theoretically, I wouldn’t be able to distinguish one [philosophical zombie] as such, even if he was standing right in front of me. — Mww

Ask it 'how are you?' If it can answer, it's not a zombie.

if there were such machines with the organs and shape of a monkey or of some other non-rational animal, we would have no way of discovering that they are not the same as these animals. But if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, [e.g. 'philosophical zombie'] we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action.
— René Descartes
Discourse on Method in Discourse on Method and Related Writings (1637!), trans. Desmond M. Clarke, Penguin

My point is: p-zombies have no ability for intuition that I can see.

Ask it 'how are you?' If it can answer, it's not a zombie. — Wayfarer

True enough, with the proviso that a human object of the query wasn’t ignoring me, or just didn’t hear me.
————

On 1637!!!.....just goes to show: all the good stuff has already been done.

Above, they were able to locate the place in the brain that lit up when people thought the word, "Screwdriver". This is reading the 1's and 0's. There is a further experiment that found out what numbers people were thinking by reading the brain, then hooked those results up to an audio device that "spoke" the number. — Philosophim

You really should read this review.

My point is: p-zombies have no ability for intuition that I can see. — Olivier5

While I agree with that, under a certain set of conditions for the metaphysical conceivability of zombies in the first place, it is at the same time contradictory to say p-zombies are indistinguishable from humans. If a zombie has no capacity for intuition, which is in essence the faculty of representation a posteriori, then it must be distinguishable from an entity that does, which includes humans. At least includes humans pursuant to one particular speculative epistemology.

The entire zombie thesis hinges on the modality of the human cognitive system. If it is not representational, intuitions have so much less the import, hence may not even be necessary, which means the absence of it in zombies won’t serve as a legitimate means to distinguish one from a human counterpart.

The reason the zombie idea is so ridiculous, is that a zombie cannot be 'a being'. By definition! A zombie is, therefore, an object, a thing. It has no inner life, it's not a being. The whole thing is a phantasm of the disease of what passes for philosophy in the modern world.

Ridiculous, aye!! Concur, and I would add, it is preposterous to conceive of a thing missing the very attribute (e.g., conscious experience, Kirk, 2005) necessarily belonging to the thing from which it is meant to be indistinguishable.

The adjectives describing those of us holding with the “disease of what passes for philosophy these days” is legion, and precious few of them are complimentary.

You really should read this review. — Wayfarer

The article I referenced was from 2019 and from 60 minutes, which is not a slouch in its reporting. I did read the published article that cast doubt on fmri studies, and its follow up corrections which pulled back much of its accusations.

But if fmri's aren't enough for you, here's another.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cerebral_achromatopsia#:~:text=Cerebral%20achromatopsia%20is%20a%20type,the%20disorders%20are%20completely%20distinct.

Basically this is color blindness caused through brain damage. There's an interesting note about an artist who gained this later in life.

"Mr. I. could hardly bear the changed appearances of people ("like animated gray statues") any more than he could bear his own changed appearance in the mirror: he shunned social intercourse and found sexual intercourse impossible. He saw people's flesh, his wife's flesh, his own flesh, as an abhorrent gray; "flesh-colored" now appeared "rat-colored" to him.This was so even when he closed his eyes, for his preternaturally vivid ("eidetic") visual imagery was preserved but now without color, and forced on him images, forced him to "see" but see internally with the wrongness of his achromatopsia. He found foods disgusting in their grayish, dead appearance and had to close his eyes to eat. But this did not help very much, for the mental image of a tomato was as black as its appearance."

There's also the famous case of Gineus Phage, who's entire personality changed after having a rod blow through his brain and actually living through it.

Not to mention the countless medical studies in fixing mental illnesses like depression and others. Your brain is what shapes you. Just like a dogs brain shapes it. A monkeys brain shapes it. There is no underlying non-physical process causing dogs, monkeys, and humans to think. Damage the brain, you damage the mind. Feel free to post alternatives.

There’s a couple of things. It is now known that neuroplasticity enables the brain to regain from a lot of damage by re-purposing. In those cases, the mind changes the brain - it's top-down causation. If physicalism were the case, this ought not to happen. There have been experiments where subjects have shown changes in brain matter simply by conducting thought experiments, such as imagining they're learning to play the piano (with no actual piano). So in those cases, and there are many, the mind shapes the brain. They are an example of top-down causation, which physicalism can't accomodate.

You can zap a brain with electricity and change what a person is sensing and feeling. — Philosophim

Ever heard of Wilder Penfield? He was a famous Canadian neuro-surgeon, who late in life wrote a book called Mystery of the Mind. This was based on decades of experience with patients who had undergone brain surgery by him, whilst still conscious (because the brain itself is impervious to pain). He found that if he stimulated parts of the brain, he could indeed elicit memories and sensations from these subjects. However he also found that almost invariably, the subjects knew that this was something that was being done to them, not something they were doing. This forced him to acknowledge that the mind is somehow different to the brain.

Another case was Sir John Eccles, a distinguished Australian neuroscientist, who likewise formed a view he called 'trialism' (as distinct from 'dualism') with philosopher Karl Popper, described in their book https://www.amazon.com/Self-Its-Brain-Argument-Interactionism/dp/0415058988.

There is zero evidence that there is something separate from molecules and energy. — Philosophim

What about, for instance, meaning. You can't get from 'the laws which govern molecules and energy' (i.e. physics, organic chemistry, etc) to 'the laws which govern semantics'. Each set of laws belong to different explanatory levels, and there's no way to bridge them known to physics or chemistry.

Another example: if an internet post like this one annoys you, that will result in hormonal changes in your body; pulse might increase, knot in stomach, flushing etc. They are physical changes for which no physical cause can be assigned, they originate purely from the perception of meaning.

These are all different facets of the explanatory gap that is another facet of Chalmer's 'hard problem of consciousness'.

None of that is to deny that physical injury to the brain is not a cause of cognitive, behavioural and other changes - no question of that. But you don’t need be a physicalist to accept that.

It is now known that neuroplasticity enables the brain to regain from a lot of damage by re-purposing. In those cases, the mind changes the brain — Wayfarer

Unbelievable! Anyone even dare to have an opinion on consciousness and you leap to "have you read the literature", "you don't understand the issues" and here you are invoking fucking neuroscience in your crackpot opinions. Are you a neuroscientist? No. Have your read 'the literature' about neuroscience? No. Do you have the faintest idea how neuroplasticity actually works at a cellular level? No. are you qualified to even understand Penfield or Eccles, or the various counter-arguments? No

The depths of duplicity you'll stoop to to push your agenda astound me. Implying that the philosophy around consciousness is so complicated that people can't even talk about it without immersing themselves in the literature, but neuroscience? Oh that's easy, apparently we can all a crack at that on the basis of a couple of newspaper articles. Ridiculous.

So if that philosophical distinction is rejected, both in whole and in part, then what are we left with? I think ordinary language serves us just fine here.

Perhaps the point, the whole point of this world is to be a vehicle for experience.

is, therefore, an object, a thing. It has no inner life, it's not a being. The whole thing is a phantasm of the disease of what passes for philosophy in the modern world. — Wayfarer

In America and the UK, you mean? At this point in time, the rest of the world seems rather immune to the siren songs of naïve materialism and its view of humans as mechanical puppets. It's more a problem in Anglo-saxon philosophy. I never heard of p-zombies in a French or Italian context.

Are you a neuroscientist? No. Have your read 'the literature' about neuroscience? No. Do you have the faintest idea how neuroplasticity actually works at a cellular level? No. — Isaac

Agree. I am not a neuroscientist. The sign on the door says 'philosophy forum'. If being a neuroscientist were a qualification, it would be another forum altogether.

are you qualified to even understand Penfield or Eccles, or the various counter-arguments? — Isaac

I've read the books I mentioned, and I feel qualified to comment on them, as they're written for general audiences and they don't rely on having knowledge of neuroscience.

Your outburst just illustrates the fact that questioning materialism irritates materialists - as I suggested in the post you're commenting on. There are many 'opinions on consciousness' in this thread, but I am simply addressing one of them.

It's more a problem in Anglo-saxon philosophy. — Olivier5

Agree.

Agree. I am not a neuroscientist. The sign on the door says 'philosophy forum'. If being a neuroscientist were a qualification, it would be another forum altogether. — Wayfarer

Then stop invoking issues within it that you do not understand in your 'philosophical' musings.

I've read the books I mentioned, and I feel qualified to comment on them, as they're written for general audiences and they don't rely on having knowledge of neuroscience. — Wayfarer

Well you're clearly not because neither of them are saying what you claim they're saying.

Still, it's pretty sloppy for Dennet to use the very psychological term "intuition" in an attempt to annihilate psychology. Others have noted that he contradicts himself all the time.

The abstract of Penfield's book says in part 'The central question... is whether man's being is determined by his body alone or by mind and body as separate elements. Before suggesting an answer, he gives a fascinating account of his experience as a neurosurgeon and scientist observing the brain in conscious patients.' Those observations were just as I said - he would stimulate the brains of subjects and record what they told him. They were able to differentiate when the surgeon was eliciting an action, and when they themselves did something - they would say something like 'you're doing that'. This lead him to believe that you can't account for the totality of the mind or the personality in purely physical terms - in other words, to suggest something like dualism.

The Eccles/Popper book abstract says 'The relation between body and mind is one of the oldest riddles that has puzzled mankind. That material and mental events may interact is accepted even by the law: our mental capacity to concentrate on the task can be seriously reduced by drugs. Physical and chemical processes may act upon the mind; and when we are writing a difficult letter, our mind acts upon our body and, through a chain of physical events, upon the mind of the recipient of the letter. This is what the authors of this book call the 'interaction of mental and physical events'. We know very little about this interaction; and according to recent philosophical fashions this is explained by the alleged fact that we have brains but no thoughts. The authors of this book stress that they cannot solve the body mind problem; but they hope that they have been able to shed new light on it. Eccles especially with his theory that the brain is a detector and amplifier; a theory that has given rise to important new developments, including new and exciting experiments; and Popper with his highly controversial theory of 'World 3'. They show that certain fashionable solutions [by which they mean 'scientific materialism] which have been offered fail to understand the seriousness of the problems of the emergence of life, or consciousness and of the creativity of our minds.'

(Popper's 'World 3' 'contains the products of thought. This includes abstract objects such as scientific theories, stories, myths, tools, social institutions, and works of art.[2] World 3 is not to be conceived as a Platonic realm, because it is created by humans.')

Both books are controversial, many don't agree with them, and a lot of people would say they've been debunked or were mistaken to begin with. But the reason I refered to them, is because they both have input from distinguished neuroscientists. Again, this is a philosophical issue, not a neuroscientific issue, because materialism itself is a philosophical issue. You don't have to know anything about philosophy to practice neuroscience (or vice versa) but these were drawn as counter-examples to the claim 'You can zap a brain with electricity and change what a person is sensing and feeling', and other materialist claims.

I know this is controversial. Why is it controversial? Because sensible people are materialists. They don't believe in 'spooky mind-stuff' and like ideas. If you believe something anything that, then you have

crackpot opinions. — Isaac

You don't have to know anything about philosophy to practice neuroscience (or vice versa) but these were drawn as counter-examples to the claim 'You can zap a brain with electricity and change what a person is sensing and feeling', and other materialist claims. — Wayfarer

Exactly. You absolutely can zap a brain with electricity and change what a person's sensing and feeling. There is zero doubt about this in neuroscience. You've presented fifty year out-of-date science which isn't even about 'sensing and feeling' without understanding the wide and complex issues because it ticked a few boxes in your pre-conceived ideas. Trawling through the pop-science books until you find one which sounds a bit like the thing you're trying to prove is not 'understanding the issues'.

Trawling through the pop-science books — Isaac

makes a good point when he speaks of brain plasticity. This is a proven fact, that one's efforts to learn something can plastically change one's brain. And I think he is right that this scientific fact contradicts naïve materialism.

Ah well, if you think he's right then that settles it. We were all just waiting to hear what you reckoned about it. I should publish immediately before someone scoops your research.

Can Daniel Dennett describe to us what his supper and the wine he washed it down with, presuming that was/is his evening meal, tasted/tastes like?

Can Daniel Dennett describe to us what his supper and the wine he washed it down with, presuming that was/is his evening meal, tasted/tastes like? — TheMadFool

If instead of a zombie, Dennett was a culinary critic with a gift for wordsmithing, he could make an attempt at it.

If instead of a zombie, Dennett was a culinary critic with a gift for wordsmithing, he could make an attempt at it. — Olivier5

But would he succeed? I'm not even asking for there to be some kind of judging committee or panel. Can he describe the taste of his meal and wine to a level that will satisfy him?

Will he describe the taste of his meal and wine to a level that will satisfy him? — TheMadFool

Probably not. But he would be able to faintly evoke it, enough to wet the appetite of his readers. So I agree that 'qualia' (sensations as we perceive them subjectively) cannot be adequately described in words, but they can be evoked, which is better than nothing. The same applies to the meaning of words, words that roll out our tongue nevertheless. So this is not something unusual.

Blackberry Eating
-- Galway Kinnell

I love to go out in late September
among the fat, overripe, icy, black blackberries
to eat blackberries for breakfast,
the stalks very prickly, a penalty
they earn for knowing the black art
of blackberry-making; and as I stand among them
lifting the stalks to my mouth, the ripest berries
fall almost unbidden to my tongue,
as words sometimes do, certain peculiar words
like strengths and squinched,
many-lettered, one-syllabled lumps,
which I squeeze, squinch open, and splurge well
in the silent, startled, icy, black language
of blackberry-eating in late September.

The taste of blackberries is not described in the above poem but it manages to evoke the explosion of the blackberry juice in one's mouth through words like squeeze, squinch and splurge.

I love you too, Isaac.

cannot be adequately described in words, but they can be evoke — Olivier5

This seems to be a contradiction to me. There are two things to consider. The description of a qualia and the evocation of that qualia. These are two different things. If we fail at the former we come face to face with the ineffable. The latter is, from personal experience, child's play.

. If we fail at the former we come face to face with the ineffable. — TheMadFool

Yes, I agree.

Can Daniel Dennett describe to us what his supper and the wine he washed it down with, presuming that was/is his evening meal, tasted/tastes like? — TheMadFool

The wine tasted like wine and the supper tasted like fish and chips. What's missing that can't be put into words?

The wine tasted like wine — Isaac

Isn't that the definition of a qualia? That there's something like the taste of wine. It's a bit simplistic of course, as wine can taste like crap or paradise depending on the bottle. It's not exactly as predictable as Coca Cola.

The wine tasted like wine and the supper tasted like fish and chips. What's missing that can't be put into words? — Isaac

A bird is a bird. Tautology. Nothing is being said in fact.