Induction is not the recognition of patterns. Induction is drawing a conclusion that does not necessarily conclude from the premises, or evidence involved. — Philosophim
So there are two kinds of criticisms that can sometimes and sometimes not be made about the same beliefs:
formed with minimal "input" from the environment and considerable input from your other beliefs or "gut reactions";
"insulated" or "protected" from possible revision.
Philosophers don't like either of these but will let the first slide so long as you are open to revision; the second is more or less sinful. Are there good general-purpose ways of talking about these things? — Srap Tasmaner
As you have no means of determining which of those mistakes are the case, you are not discarding a belief because it can be ruled out. You are discarding a belief because you wish to replace it with another. — Isaac
...our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually, but only as a corporate body.
It is certain that the bishop must stay on squares of the same colour; until it becomes time to pack away the pieces. — Banno
Are you suggesting we should analyze knowledge in terms of "knowing how to form beliefs"? — Srap Tasmaner
Induction is not the recognition of patterns. Induction is drawing a conclusion that does not necessarily conclude from the premises, or evidence involved. — Philosophim
That's not induction specifically, that's just any invalid inference. — Pfhorrest
Either way, how do you avoid the problem I mentioned at the beginning that one cannot distinguish the presence/absence of evidence from unchecked belief? — Isaac
No. I'm suggesting philosophers might better analyse knowing that... in terms of knowing how... — Banno
Techne — Srap Tasmaner
It does seem like there are facts we just store in memory though — Srap Tasmaner
Could one have stored in memory a fact that was utterly irrelevant to any action one might undertake? And here we might include saying "I remember that..." — Banno
Could you have memories that you cannot in fact access or verbalize? The answer to that is clearly yes. — Srap Tasmaner
Seriously I'm sure there's research that shows facts and skills are stored differently. It is certainly true for language that word roots are in one place and rules another. — Srap Tasmaner
Good; it's always better not to let new information undermine your pre-existing view... — Banno
knowing that is a type of knowhow — Banno
Again, so what? — Banno
We already distinguish between knowing-how and knowing-that in everyday language. — Srap Tasmaner
It is not a discreet atom that could be tied to one memory or to one neural chain — Banno
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