Indeed. I propose that malapropisms are the random mutations of human languages. DNA too is a language, though a chemical one, and what I find interesting is how replication error (mutations) can be a strength in that they introduce novelty.Creating new theories...
Novelty.
That's what's left sorely unaccounted for. The attribution of meaning to that which is not already meaningful. — creativesoul
What's the intended force of this though? — Srap Tasmaner
Are you distinguishing reference from something we do with language that is not a fantasy? — Srap Tasmaner
If you aren't, why should we care? — Srap Tasmaner
language, art, and money — bongo fury
You called reference a fantasy; — Srap Tasmaner
but of course it turns out this is a picturesque way of describing anything abstract — Srap Tasmaner
Clarification, please — bongo fury
The only time you find my thinking incomprehensible is when I apply YOUR theory to other uses of language, like plagiarism. If integrating your theory with other uses of language makes it incomprehensible then that means your theory is incomprehensible.I again find your thinking incomprehensible. — Banno
Creating new theories...
Novelty.
That's what's left sorely unaccounted for. The attribution of meaning to that which is not already meaningful. — creativesoul
But there are still causes that result in mutations and malapropisms. They aren't random. They only appear that way because of our ignorance. If they were ultimately random, then there would be no way for someone to understand what was meant.Indeed. I propose that malapropisms are the random mutations of human languages. DNA too is a language, though a chemical one, and what I find interesting is how replication error (mutations) can be a strength in that they introduce novelty. — Olivier5
But there are still causes that result in mutations and malapropisms. They aren't random. They only appear that way because of our ignorance. — Harry Hindu
Why are you pestering this thread — Srap Tasmaner
It is easy enough to explain this feat on the hearer’s part: the hearer realizes that the ‘standard’ interpretation cannot be the intended interpretation; through ignorance, inadvertence, or design the speaker has used a word similar in sound to the word that would have ‘correctly’ expressed his meaning. The absurdity or inappropriateness of what the speaker would have meant had his words been taken in the ‘standard’ way alerts the hearer to trickery or error; the similarity in sound tips him off to the right interpretation. Of course there are many other ways the hearer might catch on; similarity of sound is not essential to the malaprop. Nor for that matter does the general case require that the speaker use a real word: most of ‘The Jabberwock’ is intelligible on first hearing. — p. 252
It seems unimportant, so far as understanding is concerned, who makes a mistake, or whether there is one. — ibid.
I think a discussion of conscious vs sub-conscious processing would be too far from the topic of this thread. — Isaac
But if you don't notice and still land on the intended interpretation? Then the utterance has just been handled by System 1 for you and doesn't bother to tell you it corrected an error in the utterance. Who solved the problem then — Srap Tasmaner
The interpretation is the result of someone or something solving the problem presented by the defective utterance, but it will be captured by Davidson simply as an interpretation, slotted into a bit of model theory in the usual way with no trace of its historical psychological origins. That procedure might be fine for aggregating language use within a population, but then attributing this "passing theory" to a member of that population isn't self-justifying. — Srap Tasmaner
The interesting thing to me, is that by virtue of creating his solution(prior and passing theories) he's actually doing what's necessary for successfully interpreting malapropisms but his accounting practice cannot take account of what he, himself has just done. — creativesoul
Aren't we saying much the same thing? — creativesoul
earlier you expressed a resistance to such a framework — creativesoul
I'm uncomfortable with this whole approach to semantics... — Srap Tasmaner
To say that an "error" occurred, or that some information replication system got something "wrong", is saying that this system had intent to do it one way and it worked out a different way. Does DNA possess intent?Is this a relevant consideration though? Does the source of the error matter? And if yes, 1) why does it matter; and 2) what evidence do you have that this is indeed always the case?
My point is: any code replicated long enough WILL at some point get wrongly copied, whatever the cause of the error. In practice, there is no such thing as a perfect information replication system that can always get it right. — Olivier5
You'd have to ask him. But it certainly looks like DNA is getting copied a lot.To say that an error occurred, or that some information replication system got something wrong, is saying that this system had intent to do it one way and it worked out a different way. Does DNA possess intent? — Harry Hindu
It leaves no psychology at all, that's for sure, which is the point. — Srap Tasmaner
I think a discussion of conscious vs sub-conscious processing would be too far from the topic of this thread. — Isaac
Davidson's approach? — creativesoul
Davidson in skirting around the psychological issues. But he doesn't talk about Dalmatians either; is that a criticism? — Banno
(I recently watched a lecture by Richard Thaler and he quoted some economist from the turn of the previous century warning that economists who try to ignore psychology end up inventing their own, badly.) — Srap Tasmaner
Davidson's approach?
— creativesoul
And related. Basically all the approaches inspired by Carnap and Tarski.
I don't know if there is any experimental evidence at all for the whole model theoretic approach to the semantics of natural languages. There is considerable experimental evidence for lots of stuff in linguistics, but not so much this, so far as I can tell.
For an example of something right next door with experimental support, there's Eleanor Rosch's prototype theory. That's not the same kind of semantics, but does actually tell you something about the semantic connections between words as people actually use them, or at least tries to. — Srap Tasmaner
I'm still sniffing around the landscape of semantics a little to see who's actually doing research.
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