I think this conversation is on the wrong thread, but briefly - there's a substantial difference between "something objective and operational about colours as we perceive them" and claiming there's such a thing as the subjective experience of 'blueness'. — Isaac

As the thread creator, I grant you the freedom to talk about whatever you'd like to talk about here. But for me, what is interesting is NOT to shoot down concepts like clay pigeons... I see no point in that. I am more interested in talking about reality, e.g. the objectivity and effectiveness of colours, as well as their beauty. You or Dennett can tell me till atheist kingdom come that I'm using improper concepts, it means nothing to me until you are able to provide better concepts, i.e. an alternative. Concepts are tools, not gods. Unless you can give me a better set of tools, I'm going to use the ones I have.

"Physical" does not really work here. The body and brain are biological. Life is already far more than just "physical". It's about information. Your body is made of information, and that's why it can die. — Olivier5

It comes to much the same thing. The body is a context in which experience is framed. But Dennett needs to be more detailed in his analysis. There are different kinds of experience; internal, such as pain, pleasure, thought etc. and experiences that are dependent on external stimulation. These are two different classes of experiences. It is not a good idea to use internal experience to draw general conclusions about consciousness that also involves consciousness of external stimuli.

It comes to much the same thing. — EnPassant

Ii don't think so. Life is much more than physics.

I don't think so. Life is much more than physics. — Olivier5

True, but to the materialist it is all essentially physical. If I say 'I am experiencing red' what do I mean by "I"? It seems to me that a good definition of the 'I' would help things a lot. It is not possible to reconstruct the I from physical systems, information, and experiences so what is it that is having these experiences?

True, but to the materialist it is all essentially physical. — EnPassant

To the naïve, self-denying materialists, yes. Which is why they fail.

If I say 'I am experiencing red' what do I mean by "I"? It seems to me that a good definition of the 'I' would help things a lot. It is not possible to reconstruct the I from physical systems, information, and experiences so what is it that is having these experiences?

I am reading Phenomenology of Perception by Merleau-Ponty and liking his perspective on this question. What I am temporarily left with is that our perception of our own perception (what he calls transcendental or reflexive perception) will always remain imperfect, partial, because when we reflect on our own perception, when we are theorizing our perception, we are not the one who is perceiving anymore, we take a step back from him. This creates a distance, an alienation with our "being at the world", our "being perceiving".

It looks a bit similar to Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

This effort to perceive perception is nevertheless at the core of his project. He says that in doing so we create the theoretical possibility for another self, that could be looking at us... And thus he turns the cogito onto itself:

Cogito power 1 (Descartes): I perceive, therefore I exist, therefore the world exists (at least as something I perceive). The status of "alter egos" (other minds) is unclear, assumed but not proven.

Cogito power 2 (Husserl and Merleau-Ponty): I perceive myself perceiving, therefore I am a "being at the world*time". This means that I am in the world and bound to perceive it, a historical living being produced by and for the world, essentially a relational, intentional being, and finally, I am a perceiver who can be perceived by other perceivers, just like I can perceive myself perceiving.

"If the body is a physical context, then can't we extend this reasoning further and argue that the pain is not really in the brain either, but in the mind? — EnPassant

No, because the mind is the processing brain. Further, the pain signal is transmitted to the nerve as well, so its not merely localized in the brain. You are viewing the brain from a philosophical standpoint, when there is a much clearer scientific standpoint. The old ideas of philosophy of mind are outdated and dead.

If we are locating things in the body can't it also be argued that neuroscience is locating/contextualizing experience in a physical context in the brain but the real conscious experience is outside the physical context altogether? — EnPassant

No. The articles I've linked and the arguments I've been given clearly show that consciousness happens within the physical context of the brain.

Indeed, can physical matter, no matter how complex, have experiences? — EnPassant

Yes. You are physical matter. You are experiencing contexts. What you are having a difficult time believing is that physical matter is capable of this. You are the evidence it is. Physical existence is amazing. It all depends on the correct combination of interactions. Oxygen can be breathed, but combine it with hydrogen and one more part, and you drown.

The physical reality around us is spectacular. Even magical. But it is real, tangible, and physical. Same with your mind. The only evidence against this is an emotional framework. You don't want to accept it, because you fear you'll lose the wonder, the specialness, and the mystery. What you don't understand is its even MORE wonderful, special, and mysterious because it is real, and not a fantasy. After all, what other reason is there to continue to believe the idea that consciousness is somehow separate from the brain? When facts fail, only emotion will prevail.

When facts fail, only emotion will prevail. — Philosophim

Emotions are not a bad thing. They are just another way to think, in fact.

Emotions are not a bad thing. They are just another way to think, in fact. — Olivier5

Absolutely. There is a time and place for emotional thinking. It is part of our intelligence, and shouldn't be dismissed. But when we are trying to come to rational conclusions, emotions can guide as a backseat driver but rationality needs to be ultimately controlling the wheel.

What I am temporarily left with is that our perception of our own perception (what he calls transcendental or reflexive perception) will always remain imperfect, partial, because when we reflect on our own perception, when we are theorizing our perception, we are not the one who is perceiving anymore, we take a step back from him. — Olivier5

Care needs to be taken here because perception and reflection on perception are very different things. If I perceive a piece of music and then reflect on that perception the former is perception proper but the latter is a different kind of 'perception' altogether; it is the mind looking at itself. But I don't see this act of self knowledge as another self. It is just the self looking at itself. Self awareness.

No, because the mind is the processing brain. — Philosophim

That has yet to be established.

Further, the pain signal is transmitted to the nerve as well, so its not merely localized in the brain. — Philosophim

The whole body is one entity. It is the means by which the mind experiences the world. But this entity makes experience subjective and this subjectivity is partially determined by the fact that the body contextualizes its experiences. When the mind experiences via the senses, its experiences are in the context of the body because the body is the context. If the mind could experience reality without the context of the body reality might look different but not by a lot. For example, mathematical deduction is not influenced by the body. Math is what it is and is not altered by the body. Eating food is different. It is very much a bodily experience.

The question is; how closely does subjective experience resemble the objective reality that is the source of that experience? It is likely to closely resemble the reality otherwise we must argue that the mind is in an almost constant state of fantasy or delusion or in a dream world. This is unlikely because we are able to coherently respond to the world that we perceive.

The articles I've linked and the arguments I've been given clearly show that consciousness happens within the physical context of the brain. — Philosophim

But that does not mean the physical context is consciousness. Correlation is not necessarily causation. Just because neurons and brain signals are correlated with thought does not mean they cause thought. The argument that the mind is the brain relies heavily on ignoring the dictum: Correlation Is Not Necessarily Causation and assuming that because two things are found together one must be causing the other. This is not always true, as explained here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correlation_does_not_imply_causation

We know that there are certain parts of the brain that allow a person to grasp language. Animals and insects which lack these aspects of the brain are unable to communicate using language.
https://www.headway.org.uk/about-brain-injury/individuals/effects-of-brain-injury/communication-problems/language-impairment-aphasia/

Aphasia is the term for when a person has brain damage that limits their ability to communicate. — Philosophim

Yes, the mind can only engage in the physical world on the same level as brain development. If a person had the brain of an earthworm it would not be possible to write poetry. An analogy is the development of computers. In the beginning they were relatively simple. They could not show graphics or images or do word processing. But as more capabilities were added they became more adept. But from this one does not conclude that computers are conscious or intelligent. It is the computer operator's mind that is intelligent and conscious. The physical systems of the brain are only the tools that enable the mind to consciously engage in the world, they are not the mind, no more than ever more sophisticated computer systems are the mind. The mind can only engage in the physical world on the same level as brain complexity.

rationality needs to be ultimately controlling the wheel. — Philosophim

Rationality is a means to an end, though, and the end, the goal, is always emotional. Even the love of wisdom is a form of love.

No, because the mind is the processing brain.
— Philosophim

That has yet to be established. — EnPassant

No, it has clearly been established. What has not been established, is that consciousness is not part of the brain. I asked Wayfarer, and he was unable to provide any evidence of consciousness existing apart from the brain. The citations I've linked have clearly shown that damage to the brain can affect the consciousness of people's ability to see color, their core personality, and ability to comprehend language. There is not one person proposing that consciousness exists as separate from the brain that has any evidence to back their claims. That being said, feel free to be the first.

The question is; how closely does subjective experience resemble the objective reality that is the source of that experience? — EnPassant

None. The brain constructs a way of interpreting the world. Successful brains are able to interpret the world in such a way, that the actual contradict this interpretation as little as possible. Brains that aren't so good interpret reality in such a way that actual reality keeps contradicting their interpretation of reality. Its like a meter stick. A meterstick is a notched tool that helps us divide physical space. Physical space does not have an underlying grid of meters that we can't see or exist in some other dimension. But we can mark it that way if we like. And it is a useful construct that is rarely contradicted by reality.

But that does not mean the physical context is consciousness. — EnPassant

No, it does. I think you misunderstand the difference between correlation and causation. Don't make the opposite mistake and think, "Well just because something has causation, doesn't mean it might not be correlation." If every time I leave the house it rains, there is correlation. Causation only happens after we demonstrate that something necessarily needs to happen or the correlates can never happen. Since it also rains when I don't leave the house, my leaving the house is not causing it to rain.

Consciousness necessarily comes from the brain, because there is no alternative. I mean, feel free to show any evidence that consciousness comes from something else. But all of the articles I've linked combine to show that there is no alternative to consciousness coming from the brain.

I can give you a few examples of evidence that would cast doubt on the idea of consciousness being caused by the mind.

1. Evidence of consciousness existing in a human being with a completely dead brain.
2. Consciousness existing apart from the localized part of your head. For example, having your body walk away while your consciousness stays right here.
3. Evidence of serious brain damage/chemical changes/proper functionality without the slightest change in personality or character.

Philosophy of mind can only be about what we have knowledge of. We can make philosophy about the current science of the brain. Philosophy of mind as questioning whether the brain causes consciousness is dead and done. Science has long proved consciousness is produced by the brain. The only question at this point is, "But maybe we're wrong", which can be said about anything, and is a useless critique in any rational argument.

I asked Wayfarer, and he was unable to provide any evidence of consciousness existing apart from the brain. — Philosophim

I referred to a book, Irreducible Mind: Toward a Psychology for the 21st Century, Ed. Kelly & Kelly.

Current mainstream opinion in psychology, neuroscience, and philosophy of mind holds that all aspects of human mind and consciousness are generated by physical processes occurring in brains. Views of this sort have dominated recent scholarly publication. The present volume, however, demonstrates empirically that this reductive materialism is not only incomplete but false. The authors systematically marshal evidence for a variety of psychological phenomena that are extremely difficult, and in some cases clearly impossible, to account for in conventional physicalist terms. Topics addressed include phenomena of extreme psychophysical influence, memory, psychological automatisms and secondary personality, near-death experiences and allied phenomena, genius-level creativity, and 'mystical' states of consciousness both spontaneous and drug-induced. The authors further show that these rogue phenomena are more readily accommodated by an alternative 'transmission' or 'filter' theory of mind/brain relations advanced over a century ago by a largely forgotten genius, F. W. H. Myers, and developed further by his friend and colleague William James. This theory, moreover, ratifies the commonsense conception of human beings as causally effective conscious agents, and is fully compatible with leading-edge physics and neuroscience. The book should command the attention of all open-minded persons concerned with the still-unsolved mysteries of the mind.

There are hundreds of pages of studies in that book.

And besides, I also pointed out the fact that it has been experimentally shown that volitional actions can have an effect on the brain. This is top-down causation, which undermines physicalism - physicalism can only deal with bottom-up effects, i.e. molecular or cellular structure affecting cognition. If volitional acts affect the brain, then that is top-down causation, and has no physicalist explanation.

The citations I've linked have clearly shown that damage to the brain can affect the consciousness of people's ability to see color, their core personality, and ability to comprehend language. — Philosophim

Of course but that is because the interface/brain has been damaged. If a camera is damaged you can not see through it but that does not mean the camera sees. The body is an interface between the mind and the world. If the interface is damaged then of course information cannot reach the mind. But the mind is also conscious independently of the body. For example, it can think and it can say 'I think therefore I am'. The mind's knowledge is not restricted to the five senses.

No, it has clearly been established. — Philosophim

What has been established is that there is a physical analogue of the mind's interaction with the world via the brain. But this analogue would have to exist if the mind is to engage with the world. Brain activity is an analogue of this engagement. It is not conscious. When you type into a computer there is a physical analogue of what you are thinking in the form of electrical signals that are translated into type. The existence of this analogue does not mean the computer is thinking.

A meterstick is a notched tool that helps us divide physical space. Physical space does not have an underlying grid of meters that we can't see or exist in some other dimension. — Philosophim

If you replace the meter stick with geometry you'll get very close. Geo-metry means 'earth measuring'.

1. Evidence of consciousness existing in a human being with a completely dead brain.
2. Consciousness existing apart from the localized part of your head. For example, having your body walk away while your consciousness stays right here.
3. Evidence of serious brain damage/chemical changes/proper functionality without the slightest change in personality or character. — Philosophim

https://flatrock.org.nz/topics/science/is_the_brain_really_necessary.htm

There is no evidence that the brain is conscious. What does exist is a materialistic dogma that insists there is no difference between the brain analogue and the mind. It is simply dogma.

The brain constructs a way of interpreting the world. Successful brains are able to interpret the world in such a way, that the actual contradict this interpretation as little as possible. Brains that aren't so good interpret reality in such a way that actual reality keeps contradicting their interpretation of reality. Its like a meter stick. — Philosophim

Actually, the human mind is capable of far outstripping the requirements for 'successfully interpreting the world'. Any animal must do that if it is to survive. But h. sapiens has gone far beyond what can be rationalised solely in terms of the requirements for survival. You don't need to be able to weigh and measure the Universe just to get by.

I've covered many of these points in this long post, which I don't think you've taken in.

Of course but that is because the interface/brain has been damaged. If a camera is damaged you can not see through it but that does not mean the camera sees. The body is an interface between the mind and the world. If the interface is damaged then of course information cannot reach the mind. But the mind is also conscious independently of the body. For example, it can think and it can say 'I think therefore I am'. The mind's knowledge is not restricted to the five senses. — EnPassant

I should have been clearer. The brain damaged individual can no longer consciously envision color. His eyes work fine. The person can no longer process language internally, their ears are fine. Phineus Gage's entire core personality changed. We are talking about the part of the camera that processes the light from the lenses. That is physical, and when that is broken, the light will not be processed any longer.

What has been established is that there is a physical analogue of the mind's interaction with the world via the brain. — EnPassant

This makes no sense. An analogue only works if you have something that you know between the two. For example, a foot is analogue to a paw. Both have a similar function, but are still different in structure. The problem is, you've given no structure for what the "mind" is, apart from the brain. The question that I will keep asking, and no one has offerred anything is, "If the mind is not produced from the brain, what is it?" Without evidence, all your saying is, "It could be something else". You can't make an analogue to something that "could" be. What "mind" is needs to be given some meaningful term to be used this way. Otherwise there is no analogue.

If you replace the meter stick with geometry you'll get very close. Geo-metry means 'earth measuring'. — EnPassant

Would you mind clarifying what you meant by this?

https://flatrock.org.nz/topics/science/is_the_brain_really_necessary.htm

I looked through your articles. None of these provided any of the evidence that you would need.
1. The "IQ" measurement tests for people with lower brain mass do not measure the entire picture of the person. For example, there are "idiot savaants" who can have high IQ in things like math or art, but are unable to understand emotions, read faces, etc.
2. The key is to show if a change in brain health, size, etc, affects a person. None of these experiments show this. They only show the person in one unchanging brain state. A good experiment would be to examine a person in their 20's who has brain fluid build up, then check in ten years to see if major alterations to personality or capability have occurred.
3. A few of these sources are from the 80's and 90's, using some fairly old computer tech. One of the big studies in which people were questioning the accuracy of his scans was done before Microsoft invented Windows. A few findings within the last decade would be better. These old one's seem like "Bigfoots", if you know what I mean.
4. Many of the links to where these sources can be checked are broken and not working.

There is no evidence that the brain is conscious. What does exist is a materialistic dogma that insists there is no difference between the brain analogue and the mind. It is simply dogma. — EnPassant

I'm sorry, but you are incorrect. Dogma is a claim that the mind exists apart from the brain, when there is no evidence of that being the case. If you had something, anything that would show consciousness existing apart from the brain, then we could have a debate. Your second need to insist it is "Simply dogma" without such evidence is the way dogma actually works. You have not earned the right to use that word yet. Provide some evidence of a mind existing apart from the brain, and you can earn it.

Actually, the human mind is capable of far outstripping the requirements for 'successfully interpreting the world'. Any animal must do that if it is to survive. But h. sapiens has gone far beyond what can be rationalised solely in terms of the requirements for survival. You don't need to be able to weigh and measure the Universe just to get by. — Wayfarer

This has nothing to do with the idea that the consciousness does/does not come from the brain.

That being said, if you're implying there's something special going on, you're misinterpreting this. Life does not just, "Get by". It struggles daily against disease, predators, and in our social case, other human beings. Life is always seeking a way to one up things that would destroy it or cause it harm. It turns out, the most successful creature on this planet that is able to combat almost anything else, is the human being. Higher intelligence has incredible benefits to a person, and the tribe that person belongs to. This is not beyond what can be rationalized in the slightest.

But I don't see this act of self knowledge as another self. It is just the self looking at itself. Self awareness. — EnPassant

There is always a distance between the observer and the observed, even when you observe yourself. That would be why being self-conscious is a problem while acting, speaking publicly, or driving. The part of you observing yourself is not doing the deed, it's observing it, and thus your self is not entirely committed to doing the deed, not 100% in action. The more accurately you try to observe yourself doing something, the less resource you allocate to doing the thing. So observing yourself can be detrimental to the efficacy of your public speaking, or car driving, or whatever action you are trying to observe yourself doing. While acting, one has to be in the act, fully, in order to get optimal results.

The observer cannot be the observed. This would be impossible, even when you observe yourself.

Therefore, self-awareness is never direct and never perfect.

The question that I will keep asking, and no one has offered anything is, "If the mind is not produced from the brain, what is it?" Without evidence, all your saying is, "It could be something else". — Philosophim

I can put the same question to you; what evidence is there that the brain is conscious? All scientists are doing is looking at a physical analogue. Suppose a scientist looks at the workings of a television and discovers many analogues of what is happening in terms of sound and vision and then concludes that the television is creating the film on screen and therefore must be conscious. But none of these physical analogues mean that the television wrote the script for the film or wrote the music score or created the actors on screen or any of that. If the scientist insists that correlation is causation you can see where he went wrong. The television processes information, it does not create it. Information is broadcast to the television from a remote source. Science does not show that the brain is conscious (how could you show something is conscious?) it only interprets the evidence according to a materialistic dogma that does not allow for the existence of mind separate from matter. The instance that correlation is causation is dogma. All scientists can say is 'The only evidence we can find is that the brain is the mind' but they cannot insist that it is. It is only a theory, not an established fact. So why can't someone offer an alternative theory?

Provide some evidence of a mind existing apart from the brain — Philosophim

It doesn't work like that. Besides evidence there is the interpretation of the evidence. These are not the same thing. Scientists interpret physical analogues to argue that brain = mind. Others choose to interpret different things to argue that mind is non material. They are both interpretations of the facts we have. Nothing has been rigorously established. I ask again, how do you show that a physical object is conscious, over and above a theory that it is?

Would you mind clarifying what you meant by this? — Philosophim

The Greeks invented geometry to measure the physical world. Their calculations are congruent with the actual world which is why they were able to create their famous architectural pieces. This means that geometry and deduction about the world is very similar, if not identical, to the objective world. So, to a large extent, we are conscious of what is actually there.

I can put the same question to you; what evidence is there that the brain is conscious? — EnPassant

I already answered this several times. I told you very clearly that you cannot use an "analogue" on something you haven't already proven exists. You are either ignoring this, or do not understand. Go back and read those answers, then feel free to try to counter them. But if you are not going to address the words I've already spoken, I'm not going to repeat them.

So why can't someone offer an alternative theory? — EnPassant

Again, showing you either did not read, or understand what I've already written. You absolutely may offer an alternative theory, but it must have evidence to compete with another theory that has evidence. You have zero evidence of how consciousness can exist apart from the mind.

Provide some evidence of a mind existing apart from the brain
— Philosophim

It doesn't work like that. — EnPassant

You are right. Because there is none. It works like that for evidence that consciousness comes from the brain. It is on you to demonstrate A. Why this is false, which so far, you have not. Or B. Provide evidence that consciousness does not come from the brain, which you have not.

The Greeks invented geometry to measure the physical world. Their calculations are congruent with the actual world which is why they were able to create their famous architectural pieces. This means that geometry and deduction about the world is very similar, if not identical, to the objective world. So, to a large extent, we are conscious of what is actually there. — EnPassant

Ok, so you agree with my meter stick analogy and point then. Please go back and read my replies to you carefully about evidence for consciousness coming from the brain, and why the use of "analogue" does not work. If you address them, then we can continue the conversation.

You absolutely may offer an alternative theory, but it must have evidence to compete with another theory that has evidence. — Philosophim

What I am saying is that the theory that brain = mind is a default position, a theory, not a proven fact.
You ask for evidence but the problem here is with the word 'evidence'. Evidence can be data, physical facts or convincing argument. But in your world view - if I understand you correctly - only physical facts are admissible as evidence. Argument is not acceptable to you without physical facts. So you get to define what is and what is not evidence and the dice are loaded in your favour.

But reducing everything to physical facts is a philosophy known as Logical Positivism which is a failed philosophy. You may read up on why this philosophy has failed. Do a search for 'Why did logical positivism fail?' It is a complex question but here is a start https://tribune.com.pk/story/967286/the-rise-and-fall-of-logical-positivism

So you are relying on a dead philosophy - as people like Richard Dawkins and many others are - to make assertions about 'proof' and what science has shown and you are confusing theory with fact. Given the failure of this philosophy it cannot be asserted that brain = mind is established science, it is only a default position and defaults can be challenged, especially if they are built on a failed philosophy.

I'm very open to hylomorphism, but the Aristotelian 'hyle' is nothing like the modern conception of matter. — Wayfarer

Correct.

Secondly, hylomorphic dualism still implies a duality, insofar as 'the rational soul' is the principle within the human which is in principle immortal. That is highly developed in various forms of Thomistic philosophy, and so is still largely accepted by many Catholics, however for very obvious reasons is completely incompatible with Dennett's Darwinian materialism. And it's still dualism! — Wayfarer

The phrase "hylomorphic dualism" is a label coined for the Thomist version of hylomorphism:

Hylemorphic dualism is the approach to the mind-body problem taken by Aquinas and the Thomist tradition more generally. (The label may have been coined by David Oderberg... — Edward Feser

Whereas, to the contrary, Aristotle's hylomorphism is not dualist. Matter and form (of which the soul is an example) are not separable from particulars except as abstractions:

So, Aristotle claims, “It’s clear that the soul is not separable from the body – or that certain parts of it, if it naturally has parts, are not separable from the body” (De Anima ii 1, 413a3–5).
...
His hylomorphism, then, embraces neither reductive materialism nor Platonic dualism. Instead, it seeks to steer a middle course between these alternatives by pointing out, implicitly, and rightly, that these are not exhaustive options. — Hylomorphic Soul-Body Relations: Materialism, Dualism, Sui Generis? - Aristotle’s Psychology - SEP

The philosopher Peter Hacker argues that the hard problem is misguided in that it asks how consciousness can emerge from matter, whereas in fact sentience emerges from the evolution of living organisms.
— Wikipedia

It just re-states the problem in other terms, it doesn't solve it. — Wayfarer

It fixes the conceptual problem at issue. Hacker makes a concrete proposal that doesn't assume dualism.

What I am saying is that the theory that brain = mind is a default position, a theory, not a proven fact. — EnPassant

No, that's not a theory. That's a hypothesis, a postulate, a proposal. Not a theory when speaking in terms of science.

"a hypothesis is an idea that hasn't been proven yet. If enough evidence accumulates to support a hypothesis, it moves to the next step — known as a theory — in the scientific method and becomes accepted as a valid explanation of a phenomenon.

Tanner further explained that a scientific theory is the framework for observations and facts. Theories may change, or the way that they are interpreted may change, but the facts themselves don't change. Tanner likens theories to a basket in which scientists keep facts and observations that they find. "
https://www.livescience.com/21491-what-is-a-scientific-theory-definition-of-theory.html

Evidence can be data, physical facts or convincing argument. But in your world view - if I understand you correctly - only physical facts are admissible as evidence. — EnPassant

Lets clarify then. First, a "convincing argument" means a rational argument concluded with deduction. Deductions must then be applied and tested against reality to ensure we had the entire picture, and that the deduction holds when faced with other people, or use in reality.

For example, we could deduce in physics that if X object is applied Y force in a vector, it will accelerate at Z speed. So we go outside, we do that, but it doesn't work. We think about it for a moment and we realize we didn't take into account the wind. So we go indoors without any wind, and it turns out our deduction works. We just forgot to take wind as a factor.

If you make a claim about reality, you must test it against reality. It is not that everything MUST reduce to physical reality, it is that we have discovered no reality that is not physical (matter and energy). Same with consciousness. We have not discovered any application of "deduction or rational argument" that consciousness exists apart from the brain. It does not exist. I'm sorry. You seem very passionate about this, which implies there must be some emotional reason why you keep wanting this. I am not saying you don't have to give up on your desire that consciousness exists separate from the mind, but you have to demonstrate in some way, that your theory about consciousness actually exists in some way that can be demonstrated.

Finally, I am not a logical positivist. I am not accusing you of holding any particular philosophy, I am asking you to think rationally for yourself. Please do the same for me.

the theory of evolution, if it is to explain the existence of conscious life, must become more than just a physical theory. — Thomas Nagel

It is already. Biology cannot be reduced to physics.

This is a case of philosophers talking past each other. Strawson for example, seems to be asking for answers to the hard problem. Dennett keeps reaching for easier ones in response. That is the variance going on here. Thus, Dennett is going to be the favored theory for people who want to really just how neuroscience relates to cognitive psychology and the like. However, that isn't really the metaphysical question at hand.

Strawson for example, seems to be asking for answers to the hard problem. Dennett keeps reaching for easier ones in response. — schopenhauer1

Strawson is responding to Dennett, not vice versa.

Strawson is responding to Dennett, not vice versa. — Kenosha Kid

But what is Dennett's response to the hard problem, if not to retreat to easier ones?

But what is Dennett's response to the hard problem, if not to retreat to easier ones? — schopenhauer1

What is your point here? That anyone who researches anything to do with mind must answer one question and nothing else? That's not how research works. You cannot dismiss the work of, say, all physicists who do not have a Theory of Everything.

What is your point here? That anyone who researches anything to do with mind must answer one question and nothing else? That's not how research works. You cannot dismiss the work of, say, all physicists who do not have a Theory of Everything. — Kenosha Kid

No, Dennett is fine doing what he is doing. As long as we can say that he doesn't have an answer for the hard problem, cool. But what I don't think is right is to say that his project necessarily explains what is being debated in circles that do believe there is the hard problem of consciousness.

In case you needed a definition, this Wikipedia introduction isn't bad:

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why and how we have qualia[note 1] or phenomenal experiences. That is to say, why do we have personal, first-person experiences, often described as experiences that feel "like something." In comparison, we assume there are no such experiences for inanimate things like, for instance, a thermostat, toaster, computer or, theoretically, a sophisticated form of artificial intelligence.[2] The philosopher David Chalmers, who introduced the term "hard problem of consciousness,"[3] contrasts this with the "easy problems" of explaining the physical systems that give us and other animals the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, and so forth.[4] Easy problems are (relatively) easy because all that is required for their solution is to specify a mechanism that can perform the function.[4] That is, even though we have yet to solve most of the easy problems (our understanding of the brain is still preliminary), these questions can probably eventually be understood by relying entirely on standard scientific methods.[4] Chalmers claims that even once we have solved such problems about the brain and experience, the hard problem will "persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained".[4] — Wikipedia article on the Hard Problem of Conscioiusness