Platonism

Tristan L

inability to support the excluded middle as an a priori law of reason — Gary M Washburn

Well, LEM follows from LNC (the Law of Not-Contradiction) and LDN (the Law of Double Negation) like so: For every proposition A, it’s true that if
0. neither A nor NOT(A) (Premise/Forestep),
then
1. NOT(A) (from (0.))
2. NOT(NOT(A)) (from (0.))
3. A (from (2.) by LDN)
4. A AND NOT(A) (from (3.) and (1.)),
which latter proposition goes against LNC. Hence, we must always have either A or NOT(A).

By the way, this is not the same principle as the Principle of Bivalence, which states that each proposition is either true or false (untrue; untruth/falsehood is stronger than not-truth). Indeed, LEM is weaker than BP, and while the former is a basic law of logic (witcraft), the latter is likely false due to the probable existence of chance and free will. I’ve said more on this topic starting here.

Tristan L

@Gary M Washburn I find the Shape (Form, Idea, Widea) of Contrariety indeed spellbinding. Let’s now apply it to itself in a way: If everything isn’t either-or, but rather neither-nor, then in particular, everything is neither either-or nor neither-nor. And we can go on that way further (neither (either either-or or neither-nor), nor (neither either-or nor neither-nor), asf.) to infinity and beyond. I find this way of thinking useful when trying to reach the unreachable Beyondly Absolute.

Gary M Washburn

Spoken like Zeno, Parmenides' shill. Both your comments are question begging. The law of contradiction does not prove itself. I've said over and over, reason must be convicted of the continuity of terms to begin its reductive process, but cannot prove this conviction. And so suffers dynamism to it, from which its terms ultimately emerge and grow. You are taking your conclusion as axiomatic. Taking what you find as what you were looking for, because it comes to your mind. A subject "is" a predicate? What do you mean? You seem to be taking predication as certifiable assertion of coherent belonging of a hermetic class. But that is not what "is" is, not what predication is. Predication is an assertion that a subject has something of the character of a predicate, not that it is a hermetic and finite pigeon hole rigidly fixed and secured the subject said to be something of it. A is something like B, B is something like C, does not in the slightest mean that A is anything at all like C. Take it any further than that and you are doing dogma, not philosophy. Philosophy is not science. Only a dogmatist could say it is. What do they teach in schools these days!? Language is a human artifact, not a machine determining reality. Thinking we ever completely sync on the meaning of terms or even the forms of reason is laughable, any more than it is reasonable to suppose we experience anything at all in perfect sync. We can pretend to adhere to scientific definitions, but who defined them when there was no science, but pretty effective language? First we have to recognize a separate mind, and a desire to be less separate, and yet not fall thrall to what we do share. We are constantly struggling with our own internal tendency to become enthralled into our definitions, and set each other free only where we do achieve some degree of recognition we are not in sync in them. And that recognition is how language comes into being and grows. Your prejudice toward the hermetic proposition puts the brakes on that dynamism, and ultimately puts you out of sync with all humanity save those few sorry dogmatists you probably hooked up with in a classroom somewhere. There ought to a period of purgation from such "learning" in which we are taught to forget it all, and to think instead of applying rules. Have you ever watched a kid learn to talk? Ever had a romance? Ever had a fight with your boss, or an encounter with the law? If any of these, and so much more, it is hard to see you still believing in the excluded middle. Kant agrees with me, if you don't. More recently, of course, it is hard to find such honesty.

Gary M Washburn

[Why do I keep getting notifications about your posts hours after I have already responded?]

Aristotle illustrates your point by saying:

Socrates is a man
All men are Mortal
Therefore:
Socrates is mortal.
I assume you subscribe to this. But, ever ask why the quantifier? Does "is" need a quantifier to be determinant? If Aristotle thinks so, and Kant thinks so, why can't you at least entertain the possibility I have a legitimate area of inquiry? If "is" is the qualifier between subject and predicate, and not a quantifier, as analysts (like yourself?) would have it, then there simply is no rational basis for treating it like some fantasized Venn diagram! These dogmatic shifts are a crime against mind, not a discovery of its law. I do understand the glee with which "rationalists" must relish their newfound place the real power systems of the world "technology" lets them feel (though a computer, for all its utility, is nothing more than an automatic - not autonomous - filing system!). But this is no excuse for neglecting its proper role of reasoned dissension from such systems. When the hell did philosophy become the vigilante of uniformity in ideas?!!!! Drop the quantifiers ("a" and "all') and the "deduction" falls to pieces.

George is like Sam.
Sam is vain.
Therefore, George is vain?????

Tristan L

You are taking your conclusion as axiomatic. Taking what you find as what you were looking for, because it comes to your mind. — Gary M Washburn

I don’t think so, for I didn’t assume LEM; rather, I proved it with the help of LNC and LDN. These two, in turn, follow directly from the wist (essence) of negation. Of course, all this, including LNC and LDN, has yet to be derived from the Orprinciple beyond being and not-being.

Predication is an assertion that a subject has something of the character of a predicate — Gary M Washburn

The way I see it, predication is the assertion that something has some property or more broadly some broadthing (universal), where Having is something I have admittedly not yet been able to define. However, I think that it might be so groundlaying (fundamental) that speech cannot be used to define it, and that the hyge (nous) has to be used to directly “see” the Shape of Having.

Your prejudice toward the hermetic proposition puts the brakes on that dynamism, and ultimately puts you out of sync with all humanity save those few sorry dogmatists you probably hooked up with in a classroom somewhere. — Gary M Washburn

Why do you seem to be accusing me of dogmatism when you in fact appear to be dogmatic? After all, it’s you who seems to take the existence of other minds for granted, while I’m the one who does not venture to make such a daring assumption. Regarding my sync, I’m pretty well in sync with my surroundings, and my platonist philosophy has served and does serve me pretty well. Small ‘p’ platonism is almost certainly true, fair (beautiful), is in sync with mathematics and modern physics, is a very sublime philosophy, and has nice consequences such as a deathless soul. It has a beyondly aspect, but in the realm of being, witcraft, though limited, does it’s job pretty well. What is it that you have qualms with?

Socrates is a man
All men are Mortal
Therefore:
Socrates is mortal.
I assume you subscribe to this. — Gary M Washburn

Yes:

For every x, if x has manhood, then x has mortality.

Socrates has manhood.

Hence, Socrates has mortality.

If "is" is the qualifier between subject and predicate, and not a quantifier, as analysts (like yourself?) would have it — Gary M Washburn

Who said that ‘is’ is a quantifier? The word ‘is’ has several, though related, meanings, and in the context we’re dealing with here, it means the relationship of having something as a property (ownship).

I think that I should point out here that the undercollection-relationship (⊆) is not the same as the membership-relationship (∈), and likewise, the (has-as-an-ownship)-relation is different from the (lets-follow-as-a-property)-relation. The former relation is born by Socrates to manhood and to mortality, whereas the latter one is born by manhood to mortality.

Ever had a romance? — Gary M Washburn

Yes, I have several long-running ongoing romances :wink:, namely with Rightwiseness (Justice), Cleanness, Wisdom, Knowledge, Truth, Fairness (Beauty), Goodness, Oneness, Godhood, and Beyondness. However, I’m likely still very, very, very far away from my beloveds.

Ever had a fight with your boss — Gary M Washburn

Don’t worry, I’m not schizophrenic, but in a way, yes, I had and still sometimes have :wink:.

If any of these, and so much more, it is hard to see you still believing in the excluded middle. — Gary M Washburn

As a radical asker, I do question LEM and even the LSIs (the Law of Self-Identity and the Law of Self-Implication), but I find it hard to see how someone could not believe in LEM. Okay, let’s say LEM isn’t true; then all of what you’ve said may be neither the case nor not the case, right? Selfing (self-reference, self-relationships, self-awareness, asf.) is truly spellbinding, and especially in philosophy, we should very often make use of it, shouldn’t we?

why can't you at least entertain the possibility I have a legitimate area of inquiry? — Gary M Washburn

Who said that I don’t?

Drop the quantifiers ("a" and "all') and the "deduction" falls to pieces. — Gary M Washburn

Please give me a reason for dropping them!

though a computer, for all its utility — Gary M Washburn

... such as allowing us to have this very discussion.

though a computer, for all its utility, is nothing more than an automatic - not autonomous - filing system! — Gary M Washburn

But if true random number generators are in built, which is already the case in some computers (reckonils), this need not be the case. Bear in mind that the human brain is a physical object which obeys exactly the same laws as a reckonil, so if the reckonil has the right info-processing ability (which current computers likely don’t have, but future ones likely will), why should a soul take up residence in a human (or other animal) brain but not in a reckonil?

George is like Sam.
Sam is vain.
Therefore, George is vain????? — Gary M Washburn

Here, you seem to be making a similar mistake to the one made (perhaps on purpose) by Socrates in e.g. the Parmenides: treating relationships as if they had a slottedness (arity) other from the one they really (soothly) have. You appear to be making a statement whose precise meaning you yourself do not quite know. Thus, you seem to have entangled yourself in wrong assumptions and so arrived at an unwarranted conclusion, whereupon you put the blame on witcraft (logic) when it is in fact you who are not quite clear about what you yourself mean. And guess who’s to the rescure to free you from your entanglement? Quantifiers!

Likeness isn’t a one-slotted relation, as Socrates appears to treat it in the Parmenides, and also not a binary relationship, as you are apparently treating it, but rather a three-slotted relationship. It relates two things F, U and a way W to each other such that F is like U in the way W. So your sentence “George is like Sam” is about as meaningful as the sentence “the number 5 is greater than”. That is, unless it is short for “there is a way W such that George is like Sam in the way W” (mark the existential quantifier). Let’s give you the freme (benefit) of a doubt and assume that you (underconsciously) have the second, meaningful statement in mind rather than the first, meaningless one. In that case, your argument becomes:

George is like Sam in some way.
Sam is vain.
Therefore, George is vain?????

Of course your argument is invalid, for the conclusion does NOT follow from the foresteps (premises). They don’t say in which way George is like Sam, so the conclusion is based on the unwarranted assumption that the way in question is vainness. So witcraft has no problem whatsoever. Rather, those who make imprecise formulations are the ones to blame. This is actually in accordance with your right observation that speech has come into being and evolves, isn’t it?

Both your comments are question begging. — Gary M Washburn

What? How could the second comment possibly beg a question? After all, it doesn’t really even make a stamement. It’s goal is to give the idea of applying selfing to contrariety. It even hints at the absolute beyondness of the Absolute, in particular its transcendence beyond reason. Shouldn’t that be something to your taste?

These dogmatic shifts are a crime against mind, not a discovery of its law. — Gary M Washburn

Since when has logic become dogmatic? (You might not be saying this, so if you don’t, please tell me.) Since when has brooking (using) this wonderful, though ultimately limited, tool for exploring the abstract world become a crime? Witcraft a crime? Doesn’t that sound like zealous dogmatism?

Also, witcraft isn’t really derived from language. The Greek word “logic” may suggest this, but the English word “witcraft” hints us in the right direction: witcraft is discovered directly by the wit, an aspect of the mind. Witcraft is very successful in both practical and highly theoretical fields. What do you find amiss with it?

"rationalists" — Gary M Washburn

Just in case you think that I’m a rationalist – I’m not. In these comments and already much earlier, I hint at absolute transcendence, and I’m perfectly aware that it includes standing above and beyond logic, reason, and thought. From what I’ve learned about him so far, I greatly bewonder (admire) Damascius’ thought. Do I need to say more to show that I find beyondness absolutely spellbinding?

Gary M Washburn

Could'a fooled me! Damascious seems to have eluded my notice, though I'm sure I've come across something of him somewhere, I make a pretty thorough overview of the literature. All the signs of rationalism as I understand it. Certainly not Platonic. In Timaeus (and elsewhere), Plato horses around with divine design, but a careful reading will show he is ridiculing it. Athens defeats Atlantis because it, Athens, is embedded in a dialectic of loss and response to it that ultimately causes it to be stronger than divinely governed Atlantis, which saps its strength in the ritual repetition and preservation of received forms. In the end the gods erase themselves from being altogether. As they are about to announce their verdict upon the world they vanish,,,. This sort of thing is how Plato intimates his real meaning. Few if any catch it, and suppose he means to order the world by triangles and circles.

What you are experiencing is that time in incalculable worth. And that the dialectical engagement of honest and competent reasoners, forced to quantify the world by the strictures of reason, but always necessarily from an unjustifiably assumed axiom, helping each other escape their conviction in that unjustified axiom simply by being of an alternative opinion of what they mean. The rational reduction of that difference of perceived terms to the least term of that difference brings us to a complementary contrariety to the convictions we both share, and so alter all terms antecedent to that complement we are to it. In this way we recognize the loss of the continuity in our convictions we find ourselves contrary to in a kind of community in contrariety against that conviction, and yet distinguish each other as much contrary to each other as contrary to that conviction lost to us, and emancipated us from, as the moment of our being reduced that loss to its lest term. It's a sort of quantum moment of ideas. But reduced loss to its least term we not only suffer the loss as the healing term of conviction, or emancipating us from conviction, but in being complement to each other and yet contrary to each other in that therapy of emancipation, we perceive the quality of reasoning we each bring to the drama of it that we would never have a chance of perceiving if we were simply meant to agree. That perception is impossible if the universe is divinely or mathematically/geometrically ordered. And, if the dialectic is permitted to recur, there can be no limit to our recognizing each other as complete and distinct individuals, yet partners at every turn and return in that intimation of the worth of that therapeutic moment. That is, intimated that participation in the defeat of conviction, there can be no limit to our knowing each other subterranean to what at any duration reason is between conviction and its loss, and so intimated who we really are completely. The completest term time is that growing moment that dialectic is. Time is the intimation of the moment of its incalculable worth. And we are its most articulate term. But if god or number intrude, that intimation dies, and all is loss.

Gary M Washburn

The reason to drop the quantifier is because it instills false belief. Also, it seems to disprove what is true. Isn't anything 'beyondly' immortal? Is man 'beyondly'? The law of the excluded middle is a basis for proof? Because you say so? Do you ever wonder why Plato spends so much effort on the subject of virtue? A careful reading shows it is because virtue is not to be subsumed into some quantifier. Doesn't A is B, in the sense you define it, mean A counts of B? If so, which does it say more about? B of A or A of B? If neither, which possesses which? And isn't possession the meaning of the count? And if neither really possesses the other, how do we know either but as the character in which each is not that possession? The character of its not being what the other is is what virtue is. That is, the act of being is dispossession. The category does not possess the predicate, it supplies a term for the differentiation of each through the dispossession of other from it. The trait is not what it counts, and the count is not what it is. You can convince yourself that the subject is fixed by predication, put in a bin where it will keep even when you go off elsewhere. But only by its departure do we come to question what the attribution of possession by the predicate really means. As I said early in this discussion, If the predicate is a member of its own category we can learn nothing of it from its other members, and if it is not, we can learn nothing of its members from it. Hence, the middle term (negation) cannot be excluded save by resorting to its count. You can count the cogs into the bin, but in doing we cannot know which one is which. Or we can identify each one, but then we cannot count them, because each one is only itself alone. You cannot get from identity to possession with the same sense of what number is. A cardinal number can operate as an identifier, but not a count. An ordinal number can operate as a counter, but not an identifier. If you cannot determine which one is which you cannot know what it is you've counted, if you know how many is counted, you cannot know what it is you've counted. Identity is differentiation of what would be counted the same. The count is the sameness of what would be counted differentiated. Analogy, the fundamental emergence of terms, is a comparison of similar differences. But difference can subsume sameness or possession only by its dispossession. I know it's a strain on the old noggin, but it's a kind of strain that teaches and emancipates.

Reckonil? Sounds like some sci-fi smart pill. I get it, though. You do understand, though, there is no such thing a a randomness generator? Presumably, what passes for one gives fodder to the pre-programed system for finding and assessing patterns. It's really not the gem you seem to suppose. We tried that for explaining evolution, but if the creature does not put the mutation to use, and mutate itself, as it were (something AI will never achieve), nothing can come of random changes that is not part of it's programming. I have a thesis about that, males and females of almost all species (including human) are equally inclined to cheat on their mates. But there is a difference. The male is trying to produce a separate species of his own genetics. The female is trying to diversify the gene-pool. Lamarck shows us how differentiation comes about without randomness, but in response to biological needs. In other words, to a great extent (much greater than geneticist would have us believe) life creates, designs, and programs itself.

Symbolic notation is used by logicians because they know it isn't really true. It's just about power. My question to them is, if you can't know which is which and yet count, and you can't count and yet know which is which, how many is 'one'?

If you've engaged in romance, or any of the other human activities I referred to, then you know full well that not sharing terms is pretty much the whole game. Being in sync is either gratitude for difference, or it is just loss.

Tristan L

[Remark: If you formally

reply

to my posts or

quote

me, I get notified of your answers.]

All the signs of rationalism as I understand it. Certainly not Platonic. — Gary M Washburn

Are you saying that Damascius (Damaskios) was a rationalist?

Anyway, Damascius’ thought is truly something marvellous. But I’d say that he was something of a mystic – nay, he went far beyond the wildest dreams of most mystics. What got me hooked was his discovery that “the Unsayable is beyond beyondliness”. I found this idea so spellbinding and also very near my own thought and gastiness (spirituality); after all, I had myself googled “transcending transcendence” or some very similar term a few years before.

The reason to drop the quantifier is because it instills false belief. Also, it seems to disprove what is true. — Gary M Washburn

In what way does it supposedly do those things? Hasn’t it entangled the mess of

George is like Sam.
Sam is vain.
Therefore, George is vain????? — Gary M Washburn

and given us a wonderful way of exploring the world of abstract things?

In reality (sooth), quantifiers allow us to to conveniently talk about properties. For instance, the sentence “There are even numbers (rimetales)” means that the property of evenness has instantiatedness.

Isn't anything 'beyondly' immortal? Is man 'beyondly'? — Gary M Washburn

I’d say ‘Yes’ to the first one if the beyondliness involved isn’t absolute: having beyondliness implies having deathlessness (though something absolutely beyondly is beyond both mortality and deathlessness, so predicating either of it doesn’t even make sense). I’d also say ‘yes’ to the second one in the sense that the soul, in particular the soul of Man, has deathlessness. (The theory most plausible to be is that Man is simply the result of a soul “living in” a body of a particular kind. Other living beings, including not-human animals, plants, and microbes, have souls, too, and like the souls of humans, their souls can only unfold as many mindly powers as are made possible by the informational abilities of their respective bodies. I also find soul-wandering within and between species totally plausible.) And yes, the soul is beyondly.

The law of the excluded middle is a basis for proof? Because you say so? — Gary M Washburn

Because my intuition tells me so. Mark, by the way, that the highest shape of knowledge, hygely (noetic) knowledge, is an underkind of intuitive knowledge, though I don’t claim to (yet) have intuitive knowledge of that flawless kind that LEM is true, of course. Think about it yourself: take any proposition A, and ask yourself whether it’s possible than neither A nor its negation NOT(A) is the case. If you disbelieve in LEM, can you give me an example of an instance where it fails – a proposition A for which we have NOT(A OR NOT(A))?

Doesn't A is B, in the sense you define it, mean A counts of B? — Gary M Washburn

I think not; rather, I think that the deedword “to be” has several meanings:

What-being, which links each thing to its wist (essence).
So-being, th.i. (that is) having properties or other broadthings (universals), as in the sentence “The Sun is a star”, which means the same as “The Sun has starhood” and predicates starhood of the Sun; these two sentences mean the proposition that the Sun has starhood. I think that you sometimes mean this with the verb ‘to be’. Is that right?
(This meaning is closely related to the one before but very much distinct from it:) Broadthingly implication, as in “All Men are mammals”, which predicates the two-slotted (is-an-underkind-of)-relation of Manhood and Mammalhood. Quantifiers can be used to link broadthingly implication to broadthing-having like so: For all broadthings B, E, the universal B bears the broadthingly implication relation to E if and only if for every x, the proposition that x has B lets follow the proposition that x has E. I guess that it is this meaning of ‘to be’ that you mainly have in mind, am I right? If so, how is it related to counting?
Existence, as in “The number 5 is”, which predicates existence of the number 5.
Existential quantification, which is endless disjuction (OR) in a way, as in “There is an odd number”; this sentence basically means the same as “0 has oddness, or 1 has oddness, or 2 has oddness, or 3 has oddness, or”, which in turn basically means that the property of oddness has the property of instantiatedness.

You can convince yourself that the subject is fixed by predication, put in a bin where it will keep even when you go off elsewhere. — Gary M Washburn

Here, witcrafty (logical) analysis can help us yet again. It shows us that problems only arise when predicates are treated as if they had fewer slots than they already have. For instance, being alive is a two-slotted relationship, and the corresponding predicate “being alive” a two-slotted predicate. Hence, sentences of the shape “A is alive”, with ‘A’ the name of a thing, are truncated and thus meaningless. Only sentences of the shape “A is alive at t” make sense, where ‘t’ is the name of a time-point.

Reckonil? — Gary M Washburn

“Reckonil” is the right English word for “computer”. “To reckon” means the same as “to calculate”, and the suffix “-il” is often used to make tool-names.

You do understand, though, there is no such thing a a randomness generator? Presumably, what passes for one gives fodder to the pre-programed system for finding and assessing patterns. — Gary M Washburn

With what right do you assume that there are no random number generators? You have rightly warned against making dogmatic assumptions, but here you yourself are making one, aren’t you (and a likely false one, too, see next paragraph)?

Of course I’m aware of pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs), but these are not what I mean. I mean true random number generators (TRNGs), which are based on stuff like thermal or quantum fluctuations. Now whether the Universe is fundamentally chanceful or deterministic is an important matter, but if it is the latter, there is no such thing as free will. Since there seems to be free will, there seems to be true randomness, too, so it should be possible to build a TRNG, shouldn’t it?

something AI will never achieve — Gary M Washburn

Yet another unjustified and likely false dogmatic claim. What’s the fundamental difference between a human brain and a reckonil? Why shouldn’t a soul be able to live in a reckonil just as in a human brain?

We tried that for explaining evolution, — Gary M Washburn

... and have met with great success.

but if the creature does not put the mutation to use, — Gary M Washburn

... which it does, for the mutation is expressed in the phenotype and thus allows natural selection to work on it.

nothing can come of random changes that is not part of it's programming. — Gary M Washburn

Well, the things that allow our souls to process information in, live in, and interact with this world and in particular with each other through computers – our bodies, including our brains – have come about by the creative, information-making might of random variation. Where does the underlying idea of Darwinian evolution supposedly not work?

I think that the above claim of yours is untrue. Whether a feature is made by randomness or by design doesn’t change that feature. Whether the human eye was designed or has evolved, it will do exactly the same thing.

I have a thesis about that — Gary M Washburn

Can you give proof of your thesis, and has it been peer-reviewed by the scientific community? If yes, what is the result?

Lamarck shows us how differentiation comes about without randomness, but in response to biological needs. In other words, to a great extent (much greater than geneticist would have us believe) life creates, designs, and programs itself. — Gary M Washburn

Lamarckism has long been shown to be very likely wrong. Modern evolutionary theory based on genetics and Darwinian evolution works pretty well and does not appeal to non-existent effects. Also, if there were no randomness, how could life create anything, including itself? Randomness is the well of new information. Without it, all info would be there from the start, and nothing would be truly made, created, brought into being.

Symbolic notation is used by logicians because they know it isn't really true. It's just about power. — Gary M Washburn

I disagree. While witcraft (logic) is limited in the end, it is a powerful tool for finding about the world of abstract things and the world of concrete stuff. How is witcrafty symbolic notation supposedly wrong?

Moreover, the very speech (language) that you use to say and write your philosophy is based on abstract things like numbers (rimetales) and logic, as is reason itself. For instance, you rely on the Law of Identity to be sure that if you are right, you’re right. Without said law, you could be right without being right, making your whole philosophy crumble.

My question to them is, if you can't know which is which and yet count, and you can't count and yet know which is which, how many is 'one'? — Gary M Washburn

As I asked above, what has logic to do with counting?

Tristan L

Let’s not lose sight of the topic of this thread, namely Platonism and platonism.

Let’s first talk about Platonism, the philosophy of Plato. This philosophy has three parts:
1. the written Theory of Shapes (Forms), which is well-known,

2. the unwritten, spoken Theory of Principles (the One and the Indefinite Dyad), which was rediscovered by Conrad Gaiser and Hans Joachim Krämer and reconstructed by them and others,

3. and the neither written nor spoken, and indeed neither writable nor speakable, unsayable religious experience of the god Apollo as eche andwardness (eternal presence). This was found out by Christina Schefer. According to her, Plato’s Good-One-Fair(Beautiful) is an image of Apollo. For example, see page 135 of her book Platons unsagbare Erfahrung “Plato’s Unsayable Experience”:

With that, however, the sense of the exclamation at the height of the Republic is inverted from the end: It is not the One which is invoked with the vocative “Apollo”, but rather Apollo himself as living doing god. He is no metaphor for the One; rather, the One has to be understood as god image of Apollo.

(My translation from German (Theech) into English)

Christina Schefer says that a religious and unsayable experience of Apollo as eche andwardness lies at the heart of Plato’s thought, behind both his Theory of Forms and his unwritten Theory of Principles (see e.g. pages 136, 221, 222 and 225 of her aforementioned book). Because andwardness is only one aspect of time, Apollo is only a limited manifestation of the Holy, a pure mysterium fascinans (fascinating/spellbinding and wonderful roun (mystery)) rather than a full-fledged mysterium tremendum et fascinans (fear-instilling and awe-inspiring as well as spellbinding and wonderful roun) (see e.g. pages 220 to 222 of her aforementioned book). She also writes on page 222 of this book:

But that means in the end: Platonic philosophy is religion (even if a special, shortened shape of religion), and indeed not philosophical religion in Hegel’s sense (philosophy is religion and religion is philosophy), but rather living religion, made up of cult and myth. It shows up, as E. Fink writes, “in the shape of a new roun”, which we call the roun of Apollo.

(My translation from Theech into English)

Let’s now talk about platonism. The platonist is the one who is aware of the existence of abstract things. More so – and more weightily – he (used gender-neutrally) is aware of the abstract things themselves. The philosophy of platonism is not foremost about belief or knowledge-that (German: Wissen), but rather awareness and knowledge-of (German: Kenntnis, Kennen). The platonist’s knowledge that abstract things exist and are soothfast (real) is drawn from his knowledge of the abstract things themselves, which includes abstractness itself. When discussing with the not-platonist, he not so much argues for a certain position as he tries to help the not-platonist become aware of the abstract entities. The platonist primarily doesn’t seek to prove to the non-platonist that abstract entities exist; rather, he tries to show him the abstract things. When he brooks (uses) witcraft to prove that abstract entities exist, he means what he does, but he hopes that this will go one step further and help the non-platonist “see” the abstract things themselves, from which that which was witcraftily proven before (namely the existence of abstract entities) can then be directly drawn. When the platonist argues from the meanings of abstract words, from different particulars sharing features, or from different people being able to think about the same concepts, he hopes that these arguments will prompt the not-platonist to look in the right direction with his mind’s eye and so see the abstract entities, so to speak.

Platonish knowledgelore is to a big extent about Kenntnis, and only then about Wissen.

Being a platonist, I find the world of the abstract entities wonderful, shapely, colorful, and alive, like a rich fruit-salad. I categorically don’t follow others, so I’m not a Platonist (a follower of Plato). Still, there are weighty ways in which my (still rather sketchy) thought is similar to Platonism that go well beyond the minimum requirements for platonism. For instance, it broadly forewyrds (agrees) with the threefold-partition of Platonism:
1. It has a (still sketchy) theory of abstract things, including Shapes (Forms, Ideas) and minds, and information to describe the realm of being. Here, witcraft is a crucial tool.

2. It has a (still very sketchy) theory of orprinciples, which seeks to swuttle (explain) the realm of being, and also not-being, in terms of orprinciples beyond being and not-being. Here, one goal is to derive the laws of logic from the orprinciples.

3. It has an unsayable experience.

However, there are also weighty differences. For instance, on the first level, my philosophy is even more abstract than Plato’s in at least some ways. After all, I hold that the underlying substances of that which is are information and abstract things, and that there is no such thing as matter (though there is Matterhood Itself, which is needed for the very state-of-affairs that there is no matter). My sketch of an orprinciple-theory also differs from Plato’s on some key points. And I don’t worship Apollo, of course. Furthermore, I love the absolute beyondness – nay, the above-absolute above-beyondness – nay ... I’ll best stop, for it’s useless talking (or even not talking!) anyway, which Damaskios is into.

Now that I’ve told you something about my position, may I ask you what school of philosophy you belong to, or how I am to broadly categorize your thinking?

Importanly and of interest to this thread, what is your take on platonism?

You seem to be interested in time, so it might also interest you that I have developed a new (if not-yet-finished) theory of time in which witcraft plays a key role and has served me very well.

Tristan L

Eking (Addition/Amendment): (the ekings below are in bold typeface)

“Reckonil” (cf. Theech "Rechner") is the right English word for “computer”. “To reckon” means the same as "to compute"/“to calculate” (cf. Theech "zu rechnen"), and the suffix “-il” is often used to make tool-names.
Being a platonist, I find the world of the abstract entities wonderful, shapely, colorful, and alive, like a rich fruit-salad; like a lush green rainforest under a partly covered but otherwise clear blue sky with high thunderclouds in it, with paradise birds of all kinds and colors living and flying around, with fresh air filled with beautiful bird-song, and with mammals, reptiles, bugs, and a plethora or other living things thriving in it; like a beautifully decorated (artificial*, of course) Christmas tree; like a crystal-clear night-sky; like a crystal berg (mountain); like oh so many other fair things.

*It's barbaric to kill living trees for the sake of celebration, for they have souls as much as we do. Of course, we can't be sure of that, but neither can I be sure that you have a soul, nor you that I have one – that is, if you really do have one in the first place with which to wonder whether I have one.

Gary M Washburn

Socrates doesn't say he knows nothing, he says he knows that he knows nothing. He is not unsure. Does being unsure have voice? Or does only knowing have voice? The voice of knowing is proving its terms not in our possession. The voice of being resolutely unsure is demanding those terms are in our possession. That distinguishes philosophy from faith.

As I asked above, what has logic to do with counting? — Tristan L

If you cannot be hermetically certain which one is which, assertion or negation, you cannot begin to count what constitutes the category either would otherwise define. And you cannot know which is which in any hermetic sense until you complete the count. Logic cannot outstrip its quantifier (save by lying to itself, which it does quite regularly and boldfaced). How many is one? There is no one until the enumeration is complete, and there is no beginning of the enumeration until we already know how many one is.

Gary M Washburn

Truth is not an aspiration, however inspiring that aspiration is to you!

Tristan L

Socrates doesn't say he knows nothing, he says he knows that he knows nothing. He is not unsure. — Gary M Washburn

Well, if he knows that he knows nothing, then on one hand, what he knows must be true – otherwise he couldn’t know (wissen) it –, so he indeed knows nothing, but on the other hand, he knows at least something, namely that he knows nothing. That’s a contradiction. However, I’m (likely :wink:) so careful as to say only that it almost certainly is a contradiction.

what constitutes the category — Gary M Washburn

The category, the kind, isn’t constituted by its members or instances. It is what it is regardless of its members. For example, if all synapsids had died out (which they thankfully didn’t) in the Great Dying, the kind of Synapsidhood would still be what it is. Likewise, the kind of Mammalhood would still be what it is. It would have no concrete instances, but its wist (essence) would be the same. And it would still be related to Synapsidhood by the underkind-relationship.

Logic cannot outstrip its quantifier (save by lying to itself, which it does quite regularly and boldfaced). — Gary M Washburn

Over and over again, you make dogmatic claims like this one and many others without giving any justification (begrounding) or evidence whatsoever. It’s no wonder, though, that you haven’t given a right justification for your baseless accusing logic of lying, for a false claim cannot be rightly begrounded, and your claim is very, very likely false.

As I see it, witcraft (logic) works perfectly and does the exact opposite of lying. It it what uncovers lies, as well as fallacies arising from imprecise, incomprehensible, swollen language without soothfast substance or meaning.

Of course, this doesn’t mean that Classical Logic is right. As a matter of fact, I find that it has problems, e.g. due to the Principle of Bivalence (PB), which states that each proposition is supposedly either true or false. This is just the claim that for each proposition, either it or its negation has the upper hand. I see no reason for accepting this baseless claim, which is why I’ve replaced the Principle of Bivalence with the weaker Principle of Trivalence.

What is it that you find supposedly amiss with logic? Where has witcraft ever gone wrong if applied the right way and as long as no pseudo-logical claims like PB are taken for witcrafty laws?

You have rightly warned against dogmatism, but you have so far failed to live up to the high-minded goal of getting rid of dogmas even though I have asked you for justifications of your claims before. On the contrary, you have made quite a few dogmatic claims but not begrounded them in the least. Now the dogmatic witcrafta (logician) is certainly being unphilosophical because he (used gender-neutrally) doesn’t ask for what lies behind the laws of logic, but your dogmatism is no better than his. Indeed, it is worse, for while his claims are dogmatic, they are at least very probably true, while your claims seem to be dogmatic and false.

Please show me that you aren’t a dogmatist after all by either giving justifications for your philosophical claims and your fringe theories on evolution and mating or rowing back from them.

Also, please don’t forget the topic of this thread: Platonism and platonism. What do you think of the former, taking into account the Unwritten Theory of Principles and the unsayable religious experience? And what do you think of the latter?

Regarding the latter (platonism), I find it surprising that you seem – please correct me if I’m wrong – to take as given assumptions for which you have nothing but indirect evidence based on your senses, such as the assumption that there are other minds beside your own (for which only thoughtcasters can have direct evidence, I think), while you also seem – again, please correct me if I’m wrong – to not be aware of the direct evidence your “mind’s eye” gives you of the abstract entities.

Truth is not an aspiration, however inspiring that aspiration is to you! — Gary M Washburn

Of course truth isn’t an aspiration, but we can certainly strive for it. Likewise, a ball is not a throwing, but one can certainly throw it.

Gary M Washburn

Speaking English, eking is just getting by. This discussion is eking.

Making stuff up and calling it Platonic doesn't make it so. Nowhere does Plato raise anything to be taken as axiomatic. All must be examined and reexamined. Never ever does faith come into it, save perhaps, and only perhaps, his cock for Asclepius. And, no, not that cock. He may here and there appear to promote geometric patterns, but this is hardly what he means by forms, which Socrates repudiates even as he uses them on the way elsewhere. The central fact is the relation between personal character, responsiveness to cross-questioning, and asserted opinions. There is no opinion I have expressed I am not prepared to justify with Plato's own work. Why should I need any other?

Gary M Washburn

Well,

Well, if he knows that he knows nothing, then on one hand, what he knows must be true – otherwise he couldn’t know (wissen) it –, so he indeed knows nothing, but on the other hand, he knows at least something, namely that he knows nothing. That’s a contradiction. However, I’m (likely :wink:) so careful as to say only that it almost certainly is a contradiction. — Tristan L

I don't see the point in refuting all this. It just appeared as I posted the above.

My answer to the quoted passage here is that you're lack of familiarity with Plato is quite shocking, considering the extensiveness and pretense to authority of your postulations.

Over and over again, you make dogmatic claims like this one and many others without giving any justification (begrounding) or evidence whatsoever. It’s no wonder, though, that you haven’t given a right justification for your baseless accusing logic of lying, for a false claim cannot be rightly begrounded, and your claim is very, very likely false. — Tristan L

If my claim is dogmatic, why is it the most authoritative examples of the "law" of contradiction base their self-evidence on their quantifiers? As in "All A is B, some A is not B? The verb Is is a quantifier wherever it assigns hermetic membership. Have you been reading Heidegger? You couldn't pick a worse source for understanding Plato! Unless it is Aristotle! But, then, Heidegger gets his take on Plato from Aristotle.

As I see it, witcraft (logic) works perfectly and does the exact opposite of lying. It it what uncovers lies, as well as fallacies arising from imprecise, incomprehensible, swollen language without soothfast substance or meaning. — Tristan L

"As I see it" is not an argument. As I see it, you don't like to speak English. In logic 101 you might be expected to swallow the lesson uncritically. But you're gonna have to do better if you want expect to get past the first year. You don't even know what terms like "conjunction" and "disjunction" mean if you uncritically assume a category comprehensive hermetic and coherent between which one it is and its supposed membership, or how many it is. Is Apollo a category? Plato does a nice comparison between Achilles and Odysseus, in Lesser Hippias. Achilles cannot satisfy his ambition to define the category (valor or courage) because he is too abstract (outside it) to be a member of it. Odysseus cannot satisfy his ambition to be most completely of the category (cleverness and cammaraderie) because he was too central to it to have any membership to share it with. Between the extreme and the typical he sums up the enigma of category. You can't have an extrinsic definition and count its membership and you can't have a clear discernment of each member and still count them of an extrinsic defining principle. 1+1 doesn't equal 2 if 1 and 1 each is distinct, and you can't add 1+1 to get 2 if they are not distinct. Well, I know you disallow careful reasoning, but what I do find depressingly consistent is that you dismiss Plato wherever his own work conflicts with your notion of Platonism, and pay no heed to him at all otherwise.

Tristan L

Speaking English, eking is just getting by. This discussion is eking. — Gary M Washburn

Firstly, check out this: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/eke#Etymology_1 to brush up your English.

Secondly, it’s no wonder that this talk is just getting by if one party has little to eke to it other than a tangle of lengthy language made up of sentences with neither head nor tail and which overflow with wild jumbledness as much as they are in need of meaning, constituting a spaghetti-like mess seasoned with baseless fringe theories as spices.

All must be examined and reexamined. — Gary M Washburn

Narrowkirily (Exactly), something that you seemingly have yet to understand and internalize.

your notion of Platonism, and pay no heed to him at all otherwise. — Gary M Washburn

You do know the difference between lowercase bookstaves and uppercase ones, don’t you? Well, if so, let me tell you once more that I’m a platonist and not a Platonist. I have my own thought, and Plato is just a stepping stone for me in developing that thought – a very big one, mind you, but still just a stepping stone. I’m not a historian of philosophy, and I’m not deeply interested in knowing what exactly the historical Plato believed. But of couse, knowing what he thought can greatly help me get closer to truth, oneness, beyondliness, and the other things that I like. I got interested in Plato because of the abstractness and transcendence of his thought, not the other way round.

However, it is you who apparently dismiss Plato’s more and his most important aspects. You seem to focus on his dialogues, when these are but of lesser weightiness. Far weightier are his Unwitten Doctrines, and weightiest of all is his unsayable religious experience of the god Apollo as a living god before and beyond philosophy. I quote from page 214 of Christina Schefer’s book Platons unsagbare Erfahrung:

That means: Plato, too [just as the Pythagoreans], wants to be understood from the epiphany of Apollo. Not only Pythagorean doctrine, but also Platonic ontology neededly presupposes the religious revelation of Apollo. This unsayable experience always already lies at the ground of all thinking and even all beonde [that which is; ‘beon’ means the “deed/state” of being]: it is the true ground of the opposite principles and their union, the last and most orspringly well from which the dialectical method springs and from which it unfolds. Without the experience of Apollo, there would be no philosophy at all for Plato. Without the epiphany of Apollo, there would be – nothing.

(My translation from Theech into English)

Is Apollo a category? — Gary M Washburn

No, but rather a living god not capable of being rationalized, just as Thor, Osiris, Isis, Utu, Ares and the others are orspringlily (originally) living gods, manifestations of the Holy, and were seen as such before being rationalized by wisdomlovas (philosophers) and godleras (theologians).

Never ever does faith come into it — Gary M Washburn

A religious experience need not have anything to do with faith. It is related to Kennen, whereas faith is related to Wissen and belief.

1+1 doesn't equal 2 if 1 and 1 each is distinct, and you can't add 1+1 to get 2 if they are not distinct. — Gary M Washburn

You’re thinking much too concretely. The entity meant by ‘+’, “addition”, “ateke”, and “toyeking” is a function which sends every ordered pair (x, y) of numbers x, y to some number z. For every number x with name ‘x’ and every number y with name ‘y’, we brook (use) “x+y” to mean the number z to which + sends (x, y). The sense of the sentence “1+1=2” (I have a much narrowkirier analysis of this matter, but that’s not the topic of this thread) basically is the proposition that ateke sends the ordered pair (1, 1) to the number 2.

As I see it, you don't like to speak English. — Gary M Washburn

:lol:, considering that I truly love the English speech.

"As I see it" is not an argument. — Gary M Washburn

Firstly: At least I make aware that this is my (almost certainly true) belief, whereas you have not the grace to do even that, but simply dogmatically preach a long list of claims.

In logic 101 you might be expected to swallow the lesson uncritically. — Gary M Washburn

You seem to have personal problems with people that do so and then uncritically assume that I do the same, although I believe that I have made it evidently and blatantly clear that this is not the case. You might just want to watch out becoming one of them, or (equally bad) someone who takes his own thoughts too seriously and swallows the whole squirt that he himself spurts out vertically. Such people often ludicrously label everyone a dogmatist who doesn’t uncritically swallow what they preach. Are such people doing philosophy or, well, preaching?

There is no opinion I have expressed I am not prepared to justify with Plato's own work. — Gary M Washburn

Okay, then please do so!

Why should I need any other? — Gary M Washburn

As I’ve said, I’m neither a Platonist nor a historian of philosophy. If you or Plato make some claim (which Plato seldom does himself in his written works), you’ll both have to give me reasons to believe you. Neither you nor Plato is a priest nor I a member of a congregation taking in whatever the priest says. However, it’s no wonder that you haven’t been able to justify your claims if they are false.

I don't see the point in refuting all this. — Gary M Washburn

For this, the Dogmatists’ Union might sue you for copyright infringement :wink:. Be careful and have a lawyer ready!

It just appeared as I posted the above. — Gary M Washburn

Well, I sent it about three to four hours before your last comment and about two hours before your next-to-last one.

My answer to the quoted passage here is that you're lack of familiarity with Plato is quite shocking, considering the extensiveness and pretense to authority of your postulations. — Gary M Washburn

In sooth, it is your ignorance of main pillars of Platonic thought that’s quite shocking. Had you even heard of Plato’s Theory of Principles and his unsayable experience of Apollo before I told you about them? To really get to the heart of Plato, a stepping-stone would be to read Christina Schefers aforementioned book. You can find an appetizer here. But of course, that book can only help you so far in kindling the unsayabe experience in your soul. The feat of getting this experience you have to make yourself; reading, writing, talking, and listening can only help you on your way.

Moreover, I repeat that I’m not deeply interested in interpreting Plato. I seek truth, not the beliefs of Plato. I have given very good grounds for my positions as far as I can tell, and I’m still waiting for your first good begrounding. I appeal to basic definitions and intuition. You, on the other hand, keep on churning out assertions which are just that: assertions.

If my claim is dogmatic, why is it the most authoritative examples of the "law" of contradiction base their self-evidence on their quantifiers? As in "All A is B, some A is not B? — Gary M Washburn

What has the one to do with the other? How does logic supposedly lie? You still owe me an answer to that question.

LNC and LEM apply to all propositions, not just ones involving quantification (which are propositions predicating properties like universalness and instantiatedness of properties). In fact, they’re not only intuitively clear, but follow directly from the definition of negation: For any proposition A, the “domain” of NOT(A) is defined to be everything that is outside the “domain” of A, so to speak. If there were a middle between A and NOT(A), NOT(A) wouldn’t include everything outside the domain of A and so wouldn’t be the negation of A after all because its not including the middle would go against the very definition of negation. Thus, LEM must hold true. Likewise, if both A and NOT(A) were true for some proposition A, there’d be overlap between the domains of A and NOT(A), so to speak, again violating the very definition of negation. And for every property E, the negation of (for all x, x has E) is indeed (there is an x which doesn’t have E). Note, however, that the latter proposition doesn’t mean that any one fixed x doesn’t have E, even if the proposition (there is an x which doesn’t have E) is true. That’s so because truth doesn’t necessarily distribute over disjunction or existential quantification: It’s true now that there is a country that will win the men’s soccer world championship in 2102, but there isn’t any country for which it is true now that it’ll win the 2102 Wold Cup.

The verb Is is a quantifier wherever it assigns hermetic membership. — Gary M Washburn

No, the verb “to be” has the meanings given above by me, and property-having, which it one of the things it means, isn’t always “hermetic”. For instance, it’s already true now that for every country C, if C wins the 2102 World Cup, then C takes home the trophy in 2102, but even so, there isn’t any country which now truly has the property of winning the 2102 World Cup, and there also isn’t any country which now truly has the property of taking home the trophy in 2102.

Let me now play the devil’s advocate and assume LNC failed.

I: Okay, everything you say is true. And yet, everything that you say is complete humbug.

You: How so?

I: Well, LNC fails, and so there’s nothing odd about your theory being true and false at the same time.

Gary M Washburn

Must everything be black or white with you? I never said logic is a complete failure, only that it assumes a hermeticity not supported by its arguments. Newtonion mechanics doesn't account for relativity. It doesn't even quite cover conventional motions. The infinitesimal is dogmatically excluded. But what if the infinitesimal is the value meant to be determined? Similarly in logic, the assumption we share terms could never be valid if terms were universal, because meaning is intimacy. There is no universal teacher, though somehow I suspect you will contradict that. That's you prerogative, but it means we can never really speak at all. If only you understood your issue you would see what a tragedy that is for you. Differences in the terms we do share may seem infinitesimal and therefore negligible, but in fact, as Plato makes plain (if you read him) if that infinitesimal divergence between us is the moment we are recognized our opinion is untruth all terms alter of that moment so as to begin a more completely shared set of terms. That process of altering all terms infinitesimally cannot be limited by any prior conviction about our terms, and so must ultimately bring us into a more complete intimacy in our terms. And that intimacy is real only insofar as we mean to set each other free of our convictions. And that freedom entails a commitment to be dispossessed those term we do share. And that dispossession is experienced as "Platonism" in the sense you do go on about. And that is why those of us who actually read Plato describe Platonism as inverted Plato. BTW, my instructor studied with John Wilde and Raphael Demos, since you do like to cite any source other than the one in question.

Borrowed WiFi is not what it's cracked up to be! The sun is on my screen!

Tristan L

Must everything be black or white with you? — Gary M Washburn

No, not at all, but everything must be either black or not black, and either white or not white.

The infinitesimal is dogmatically excluded. — Gary M Washburn

No, not really. Precise (Narrowkiry) mathematical theories about infinitesimals have been around for some time now. For instance, we have the hyperreal numbers, who reckon infinitesimals in their ranks. And LEM doesn’t dogmatically exclude infinitesimals: a hyperreal number is either 0 or not 0, and infinitesimals are the latter. They are included in the Second: Not-Zero.

terms were universal — Gary M Washburn

What exactly do you mean by that? That those terms mean universals (broadthings)? Or that they are common to everyone with exactly the same meaning? Or something else? In the following, I’ll assume the second option, and please correct me if I’m wrong.

Similarly in logic, the assumption we share terms could never be valid if terms were universal, because meaning is intimacy. There is no universal teacher, though somehow I suspect you will contradict that. — Gary M Washburn

How could I, who is too careful to even rule out solipsism, assume that we share terms with exactly the same meaning?

Differences in the terms we do share may seem infinitesimal and therefore negligible — Gary M Washburn

Certainly not! If the differences are more than nothing, even if only infinetisimal, they are still something.

I don’t assume that we brook (use) terms in exactly the same meaning. In fact, I don’t assume anything beyond that I brook certain terms with a certain, perhaps vague meaning right now. I leave it open whether there are other minds that also use terms, and even if they do, I have no reason to believe that they brook them with the same meaning as I do. Since I’m likely not a thoughtcasta, the only information that I have about other minds comes from my sensory experiences. To swuttle (explain) these, I hypothesize that I have a body, that I interact with that body, that my sensory perceptions are brought about by sensory organs sending info to my brain which is then read by me myself, that such and such sensory inputs are caused by such and such bodies doing so and so because the are ensouled, and so on, and so forth. From my sensory data, I derive the hypothesis that when you say “five”, you mean the number 5 by it. But of course, I probably can’t look directly into your mind, so I don’t know what exactly you mean by the word “five”. Is is the Sun? Likely not, for it doesn’t fit my sensory data well. But is it the cardinal 5? Or the ordinal five? Is is the Ideal Number 5 which lies behind both the cardinal and the ordinal and springs forth from the orprinciples? Since I’ve at least almost never directly sent info to or received it from another mind (and no, even a direct brain-to-brain interface would be no true thoughtcasting), I hypothesize that there are no thoughtcasters in the world I live in. In that case, all info exchanged by minds can only be sent through a physical channel. Hence, I expect there to always be some differences in the ways terms are brooked, not least because a physical channel only allows for finitely many exchanges in a finite time (thought this isn’t certain, for quantum entanglement might allow eyeblinkly talking after all if there is quantum not-equilibrium, see e.g. Antony Valentini’s version of pilot-wave theory).

Therefore, I think that witcraft is actually a private matter. I just assume that our terms are close enough for us to help each other do logic. But doing the witcraft remains a private deed.

Let’s take – segue – the Law of the Excluded Middle as an example. What I mean with “LEM” only I and thoughtcastas can truly know. Unless you’re a telepath (thoughtcaster), you can only guess what I have in mind when saying “LEM”. I had assumed that what you mean by it almost the same as what I mean by it, but I might have been wrong, strengthening my case for potential solipsism and the like. For instance, the Wikipedia article on LEM claims that LEM supposedly states that each proposition is either true or false. Now that’s very much not what I have in mind by “LEM”. What I mean by “LEM” is the law that for each proposition, its disjunction with its negation must be true. That doesn’t mean that either the proposition or its negation is true. For instance, it’s true today that it will rain tomorrow or it won’t tomorrow, but it’s neither true today that it’ll rain tomorrow, nor is it true today that it won’t rain tomorrow (assuming that the weather isn’t foredetermined, which I’ll suppose here for argument’s sake). As I said earlier, I see no reason to believe that truth distributes over disjunction. From the way you write, I now infer that you may perhaps mean something different by “LEM” than I do, namley a part of PB (which I don’t accept). If you have read through what I’ve written, you might have realized this. Have you actually read through what I’ve written?

BTW, my instructor studied with John Wilde and Raphael Demos, since you do like to cite any source other than the one in question. — Gary M Washburn

That’s all nice and well, but how exactly does it bear on the matter at hand? Regarding this last statement of yours as well as your statements

as Plato makes plain (if you read him) — Gary M Washburn

and

And that is why those of us who actually read Plato describe Platonism as inverted Plato. — Gary M Washburn

reading Plato isn’t enough at all. Plato put the jewels of his philosophy into his Theory of Principles, which he only taught mouthly in his Academy and on which we only have indirect transmission. We have to rely on that and the mere hints in the dialogues for reconstructing the Theory of Principles. The unsayable experiece is even more elusive, for it is fully beyond speech an can only be hinted at. The philosophers of the Tübingen Pradigm and Christina Schefer have already reconstructed the Theory of Principles and discovered the unsayable exprerience of the Holy, respectively. I don’t need to invent the wheel again and reconstruct the Theory or discover the Experience by myself. Those people have already done that for me. And in a way, they are far more authoritative on Plato that Plato’s dialogues are because they have been willing to write about things which Plato meant not to write down.

If only you understood your issue you would see what a tragedy that is for you. — Gary M Washburn

The real tragedy is that you seem to be still imprisoned in the Cave, unwilling to turn your gaze to the most real world of being – the abstract world.

I have given you many challenges and am still waiting for you to answer. In particular, I’d like to repeat three questions:

What do you think of abstract things?

What do you think of the Unwritten Doctrine?

What do you think of the unsayable experience Plato had?

Gary M Washburn

No, not really. Precise (Narrowkiry) mathematical theories about infinitesimals have been around for some time now. For instance, we have the hyperreal numbers, who reckon infinitesimals in their ranks. And LEM doesn’t dogmatically exclude infinitesimals: a hyperreal number is either 0 or not 0, and infinitesimals are the latter. They are included in the Second: Not-Zero. — Tristan L

Please stop referencing extraneous sources. Table stakes please! But, if I must, please read 'The Analyst', by George Berkeley. As a mathematical term, the infinitesimal is contradictory. George will explain, and with the advantage it is not just my opinion.

mouthly — Tristan L

What? That's not even English! I think you mean 'by mouth'. But you can hardly use that as a reference. Do you really think sources from almost a thousand years later can be credible witnesses of what Plato taught 'mouthly'?

Enough quoting you. You don't pay attention anyway, not even to your own assertions.

I am really fed up with two thousand years of usurping meaning! A gurgling infant is closer to the dynamic source of meaning and signification than all this 'from on high' nonsense. This dogma is the basis for all cruelty in the world. The foundation of meaning, of all terms in all language (yes, even computer language!), is the intimation of our worth to each other personal dialectic is. This is Plato's prime message, one that gets lost to those who, like yourself, demand to be in possession of your terms. Meaning is willing dispossession, not willful expropriation. Colonization of the mind is the most violent and outrageous crime against philosophy.

Tristan L

Please stop referencing extraneous sources. Table stakes please! — Gary M Washburn

:confused:???

But, if I must, please read 'The Analyst', by George Berkeley. As a mathematical term, the infinitesimal is contradictory. George will explain, and with the advantage it is not just my opinion. — Gary M Washburn

Well, regardless of whose opinion it is, it is false, plain and simple. If you had kept up with mathematical developments in the last over-two-and-a-half yearhundreds, you would know that there is nothing contradictory about infinitesimals whatsoever. Let me give you a very simple example: Take any ordered field (F, +, *, <), such as the ordered field (IQ, +, *, <) of the rational rimetales (numbers) or the ordered field (IR, +, *, <) of the real numbers. Then the rational functions over the field (F, +, *), together with an addition +’ and a multiplication *’ naturally defined in terms of + and *, make up a field (F(x), +’, *’), called “the function field of (F, +, *)”. With the help of the ordering < on (F, +, *), you can define an ordering <’ on F(x), namely the alphabetical ordering of the polynomials over F and then the rational functions in general. Like that, you get an ordered field (F(x), +’, *’, <’) in which there are infinite numbers, th.i. numbers greater than all natural numbers, and infinitesimals, which are the reciprocals of infinite numbers. Any modern mathematician will tell you that, and it has been known for quite a while now. No contradiction lurks in there at all. Will you go so far as to contradict maths for the sake of dogmatic and false assertions?

Of course, it’s no wonder that you have problems with LNC if you see contradictions where there are none. You falsely think that some true propositions, such as the one saying that infinitesimals exist, are contradictory, and then, based on that false premise, argue from the truth of the supposedly contradictory propositions that LNC must fail.

What? That's not even English! — Gary M Washburn

Oh, really? You might want to check out "oral (mouthly)". The Theech (German) cognate and equivalent of “mouthly” is “mündlich”, and it can be used as an adjective and an adverb. How can you use “by mouth” as an adjective, as in “mouthly theory” (Theech: “mündliche Lehre”)? If you don’t accept “mouthly” as an English word, you admit that Theech is better than English in at least that respect (and many others, if you compare the two speeches). Sadly, the wonderful English tongue has been greatly messed up.

Do you really think sources from almost a thousand years later can be credible witnesses of what Plato taught 'mouthly'? — Gary M Washburn

Thanks for lecturing me! I didn’t know before that e.g. Aristotle lived almost a thousand years after Plato. But this point is not for me to talk about with you. Please discuss it with the scholars and philosophers of the Tübingen Paradigm.

This is Plato's prime message, one that gets lost to those who, like yourself, demand to be in possession of your terms. — Gary M Washburn

Your understanding of me apparently is very wanting. Isn’t it I who stresses the weightiness of unsayableness and a mystical experience above and beyond all language and back up my claim that Plato had already realized that by reliable sources, whereas for you, language seems to be the be-all-end-all?

So you arrogate to yourself the possession of what Plato really means when what is most central to him cannot be bound up in terms or words of any kind?

You don't pay attention anyway, not even to your own assertions. — Gary M Washburn

all this 'from on high' nonsense — Gary M Washburn

This dogma is the basis for all cruelty in the world. — Gary M Washburn

You seem to have a need for ascribing your own qualities to others based on the mistaken notion that by doing so, you somehow get said qualities away from yourself.

I hope you could prove the following wrong, but everything points to you having demonstrated your want of knowledge and your inability to answer my challenges nicely and vaunted your dogmatism effectively.

Gary M Washburn

You're rubber, I suppose?

What gives anti-Plato folks like you the this idea he was a mystic??

Aristotle himself admits he didn't have a clue what Plato meant. Good source! No, I was thinking you had gotten a bit more obscure, judging by your other references. Mentioned before, I think, like Proclus, Origen, Boethius. Or maybe even later, like Augustine.

I don't even want to know what the hell 'Theech' is!

Not reading 'The Analyst', I see! I guess required reading of modern philosophy doesn't impress! In case you are bone ignorant, the modern era is from late Renaissance to the Enlightenment.

Gary M Washburn

↪Tristan L

Did a Wiki for Theech, nothing.

TheMadFool

↪Srap Tasmaner

Alice is thinking something
There is something [that Alice is thinking about]

A
1. Alice is thinking Bob, the elephant
2. There is Bob, the elephant [that Alice is thinking about] (excuse the grammatical error)

B
3. Alice is thinking elephants
4. There is elephants [that Alice is thinking about] (ignore grammatical mistake)

C
5. Alice is thinking square-circles
6. There is square-circles [that Alice is thinking about] (again, pardon the grammatical boo-boo)

Two levels of thought with subcategories:
D. The possible
7. Concrete: Bob, the elephant
8. Abstract: Elephants

E. The impossible
9. Contradictions: Square-circles

In case of A, assuming there's an elephant called Bob, clearly, if Alice is thinking of Bob, Bob is.

In case of B, Alice is thinking of an abstraction - elephants. The Platonic thing to do would be to say there's a form, elephantness in some world of forms, and that all elephants are tokens of it.

In case C, it being true that Alice is thinking about square-circles doesn't imply that square-circles are.

In what sense is it that square-circles can't be? They're said to be impossible - they're contradictions. Right? The low hanging fruit here is that in the world in which Bob, the elephant is, you won't come across a square-circle. That's that.

What about the world of elephants - the abstraction? Squrares are abstractions, circles are abstractions i.e. both squares and circles are equivalent in terms of their existential quality to elephants - all being abstractions. A square-circle however has no place either in the world of the concrete or in the world of abstractions.

Here's where it gets interesting, at least to me.

There seems to be a sentiment, an expectation if you will, that for something to be there must be a world to be in. Isn't this the crux of Platonic worlds? I ain't sure. You be the judge.

At this point, I'm going to reverse the logic but, hopefully, not to the point that my argument fails. Basically, the idea is that just as one expects there to be a world in which things can be, if one claims that something can't be then, my logic goes, there must be a world in which that thing can't be.

Square-circles can't be - they're impossible - but in what/which world? Not in the world of the concrete, the world of Bob, the elephant, for certain. They also can't be in the world of abstractions - the world of elephants, squares, and circles. But for square-circles not to be, there must be a world in which it can't be. In other words, the world of abstractions - Plato's world of forms - must exist. If not, that square-circles are impossible, i.e. they can't be, doesn't make sense. This world of forms is inhabited by abstractions; Alice thinking about something implies that that something exists...somewhere :lol:

Gary M Washburn

Why are you so afraid of your own mind??? It's like you have to hold onto the rail for fear of falling off of reality. Plato's is a world of human character and dynamic convictions. That dynamic, how we change our opinions in response to critical questioning, not only reveals our character and competence, and our ability to recognize and appreciate the worth of that critical questioning and the worth of our response to it, but reveals the incapacity of geometry and number to delineate reality. How do you expect you know, and you do know, that, whatever instrumentality you use, you cannot draw a perfectly straight lime or perfectly round circle? You seem to be of the camp that draws from this the conviction that geometry is 'more real', whereas Plato, if you read him carefully, agrees with me that this proves reality is in the incapacity for geometry to define the real. The missing value may be possible to reduce to negligible, hence the use of the infinitesimal is physics, but the neglected value is the issue we are in search of. Resolving it in negligence is washing the baby and throwing it out, keeping the bathwater as if that is what is real!

I passed logic 101 over fifty years ago, and I aced geometry even earlier.

Gary M Washburn

https://iep.utm.edu/sqr-opp/

The square of opposition is a chart that was introduced within classical (categorical) logic to represent the logical relationships holding between certain propositions in virtue of their form. The square, traditionally conceived, looks like this:

square-of-opposition

The four corners of this chart represent the four basic forms of propositions recognized in classical logic:

A propositions, or universal affirmatives take the form: All S are P.
E propositions, or universal negations take the form: No S are P.
I propositions, or particular affirmatives take the form: Some S are P.
O propositions, or particular negations take the form: Some S are not P.

From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Note, the "self-evidence" of the character of opposition in each case relies upon the quantifiers used. And the verb to be is used as the universal quantifier as affirmation or negation. Apparently this site will not preserve the formatting, to get the square chart apply the URL at top.

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