Not to me it isn’t. Maybe you’re a p-zombie?

"It appears that I see color, feel pain, etc." is a self report. You're reporting to me about yourself, via common language use. Self reports are existentially dependent upon common language use. Common language use is public, external, and effable.

It’s private in the sense that only I know I’m having the experience, — Marchesk

...know...

So you have a justified true belief?

And we don't know that you see the board as bent?

And this makes sense to you?

I’m self-reporting to you. I don’t require a self-report of my own experiences. But I do need it for others. Thus the privacy of experience.

Now if you have no experiences of your own, I can understand why you would confuse self-reports and language with experience. But I suspect you do, and like Dennnett, have convinced yourself that it’s a trick of your brain.

As much as I do for the external world. And yes, you don’t know that I see the same thing without verification of some sort.

As much as I do for the external world. — Marchesk

I thought you thought qualia were somehow special; but this puts them on the same footing as chairs and other stuff, doesn't it? You and I agree that this is a wooden chair, and that the board appears to bulge...

SO were is this getting us? How are qualia distinct from chairs?

The chair looks like wood, but turns out to be plastic.

I do not think that Dennett is denying that some thoughts are private, in the sense of being unspoken — creativesoul

One wonders what Dennett means by unspoken thoughts. Surely not “inner dialog”?

Thoughts that might be spoken, but haven't been; as opposed to thoughts that supposedly cannot be spoken. Like, perhaps, qualia.

But how to make sense of that?

SO were is this getting us? How are qualia distinct from chairs? — Banno

Qualia are the secondary qualities of perception. They’re not properties of chairs.

Sure, you said that. But we are trying to work out the consequences of that. Both are spoken of; but you claim qualia are private. SO what is the nature of this privacy? Can you make it clear?

chesk
Thoughts that might be spoken, but haven't been; — Banno

Thoughts I hear in my head. Or see in my imagination. Or remember with whatever sensory modality.

But how to make sense of that? — Banno

Since we’re both human, we have similar enough experiences in which to build language upon. But do note the limits of communicating our experiences to one another.

I asked you to strip the experience down of all that is public, external, and effable. Your report will come via language. That's not a problem. I'm asking you exactly which properties of that experience can stand on their own after you've removed the public, external, and effable?

One wonders what Dennett means by unspoken thoughts. — Marchesk

My characterization. Not Dennett's.

SO what is the nature of this privacy? Can you make it clear? — Banno

Something that can’t be communicated, apparently. Insert Luke’s comment on showing here.

You want me to remove all the properties of language and then report my experiences to you? They aren’t linguistic. The language is just a reference.

What's left? — creativesoul

Experience is a synthesis, not an aggregate. Experiences cannot be disassembled, they may only be analyzed.

Beware misplaced concreteness.

Qualia are the secondary qualities of perception. — Marchesk

Can you please break down an experience you've had and show me/us which bits are qualia and which aren't? Or how qualia apply to it? Describe your keyboard or something!

Well actually it would be better to say the entire experience is qualia, in that’s how a keyboard appears, but certain properties such as shape or reflectivity are inferred from the experience. And those are taken to be primary, objective properties. But to answer directly, it would be the color, feel and even smell of the keyboard from which we construct an object in perception. Or the result of that construction, however the neural mechanisms work.

If the entire experience is qualia, how does that idea work with qualia being secondary properties of perception?

I might be equivocating on Locke here, but the primary ones are taken to be related to the objective ones. We see a shape extended in three dimensions via the color shadings. The exact physics of the world is a bit different, but there is an object with mass in 3 spatial dimensions that reflects light of a certain wavelength.

So you're characterising qualia as relational properties of sensation causes and sensations? As Lockean secondary qualities?

I guess, for perception anyway. What’s important is the appearance, not my muddled attempt to answer you.

Okay. Take me through this. If what's important is the appearance, how is the appearance distinguished from the relational properties of sensation causes and sensations?

(1) What is Dennett's argument in Quining Qualia? — fdrake

Deflation of qualia would benefit philosophy and science.

(2) How do you think he argues for that position?

With exercises meant to demonstrate that a person's reports about qualia are vague, confused, and unreliable.

(3) In what sense is Quining Qualia an argument for externalism of mental content?

It would better be seen as fleshing out why qualia should be handled in an externalistic way.

How do the different intuition pumps try to demonstrate the necessity of environmental relationships for mental content to be configured as it is?

Isn't that kind of obvious?

Deflation of qualia would benefit philosophy and science. — frank

What do you mean by deflation? Considering the article never uses the word, it needs explaining.

With exercises meant to demonstrate that a person's reports about qualia are vague, confused, and unreliable. — frank

:up:

It would better be seen as fleshing out why qualia should be handled in an externalistic way. — frank

Okay, what do you mean by externalism here? Again, seeing as the article never uses the word, it needs explaining.

Isn't that kind of obvious? — frank

Not to me. How do they do it?

We can call the appearance that if you prefer it to qualia. It doesn’t remove the what it’s like or seems to each of us. I will answer your three questions from earlier soon.

When you say the appearance seems some way to us, what do you mean?

Here is what it seems to me you mean:
(1) Appearances are secondary qualities. In other words, appearances are relationships between perceived objects and the perception of that object.
(2) Every appearance inheres in a subject.
(3) The appearance has, as a property, a way it seems to the subject it inheres in.

Does that sound about right?

What do you mean by deflation? Considering the article never uses the word, it needs explaining. — fdrake

Quining?

Okay, what do you mean by externalism here? Again, seeing as the article never uses the word, it needs explaining. — fdrake

This is where we disagree. You need to know what externalism is to understand Dennett.

Not to me. How do they do it? — fdrake

I've already discussed the PLA one twice. Banno threw out the machine one early on. Which one did you want to discuss?

I'm feeling this unnecessarily nasty vibe developing. Better yet, let's drop it, ok?

Yes.

Quining? — frank

"Denying resolutely the existence of something which seems important" (paraphrase) seems to me much different from, say, saying that convention T suffices as a theory of meaning for sentences. What is being deflated into what and why?

This is where we disagree. You need to know what externalism is to understand Dennett. — frank

Can you tell me what I need to understand about externalism to understand the argument in the article?

Yes — Marchesk

Woop woop.

(1) Appearances are secondary qualities. In other words, appearances are relationships between perceived objects and the perception of that object.
(2) Every appearance inheres in a subject.
(3) The appearance has, as a property, a way it seems to the subject it inheres in. — fdrake

Do you further identify the "seeming" as a quale? Is that the qualish bit?

Can you tell me what I need to understand about externalism to understand the argument in the article? — fdrake

If you can't tell me in basic terms what externalism is, we're done.