Even if we say red sensations are relational, we're still left with the problem of explaining how the neural activity which produces them does so. So far, neural activity along with every other objective fact of the world can be described without reference to the sensations we experience the world with.

That's a problem, regardless of how you characterize it, and whether it's the end result of a reporting mechanism. There needs to be an explanation for how the sensations are produced.

Certainly a viewer cognizes the results of combinations of parts to whole. What is that on its own without the viewer though? — schopenhauer1

Is that a metaphysical question?

Is that a metaphysical question? — Srap Tasmaner

Yes.

It’s a question of whether objects having parts is coherent and consistent with physics. If not, then complex objects don’t exist.

Kind of similar to arguing over the coherency of qualia.

But what is emerging into what? How? — schopenhauer1

What is emerging is a functional structure. How is the core of the problem.

Embryology has made progress and so has evolution theory, but neither can fully explain ontogenesis or phylogenesis, respectively.

Generally, in biology, the process of creating a new structure involve folding a line or a surface onto itself to create a 3d structure, like an origami. In other words, your "epistemic cut" often looks like an invagination, an indentation, a wrapping. A fold. The folding is automatic. The archetypical example is the folding of proteins, in which a chain of amino acids folds into a functional enzyme:



There is something fractal in this capacity to create structures with lines, or surfaces:


Flower blooming


Embryonic development of the human face

In all cases, note the rather surprising approach: the seemingly infinite production of new flowers at the core of the inflorescence, the apparent absurdity of the face development. This is what emergence does look like: it's not designed and built like a human architect or an engineer would have done it. It grows, a certain growth is happening, that leads in surprising ways to a familiar structure (a plant, a flower, a face).

In summary, a line folded many times can create a structure. This would be how the DNA linear code can produce a 3D organism. Nowhere in that DNA code can one find a map of the individual it belongs to. It just codes for self-folding proteins, who act upon each other and their environment in ultra complex feedback loops to produce a biostructure.

Emergence is a self-folding origami.

how is it that downward causation or top-down causation works without a viewer? — schopenhauer1

In biology, the short answer is through feedback loops. The classic example is a thermostat that can regulate a room temperature. Life is essentially a set of feedback loops, at all levels, everywhere. From the biochemistry to the cell to the organism to the ecosystem and back (of course!). Note that once again it is some kind of folding, but not a topologic one this time: a folding of causality, a causal fold.

Take calculating some iterative algorithm that has no p-type solution. The step you happen to be on isn't the 'result' of the process, it's just the transient stage you're currently at. If we did want a result it might more properly be something like 'you're going to doing this forever', or 'you'll never get a number below 100', or some such limit. That's the way I'm seeing perceptual processing, from day one the perception is not a result, its a prediction to be input into the algorithm generating the next perception... — Isaac

I was perhaps unclear. By the result of a process, I mean a single execution of some brain function, for instance V1. One of the things V1 is responsible for, as I understand it, is edge detection. An 'edge' is something we are conscious of, but it's not something distinct in raw optical data, i.e. the inputs to V1. It is an output or result of V1. Yes, that output might be modulated by new data or future feedback; nonetheless 'this edge' is an output of a particular process of V1. This would be analogous to the result of a single iteration of your algorithm, not some potentially unattainable final answer.

In all cases, note the rather surprising approach: the seemingly infinite production of new flowers at the core of the inflorescence, the apparent absurdity of the face development. This is what emergence does look like: it's not designed and built like a human architect or an engineer would have done it. It grows, a certain growth is happening, that leads in surprising ways to a familiar structure (a plant, a flower, a face). — Olivier5

This is just lovely. What an excellent post.

It’s a question of whether objects having parts is coherent and consistent with physics. If not, then complex objects don’t exist. — Marchesk

Yawn.

You asked whether it was a part of metaphysics. I was explaining to you how it is. Whether you find it interesting is irrelevant.

Hmm. See the Dennett quote at ... It's not "illusionism"; thinking a tornado is an illusion would be... counterproductive.

Red isn't part of our scientific explanation of the world. And yet we all have sensations. — Marchesk

Red isn't part of our scientific description of the world? That's a step too far. We have plenty of science around red, blue, green and so on. Physical science, involving frequencies, and physical and chemical structure; physiological science, involving retinas and cone cells and so on; Psychological science, involving illusions and language...

Red in not incommensurate with science. We are able to take casual talk about red and translate it into talk that is more 'scientific'; if we could not, we would have good reason to doubt the utility of science.

Here I have in mind Davidson's argument in On the very idea of a conceptual schema. It's not that we are dealing with conceptual schemes that simply cannot be translated one into the other.

The case is more interesting with intentions and intentionality. See my thread on Philosophy and jigsaw puzzles... I'm reading Mary Midgley, who expresses similar views. Could there be a neural equivalent of "I want scrambled eggs for breakfast"?

But that's nothing to do with qualia; their role here has been to add confusion.

As Chalmers and Nagel have argued, the red sensation is not part of any objective explanation. Rather, it's either a label ("red light") or the known end result ("red sensation"). It can be removed and it doesn't effect the science at all. It's a correlation with our talk of sensations.

As Block and Lanier have argued, we don't know whether the red sensation is itself biological or functional. So a computer might implement the same functionality and not have red sensations. Or maybe it does, and so do meteor showers and nation states on the occasions they implement said functionality. Both of which imply some sort of weird identity that's absent from the biological or functional concepts.

But this is most plainly put is Locke's primary qualities being used in science, while the secondary qualities themselves remain unexplained. Somehow the primary qualities in an organism results in secondary ones, but so far no explanation has shown how. Thus, the hard problem remains.

...the red sensation is not part of any objective explanation. — Marchesk

Take out the loaded term "objective" and what do you have?

Red is used in explanations. I handed you that cup because it is red.

Introduce the problematic division of objective and subjective statements and of course you end up with an inability to bridge the great divide that is the hard problem. It's sitting in your assumptions.

Red is used in explanations. I handed you that cup because it is red. — Banno

That's not scientific. The red isn't the reflective surface, it's not the lighting, it's not the activated cones, it's not the electrical impulses going to my visual cortex, and it's not the neural activity.

Unless you wish to defend either color realism or mind-brain identity.

Introduce the problematic division of objective and subjective statements and of course you end up with an inability to bridge the great divide that is the hard problem. It's sitting in your assumptions. — Banno

You don't need to. Just use the terms of sensation and the terms of neurons, electromagnetic radiation and molecular surfaces and you'll see there's a mismatch. Ordinary language analysis doesn't help here.

That's not scientific. — Marchesk

And...?

Again, if you assume a distinction between objective and subjective statements, you shouldn't be surprised to find that you can't bridge the gap you created.

...mismatch... — Marchesk

We end up with two different ways of talking about the same thing. The coin is an alloy of tin and copper; and it can be exchanged for a bag of lollies. That's not a mismatch.

Again, if you assume a distinction between objective and subjective statements, you shouldn't be surprised to find that you can't bridge the gap you created. — Banno

The distinction falls out of whatever language you wish to use, because our perceptions of the world and mental processes differ from the world.

We end up with two different ways of talking about the same thing. The coin is an alloy of tin and copper; and it can be exchanged for a bag of lollies. That's not a mismatch. — Banno

But you agreed earlier in this thread that red isn't electromagnetic radiation of certain wavelength. Are you saying now the entire process is identical to having a red sensation?

Hm. Stop reacting and have a think for a bit.

I've thought through the consciousness debate more than any other philosophical subject, which includes reading and listening to debates.

...

Painted using a matte house paint with the least possible gloss, on stretched canvas, 3.5 meters tall and 7.8 meters wide, in the Museo Reina Sofia in Madrid.

An anti-war statement displaying the terror and suffering of people and animals.

Two ways of talking about the very same thing.

Do we need to reduce one to the other?

Thinking for a wee bit ...

Although the original is identical to the materials which make up the painting (when arranged in that particular fashion), the image itself can be reproduce in other media, such as the digital version you posted. So although we might be tempted to say that a red cup is identical to the process of perception of seeing a cup, we can also produce red cup experiences in dreams, imagination and hallucinations.

So then it would seem sensations like images can be produced by different processes.

And...?

It's the conclusion that counts here. What do you conclude?

I don’t have conclusions in this debate. It remains a puzzle.

Sweet. On that we might agree. Where we might differ is that I remain unconvinced that there is a puzzle.

Yes, and that gets my goat.

Which pleases me immensely...

I somewhat agree with this, if we grant Dennett's arguments for quniing qualia. However, you do seem to be espousing illusionism in this paragraph. Which would be that we're being deluded by some trick of cognition into thinking sensations of color, sound, paint, etc. are something they're not, which is some form of the private, ineffable subjectivity. — Marchesk

What are sensations of color?

Combinations of red, green, blue visual experiences. Are you a color realist?

What are red, green, blue visual experiences?

Are you blind from birth? What is the point of this sort of questioning?

...you do seem to be espousing illusionism in this paragraph. Which would be that we're being deluded by some trick of cognition into thinking sensations of color, sound, paint, etc. are something they're not, which is some form of the private, ineffable subjectivity. — Marchesk

What are these things you called "sensations of color, sound, paint, etc."

What is their nature? I don’t know, nor does anyone else, it would seem. What I do know is they are the result of certain animal nervous systems when perceiving, dreaming, etc. But they vary by species, and to some degree, by individual. Take three people in a room. One feels cold, another warm and the third just right. But the thermometer measures the same temperature. This sort of thing was noticed by ancient philosophers in Greece, India and China.