I've tried really hard to be a nominalist for a long time. What I've found is that, if you're too quick to reach for Occam's Razor, you slit your own throat.

Off the top of my head, I don't have a general argument for metaphysical realism. I rather make the observation that, if you look at any attempt to flesh out nominalism, you find that the nominalist ends up appealing to some abstraction or another. To me, this seems futile, because as soon as you exorcise one abstract "phantom," you end up inviting another into your system.

For example, a short dialog, between a nominalist named N and a realist name R:

N: Universals are merely names that we have for particular things. There is no entity that can be instantiated over and over again.
R: Are names real?
N: Yes, but they exist only in our minds.
R: Whose mind: yours or mine?
N: Both.
R: So a name can be realized, or instantiated, or however you want to put it,in multiple minds?
N: Yes.
R: So how are names different from universals?
N: Well, it just means that we react in the same way when we see two objects, so both objects fall into the same category.
R: So what's similar about our reaction in both cases? Are there not, then, "reaction universals?"
N: Perhaps they're just similar reactions.
R: What makes them similar?
N: There are aspects of each reaction that are the same.
R: Are the aspects universals, then?

That's the problem, really. I think that the reason for there being so many different kinds of nominalism is that nominalists tie themselves up in knots trying to reduce the non-concrete to the concrete without invoking the non-concrete, and failing, and then trying something else. If the problem keeps resurfacing like that, then you should probably take that as a hint that your approach isn't working.

Of course, realism has its own problems. But they seem more like "interesting questions" than things that undermine realism itself.

I've tried really hard to be a nominalist for a long time. What I've found is that, if you're too quick to reach for Occam's Razor, you slit your own throat. — Pneumenon

Haha, I like that. Ockham's Razor is one of the foundational aspects of nominalism, but is also heavily criticized.

That's the problem, really. I think that the reason for there being so many different kinds of nominalism is that nominalists tie themselves up in knots trying to reduce the non-concrete to the concrete without invoking the non-concrete, and failing, and then trying something else. If the problem keeps resurfacing like that, then you should probably take that as a hint that your approach isn't working. — Pneumenon

This, along with your example, I disagree with (tentatively at least). The Realist is demanding something to be explained that cannot be explained because it is not even anything at all; it's unscientific and an appeal to "common sense", which I don't find to be very convincing. I don't see why these "universals" can't be seen as a type of meme within language.

R: So what's similar about our reaction in both cases? Are there not, then, "reaction universals?"
N: Perhaps they're just similar reactions.
R: What makes them similar?
N: There are aspects of each reaction that are the same.
R: Are the aspects universals, then? — Pneumenon

I think the best answer to this from a nominalist perspective is Trope Theory. Each of these properties are similar, but none are identical. They are unique.

Argh, this is a very frustratingly confusing topic. I think the best way of explaining what I'm getting caught up with the most is that, perhaps, the Realist is correct because properties are like the "life" of an object. I think actually a better question instead of asking what makes things similar is what makes things different. The nominalist would answer that what differs is the material structure of the particular, like the atomic structure, or the string/quantum foam/etc structure. But this begs to question as to why these different structures give rise to different properties.

However, it could be said that properties are just subjective experiences, right? "Redness" doesn't actually exist, it's just a photon with a wavelength of 620-750 nm that is interpreted by our brains. Which actually leads to the problem of qualia, not universals.

Furthermore, I don't understand how Realism avoids infinite regress (Third Man argument). If a is F, then a exemplifies F-ness. But F-ness also must be explained, by Super-F-Ness, etc. If universals are immune to infinite regress, why aren't particulars?

Additionally, I fail to understand how we can come to understand such things as "abstract" objects. To be perfectly honest they simply come across as spooky, superstitious ghosts.

Would it be incorrect to understand universals as "POTENTIALS OF EVERYTHING THAT IS POSSIBLE"?

N: Universals are merely names that we have for particular things. There is no entity that can be instantiated over and over again.
R: Are names real?
N: Yes, but they exist only in our minds.
R: Whose mind: yours or mine?
N: Both.
R: So a name can be realized, or instantiated, or however you want to put it,in multiple minds?
N: Yes.
R: So how are names different from universals?
N: Well, it just means that we react in the same way when we see two objects, so both objects fall into the same category. — Pneumenon

The problem is starting with the idea there are any universals exist in the first place. What is generally referred to a "universal" is, in fact, does not exist at all. It is actually a logical expression rather than state of existence. So in the relevant sense, names do not exist. They are anti-real. The same goes for any logical expression of a state of existence, whether it be a rock, person, social practice or government. Any universal, logically necessary truth, does not exist.

In your example, N has already ruined the argument by their first statement. Universals are not the names we have for particular things. Our name for something is our action. It exists. Someone might name you "Pneumenon." I might name you "Judith Butler." Each instance of naming is an existing state of someone doing something. Neither of these existing states, by their definition, are universal. One name is used in one instance, a different name is used in the other.

I'm sorry, but if you want to be butthurt about Judith Butler, can you do so in a PM or something? I'm trying to have a conversation here.

Argh, this is a very frustratingly confusing topic. I think the best way of explaining what I'm getting caught up with the most is that, perhaps, the Realist is correct because properties are like the "life" of an object. I think actually a better question instead of asking what makes things similar is what makes things different. The nominalist would answer that what differs is the material structure of the particular, like the atomic structure, or the string/quantum foam/etc structure. But this begs to question as to why these different structures give rise to different properties. — darthbarracuda

Whichever question is better, there's nothing to stop me from asking, "What makes them the same?" And so I will: why are two tropes similar? If A and B are resembling tropes, but C is not a resembling trope to either, then why is that?

And what's a structure? Because if two objects can have the "same" structure, then you're appealing to universals again. Ditto for the "brain-interpretation" counter, which seems to be positively full of holes. Is the brain doing the same interpretation over and over? And even if red is "just" an experience, is it the same experience over and over?

That's the problem with the nominalist response that appeals to "brains" or "minds" in order to try and get away from realism. All such responses operate on an implicit dualism that assumes that, if something is "in the mind," then it's safely cordoned off from the rest of the world. If abstractions can exist in my mind, but not in the rest of the world, then you need a good reason why they can only live in my mind. I don't think that minds are particularly unique "metaphysical ecosystems," if you get my drift.

Same for "names." Let's say that every name is an action rather than a universal. So what? The question then arises: if I say "Bob" twice, then in what sense did I say the same thing twice?

That's the central problem: if nominalism were true, then I'd expect my experience of things to be a completely chaotic flux of absolute randomness with no identifiable patterns whatsoever, because as soon as identifiable patterns crop up, universals have already snuck back in. But experience is not a chaotic flux of absolute randomness.

Nominalists aren't stupid. They've come up with countless clever answers to how things are the way they are without universals. But all of those clever answers seem to be susceptible to different forms of the same problem. Perhaps the problem is universal. ;)

Your penultimate paragraph, by the way, beautifully summarizes the motive behind nominalism:

Additionally, I fail to understand how we can come to understand such things as "abstract" objects. To be perfectly honest they simply come across as spooky, superstitious ghosts. — darthbarracuda

The main counter to this is that, if abstractions are spooky, superstitious ghosts, then the nominalist is just as haunted as the realist; every time the nominalist banishes a ghost out the front door, another one slips in the back.

Moreover, what isn't a spooky, superstitious ghost? In recent times, you see, we have learned that the ordinary, solid matter that we see around us is made up, at the smallest scales, of really weird stuff that isn't anything like our commonsense notion of matter. And yet, the nominalist wants to appeal to that commonsense notion in order to get rid of universals.

I'll address the third man argument, as well as your last paragraph, later, because they're both almost worthy of threads in themselves.

I mentioned because it is directly related to this topic. Holding that universals exist is the error you were making in that conversation. Care to comment on my actual argument about universals?

Care to comment on my actual argument about universals? — TheWillowOfDarkness

Well, here we go:

So in the relevant sense, names do not exist. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Our name for something is our action. It exists. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Um...

Anyway, let's say that I say "Bob" twice. In what sense were both actions "the same?"

A Metaphysical Realist holds that not only do concrete particulars exist, but so do abstract, multiply exemplifiable entities, known as universals. For the particular, an apple, to be red, it must exemplify the universal "redness". For a triangle to be triangular, it must exemplify the universal "triangularity". The universal is the predicate, and the particular is the subject. — darthbarracuda

This is Platonic argument. It has everything backwards.

The existing triangle cannot exemplify universal "triangularity" because it is merely one finite state of a triangle. It is not an instance of "triangularity" which exists everywhere and anywhere. There is nothing "universal" about it it.

To account for the triangular nature of the existing triangle, we need to think in the reverse of the Platonic argument. Rather thinking in terms of the universal nature which "allows" this triangle to exist, we must first start with the existence of the triangle, as that is what we are talking about. When we examine this state of existence, we find it is a particular shape, at a certain point at space and time. We note the existing triangle has its own particular logical expression. It means something particular. A meaning which is sometimes also expressed by other states of existence (other existing triangles have a similar meaning: they are "triangular" ).

Rather than an existing states "exemplifying" the universal, it is universals such as "triangularity" or "redness" exemplify particular states of existence. If we think about a "triangularity" or "redness," our thoughts are of a logical expression which exemplifies some states of existence. Some existing things are triangles or red, like the logical expression we are thinking of in this instance.

I am pretty sure that abstract objects (such as natural numbers) and many other kinds of abstract universals are real. But to say they are real, isn't the same as to say they exist, insofar as they don't 'exist' in the sense of being concrete particulars.

For instance, that cup exists, this keyboard exists, the computer in front of me exists. When we speak of abstract objects, such as number, we are not speaking of something that exists, but something that pertains to the operations of thought itself.

A rational and language-using being has to employ that ability even to speak. We inherently grasp the nature of numbers, labels, names, and many other things, like ratios, and so on, because they are innate to the process of thought itself. And, lo and behold, we also find that numerical reasoning seems innate to the processes of nature, meaning that numerical reasoning allows rational beings to discover hitherto unknown things about the order of nature.

So do universals exist? I say they are real, but not existent; they pertain to the nature of reality and of thought, but are not concrete particulars and so don't exist in the same way that concrete particulars exist.

Whichever question is better, there's nothing to stop me from asking, "What makes them the same?" And so I will: why are two tropes similar? If A and B are resembling tropes, but C is not a resembling trope to either, then why is that? — Pneumenon

I'm not sure, actually. The book I'm reading by Loux is actually quite confusing in this regard.

And what's a structure? Because if two objects can have the "same" structure, then you're appealing to universals again. Ditto for the "brain-interpretation" counter, which seems to be positively full of holes. Is the brain doing the same interpretation over and over? And even if red is "just" an experience, is it the same experience over and over? — Pneumenon

But doesn't this lead to the positing of some mystical "connection" between the brain and the realm of the universals? How do we, as concrete particulars, come to know about universals?

That's the central problem: if nominalism were true, then I'd expect my experience of things to be a completely chaotic flux of absolute randomness with no identifiable patterns whatsoever, because as soon as identifiable patterns crop up, universals have already snuck back in. But experience is not a chaotic flux of absolute randomness. — Pneumenon

Gotcha, makes sense. Like Dennett's idea of the Cartesian theater. If dualism is not correct, then thoughts exist, which means these abstractions exist.

Same for "names." Let's say that every name is an action rather than a universal. So what? The question then arises: if I say "Bob" twice, then in what sense did I say the same thing twice? — Pneumenon

This goes into the difference between types and tokens, I believe. Tokens are different auditory and visual representations of a name.

Which actually just makes names seem like universals. huh

I'll address the third man argument, as well as your last paragraph, later, because they're both almost worthy of threads in themselves. — Pneumenon

Cool, thanks.

Both actions are the same in that they are an existing state of some kind. Each is the presence of you calling someone Bob. Without them, there would be no existence of you naming the person(s?) Bob.

Each is, however, different in logical expression. The two instances of naming do not mean the same thing. You said them at different times. You might even be referring to different people.

Most importantly though, the logical expression of "Bob" of either act is not the state of existence of naming someone "Bob." The meaning of "Bob" doesn't exist. It is not your action to call someone "Bob." The meaning of "Bob" is always the same, regardless of what exists. If someone means "Bob," then it is necessary they mean "Bob." This is always true, no matter if anyone exists naming someone "Bob."

You are equivocating these two. In your arguments, you are treating the necessity of the meaning of any language as the existence of that language. This is a twofold error. Firstly, it results in a situation where people cannot be wrong about someone's name. If I named you "Bob," you would have to mean "Bob" under your argument, as it is treating the existence of name to be equivalent to the meaning of the named thing. There is no capacity to be (ethically) wrong in using a particular language game. I couldn't be mistaken in suggesting you mean "Bob."

Secondly, it results in equivocation of the existence of the name with the existence of other things. Since the existence of a name is considered the same as a thing's meaning, it quickly results in the equivocation of one named thing for another. The act of naming someone "male," for example, gets equivocated with describing particular biological traits. We start mistaking naming for description of empirical states. We start trying to access description of certain particulars (i.e. states of existence) through the universal meaning of a name (e.g. "Men are..." "Women are..." etc.,etc. ), even though what we are trying to describe is not a name at all.

I found a great, short resource that sums up the problem of universals for those who don't know it too well. It also has the perfect paragraph describing what I find to be troubling about universals:

"On the realist account, it seems a particular must either have a universal or not –
something is or isn’t a banana, is or isn’t yellow, and so on. But psychologists have
recently argued that this ‘either is or isn’t’ judgment isn’t how our concepts work. Are
plantain bananas or not? More or less? When does yellow become orange or green? Is a
shark a fish? Many concepts seem to work by comparison with a prototype, a defining
example (yellow, fish, banana), and other things are judged to be more or less similar to it
– which is what a nominalist would say."

A very good essay on the historical background to the 'realist vs nominalist' debate is What's Wrong with Ockham? Reassessing the Role of Nominalism in the Dissolution of the West.

It provides a very close examination of what, exactly, William of Ockham was objecting to, when he said that universals amount to mere names. It argues that this turn has had enormous consequences for Western philosophical thought, especially by severing reason from the concept of the formal cause:

Ockham did not do away with objective reality, but in doing away with one part of objective reality—forms—he did away with a fundamental principle of explanation for objective reality. In doing away with forms, Ockham did away with formal causality. Formal causality secures teleology—the ends or purposes of things follow from what they are and what is in accord with or capable of fulfilling their natures. In the natural world, this realist framework secures an intrinsic connection between efficient causes and their effects—an efficient cause produces its effects by communicating some formality: fire warms by informing objects with its heat.

He goes on to say

...the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. Notice: even if contemporary philosophers came to a consensus about how to overcome Cartesian doubt and secure certainty, it is not clear that this would do anything to repair the fragmentation and democratization of the disciplines, or to make it more plausible that there could be an ordered hierarchy of sciences, with a highest science, acknowledged as queen of the rest—whether we call it first philosophy, or metaphysics, or wisdom.

The key word being concepts, not existing things. What people are judging as more or less similar is not the object in question, but rather that the meaning expressed by the object is the same as another meaning. An existing triangle, for example, shares a similar meaning to every other existing triangle and any imagined (i.e. non-existent) triangle. Yet, it remains the case that each particular is only itself, even as it expresses some meaning which is necessarily itself. Thus, every existing thing expresses a "universal" (what means), but it is only ever a particular.

However:

Any mental image I can form of a man is always going to be of a man of a particular sort -- tall, short, fat, thin, blonde, redheaded, bald, or what have you. It will fit at most many men, but not all. But my concept 'man' applies to every single man without exception. Or...any mental image I can form of a triangle will be an image of an isosceles , scalene, or equilateral triangle, of a black, blue, or green triangle, etc. But the abstract concept triangularity applies to all triangles without exception. And so forth.

Second, mental images are always to some extent vague or indeterminate, while concepts are at least often precise and determinate. To use Descartes’ famous example, a mental image of a chiliagon (a 1,000-sided figure) cannot be clearly distinguished from a mental image of a 1,002-sided figure, or even from a mental image of a circle. But the concept of a chiliagon is clearly distinct from the concept of a 1,002-sided figure or the concept of a circle. I cannot clearly differentiate a mental image of a crowd of one million people from a mental image of a crowd of 900,000 people. But the intellect easily understands the difference between the concept of a crowd of one million people and the concept of a crowd of 900,000 people.

Third, we have many concepts that are so abstract that they do not have even the loose sort of connection with mental imagery that concepts like man, triangle, and crowd have. You cannot visualize triangularity or humanness per se, but you can at least visualize a particular triangle or a particular human being. But we also have concepts -- such as the concepts law,square root, logical consistency, collapse of the wave function, and innumerably many others -- that can strictly be associated with no mental image at all. You might form a visual or auditory image of the English word “law” when you think about law, but the concept law obviously has no essential connection whatsoever with that word, since ancient Greeks, Chinese, and Indians had the concept without using that specific word to name it. You might form a mental image of a certain logician when you contemplate what it is for a theory to be logically consistent, or a mental image of someone observing something when you contemplate the collapse of the wave function, but there is no essential connection whatsoever between (say) the way Alonzo Church looked and the concept logical consistency or (say) what someone looks like when he’s observing a dead cat and the concept wave function collapse. — Edward Feser

Think, McFly, Think

For instance, that cup exists, this keyboard exists, the computer in front of me exists. When we speak of abstract objects, such as number, we are not speaking of something that exists, but something that pertains to the operations of thought itself. — Wayfarer

So do universals exist? I say they are real, but not existent; they pertain to the nature of reality and of thought, but are not concrete particulars and so don't exist in the same way that concrete particulars exist. — Wayfarer

You may be interested in Trope Theory.

The problem I have with saying that universals exist or are real is that we have no idea what it being said.

Of course, the same applies to saying they are not real or don't exist.

Ideas of generality are what we use to talk about particulars; why should we think we can use them to talk about themselves and still l remain within the realm of intelligibility ?

Not likely. I am opposed to nominalism. But I'm not materialist, so I believe that the natural numbers, for instance, are real, but not material.

Ideas of generality are what we use to talk about particulars; why should we think we can use them to talk about themselves and still l remain within the realm of intelligibility ? — John

We can talk logically about logic, can't we?

Trope Theory is very similar to Realism, but simply posits that instead of abstract universals, there are only concrete particulars, and that properties are made up of "tropes". Each trope is unique.

Yes, but that is the exact opposite of the 'realism' that accepts universals. Medieval realism, as understood by the scholastic philosophers, was the view that universals are real; it is almost diametrically opposite to the kind of modern realism which says that only concrete particulars exist. So - 'realism', in the context of this argument, has a very different meaning to 'realism' in the sense that scientific and modernists use the word.

Trope theory in metaphysics is a version of nominalism. Here, a trope is a particular instance of a property, like the specific redness of a rose, or the specific nuance of green of a leaf. Trope theories assume that universals are unnecessary.

So, trope theory is nominalist. I tend towards the opposing view, which is realism, in the traditionalist sense - that abstracts and universals are real. But, as I have said above, I don't believe that it is correct to say 'they exist', as I think 'existences' pertains to empirical objects. But such things as 'the law of the excluded middle' don't 'exist' in the sense that a concrete particular exists, but they are nevertheless real. But generally speaking the modern philosophical lexicon doesn't allow for the distinction between 'what is real' and 'what exists'.

But generally speaking the modern philosophical lexicon doesn't allow for the distinction between 'what is real' and 'what exists'. — Wayfarer

This is an interesting idea that I have never thought about.

Ok name a general characteristic of generalities. And if you want to say they are real beyond their instantiations then say what their reality consists in.

A general characteristic of generalities is that they are general. (Sorry, couldn't resist.)

I am having trouble thinking of anything which 'instantiates' the 'general'. As a general rule, whatever instantiates something is a 'particular' rather than general - because by definition 'instantiates' is 'an instance' of something.

My argument for the reality of abstracts such as number is simply that a number is the same for anyone capable of counting. 3=III=three=drei in any language or symbolic system. So what '3' consists of is something like an apprehension of quantity. But what is apprehended is not the same as a numerical symbol; the symbol is a representation, but what is being represented is an abstraction. An instance of three things can be composed of any type of thing or even other abstractions - three separate words - but there always must be three of them. If I said 'this sentence consists of three words', I'd be wrong. (But if I said 'I'd be wrong' consists of three words, I'd be right.)

And I say that the number of things is apparent only to an intelligence capable of counting, so in that sense, is not a 'sensible object' but an 'intelligible object' i.e. intrinsic to the operation of rational thought.

As I understand it all particulars instantiate generalities, such as colour, shape, mass, size etc, etc, so many of them!

But I can't see how it makes any more sense to say that three is real apart from groups of particulars that instantiate it, imagined instances of it or mathematical operations that play with it, than it does to say that tree is real apart from trees that instantiate it or imagined instances of it.

Of course we can say that such universals as tree and three (or tree-ness and three-ness) exist (or are real) as forms in some imagined realm; but I don't think we have any genuine idea what that could mean, it therefore amounts to just playing with words, so I can't see any sense in saying it apart from poetic affect.

I can't see how it makes any more sense to say that three is real apart from groups of particulars that instantiate it, imagined instances of it or mathematical operations that play with it, than it does to say that tree is real apart from trees that instantiate it or imagined instances of it.

There is mental arithmetic, but there are no mental trees.

Asking if a thing is "real" is too ambiguous. Is a mirage real? Well, it's not a real oasis but it is a real mirage. So are universals real? Well, are they real what? Real universals? True by definition. Real particulars? False by definition.

Start by asking what it means for a universal to be real before you ask whether or not they are real.

But there are imagined trees. And you can play around with the idea of trees, not in so formalized a way as arithmetic, to be sure; but by writing about them or drawing them or creating design motifs of them and so on.

Yes, but you can say that particulars are real or that they exist because they enter into relation with, and causally influence, others particulars, and because they can be perceived, intersensorially and intersubjectively. Such things cannot be said about universals; so in what sense can they be said to be real, or to exist beyond their particular instantiations?

Yes, but you can say that particulars are real or that they exist because they enter into relation with, and causally influence, others particulars, and because they can be perceived, intersensorially and intersubjectively. — John

So to be a real particular is to causally influence empirical phenomena.

Such things cannot be said about universals

Sure. Universals are not real particulars. That goes without saying.

What you seem to have done is conflated "this is what it means to be a real particular" with "this is what it means to be real" and then concluded that because universals don't satisfy the former then they don't satisfy the latter. But this is equivocation. As I said before, you can't just ask "is X real?"; you have to ask "is X a real Y?". Mirages aren't real oases but are real mirages.

in what sense can they be said to be real?

In some other sense, perhaps. Conceptual or grammatical or as a Form, depending on one's position.

What you seem to have done is conflated "this is what it means to be a real particular" with "this is what it means to be real" and then concluded that because universals don't satisfy the former then they don't satisfy the latter. — Michael

You are half right here. What it means to be a real particular or to exist as a particular is what it is usually taken to mean to be real or to exist. Relations between particulars and their attributes are also generally understood to be real or to exist, but such relations and attributes are not in themselves universals, any more than particulars are universals, but are rather examples of universals.

"In some other sense, perhaps" isn't saying much. If, for example, you wanted to say that universals exist as concepts, grammatical entities or forms, then you should be able to give an account of such an existence that does not depend on describing particulars, their relations or attributes, otherwise you will not be giving an account of how universals exist independently of their instantiations as particulars, their relations or attributes.

If such an account of their independent existence or reality cannot be given then I don't see how it could make any sense to assert their independent existence or reality.

If, for example, you wanted to say that universals exist as concepts, grammatical entities or forms, then you should be able to give an account of such an existence that does not depend on describing particulars, their relations or attributes, otherwise you will not be giving an account of how universals exist independently of their instantiations as particulars, their relations or attributes. — John

I don't see how this follows. Do I need to give an account of how the copula can "exist independently" to say that the copula is a grammatical entity? Do I need to give an account of how counterfactuals can "exist independently" to say that counterfactuals are concepts?

If such an account of their independent existence or reality cannot be given then I don't see how it could make any sense to assert their independent existence or reality.

Neither do I. But why must universals have an "independent existence or reality" to be real? Again you seem to be suggesting that universals must be real particulars to be real, but of course that makes no sense. You're arguing that a universal is only real if it is a particular, which is a contradiction. The conditions required to be a real universal must, by definition, be different to the conditions required to be a real particular.