One thing about consciousness is that it seems to be related to volition, might even be why we have it at all instead of just reflexes, however complicated. Or it could be this is the cheapest way to build up a repertoire of complex reflexes. (I spend far more time talking and writing than I do trying to remember words I want to use.) At any rate, we don't have volition here: I don't choose to see the world as colored, or to smell what I smell or feel what I feel, and so on. I have no control over what's dumped into my awareness and what's not. (Similarly, it's almost impossible not to understand speech in a language you understand, so robust is the habit.) That strikes me as interesting, but I've no idea what to do with it. — Srap Tasmaner
He's talking about the word itself. The word exists. I suppose on way to put it if you want to maintain that all words we use must, by that use, have a meaning (a position I have some sympathy with), then you could say the Dennett was showing that we do not mean any single identifiable thing when using the word. — Isaac
Have a read of the Farrell paper — Isaac
Because they have backward-acting neurons which suppress signals from more primary cortices before they get processed in the models of cortices higher than them. All the while that's happening, these higher level cortices are not on idle, waiting for the results, they're still processing the previous data and this affects the backward acting signals. So basically, before a signal has even left a primary area it is out of date, it has been interpreted post hoc on the basis of a model from a few seconds ago (or a long as a few minutes ago as you go higher up the cortices). — Isaac
But the distinction between primary and secondary attributes is hard-baked into our worldview. There’s no easy way to unscramble this particular omelette. Heck, Dennett won’t even admit there’s a need to make the effort, or that there is an issue to solve. Modern scientific method ‘brackets out’ the subjective - that is the meaning of the ‘view from nowhere’. And then, having bracketed it out, it says it can’t find any sign of its reality. There’s a really basic sleight-of-hand behind this entire debate, but for those who can’t see it, it’s devilishly hard to explain. — Wayfarer
In these discussions, I really am at a loss to explain how the Dennet's and Churchlands of the world actually the believe the stuff they're saying. I think it has less to do with how they experience the world and more to do with a certain mindset that views consciousness (and everything associated with it) as "woo". — RogueAI
I think the first step to unscrambling that omelette is to reject the 'view from nowhere', and thus also the 'bracketing out' of the human perspective. — Andrew M
The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop.
If there's an alternative, then is is necessarily true that it's possible to doubt without having an experience of the thought process (presumably that's what the p-zombie does) and so you cannot then say anyone who doubts must be having an experience of doubting purely on the grounds of there being no alternative. — Isaac
what would an answer to this question look like?. — Isaac
If I ask "why do we have noses" an evolutionary, or physiological account suffices as an answer, but for some reason such an account is insufficient for the 'hard problem' enthusiasts. — Isaac
The problem is a consequence of not understanding our own thought and belief, what it consists of, how it emerges, evolves, what it gives rise to, and the role that all of this plays in our lives(conscious experience).
That's the only place to start. — creativesoul
leading one day to be able to read someone's thoughts... Science fiction? — Olivier5
Aren't you just expressing the hard problem with that question: why do we have qualia if they make no functional difference?
— Luke
No, that question assumes we have qualia. I'm saying that we don't. That nothing ontologically answers to that description — Isaac
Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, but these properties are so unlike the properties traditionally imputed to consciousness that it would be grossly misleading to call any of them the long-sought qualia. Qualia are supposed to be special properties, in some hard-to-define way. My claim--which can only come into focus as we proceed--is that conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special. — Dennett
Talk of qualia serves only to obscure such conversation. "You can never know what the coffee tastes like to me"...well, yes I can; I know it tastes bitter. I can surmise that another coffee, even nuttier to me, might well be more bitter to you.
I know what the coffee tastes like for you. — Banno
A computer based "expert system" for quality control and classification is probably within the bounds of existing technology. We now know enough about the relevant chemistry to make the transducers that would replace taste buds and olfactory organs (delicate color vision would perhaps be more problematic), and we can imagine using the output of such transducers as the raw material--the "sense data" in effect--for elaborate evaluations, descriptions, classifications. Pour the sample in the funnel and, in a few minutes or hours, the system would type out a chemical assay, along with commentary: "a flamboyant and velvety Pinot, though lacking in stamina"--or words to such effect. Such a machine might well perform better than human wine tasters on all reasonable tests of accuracy and consistency the winemakers could devise, but surely no matter how "sensitive" and "discriminating" such a system becomes, it will never have, and enjoy, what we do when we taste a wine: the qualia of conscious experience! — Dennett
Our theories about the world emerge from our pretheoretical observations and reason...
— Olivier5
What would such pre-linguistic reason consist of?
— creativesoul
"Pre-theoretical" means something different from "pre-linguistic". It means stuff you do in practice without thinking about it in theory. Like when you watch large packs of birds fly. You are not necessarily theorizing about yourself watching birds fly, or even about how the birds fly. You may simply watch them. You may wonder why they fly so high or turn so suddenly, all as one, but it's not a research program yet, more a wonder, a question. You may start to reason that this is peculiar and beautiful, and start filming the phenomenon with your cellphone. You are still not theorizing much. You are just recording whatever you can of the event, thinking your friends will like this.
You may theorize latter, for instance if I ask you why you looked at those damn birds for so long. — Olivier5
So you deny basic logic? Numbers and neurons aren’t colors. This is a matter of identity. You expect me to reconsider? — Marchesk
↪Isaac
what would an answer to this question look like?. — Isaac
One possible answer is that some from of consciousness is inherent in all matter. Another would be some set of conditions that produce consciousness. Another would be whatever Dennett is doing. There are plenty of hypothesis. But without a "consciousness-o-meter" they're all untestable. — khaled
The problem is a consequence of not understanding our own thought and belief, what it consists of, how it emerges, evolves, what it gives rise to, and the role that all of this plays in our lives(conscious experience).
That's the only place to start.
— creativesoul
Agreed. But that's still a terrible starting place. — khaled
How might we form a theory about what these thoughts consist of, how they emerge, evolve, etc without being able to detect the thing we are testing the hypothesis for from a third person perspective? — khaled
Seems like you mean to say that the word "qualia" has no referent, rather than no meaning. — Luke
I take all this to mean that it takes some time for a signal (e.g. sense data) to travel (e.g. from the skin) to the brain. Without wanting to derail the discussion too much, the question becomes: when is "real time", or with what is "real time" synchronous? You seem to suggest it is (e.g.) when light hits the retina. But why then? And whose retina? — Luke
Modern scientific method ‘brackets out’ the subjective - that is the meaning of the ‘view from nowhere’. — Wayfarer
I assume you reject qualia because you take "qualia" to refer to properties of conscious experience which do possess these four special qualities. And therefore, like Dennett, you would allow that we do e.g. see the redness of a flower or taste the bitterness of coffee. — Luke
It is only the most naïve and nihilist forms of materialism that deny consciousness or agency, not science. — Olivier5
Through us and other species. And let's remember that our understanding of the universe remains highly imperfect. As for size, why does it matter? The stars are not as wise as you are (Omar Khayyam).However again this overlooks the centrality of the human mind in arriving at that understanding. .... the universe has, as it were, come to this understanding of itself through us. — Wayfarer
That is true but in my experience, real scientists are far more humane and modest than their philosophical worshipers.The notion that modern science ‘de-humanises’ the modern worldview is hardly my invention, it is the topic of a vast literature. — Wayfarer
The stars are not as wise as you are (Omar Khayyam). — Olivier5
As though it'll then be clearer what everyone is talking about. — bongo fury
Einstein generalized the finding to light. — Olivier5
Through us and other species. — Olivier5
real scientists are far more humane and modest than their philosophical worshipers. — Olivier5
Ah. Thanks for clearing that up. Not sure how helpful that distinction is given the task, but at least I better understand what it means. — creativesoul
Through us and other species.
— Olivier5
Don't agree with that. That's kind of fashionable reaction against so called 'human exceptionalism'. We have to own our abilities, not project them on other species. Reason is a soveriegn faculty. — Wayfarer
Do you disagree with Dennett that there are properties of conscious experience? — Luke
Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties.
. Whilst I agree with Dennett about rejecting the purported properties of qualia, I also reject that there is such a thing as the 'redness' of a flower. I don't think it makes sense. If there were such a thing, we'd expect some evidence — Isaac
I don't really agree or disagree here. I think the concept is too poorly defined. If by 'reality of conscious experience' we merely mean that some mental goings on can be referred to as 'conscious experience' then I'd agree that, being real, they'd have properties. — Isaac
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