any belief is justified (including contrary ones) until there is support to the contrary, i.e. reason to rule that belief out — Pfhorrest
if A = B and C, and you can show that B and C are contrary to each other, you can rule out A. — Pfhorrest
We needn't worry about deductive arguments as they're foolproof justifications in that if the argument is sound it's impossible that the conclusion is false. There is no room for error with deductive arguments is what I mean. — TheMadFool
As I said in my first comment, this is of no use with knowledge claims because we have no means of distinguishing premises from conclusions. We cannot say that our belief in A is justified by the deductive argument 'If B then A, B therefore A' because our belief that B might be what is at fault, or our belief that 'if B then A'.
The whole approach rests on the flawed assumption that we build up our beliefs one block at a time from some first principle like an inverted pyramid. There's scant evidence that we actually do this and abundant evidence that we don't — Isaac
My response to this problem is similar to that of Robert Nozick: I say that knowledge is believing something because it is true, such that not only does one believe it, and it is true, but if it weren't true one wouldn't believe it. — Pfhorrest
My response to this problem is similar to that of Robert Nozick: I say that knowledge is believing something because it is true, such that not only does one believe it, and it is true, but if it weren't true one wouldn't believe it. — Pfhorrest
Edmund Gettier has since proposed that even justified true belief is not enough to constitute knowledge, to the extent that reasons to believe something can sometimes be imperfect, can suggest beliefs that nevertheless turn out to be false, yet we nevertheless want to say that someone can still be justified in believing something for such reasons. — Pfhorrest
It remains the case that you are either mistaken about A or mistaken about the relationship between B and C, or mistaken about the relationship A = B and C (or you're mistaken about logic itself). — Isaac
The whole approach rests on the flawed assumption that we build up our beliefs one block at a time from some first principle like an inverted pyramid. — Isaac
Who, in your opinion, has the last word to approve it is true or not and/or it is useful or not? — KerimF
Are we talking about my own personal belief or something that is believed by everyone because all humans by necessity believe or perhaps because science believes ? — magritte
we must always be open to the fact that we do not have the entire picture. — Philosophim
This requires knowledge of whether or not the thing is true — Kenosha Kid
Knowledge is merely justified belief, where justification itself implies a reason to think it is true; — Pfhorrest
any belief is justified (including contrary ones) until there is support to the contrary — Pfhorrest
Sure, but you’re still mistaken about at least one of those things, so you know it can’t be the case that all of them are true at once, and the range of possibilities is thus narrowed. — Pfhorrest
You get that opposing that assumption (or rather, the assumption that that is the correct way to form beliefs) is what critical rationalism (as opposed to traditional justificationist rationalism) is all about, no? — Pfhorrest
reason to rule that belief out — Pfhorrest
Ok, I just wanted to make sure this was what you really believed, as on its face, it seemed contradictory. — Philosophim
No. You always were mistaken about one if these things, they merely exhaust the set. If you've narrowed it, what was the possibility you've eliminated? — Isaac
No, I don't get it. — Isaac
You’ve narrowed the possibilities you’re aware of being possible by realizing that certain combinations of things are not possible. They were always not possible, sure, but we’re talking about your awareness of the possibilities. — Pfhorrest
See the above analogy to justification of actions, I think that will clear it up. — Pfhorrest
I think maybe this is the point of confusion. I’m not talking about transforming beliefs into anything else, but just when a belief is or isn’t justified, or warranted. — Pfhorrest
It acquires this status 'justified' simply by virtue of there being another belief which references it. — Isaac
Take my example of believing there are unicorns in my back garden. That's just a belief. Then I also believe there's no good reason not to believe there's unicorns in my back garden. My — Isaac
This thread is about my account of in which circumstances someone does actually know something, whether or not they or we can know for sure that they know it. — Pfhorrest
If you believe unicorns are in your back yard and would continue believing that despite evidence to the contrary, but as it so happens there are unicorns in your back yard, you didn’t really know that. — Pfhorrest
If you would be responsive to evidence to the contrary, and there just isn’t evidence to the contrary because your belief is correct, then you know something. — Pfhorrest
No more so than traditional JTB. Really the whole “truth” component of both traditional and my modified JTB is a historical vestige that’s rather redundant. Knowledge is merely justified belief, where justification itself implies a reason to think it is true; we only bother saying “justified TRUE belief” because before the justification criterion was added, the standard was simply “true belief”. It would have been better if the “true” had simply been replaced by “justified”. — Pfhorrest
Why not? — Isaac
Who on earth believes something despite also believing there's evidence to the contrary (sufficient to counter that belief)? — Isaac
determined to be true e.g. by observation, deduction, etc. — Kenosha Kid
Once again we need to distinguish between believing there is good evidence to the contrary and there actually being good evidence to the contrary. If we don’t, then we have to concede that every belief anyone ever has is equally justified, i.e. there is no such thing as epistemic error, because as you say, everyone THINKS they have good reason to believe as they do, but often they don’t. — Pfhorrest
I say that knowledge is believing something because it is true, such that not only does one believe it, and it is true, but if it weren't true one wouldn't believe it. — Pfhorrest
Namely, rather than the usual justificationist sense of rationalism, whereby no belief is justified until it can be supported from the ground up somehow, instead any belief is justified (including contrary ones) until there is support to the contrary, i.e. reason to rule that belief out -- an epistemological position called critical rationalism, supported by philosophers like Kant and Popper. — Pfhorrest
I'm not sure what you mean here. Deduction is, to my reckoning, the relationship between premises and conclusion such that the latter follows from/is a consequence of the former. It differs from consistency in that two propositions maybe consistent but don't constitute a deductive argument. — TheMadFool
We needn't worry about deductive arguments as they're foolproof justifications — TheMadFool
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