No observation rules this belief out. It is ruled out by logic, it doesn't require any observation at all. — Isaac
But other (background) beliefs would compel us to interpret our observations (i.e. laden them with the theory contained in those beliefs) as demonstrating that self-contradictory belief to be so. Since a self-contradictory belief cannot be so — which we already knew, yes — we cannot within contradiction maintain those beliefs according to which our our observations demonstrate the contradictory belief to be true. — Pfhorrest
But that still leaves you with an observation that your background beliefs plus the theory under consideration together say should be impossible — logically impossibly, in conjunction with all those beliefs. All those beliefs and the thing they would have you say you observed cannot all be true at once...
...Either way, the observation of something your beliefs say should be logically impossible compels the revision of some beliefs or others to avoiding having to conclude that you observed something logically impossible. — Pfhorrest
Observations don't demonstrate any belief to be either true or false, they underdetermine. — Isaac
Try it in these terms...
Belief A is a belief about logic {X and ~Y, where X implies Y, is inconsistent}.
Belief B is an inductive belief {that X implies Y}
Belief C is a belief in an observation {that I just observed X and also ~Y}.
Resulting from C one could believe ~C, ~B, or ~A. One cannot believe A, B, and C. But we knew this all along. Prior to C, one could believe A and B. After C, one could believe A and B. C hasn't changed anything — Isaac
Not with sufficient additional beliefs about C, and additional beliefs don't falsify anything. — Isaac
applying the abstracted logic of deduction to inductive reasoning — Janus
If we don't see fossil remains that show such a development that does not falsify the hypothesis of evolution definitively, because the fossils may have been destroyed by processes of which we are not aware. — Janus
The whole point is that inductive reasoning is not valid. No number of observations of the consequent of an implication can tell you that the antecedent of it is true. It's invalid for one case, and it's still invalid after a million cases. — Pfhorrest
When it comes to science inductive and abductive reasoning is all we have. — Janus
The critical rationalist / falsificationist account is aiming precisely to rectify that problem. — Pfhorrest
I don't see how it can do that when it necessarily relies on the inductive assumptions that have been codified as the so-called laws of nature. If nature were not assumed to be invariant, then all of science would be utterly at sea; and I can't see how falsification could help with that, because the compass is always abductive reasoning based on induction (the expectation that the law-like behavior of things will remain as it has been found to be). Falsification can never be definitive, any more than verification can. How much less definitive would it be if there were no inductive assumption that the laws of nature cannot change? — Janus
But again they can be reversed to make verification and falsification logically equivalent. So, I could assert "Not all swans are white", and the observation of a black swan would verify this claim just as it falsifies the obverse claim "No swans are white". — Janus
Assuming that there are some invariant laws of nature or another is not itself induction. Only seeing a lot of examples of a pattern and taking that as evidence that that pattern is an invariant law of nature is. — Pfhorrest
The observation of a black swan would tell you nothing at all about whether "no swans are white". — Pfhorrest
Changing those theories to reinterpret the observation in a way that doesn’t falsify the theory you’re trying to test is still changing what theories you believe in response to observation. — Pfhorrest
Belief C hinges on the theories with which the observation is laden. If you reject C, then you have to change those beliefs that would otherwise lead you to conclude that C. — Pfhorrest
if we’re getting into the realm of possibly rejecting logical entailments then we’re free to be wildly inconsistent and not reject anything; all this is premised on caring about logical consistency — Pfhorrest
In any case, you have to reject some beliefs you already had: either throw out B (the obvious first choice), throw out some part of the background beliefs that lead you to believe C (probably a much taller order) — Pfhorrest
If you have to add additional beliefs to hang on to your belief system — your belief system cannot retain consistency with your experience without adding those other beliefs —then you have falsified the negations of those beliefs. — Pfhorrest
It is. Your claim is the ability to falsify them, not change them around. — Isaac
No, as I said below, usually all that's needed is additional beliefs - no changes required. — Isaac
a) Why is throwing out C a much taller order? In the vast majority of complex cases, the idea that our observations are incorrect is the most go-to answer to any inconsistencies. We can't even trust our observations with the simplest of matters (see optical illusions), so when it comes to interpreting complex scientific experiments, rejecting C is the number one choice. — Isaac
b) More importantly, you're doing your old trick of completely ignoring the bits of the counter argument you don't like. — Isaac
I've just explained how there's no need to reject C, one usually adds beliefs to C — Isaac
The additional beliefs which allows C+B is underdetermined by the range of available additional beliefs which would do that job. — Isaac
Adding a belief to your set of beliefs is changing that set of beliefs, and as above, if you're epistemically compelled to make that change, that's the same thing as that set of beliefs being falsified. — Pfhorrest
's just the negation of fideism, where that in turn is the claim that some beliefs are beyond question, beyond refutation, unable to possibly be shown false or incorrect or wrong. — Pfhorrest
So, what is it you imagine the fideist thinks in our scenario that is different from the critical rationalism you espouse? They believe A. They believe B, they believe C (which logically contradicts B without some additional beliefs - ie contradicts A). What then? Using a real example, what does this mythical fideist then think? — Isaac
They're not allowed to explain C away using any revisions or further beliefs, because that's just 'critical rationalism' apparently. — Isaac
In any of the A-B-C scenarios we've been discussing, they hopefully will admit to A (not be explicitly logically inconsistent), and probably have some B that they hold immune to question, and so will resort to revising C. — Pfhorrest
Anyone who clings to some particular belief with unreasonable tenacity and will jump through whatever mental hoops necessary to excuse or dismiss any evidence that would otherwise apparently disprove it. — Pfhorrest
Fideism shares the "liberalism" part of my "critical liberalism"*, but it negates the "criticism" part of it: the fideist agrees with me that you are free to hold beliefs without proving them first, but also thinks that you may hold beliefs as utterly beyond disproof. — Pfhorrest
Fideism proper really only applies to beliefs that are unverifiable. Such beliefs are obviously also unfalsifiable, — Janus
Other kinds of claims that are not about what is or isn't real -- like philosophical claims, logical/mathematical claims, and moral claims -- can be tested by means other than empirical observation, and so do not necessarily demand fideism. — Pfhorrest
In Srap's example, "C" is the set of all of the background assumptions made when first making the observation, which include that the dish is clear of debris. Upon seeing an unexpected signal, a possible revision to the beliefs to account for that is "maybe there is dirt on the dish". Because "there is no dirt on the dish" was one of the beliefs within C, positing that maybe there is dirt on the dish is a change to C, a change away from the old C to some new set of background assumptions very much like C but different in whether there is thought to be dirt on the dish. That constitutes a rejection of C.
(Of course, in the actual case of Srap's example, that replacement for C in turn was quickly falsified itself, as the observations expected from the hypothesis that there is not dirt on the dish soon failed to materialize, when they didn't see any dirt on the dish. Sure, they could have still hypothesized invisible dirt instead of abandoning that hypothesis, but supposing there's a CMB was less of a huge change to the accepted view than everything that would be required to suppose there's invisible dirt on the dish). — Pfhorrest
It also fails to account for the fact that investigating actually works -- it shouldn't, because you can always just reject the new observation, or you can find some way to take it on-board without falsifying anything, always. — Srap Tasmaner
"Strange radio signal? Maybe it's an equipment error. No. Maybe it's something on the dish. Pigeons were on the dish, now they're not, so that fixed it? No. Maybe something else is still on the dish. There was dirt on the dish, now there's not, so that fixed it? No. Maybe there's... invisible dirt on the dish? No, that's too far-fetched (would require modifying too many other assumptions). So maybe there is a real radio signal. Is it coming from other terrestrial sources? No. Other astronomical sources? No. Could there be... invisible sources? That's almost as far-fetched as invisible dirt. (But lets check anyway... nope). So maybe there really is a microwave-frequency signal coming from all directions? Well it looks like it's either that or something like invisible dirt, and as weird as some cosmic microwave background radiation is, that's less weird (required modifying fewer other assumptions) than invisible dirt." — Pfhorrest
far-fetched (would require modifying too many other assumptions). — Pfhorrest
less weird (requires modifying fewer other assumptions) — Pfhorrest
That doesn’t mean we can’t discuss the merits of using different methods ourselves in the first person. Which is all I do in my arguments for my methodology: illustrate why doing things otherwise is more likely to lead you into or keep your in error than this way, so it’s in your interest, if you care about figuring out the truth, to do it this way. It’s not all about judging other people. — Pfhorrest
unreasonable — Pfhorrest
plausible — Pfhorrest
obvious — Pfhorrest
unwieldy — Pfhorrest
In order to advocate it you must at least have judged that there exist people which do not follow this method — Isaac
you've advocated this method on a board dedicated to the discussion of philosophy, not class of primary school children whom you might prima facie suspect of benefiting from guidance. — Isaac
So you cannot dismiss anyone's though process without that dismissal simply being grounded on the fact that you personally find their revision of C (rather than revision of B) to be 'unreasonable' in the circumstances - yet you've given no account at all of how you justify that assessment. — Isaac
they're assumptions it didn't even occur to us that we had taken any position about until something we didn't expect happens and we're pressed to explain what exactly about our expectations was in error. — Pfhorrest
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