With that in mind, physicalism is no more useful than zoroastrianism. — Merkwurdichliebe
Materialism is waning. But the pendulum just keeps swinging. — frank
I think he meant that physicalism morphed into something its earlier adherents would have rejected. Remember Newton's cohorts wanted to reject gravity on the basis that it was mystical. Newton gave up and retired to his basement in the face of the dogma. — frank
Do 'we' know that? What does 'produce' mean, here? What is it that is being produced? And how is it being produced? And, is the brain 'a physical thing?' Extract a brain from a human, and it is still the same matter, but it's now an inert object, even though it's stil a physical thing. When situated in a living being, the brain has more neural connections than stars in the sky. It is no longer simply an object, but a central part of cognition and is central to any possible theory, including any theory about 'what is physical'. So in what sense is it a 'physical thing' in that context? — Wayfarer
But the fact of the existence of this school shows that the ground is already shifting towards a more 'mind-like' and top-down causal model of life and mind. — Wayfarer
But as I've said - the contrary also works, and that is demonstrable by observation and experiment. Humans can perform mental acts which alter the physical configuration of the brain. A physical change to a brain is through injury or a medicine or substance which literally alters the material structure. But if the structure is altered through a volitional act, then that is mental in origin. — Wayfarer
That is 'brain-mind identity theory'. But 'wetness' does not stand in the relationship to hydrogen and oxygen that consciousness does in relation to matter. — Wayfarer
Besides, consciousness does not only work within the brain, it is present at some level in the operation of all living organisms. — Wayfarer
So, you're operating within the latter explanatory framework. So any 'theory of consciousness' that I would try and submit, would have to fit within that explanatory framework. But there's a fundamental problem with that, because to do so requires treating 'res cogitans' as an object - which it never is. There is no object anywhere called 'mind'. You can only deal with the question if you can conceive of the subject of the question in objective terms. — Wayfarer
True. Same for idealism though. — frank
What is physical is matter and energy.
There are living brains, which are chemically self-sustainable, active, and produce neuronal activity, and dead brains, which don't. — Philosophim
What if unicorns are just really good at hiding?" You need some evidence, or its not a point of discussion. — Philosophim
And that is why Idealism is not used in science. — Philosophim
What is physical is matter and energy.
There are living brains, which are chemically self-sustainable, active, and produce neuronal activity, and dead brains, which don't. — Philosophim
I was wondering if you knew of some evidence based model I was unaware of, but it appears not. — Philosophim
Your current philosophy, which is based on outdated and disproven models, is not rational. — Philosophim
The dominant trend does not appear to consider itself as an ideology (despite that is exactly what it is), somehow it regards itself as incontrovertible and self evident. It is very dogmatic, bordering on what I consider religious belief — Merkwurdichliebe
The main problem with our usual understanding of secularity is that it is taken-for-granted, so we are not aware that it is a worldview. It is an ideology that pretends to be the everyday world we live in. Many assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed. Yet that is the secular view of secularity, its own self-understanding... The secularity we presuppose must be "de-naturalized" in order to realize how unique and peculiar such a worldview is... — David Loy
Many assume that it is simply the way the world really is, once superstitious beliefs about it have been removed. — David Loy
it's always good to hear an expert expunge. — Kenosha Kid
I'm not sure whether you're saying that the recognition of the car is part of the experience I am conscious of, which is also what I'm saying, or whether we consciously recognise the car, which flies in the face of my experience, and also seems to contradict the idea that the brain is adept at filtering out irrelevant sensory data that we are, consequently, unaware of (e.g. the sound of a car engine at night after living a month in Manhatten, versus the sound of a gunshot). — Kenosha Kid
The left car is blue. I am conscious of it being blue. I am not conscious of figuring out that it's blue: it's blueness is presented to my consciousness. — Kenosha Kid
I assume you mean that the timescales involved in consciously working stuff out is much slower than the timescales of photons-hitting-retina to conscious-of-image. It can't be too much later. I have present experience for a reason: present problems require present solutions. — Kenosha Kid
And yet we all can agree than certain cars are blue, and others not. — Olivier5
Yes, seeing someone do something is different to doing it yourself. However yours and my view is not 'a view from nowhere', and neither is Alice's experience radically private or subjective. As human beings, we can use the same language to describe Alice's activity as she can.
— Andrew M
Sorry, but I think you’re missing the point. The basis of the whole debate is whether there is an essential difference, something that can’t be captured objectively, about the first-person perspective. Obviously we can ‘use the same language’ and if you say ‘Alice kicks the ball’ of course I will know what you mean. But that misses the point of the argument. — Wayfarer
The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience. — David Chalmers
There's no problem where there is an operational meaning in terms of people's reports (patient and scientist, say). My argument is with dualism. — Andrew M
I'm just trying to keep us grounded in empirical data here. Kids can learn to name colours, predictably so, and these colours they name seem to correspond well to some objectively measurable wavelengths of electromagnetic waves. There is therefore something objective and operational about colours as we perceive them.What seems to happen with consciousness, perception, free-will..basically anywhere where neuroscience might have some input, is that the response is to vehemently assume our first blush reckoning about it must be right and then filter all the data through that. — Isaac
Substance dualism? Chalmers is famous for suggesting property dualism at least methodologically. But beyond that, he just invites speculation about how to bring phenomenal consciousness into the realm of science. The universe appears to contain elements that possess subjectivity. Let's head toward a theory of consciousness that includes that. — frank
The problem is the implicit dualism in the claim. There are no 'first-person' versus 'third-person' perspectives. There is just your perspective, my perspective, and Alice's perspective. — Andrew M
Consciousness is so hopelessly defined it is hard to know what a person means by it. — EnPassant
In contrast with Chalmers, Dennett argues that consciousness is not a fundamental feature of the universe and instead will eventually be fully explained by natural phenomena. Instead of involving the nonphysical, he says, consciousness merely plays tricks on people so that it appears nonphysical—in other words, it simply seems like it requires nonphysical features to account for its powers. In this way, Dennett compares consciousness to stage magic and its capability to create extraordinary illusions out of ordinary things.
The universe appears to contain elements that possess subjectivity. Let's head toward a theory of consciousness that includes that. — frank
Mind, I suspect, is not an inexplicable accident or a divine and anomalous gift but a basic aspect of nature that we will not understand until we transcend the built-in limits of contemporary scientific orthodoxy.
There is no viable model out there that states consciousness is separate from the brain's function. Any that try to are phlogiston theories at this point. — Philosophim
There is plainly a distinction between the first- and third-person perspectives, as is implied by grammar itself! — Wayfarer
And furthermore, it is also undeniable that people have different perspective, for the obvious reason that if we did not, then there would no individuation. — Wayfarer
Persons are subjects of experience, and that dimension of existence is not something that can be fully captured from a third-person perspective. — Wayfarer
In the WIKI article you provided the link to, we read:
In contrast with Chalmers, Dennett argues that consciousness is not a fundamental feature of the universe and instead will eventually be fully explained by natural phenomena. Instead of involving the nonphysical, he says, consciousness merely plays tricks on people so that it appears nonphysical—in other words, it simply seems like it requires nonphysical features to account for its powers. In this way, Dennett compares consciousness to stage magic and its capability to create extraordinary illusions out of ordinary things.
Questions: why is it important for Dennett to prove that 'consciousness is not a fundamental feature of the Universe'?
What currently prevents it from being fully explained by natural phenomena? — Wayfarer
The universe appears to contain elements that possess subjectivity. Let's head toward a theory of consciousness that includes that.
— frank
Mind, I suspect, is not an inexplicable accident or a divine and anomalous gift but a basic aspect of nature that we will not understand until we transcend the built-in limits of contemporary scientific orthodoxy.
Thomas Nagel The Core of Mind and Cosmos — Wayfarer
Without the dualism, the landscape and the nature of the problems look very different, and not impossible in principle. — Andrew M
The alternatives are not simply materialism and dualism. As you may know, my own position is hylomorphism. — Andrew M
The philosopher Peter Hacker argues that the hard problem is misguided in that it asks how consciousness can emerge from matter, whereas in fact sentience emerges from the evolution of living organisms. — Wikipedia
The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. Further, since the mental arises through the development of animal organisms, the nature of those organisms cannot be fully understood through the physical sciences alone. Finally, since the long process of biological evolution is responsible for the existence of conscious organisms, and since a purely physical process cannot explain their existence, it follows that biological evolution must be more than just a physical process, and the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory. — Thomas Nagel
Because that is what body is really, a physical context in which experiences are framed. — EnPassant
There is therefore something objective and operational about colours as we perceive them. — Olivier5
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