The thing is that I don’t do this willingly; rather, it’s the only thing that I can do as far as I can tell. That’s because likely the only mind of which I am directly aware is my own. The existence of all other minds, including yours, is only my hypothesis. — Tristan L
Do Alice and Bob have the "same idea" when looking at this object. — RussellA
It seems that linguistic meaning is ultimately indeterminate for several reasons, including the problem of definition, the Russell paradox about sets not being members of themselves and Gödel's incompleteness theorems.
Perhaps, as it is therefore beyond the ability of current language to fully explain the reality of the world we live in, then another movement with the same goals as the Logical Positivists of the 1920's and 30's would be beneficial, ie, to create a new language whose meaning was determinate. — RussellA
As an aside, I intuitively believe that we live in a deterministic world, even allowing for apparent free-will, chaotic systems (still deterministic yet making predictions difficult) and quantum indeterminacy (not ruling out the possibility of a deeper determinism underneath quantum mechanics). — RussellA
Let's suppose you're right, and there are Properties and concrete particulars are instances of them. — Srap Tasmaner
When I ask you to hand me that instance of Wrenchhood, am I asking you to hand me Wrenchhod? No. Am I "talking about" Wrenchhood? I am using the concept of Wrenchhood, and relying on you to understand it, but talking about Wrenchhood is when you analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions of being an instance of Wrenchhood. (Or whatever you like there.) Asking for 'that wrench there' is not that. — Srap Tasmaner
When we talk, hypothetically, about an instance of a concept that has no instances, what is the thing we are talking about? There is no such thing, so we are talking about nothing. — Srap Tasmaner
But you would have it that if there are no instances of Wubblehood, then when we talk about wubbles we're actually talking about Wubblehood. But the absence of wubbles doesn't change talk about wubbles into talk about Wubblehood the concept. — Srap Tasmaner
This argument for Platonism, from vacuous predicates and vacuous singular terms, is widely accepted, I'll grant you, but not by anyone who has learned the difference between use and mention. — Srap Tasmaner
If you learn anything at all this can only mean you are not alone. You cannot change your mind about what words mean alone, — Gary M Washburn
Anyway, how can you use a word which refers to something which isn’t there? — Tristan L
It is always neither what blueness is nor not so. — Gary M Washburn
No one thinks that just because you can say "the third ream of paper" that there were three. — Srap Tasmaner
Or, let's say, considering the purpose of this thread: I don't think that, and you have given me no reason to do so. — Srap Tasmaner
Wouldn't any attempt to create a language with determinate meaning just produce another indeterminate language — Metaphysician Undercover
So I assume that this ideal, deterministic world, which you believe yourself to be in, despite all the evidence otherwise, would support this ideal, deterministic language which you believe in — Metaphysician Undercover
? — Tristan L
In answer to the question, "can a deterministic world support a deterministic language ?", I don't believe so, as it seems that linguistic meaning is always indeterminate. The problem remains that language is part of the mind, and the mind is part of the world, not separate to it. Ultimately, bearing in mind Russell's paradox about sets being members of themselves, something can never know itself, meaning that language can never be determinate — RussellA
In Plato's terms, language may be included with justice, truth, equality, beauty as being derived by reasoning from the Form of the Good, where the Good is a perfect, eternal and changeless Form, existing outside space and time and superior to every material instantiation of it. The perfect Form - a deterministic language - may be strived for, but never achieved. This raises a problem with Plato's Theory of Forms in that if the Form is outside of time and space and superior to every material instantiation of it, how can Plato argue for the existence of something that he has already argued is beyond his ability to discover. — RussellA
Isn't at least part of the world indeterminate? — Metaphysician Undercover
Socrates and Plato were more like skeptics — Metaphysician Undercover
logic is not grounded in spatial-temporal existence — Metaphysician Undercover
I should have distinguished between the two types of indeterminism, semantic indeterminism (SI) and metaphysical indeterminism (MI). — RussellA
The more pertinent indeterminism — Gary M Washburn
"same" is ambiguous in meaning. IE, is "same" meant as a type (the same type of idea) or a token (the same instance of an idea). — RussellA
Many, including myself, believe that indeterminism is nothing but a semantic problem about the meanings of words. However, others believe, such as Professor David Taylor, that if indeterminism is semantic then one falls into an infinite regress, meaning that SI requires MI, in that there is something indeterminate about the world itself. — RussellA
However, metaphysical determinism and semantic indeterminism are linked by the arrow of time, in that one can have both metaphysical determinism, a cause necessarily determines an effect, and semantic indeterminism, given an effect the cause cannot necessarily be determined. — RussellA
From my reading, although Plato was interested in logic, and did discuss sentence analysis, truth and fallacies, logical puzzles in Euthydemus and the difference between valid and invalid arguments, logic as a fully systemized discipline only began with Aristotle. Plato approached the World of Forms not through logic but through intuition, where knowledge of the Forms cannot be gained through sensory experience but through the mind. Forms transcend time and space, timeless and unchanging. Plato was a Dualist, where the soul before being localised by the body was directly connected to the World of Forms. After the soul had been confined by the body, it retained a dim recollection of the Forms. IE, for Plato, the mind approaches the World of Forms not through logic but through a dim memory of them. — RussellA
not if it allows Platonism — Srap Tasmaner
Isn't semantic indeterminism dependent on free will? — Metaphysician Undercover
If it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, doesn't this mean that there is no cause? — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle actually defines "soul", as "the primary actuality of a body having life potentially in it" — Metaphysician Undercover
The Shape of Contrariety — Tristan L
IE, a metaphysically deterministic humanoid without free will can be programmed to avoid any logical problem of semantic indeterminism. — RussellA
Our system of knowledge is based on axioms. Axiom One could be that we live in a deterministic world where all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes. Axiom Two could be that we live in an indeterministic world where no event is certain and the entire outcome of anything is probabilistic. Being axioms, no relationship between an earlier event and a later event needs to be logically proved.
IE, the fact that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be proved, does not exclude axiom one, ie, that there are causes. — RussellA
The Shape of Contrariety — Tristan L
Whah??? Whatever you mean by this shape, the point is, if there is no there there there is no shape to it. Plato was not a Pythagorean, and Socrates violated the most sacred secret tenet of that cult, in Meno. So why impute geometry to him? — Gary M Washburn
The issue is that what causes language to be semantically indeterminate is that the creators of language have freewill — Metaphysician Undercover
If it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, doesn't this mean that there is no cause? — Metaphysician Undercover
deterministic machines without human free will cannot cope with semantic indeterminism. — RussellA
Language (syntax and semantics) as a human creation is inherently indeterminate, in that it is not possible to create a determinate language, as illustrated by Gödel's incompleteness theorems in mathematics and Bertrand Russell's failed project of Logism which attempted to create an analytic framework for language.
IE, any language is indeterminate, regardless of whether its creators have free will or not. — RussellA
IE, for someone who believes in axiom one (defined as a statement so evident or well-established that it is assumed to be true ), it follows that they accept that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, meaning that the fact that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated does not affect their belief in a cause. — RussellA
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.