There are chicken and egg aspects to this, and both likely came into being together and influenced each other. — Coben

Agreed; no one should doubt the reality of an ontological domain. That which is susceptible to doubt, is apodeitic certain knowledge with respect to its content, which necessarily includes the fundamental nature of its constituent objects. You know....their fundamental ontological predicates.
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I don't see how you can decide how you can have knowledge of things, if you have no idea what things are. — Coben

This is correct, which simply means I do have ideas about what things are, because to say I don’t know something about things is self-contradictory. I do not make the mistake of granting objects the ability to tell me what they are, but rather, I tell them what they are, henceforth depending on future experience to show me otherwise.

Indeed, nothing has yet possessed a more naive power of persuasion than the error concerning being, as it has been formulated by the Eleatics, for example. After all, every word and every sentence we say speak in its favor. Even the opponents of the Eleatics still succumbed to the seduction of their concept of being: Democritus, among others, when he invented his atom. “Reason” in language — oh, what an old deceptive female she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.
— Twilight of the Idols

(emphasis is mine) — 180 Proof

Happy Birthday, F.N. :fire:

Agreed; no one should doubt the reality of an ontological domain. That which is susceptible to doubt, is apodeitic certain knowledge with respect to its content, which necessarily includes the fundamental nature of its constituent objects. You know....their fundamental ontological predicates. — Mww

I am not sure where 'apodeitic certain' is coming from. I know some people believe in that kind of knowledge and some regarding ontological issues. Which one could argue is a bit like what you say here.

This is correct, which simply means I do have ideas about what things are, because to say I don’t know something about things is self-contradictory. I do not make the mistake of granting objects the ability to tell me what they are, but rather, I tell them what they are, henceforth depending on future experience to show me otherwise. — Mww

My sense is that both what your ideas are and what scientists ideas are
are not irrelevent, even the ontological ones, just that they are open to revision. You frame yours as not granting the objects the ability to tell you what they are, but that you tell them what they are. Presumably not assuming that you can tell them anything at all and be satisfied yourself, even with how this fits what has happened in the past and now.

I suppose the thing I am saying is that the fact that you have this model is based on ontological ideas - which are presumably open to revision - about what your nature is and what the nature of external reality is. So you have a current ontological position and this influences your epistemology or the act of telling things what they are. It is just not apodeitic certain.

To me things that are not apodeitic certain can be relevent.

things that are not apodeitic certain can be relevent. — Coben

Absolutely; was never contested.

I am not sure where 'apodeitic certain' is coming from. — Coben

The proposition containing an apodeictic certainty merely expresses the impossibility of its negation, or, to a lesser degree, its negation ends in a contradiction. Mathematical expressions are the more ubiquitous of such expressions, all of which are entirely predicated on the the principles of universality and necessity but nevertheless are dependent on experience for their proofs. The pertinence of the concept of such certainty relative to this particular dialectic, shows itself in the mode of their proofs, insofar as, in the case of knowledge of the fundamental nature of objects, because it relies exclusively on the experience of them, cannot adhere to the principles of universality and necessity.

But we’re circling the proverbial drain here, methinks. Which is fine.....no harm, no foul.

Absolutely; was never contested. — Mww

Great, it had seemed part of a line going back to you saying ontology is irrelevant.
Perhaps we could go back to the beginning of my responses to you.

So....no, ontology is irrelevant; that a thing has an actual nature is given, even without the possibility of ever knowing the irrefutable truth of what it is. Granting the validity of an ontological domain does not at the same time grant apodeitic knowledge of it, and the human cognitive system in fact prohibits it.
(Prohibits iff the human system is representational, which would seem to be the case) — Mww

How is ontology irrelevant? To what is it irrelevant? Is it due to not producing irrefutable truths? If so why does it seem useful to have ontological assertions in science? Perhaps useful and irrelevant are not overlapping? It might only require, for me, a rephrasing of the above paragraph.

So....no, ontology is irrelevant (...).....
— Mww
How is ontology irrelevant? — Coben

Because at least one, and perhaps the most comprehensive, established definition of it, which is a study of the nature of being. I personally see no reason to study something, that is: indulge in a concerted effort to acquire knowledge of, the result of which makes no difference to me. Somehow, I just can’t get excited about studying the fundamental nature of a basketball. And studying the fundamental nature of elementary particles may very well lead to a better toaster oven, but the particle remains as it ever was.
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It might only require, for me, a rephrasing of the above paragraph. — Coben

The key is contained in it: that a thing has a nature is given, it is given because it exists, it exists because it is represented in me as a phenomenon. Which would be the case no matter the fundamental nature of its being, the stipulation obvious that beings of different nature merely manifest as different phenomena. Simply put, I have no need of the true nature of “canine” to cognize “wolf”, because it is I that determines both, those concepts, and which objects may eventually be subsumed under them.

The argument in conjunction with that, eventually ends with....it is the phenomenon to which a concerted effort to acquire knowledge belongs. My one and only concerted effort is to understand the relation between the object I perceive and the phenomenon I experience, which is called knowledge, an altogether epistemological domain. The object itself, remains nothing more than an occassion for the exercise of my understanding, with respect to the reality of which such object is a member. This, and only this, enables me to characterize, e.g., certain animals as “canine”, and from that cognize particular instances of general characterizations, as “wolf”.

“....the proud name of ontology must give way to a the modest title of analytic of the understanding...”
(CPR, A247/B303)

Now, the whole theory is shot to hell if the notion of phenomena as representation is rejected. Which is fine, reject away, but in doing so, one must take great care with its replacement.

Because at least one, and perhaps the most comprehensive, established definition of it, which is a study of the nature of being. I personally see no reason to study something, that is: indulge in a concerted effort to acquire knowledge of, the result of which makes no difference to me. Somehow, I just can’t get excited about studying the fundamental nature of a basketball. And studying the fundamental nature of elementary particles may very well lead to a better toaster oven, but the particle remains as it ever was. — Mww

So then perhaps irrelevant to you, but not to physicists and basketball coaches. Or those deeply interested in those subjects.

The key is contained in it: that a thing has a nature is given, it is given because it exists, it exists because it is represented in me as a phenomenon. Which would be the case no matter the fundamental nature of its being, the stipulation obvious that beings of different nature merely manifest as different phenomena. Simply put, I have no need of the true nature of “canine” to cognize “wolf”, because it is I that determines both, those concepts, and which objects may eventually be subsumed under them. — Mww

Sure, but you likely take an ontological stance on 'things that happen in dreams' that is different from some people in other cultures and even some in your culture. And then you may also take ontological stands on universals or certain reified (in some people's opinions) abstractions. And others might find ontological models important in a number of fields. Even most philosophical topics will be affected by the ontologies of the discussion partners.

And then some people do need to think in terms of groupings of species/breeds.

Ontology is the study of various ideas about the nature of reality. — Coben

So what would be a good initial idea about the nature of reality, and what form of study would be entailed by it?

Ontology is extremely important. The entire world, for humans, can be divided into three simple categories: opportunities, threats, and neither. Whatever we treat as belonging to any of these classes must be real or else they're inconsequential and not worth our time or energy. :chin: