there is an absolute set of truths that defines our universe and life, a human being needs to discover just a 'subset' of it to reach his 'relative perfect' knowledge; all ideas and answers that he really needs to know.

Kerim

I just came by to say I have not forgotten! I will have this answered at least by Sunday.

Ok! Finally got some time to sit down and really analyze this again.

So there are some really good things with goals. I think they are a great way to start a search for knowledge. I just don't think they are a necessary precursor to knowledge, or work as an end. Lets keep our space example. I have a goal to discover that the world was flat. I am told before I go into space that water will float out in the open if you release it from its container. I don't believe the astronaut, or have any care or goal to learn this.

Once I am in space, I grab my water container, squeeze the straw, and sure enough, water emerges and floats there in space. I never had a goal in the beginning or the end, and yet it appears I now have applied knowledge that water floats in open space.

Perhaps this is where my issue comes from. It seems like you want to propose goals are a necessary part of knowledge, when I think it is an optional part of knowledge. Again, I really like it as an explanation for why we start seeking knowledge, but much of our day to day applied knowledge is not anticipated or sought out.

As for inter-goal applicability, while your explanation is more fleshed out, I don't think it solves the main problem. So far, I can decide whatever goals I want. Which also means I can throw out whatever goals I find contradictory, so long as there is consistency in my set of information.

What this leaves us with is a web of beliefs that are are not contradictory if we throw out evidence we don't like that fits our end goal. This is what a conspiracy theory is. Flat Earthers throw out any evidence or come up with interpretations that allow them to hold to their beliefs despite mounds of contrary evidence.

Like the unicorn case, perhaps much of this, or even all of this, can be solved by clarifying the context and applicability of the belief and separating the beliefs from the goal. I just don't think a goal is a belief, and I think you are extending to goals aspects of beliefs, when a goal is more the start of seeking out and obtaining beliefs which we may then consistently apply as knowledge.

As for the structure, all it needs is another draft review. You can tell you're thinking as you type, and you repeat a few things unnecessarily. I do it too, so I recognize it. =) As for the order, I think its mostly the introduction of doubt and definitions when you imply in your introductory paragraph that you're going to start with consistency and applicability. Again, absolutely no judgement. The paper that I wrote is 20 pages, but when I first wrote it, it was over 100. Lastly, my mention of it being a draft was to show that I was not going to word pick, but that I was looking at its overall concepts. Which, is still pretty good!

Hi TVCL.I see you've tried to get to the bottom of this issue but I;m not sure it needs so many words. Logic cannot prove a truth about Reality, (as Aristotle points out) but it can find truths for us. I cannot see where 'usefulness' enters the picture. A thing is useful only if we use it, such that usefulness is not a property of information or things. A hammer is not useful if we only have a screw.

. . 25. Therefore, it is the goal of possessing an understanding of the truth that makes sense that justifies adherence to logic; it is the usefulness of logic for the end of achieving this goal that justifies adherence to it and makes it necessary in our search for truth.

I'd agree with this. For this reason metaphysics is a science of logic.

You make a good argument against paraconsistent logic, since we cannot understand the results it produces.

I cannot see where 'usefulness' enters the picture. A thing is useful only if we use it, such that usefulness is not a property of information or things. A hammer is not useful if we only have a screw. — FrancisRay

This at the fulcrum of the argument: we need logic to do all knowledge/truth seeking, but why would we use logic if it was not useful?

This is looking good. Not because we appear to be in 100% agreement, but because the issues appear to be thinning out and most of the core logic appears to be stable. Most of this appears to be an issue of semantics or clarity...

So there are some really good things with goals. I think they are a great way to start a search for knowledge. I just don't think they are a necessary precursor to knowledge, or work as an end. — Philosophim

To be clear (and perhaps what I should emphasise more) is that I agree; goals are not a necessary precursor to knowledge, but they are a necessary precursor to/component of the search for knowledge - the argument that I am trying to make is not concerned with how any or all knowledge comes to be known, only that knowledge which is sought. We can discuss that further if you like but the simple idea is that it seems to be the only type of knowledge worth discussing because we cannot create a model for finding knowledge which is not sought (how does one seek knowledge passively? Isn't that a contradiction?)

So far, I can decide whatever goals I want. Which also means I can throw out whatever goals I find contradictory, so long as there is consistency in my set of information. — Philosophim

You can throw out almost any goal that you want, but if you are searching for knowledge you cannot throw out the goal of being consistent. Beyond that we really are free to choose which goals we want, but not so free that this allows us to pursue any set of goals. This is what inter-goal applicability will determine.

What this leaves us with is a web of beliefs that are are not contradictory if we throw out evidence we don't like that fits our end goal. — Philosophim

Of course. People are allowed to lock themselves off from contradictory information. Would you and I do that? Probably not. Why not? Because hopefully we want to have the optimum match between our beliefs and reality that we can manage. One can close themselves off from contradictory information but they also cut themselves off from being in accordance with large swathes of reality - these potential consequences are the prerogative of each individual thinker.

If you think this allows anyone to claim that anything is knowledge, I will once again draw your attention to the question of the exact thing that is trying to be achieved...
In the Flat Earth example, is the person's goal:
a) To prove that the earth is flat?
b) To discover whether the earth is flat or not?
c) To simply believe that the earth is flat?

What the person actually knows about the shape of the earth will depend on which one of these they are trying to achieve. I might have rushed this retort and so if you'd like me to expand upon it, by all means let me know.

Finally - some useful remarks on the structuring. I will keep them in mind.

Thank you.

All the Best!

the argument that I am trying to make is not concerned with how any or all knowledge comes to be known, only that knowledge which is sought. — TVCL

Ok, I think this clears up a significant amount of confusion and reservations on my part. You are specifically removing any consideration of knowledge which is not specifically sought out. As for the why:

because we cannot create a model for finding knowledge which is not sought — TVCL

I had to read this a couple of times, and I want to make sure I understand what you're stating. If I understand correctly, you are stating knowledge is an active process. Because we have to consider things such as applicability and consistency, this requires our active faculties. This is versus taking beliefs without question or consideration.

Now while I think goals are a fantastic way of explaining why someone searches for knowledge, they can also be precursors to simply believing something without the need for knowledge. If my goal is to learn ethics for example, I could take a web of beliefs that construct an ethical morality that satisfies an emotional goal. If my goal is to believe in Santa Claus, it can drive me, but it doesn't necessarily drive me towards knowledge in Santa Claus. Same with the flat Earth examples.

I suppose what I'm trying to say is that goals are not necessary or exclusive to the application of knowledge. Goals are the necessary precursor to seeking something, but that something can be about seeking beliefs that satisfy one's own desires. We say what separates a belief from knowledge is its applicable consistency. But I could just as easily have an inapplicable inconsistent conclusion if my goal is to have a belief without using knowledge.

So to go back to your beginning, I do believe that the precursor to knowledge is having a goal, or something a person wants. In trying to obtain that goal, a person might (not necessarily) discover that their conclusions may clash with reality. In wanting to obtain goals that are more likely to reflect reality, a person seeks a way to obtain a goal in the most rational manner. The conclusion a person can gain from this is beliefs which are applicable and consistent are the most rational conclusions one can make if they wish their beliefs to not be contradicted by reality.

I think however once knowledge is discovered, it is something one decides to integrate into future goals, but it is not a goal itself. Often times in pursuing our goals we are shown that they are impossible to reach. Either that, or we learn something we never event considered, and it opens up new possibilities for us. While the goals may change, the ever present undertaking of the process of knowledge remains with us. Do we decide to continue to apply it in every case? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. And I think this is perhaps what you are trying to imply? The question perhaps here is what is the justification for deciding to use the process of knowledge in some cases versus not others.

This question is a version of the the problem of induction, which is not a simple problem to solve. I believe your answer is that it is up to every individual to use knowledge, or not. While this does simplify the issue, I believe it is a surrender that many people will pick up on. The question is begged, "Is there a rational way of deciding when we should use knowledge, and when we shouldn't?"

But I'll let you respond here to see if I'm on the mark, or still off a bit. Great reply, I think we're almost to the point we can start taking the theory into some common epistemological problems!

because we cannot create a model for finding knowledge which is not sought
— TVCL

I had to read this a couple of times, and I want to make sure I understand what you're stating. If I understand correctly, you are stating knowledge is an active process. Because we have to consider things such as applicability and consistency, this requires our active faculties. This is versus taking beliefs without question or consideration. — Philosophim

No, my apologies - I really could have phrased this line better. I was trying to make a clear point by stating a tautology. What I should have said was:

"We cannot create a model for seeking knowledge which is not sought."

Of course, the argument that I'm trying to make rests on the assumption that one is doing epistemology or at least trying to search for knowledge (or even search for truth). If no one is searching for knowledge, the whole discussion about how we know anything becomes void by default because even having the discussion necessarily entails that we are trying to search for knowledge (after all, we would be searching for knowledge about knowledge).

It's for this reason that I have designated the search for knowledge as the keystone or initial axiom for proto-epistemology. That might seem odd because of course it is not necessary that one would search, it is only contingent. However, it is necessary that there should be a search if we are to do any epistemology. And so, the Search is the starting point of all of epistemology - this is the point from which all else follows. I risk sounding like a broken record, but this is a point that can't be stressed enough. Hopefully, I have demonstrated this by now.

As for the rest of your comments, you're right on the money. You appear to have understood my argument well. Yes, goals are not a type of knowledge per-se, but they are always necessarily relevant to knowledge and knowledge is always judged in relation to them. However, goals are independent of knowledge in so far as one can choose or aim to pursue knowledge as a goal to a limited extent. However, reality is independent of both one's goals and one's knowledge and nothing in the argument suggests that the goals that one chooses allows them to dictate reality. At best, they can choose or limit which parts of reality they have access to.

I think however once knowledge is discovered, it is something one decides to integrate into future goals, but it is not a goal itself. Often times in pursuing our goals we are shown that they are impossible to reach. Either that, or we learn something we never event considered, and it opens up new possibilities for us. While the goals may change, the ever present undertaking of the process of knowledge remains with us. Do we decide to continue to apply it in every case? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. And I think this is perhaps what you are trying to imply? — Philosophim

Yes. If by "The Process of Knowledge" you mean the heuristic or argument that I have presented, this is well summarised.

Let's move onto the question you posed, then:

The question perhaps here is what is the justification for deciding to use the process of knowledge in some cases versus not others. — Philosophim

From everything that has been said, and if we are in agreement, it follows that the justification for deciding to use the "process of knowledge" would be to have one's knowledge in accordance with reality. But not only this, but to ensure that one's goals were also in accordance with reality to the best possible extent.

"We cannot create a model for seeking knowledge which is not sought." — TVCL

Yes, I think I understand this. Sounds good!

But not only this, but to ensure that one's goals were also in accordance with reality to the best possible extent. — TVCL

If goals are also subject to the analysis of application and consistency, then I don't think there is a problem.

I think this is a good theory to assist a person in the day to day use of knowledge, and works to avoid the minutiae that epistemological analysis can devolve to. Well done! I had thought to introduce a few epistemological puzzles in here, but I find they are unneeded. This theory is about effective practicality, not games or large societal constructs.

Did you wish to take this theory anywhere else? Were there more advanced concepts you were considering? A pleasure as always to read and discuss, this has certainly been a treat!

Fantastic.

And so, before we proceed it is worth double-checking to be sure whether you agree with the argument.

It's good to know that you have concluded that I have created a model that we have apparently ironed all of the kinks out of, but I would also like to stress that what I am trying to establish is not just one model to be chosen from many, but the truth. That is to say, I have argued that it is true that if we search for knowledge, all that I have argued about the necessity of consistency and applicability necessarily follows; it is true that these are the basics of our proto-epistemology - provided that we are searching for knowledge, we cannot have a proto-epistemology which removes any of these elements.

Do you agree with this?

what I am trying to establish is not just one model to be chosen from many, but the truth.
— TVCL

Do you agree with this? — TVCL

No, I don't agree it is the truth. What I can agree from your model, is that your model is something that can be known. It can be applied in this instance between the two of us, and it seems to have consistency. But will that be the case when another person is introduced? Will it be the case 5 years from now if humanity makes some new discovery about knowledge we had never considered?

The real question to be asked is, "Does the knowledge model apply to itself?" Because if it does, then we have created a model that, according to us, will give us a more rational method of claiming things that are not contradicted by reality. But we can never claim that such knowledge is "the truth" with certainty, but that is "the truth" with rationality.

Further, this is a model that represents concepts in a way that are usable and digestible to certain people. There will be some that this model is not enough, and for others, that this model is too much. There are almost certainly other ways of expressing the concepts detailed here in greater or lesser detail, with different words, different languages, and different outcomes. At the end of the day it is a tool that fits a certain person and size of problem. Is this tool effective at solving the problem for a good number of people? That is a question that can only be answered by putting it in the hands of several people, and seeing what they do.

There is my technical answer. =) For what its worth, I believe that any model that wants to have a hope of being epistemologically useful is going to have some expression of the elements of consistency, applicability, and context. And for what that is worth, I believe there is a truth to that.

It's good to know that you have concluded that I have created a model that we have apparently ironed all of the kinks out of — TVCL

Ha ha! I wish. =D Lets call it, "major deal breakers" instead of "kinks". I don't mean this negatively either. Creating an epistemology without any major deal breakers is huge! Something without major deal breakers is a base upon which you can start, and begin refinement. There is no tool, especially one as new as this, that will not still have a kink or two left. You'll run into people that will point them out. You'll probably find some yourself as you use it and refine it. That is not a knock against it, that is the natural course of all things that we use. There may be parts you throw away or tweak in the future, but I believe you have a solid base.

So, a fine job! Feel free to continue, I'm happy to see where you wish to take this from here!

That's pretty funny... my initial reaction was to be incensed by this, thinking "But if it's logical and all of the arguments follow necessarily from their axioms, it must be true! and so, what are you talking about?"

But then it occurred to me...

No, I don't agree it is the truth. What I can agree from your model, is that your model is something that can be known. — Philosophim

Which is all the the model is intendent to do. Indeed, that's all that it can do. To posit that it can be the truth at this juncture is absurd. As you say:

we can never claim that such knowledge is "the truth" with certainty, but that is "the truth" with rationality. — Philosophim

Moreover, I agree with you. The degree to which this model will be convincing to people will depend on a range of things, from semantics to levels of intelligence and even if it was understood perfectly by all, time alone might lead to a dilution of our understanding.

Now, for what it's worth, I do think that there is a thread within the model that makes it stable across time and context (which is related to logic), but we are far away from demonstrating that yet.

What's more, it appears that what I cannot and should never seek out is a perfect model of the truth. Instead, what I am aspiring to develop is the best model for proto-epistemology that can be managed. Even if "the best" never equates to "perfect".

And so, this a good place to be.

For the progression then...
I had previously envisioned that my entire argument would progress through 3 major parts:
1. The foundations (which we have now completed),
2. The direct implications, and
3. Advanced implications and eventual justification for Christianity.

If all has gone well and the model at least holds its own weight, perhaps now we can move onto some of the direct implications which open up the relevance of the argument.

So, I got to thinking about what problems the theory is trying to solve. You might not have known, but I released a book about a year ago when I was trying to tackle my philosophical problems:
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Practically-True-Tony-Lowe-ebook/dp/B07Y6GDJ16/ref=sr_1_2?dchild=1&keywords=practically+true&qid=1603622262&sr=8-2

(You don't need to read it)

I bring it up because there were a number of issues that I was attempting to break into with this book which the model that we have been discussing was eventually borne out of. However, having come so far with it I had almost forgotten what the problems were that I was trying to solve. Having reached this point it has come time to reconsider these problems. There are basically two key problems that the model that I am presenting is attempting to solve, and I will include a sketch of their solutions below:

Problem 1:
Epistemology is convoluted and long-winded from the outset. If one wanted to know how they search for knowledge, there is precious little that one can offer as an initial foundation.
A new student of philosophy might be presented with a number of epistemological theories and be encouraged to consider some of their problems, but will not be taught how to choose between these theories or how to recognise when a problem has or has not been solved. Indeed, to do so would require that the student knows something about knowledge; namely, how to tell a good theory of knowledge from a bad one. However, if epistemology is the study of knowledge itself, the questions becomes "how do I know how to know before I know how to know?"

Answer 1:
By making an appeal to the search for knowledge as a search we find that there are basic, proto-epistemological standards that must be adhered to from the outset, which provides a foundation for advanced epistemology to be built upon. Of course, adherence to logic/reason alone might provide the foundation for proto-epistemology, but logic/reason alone does not justify itself. For this to function as a foundation, a simultaneous appeal must be made to a general concern for goals and for the search for knowledge in particular.

Problem 2:
Epistemology is not "practical", at least not directly. It is divorced from questions of ethics; that is, there is a separation between it and questions of how we choose and live until some work is done to connect epistemology to the field of ethics. For this reason, one might conclude that there is a disconnect between questions of how we know what we know and why we do what we do.

Answer 2:
The model can be made to argue that there is an intimate connection between ethics and epistemology. One does not quite "lead" onto the other but the two are entwined from the outset. This follows directly from the state of our proto-epistemology.

And so, if you are still happy to proceed it seems that it could be useful for us to discuss whether the argument that I have made either does or is able to solve these two problems and to what extent. This allows us to work into the "direct implications" stage of the overall project. What do you think?

Ha ha! I'm glad you didn't take that the wrong way. Really, you've done a magnificent job with what you have.

Now, for what it's worth, I do think that there is a thread within the model that makes it stable across time and context (which is related to logic) — TVCL

I agree with you on a personal and intuitive level. You have a solid foundation which I feel is going to be very difficult for people to find a loose brick in.

Yes, I agree with problem 1. Epistemology is bogged down with a lack of clarity. I believe your proposal is a fantastic solution to problem 1.

Problem 2 is interesting. Back when I started epistemology, I actually began the investigation to know the idea of a God, and prove ethics. The problem was I couldn't prove any of those until I knew what knowledge was!

I believe I understand what you mean though. You are answering the problem, "Why should we seek knowledge?" Because you've realized we don't HAVE to seek knowledge. It is a choice. Please continue, I am interested to read where you want to take this!

Good, really good. This is a great place to be.

First of all, it's interesting that you say:

I agree with you on a personal and intuitive level. — Philosophim

Large chunks of what I'm doing have been a matter of allow leaps of intuition and then filling out the spaces in between and so it would be interesting see if you can unpack why your intuitions seem to agree with the idea that there is a common thread connected to logic...

Anyway, the main topic for discussion should be the second problem, then. It appears that you are satisfied that the argument can solve the first problem and re-stating why might be tantamount to beating a dead horse, whereas the second needs some further unpacking.

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Why should we search for knowledge and how is ethics connected to the model of proto-epistemology?

Given the model, we should search for knowledge if we want to be better equipped to pursue our goals.

The process of discerning knowledge requires us to discern what models of belief can or cannot be applied to reality. It follows that some models of belief will accord with reality and some will not. Some models of belief will allow us to proceed through reality towards our goals, some will not. Therefore, the very basic proto-epistemological process is a process of discovering what reality does or does not allow and, therefore, what we can or cannot do.

Now, we have established that the search for knowledge allows us to better pursue our goals; allowing us to find what does or does not allow us to achieve them. However, this does not yet tell us which goals we should or should not have to begin with. This is where an appeal to the inter-goal applicability comes in. Just as the model allows us to discover which means do or do not facilitate the attainment of particular goals, it allows us to discover which goals we can or cannot pursue as-such. After all, if one's belief that a given goal can be pursued cannot be put into action, that belief is not applicable and is therefore not knowledge. Therefore, if we are seeking knowledge the process of discovery will rule out those goals that cannot be pursued. Therefore, the process should whittle-down our goals to only those goals that can be pursued.

But the question remains: of those goals that we know can be pursued, how do we determine which ones should be pursued?

Consider this example:
A mafioso gangster has the goal of being corrupt and unlawful for the purpose of making money. He is able to purse both of these goals and so we find that both of the goals:
a) to make money; and
b) to break the law
are compatible. If knowledge is also of interest, the mafioso would conclude that these goals are not contradictory and are mutually-applicable. Therefore, his belief that he can pursue both counts as knowledge.

However, the mafioso also finds that there are times when he is prompted to be an honest man; perhaps before an ignorant wife, perhaps before the local priest, or perhaps before his innocent daughter when she asks him whether he is a murderous, unjust criminal. The mafioso knows that his honestly will cost him dearly in these relationships or in his work...

Therefore, the mafioso discovers that has can goals which are incompatible:
a) to make money whilst breaking the law,
b) to be an honest man; and
c) to maintain the respect of his family
are three goals that cannot be pursued together. They are mutually non-applicable and so the belief that all three can be pursued together is non-knowledge.

By such a process the mafioso can learn which goals or even set of goals he can or cannot pursue in life. Deciding between them would require a recourse to higher-priority goals. The mafioso cannot be honest and a criminal. Which is more important to him? His wealth and power or his relations?

Choosing between these options is a question of considering which avenue either closes or opens up a goal-set that allows one to pursue their higher-order goals...

Pursuing crime might allow the mafioso to pursue money, power and easy women but exclude his options for pursuing an honest life and genuine, loving relationships. As a more abstract example, we might posit that a man can choose a set of goals that will lead to ultimate misery and another that will have a higher chance of leading to fulfilment.

As of yet, this argument cannot determine whether a man should desire fulfilment over misery 0 perhaps a man is a masochist. What it can do is give us a should based on a contingency... if the man wants, say, fulfilment the search for knowledge will determine that he should adopt particular sets of goals at the exclusion of others.

One more thing...
As was mentioned initially, it follows directly from the logic of the model that it maximises our ability to interact with reality; or, you could say "to navigate reality", or you could say "to make the best decisions within it" in light of our goals and motivations.

It therefore appears that there are two initial axioms that entail the search for knowledge and, therefore, the model:

If one wants to search for knowledge, the model is entailed and one is better equipped to make decisions.

Likewise,

If one wants to make the best decisions, the search for knowledge is entailed, as is - by extension - the model.

A good weekend to you again! I'll jump right in.

Just as the model allows us to discover which means do or do not facilitate the attainment of particular goals, it allows us to discover which goals we can or cannot pursue as-such. After all, if one's belief that a given goal can be pursued cannot be put into action, that belief is not applicable and is therefore not knowledge. Therefore, if we are seeking knowledge the process of discovery will rule out those goals that cannot be pursued. — TVCL

I just want to clarify a breakdown here. This is where I see an issue with goals being blended with beliefs. A goal does not start out with any idea that the goal can, or cannot be obtained. As we obtain beliefs that are attempts to reach the goal, there may be several failures along the way. But those failures do not indicate that the goal should not be pursued anymore. Look at the many failures of epistemology. Does that mean we should abandon the goal of trying to figure out knowledge? I think not. =)

A goal isn't really a belief. Its an objective someone wants to reach. As you've stated, its the first step toward pursuing knowledge, but it is not knowledge itself. We can believe we can reach that goal, or believe that we will fail in our obtainment of that goal. Knowledge applies to the beliefs that we farm in pursuit of that goal, but I hesitate to claim that knowledge of the beliefs along the way should determine what goals a person pursues.

Why we pursue goals is a weight of personal interest, societal benefit, and energy and time investment needed in its pursuit. Thomas Edison had a goal of creating a cheap and easily manufactured light bulb. He went through 3,000 theories over the course of two years at making such a light bulb before he succeeded. If he hadn't succeeded after 3,000, should he have tried another 3 thousand? At what point of trying to obtain the knowledge he desired should he have quit?

In your mafioso example, I don't feel we're addressing knowledge, or what we should do. We're just addressing that certain goals have conflicts. If my goal is to go left and right at the same time, we find a contradiction of definitions, and therefore a contradiction of goals. This is different from exploring beliefs, and then finding that there is a contradiction in one's beliefs about reality using applicability and consistency.

So I think not pursuing conflicting goals is a given. But that doesn't answer the question of when we should start or stop pursuing goals that are not in conflict with our other goals, but over time and effort have never yielded results.

Given the model, we should search for knowledge if we want to be better equipped to pursue our goals. — TVCL

As such, I think an adjusted sentence would be, "Given the model, we should search for knowledge if we want to better equipped to obtain our goals". We can pursue our goals in many ways. Knowledge lets us know when we have obtained that goal. But does it necessarily show us that we cannot obtain that goal? I think that is the overall issue.

A good weekend to you too.

Interesting criticisms... On the one hand, I think that I agree that I might be blending goals too closely with knowledge, but on the other I disagree with some of the claims that you've made...

Let's start with:

A goal isn't really a belief. Its an objective someone wants to reach. — Philosophim

Are you sure? Let's think about that. Now, I agree with you that knowledge as-such is not a goal, but what of the idea of positing a goal to be pursued if one does not believe that the goal can be attained? We can either say that a goal is a belief or at least based upon a belief: the implicit belief that the goal can be pursued. Now, like any belief, the goal is a working hypothesis - one knows that they can pursue a goal in so far as it is non-contradictory and in so far as the can, in fact, pursue it.

You've stated that

A goal does not start out with any idea that the goal can, or cannot be obtained. — Philosophim

But what if one knew - using the model - that a given goal could not be pursued? Can a goal start out with the belief that it cannot be pursued? Now, admittedly, one might know that a goal cannot be pursued and still persist in pursing it, but we would simply conclude that, despite being better equipped to navigate reality, such a person would have failed to use this equipment.

This is why the model is important. A goal is not the same as a belief, but goals are based upon beliefs and because beliefs are tested by the model, the belief that a given goal can or cannot/should or should not be pursed are tested in the same basic way.

The mafioso example was used to show that conflicting sets of models cannot be pursued. If the mafioso had pursued knowledge as-such prior to the mere pursuit of power, he might have recognised this and prioritised one path over the other. The question of which he would choose is a question of core motivations, but if he was - at his core - motivated by fulfilment instead of masochism he should have chosen the honest path and application of the model reveals this.

Admittedly, at this point the argument only goes as far as to argue that the model can reveal what sets of goals one should have in reference to their hierarchy of goals or even their primary goals. However, it does not yet give an argument for which primary goal we should have as opposed to another. The only thing that is worth adding to this is that the model will reveal that not all primary goals are possible because some simply cannot be pursued.

And so, I stand by my previous conclusions...

If one is looking to better their decisions the search for knowledge is entailed because this reveals the means to attain goals, including knowledge of which goals can be hierarchically arranged; and

If one is looking to find knowledge, this will make one better equipped to pursue their goals.

Of course, you may still be unconvinced by this and if so I would like to hear your thoughts.

All the best

But what if one knew - using the model - that a given goal could not be pursued? — TVCL

Are you sure? Let's think about that. Now, I agree with you that knowledge as-such is not a goal, but what of the idea of positing a goal to be pursued if one does not believe that the goal can be attained? We can either say that a goal is a belief or at least based upon a belief: the implicit belief that the goal can be pursued. Now, like any belief, the goal is a working hypothesis - one knows that they can pursue a goal in so far as it is non-contradictory and in so far as the can, in fact, pursue it. — TVCL

Sure, let me break it down the way I see it as I've interpreted your stance so far, and see what you think.

Goals are the precursor to the search for knowledge. If goals are beliefs, then they are not the precursor to the search for knowledge anymore. The evaluating of beliefs to be applicable and consistent is knowledge. That would mean you would have to apply the method of knowledge to the goal itself, as its technically a belief.

But let me clarify what I mean by belief as well. A belief is an assertion that reality is a particular way. While in English we might say, "I believe I can reach my goal, we can also say, I don't believe I can reach my goal. The belief is not in the goal, but whether one can obtain, or not obtain one's goal. The outcome is what we can know, the motivation to seek that outcome is the goal.

Another way to see it is the goal itself is not true or false. What one discovers on the way to obtaining that goal is true or false. What we can determine from pursuing goals is that particular outcomes are false. So let us say my goal was to walk 1,000 miles in a day. I attempt it, and fail. I know that on that day, with what I prepared and did, I did not meet my goal that day. But what if I try something else? Maybe train for a month, or drink water more frequently then I did last time. The result is true or false based on all the circumstances one made in pursuit of the goal on that particular attempt. It does not mean that if you try another way, you will not meet the goal.

Thus I can look at some goals and evaluate certain attempts that have been made to determine if my pursuit of a goal in a particular manner will result in a success or failure. Take epistemology. We know that certain ways of trying to define knowledge fail. Part of evaluating epistemology is trying to examine why it failed, and then not repeating the same mistakes. But that doesn't mean that the goal of figuring out knowledge cannot be obtained if we don't try another way that has not yet been tested.

Admittedly, at this point the argument only goes as far as to argue that the model can reveal what sets of goals one should have in reference to their hierarchy of goals or even their primary goals. — TVCL

I understood that. I just don't think that is anything that people don't already understand. Evaluating what you want, and making sure that you don't want things that are at odds with each other is a given for most people. Your model has a specific purpose, and I think it does it very well. Its purpose is to answer the question, "Why use knowledge? And in evaluating this, we find knowledge is a rational methodology that will help us obtain our goals better than the alternative, irrationality.

it does not yet give an argument for which primary goal we should have as opposed to another. The only thing that is worth adding to this is that the model will reveal that not all primary goals are possible because some simply cannot be pursued. — TVCL

Yes, it is a very tricky thing to figure out what goals we must pursue over others. But perhaps this can start with the explanation that demonstrates certain goals cannot be pursued. Recall my examples of people pursuing goals that have failed time and time again. While I think we can both claim we can determine that an attempt at a goal can be knowledge of success or failure, at what point do we rule the goal out entirely as something someone should pursue? Is this even possible?

All the best returned as well. I feel this is an interesting exploration, and one I am not sure I have the answer to.

But let me clarify what I mean by belief as well. A belief is an assertion that reality is a particular way. While in English we might say, "I believe I can reach my goal, we can also say, I don't believe I can reach my goal. The belief is not in the goal, but whether one can obtain, or not obtain one's goal. The outcome is what we can know, the motivation to seek that outcome is the goal. — Philosophim

Right, that's cleared things up and okay - I think I now agree that the argument has over-reached itself.

A belief can be about a goal, which is why the inter-goal applicability part applies because our beliefs about which goals can be compatible can be right or wrong, but this is not the same as saying that a belief is a goal. And yes, you have the model correct.

What we can determine from pursuing goals is that particular outcomes are false. So let us say my goal was to walk 1,000 miles in a day. I attempt it, and fail. I know that on that day, with what I prepared and did, I did not meet my goal that day. But what if I try something else? Maybe train for a month, or drink water more frequently then I did last time. The result is true or false based on all the circumstances one made in pursuit of the goal on that particular attempt. It does not mean that if you try another way, you will not meet the goal. — Philosophim

Agreed.

Okay, so let me back-track and try to explain where I am coming from with this approach and what my intuition is saying...

The model that I've presented appears to have a direct connection to ethics because a concern for what we are tying to do in the world or for what decisions we are trying to make is woven directly into the logic of the model. Use of the model or the process of searching for knowledge reveals which sets of goals can be pursued and which cannot. The model does not dictate which courses of action we must take, but application of the model reveals what courses of action/decisions reality does or does not allow.

In so far as this becomes prescriptive, it becomes prescriptive based on a contingency; If you seek to achieve this or that end, either the end cannot be attained at all or you should choose particular sub-goals or particular courses of action in order to attain it. Now, of course, it is not as if that will all be revealed from the outset and it might not be the case that one knows a particular goal can be pursued until they try to pursue it. In any case, this is inter-woven with the search for knowledge because it is the process of searching which reveals these things for us; which reveals knowledge about our goals.

And so, this appears to be as far as the model goes: it cannot tell us what we should do as-such, but can reveal what we should or should not do given particular core motivations.

That is, with one exception: of course, the model entails or necessarily assumes the search for knowledge itself. It would therefore follow that we should make certain decisions if the search is to take place at all (such as the decision to maintain the search).

And, as has already been mentioned, the goal of knowing what decisions or courses of action reality does or does not allow also entails the search for knowledge.

What are your thoughts on all of this?

The model that I've presented appears to have a direct connection to ethics because a concern for what we are tying to do in the world or for what decisions we are trying to make is woven directly into the logic of the model. — TVCL

I think a short and loose definition of ethics could help here. Ethics in general is the question of, "What actions should I do" for the best outcome. If we have concluded that the knowledge is the best means of making decisions that do not contradict with reality, seeking knowledge when pursuing one's goals seems like a better choice then not. So in one sense, we can say that seeking knowledge is the most ethical manner of pursuing one's goals. I might be reaching here, but its what I've got. =)

Use of the model or the process of searching for knowledge reveals which sets of goals can be pursued and which cannot. — TVCL

Here again, and I think you're in agreement on this, the knowledge we discover can't (yet) reveal to us which goals we should pursue. It only reveals which beliefs and results we can or cannot use in pursuing our goal. Perhaps knowledge can reveal when a goal should not be pursued anymore. But when I think of the Thomas Edison example, I find it hard to conclude if there is anything in the knowledge gained that can give a concrete solution.

And perhaps this is because a goal is not a belief. It is a motivation. We can examine why a person would be motivated to obtain a goal, and conclude that there is a certain amount of effort a person is willing to put forward to obtain that goal. Once the effort exceeds what the person is willing to put into the search, they likely stop. The problem with this is I'm not sure that's knowledge, just an examination of why a person pursues, or does not pursue a goal. That seems like it would be different for each individual.

And that leads to the big question again, "What goals should a person pursue in life?" That sounds like an entirely different topic from knowledge. Perhaps you can marry the two together, but like you mentioned, it seems this is as far as the model will take us. And that's not anything to be disappointed by either! I think you still have a fantastic model of knowledge that can be explained and used by the layman! Perhaps you'll come up with a new model of ethics. But before then, did you have other places you wanted to take the model? Again, the conversation has been great, so lead it wherever you wish.

Hmm... this is complicated (which is unsurprising)... but this is good because it's giving me an idea of just what the model can or cannot do.

A few thoughts come to mind when reading this which I would like to note down quickly...

1.

If we have concluded that the knowledge is the best means of making decisions that do not contradict with reality, seeking knowledge when pursuing one's goals seems like a better choice then not. — Philosophim

But a decision that "contradicts reality" simply cannot be made. That's what the model reveals: that some courses of action are not allowed by reality. More specifically, some sets of actions or goals are not permitted by reality.

It's as if reality says: "If you want to become a mafia boss you can commit crime. Indeed, you should commit it if that is necessarily entailed by the definition of you goal." However,

"If you want to be a mafia boss you cannot be an honest man at the same time."

Of course, the issue is kind of like us going up to reality and asking "But what should I want!?" and reality throws up its hands.

2.

And that leads to the big question again, "What goals should a person pursue in life?" That sounds like an entirely different topic from knowledge. — Philosophim

Not if the question is "How do I know what goals a person should pursue?" ...

3.

And perhaps this is because a goal is not a belief. It is a motivation. — Philosophim

I'm still not sure about this...
The model does not equate goals with beliefs. Instead, it recognises that goals contain implicit beliefs. The goal "To pursue X" is not a belief. But without the belief that "X can be pursued" why would one have the goal? Come to think of it, perhaps this is where the model is becoming too loose because its an added assumption, not a necessary conclusion. The assumption is that someone would not pursue a given goal unless they believed that the goal could at least be pursued, if not attained. My intuitions are hammering me with this, but this cannot be proven. Then again, I wonder: how could someone possibly pursue a goal if the don't believe that it can be pursued? Not if they don't know that it can be simply don't believe that it can...?

4. "Ethics" could be the wrong term, but the fact that the model is practical seems to be important.

It may well be the case that we have exhausted this topic already and need to move on, but I'd like to mull it over first before hand and make sure we're clear about what we can solidly build. And so, if you have any thoughts, comments or retorts for these thoughts in the mean time it would be great to hear them.

This connection between logic and use can be summarised as follows: — TVCL

Truth and use?! The only sense I can make of this is that truths are useful. By the way, lies/falsehoods are useful too, even more so on some occasions. So, that's that.

we judge truth by its “usefulness” or regard use as the “measure” of truth because we judge truth by the extent to which our understanding satisfies the parameters of our enquiry — TVCL

As I said, lies can be useful, sometimes more so. What impact does this have on your thesis that the measure of truth is how useful it is? Doesn't it mean, in some sense, at some level, that truths are, it feels weird to say this, lies. Maybe I'm missing something. Care to share?

If logic is the sole measure of truth, it begs the questions because logic alone cannot justify why it should be adhered to. — TVCL

This has been one of my deepest worries, not that I'm a somebody in the field. However, if you ask me, what I'd like to do is to point you in the direction the word "self-justifying" and whatever it means, assumes, entails, etc. I know it looks like the case of the clueless priest who pronounces to his congregation, " the Bible is true because the Bible says so" but whatever the truth is, logic, unlike other systems of thinking, e.g. faith, is, in a very moving and inspiring way, self-judging in the sense it's aware of its own limitations which is more than I can say of other options, the one I'm familiar with being faith.

Therefore, both logic and a regard for use are necessary standards for seeking an understanding of the truth that makes sense. — TVCL

I feel like agreeing despite my views on the critical points of your argument. :smile: Good day. Thanks.

The argument has undergone much development since the OP and some of the structure, including some of the definitions, have changed. I would like to engage but if you want to proceed constructively I suggest that you read this brief/draft of the argument which was linked to above.

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZLiQgp2pJTbxbvMXppGuwTF8ZrkUTPHmYD6EgmLPXLY/edit?usp=sharing

It is then perhaps worth reading through the discussion between myself and @Philosophim that comes after the link

Pardon the interruption. Please continue your conversation, I'm sure you guys have made good progress on that front. Good day!