The apple is nonetheless red, but the animal is unable to perceive that. — Andrew M

That the apple is not red to some animals implies that it is not red tout court, but that it has the constitutional potential to appear red to some animals. For all we know it may appear as some other colour we have never perceived to some animal. Would you then say that the apple is that nameless colour tout court? Or if the apple is grey to an animal that has no colour receptors does it follow that the apple is also grey tout court? What I think you are missing is that colour is relational, not inherent, whereas the potential to be coloured is inherent.

The belief that a dictionary contains the meaning of a word. Naive. Indeed, silly. We don't need more holy books — Banno

So how is it so can look up a word I don’t know in the dictionary, read it’s definition, then use it meaningfully in conversation?

Seems like a rather holy experience to me. Especially when it’s Urban Dictionary.

Also sounds like an ontological commitment to color realism on Andrew’s part.

I also have an ontological commitment to colour realism, but it is a commitment to relational realism. I can't see any analyzed way in which it makes sense to say that the apple is inherently, absent of all external (to the apple) conditions, red. Of course it makes sense in the ordinary way to say the apple is red, but as I said before saying that is just shorthand for saying that it appears red to us.

So how is it so can look up a word I don’t know in the dictionary, read it’s definition, then use it meaningfully in conversation? — Marchesk

Dont be naive about the dictionary, but do be naive about apples.

Relational realism would mean colors are real for certain perceptual systems when perceiving under normal lighting conditions? I can dig that.

Selective ordinary language philosophy.

That sounds almost right, although I'd say they are real under any lighting conditions, unless there is not enough light to see any colour at all. So the apple might appear purple under conditions where blue light predominates, and that appearance of colour would be just as real as the red which appears under "normal" lighting conditions.

Selective ordinary language philosophy. — Marchesk

It needs to be a little more random.

messaging (including fake messaging) between species is commonplace, in a very practical biosemiotic manner. — Olivier5

There is dynamic "measure-counter measure" dimension to inter-species communication and perception. Consider the case of the tiger moth.

Moth Blocks Bat Attack by Jamming Sonar

Navy engineers aren't the only ones who can jam sonar. Scientists have discovered a species of tiger moth that thwarts hungry bats by emitting extra-loud clicks to block the bats' ability to echolocate.

Researchers have long known that some species of moths send out clicks in response to bat sonar, but until now, no one has been able to prove that the clicks actually interfere with echolocation. "The idea of a jamming mechanism has been thrown around for 50 years, but nobody has really put a moth and a bat together in a flight room to see what happens," said ecology graduate student Aaron Corcoran of Wake Forest University, co-author of the study published Thursday in Science.

Corcoran and his colleagues pitted a particularly noisy species of tiger moth, the Bertholdia trigona, against big brown bats trained to hunt in a flight room. As long as the moths were able to click, the bats couldn't catch them, even though the moths were tethered on a string.

But when the scientists pierced a small hole in the moths' sound-producing structures, called tymbals, the silenced moths quickly became lunch.

"It's the first good, solid case of this going on," said insect behavior expert James Fullard of the University of Toronto at Mississauga, who was not involved in the study. "For this bat and this moth, it looks pretty convincing that jamming is what's going on."

Not all clicking moths can jam sonar, Fullard said, and that's part of what makes this discovery so exciting. Previous research revealed that two other varieties of tiger moth make clicks that are too quiet to interfere with bat echolocation. Instead, he said, these moths likely use the clicks as a warning: Because most moths that click back at bats are poisonous, scientists think the noise may communicate, "Don't eat me, I taste bad."

But B. trigona isn't poisonous, and the Wake Forest researchers experimented with young bats that had no prior exposure to clicking moths, so they hadn't already learned to equate clicking with a bad taste. Nor did it seem like the bats were just startled by the clicking moths. Even after multiple attempts on multiple nights, the bats still couldn't catch the intact B. trigona.

"Mammals habituate to startle rather quickly," Corcoran said. "We went through seven days of trials, but the bats never habituated. They were put off by the clicks right away and throughout the whole experiment."

The researchers haven't yet proven how the moth's sonar-jamming mechanism works, but they have two leading hypotheses: The moth's clicks may act as false echoes, essentially making the bat "see" double, or they may interrupt the bat's own echoes, making its prey appear closer than it is.

https://www.wired.com/2009/07/mothjam/

Fair enough, apologies for not reading the thread. — Olivier5

:up:

A signal calls for an action, typically. That's why it's urgent. It comes at a certain moment, when a certain action is required and not before. In this case, the apple turns red when it is ripe, i.e. when the fruit and its seeds are ready for cumsomption by animals. So basically the tree is calling an animal as a sort of taxi, when it's ready, to transport its kids to a new neighborhood (the seeds, that will be excreted a few miles away). The cab fare is the sugar in the fruit. — Olivier5

That's a great metaphor. Good post!

The apple is nonetheless red, but the animal is unable to perceive that.
— Andrew M

That the apple is not red to some animals implies that it is not red tout court, but that it has the constitutional potential to appear red to some animals. — Janus

No, the apple is red tout court.

The word "red" picks out a physical aspect of the apple, not how it appears (which is a qualifier meaning "seem; give the impression of being", not a reference to a mental entity or mental experience).

For example, suppose that some people have a genetic difference that results in brain wiring such that red apples appear green to them and green apples appear red.

They would learn to use the word "red" to describe red apples just the same as everyone else (since that is the convention). Their experiences are different from ours, unbeknown to us. But they correctly identify that the apple is red because the color term is picking out a physical aspect of the apple that is distinguishable by them (i.e., red from green), not how the apple appears to them.

If they put on red-green inverting glasses, they would then say that the red apple appears green to them, just as we would. So even though their experiences are different to ours, they are nonetheless using the color terms in the same way that we are. That's a proof, if you like, that color is a physical aspect of the apple, not a mental phenomenon. Instead it is theirs and our experiences that are different. And that experiential difference has a physical basis in the genetic/brain wiring difference.

For all we know it may appear as some other colour we have never perceived to some animal. Would you then say that the apple is that nameless colour tout court? Or if the apple is grey to an animal that has no colour receptors does it follow that the apple is also grey tout court? What I think you are missing is that colour is relational, not inherent, whereas the potential to be coloured is inherent. — Janus

The apple is red regardless, per the conventional use of the word "red". However there's no problem with having an alternative color language that denotes the color distinctions that a particular animal makes. And an animal that can't distinguish color at all is color-blind.

Corcoran and his colleagues pitted a particularly noisy species of tiger moth, the Bertholdia trigona, against big brown bats trained to hunt in a flight room. As long as the moths were able to click, the bats couldn't catch them, even though the moths were tethered on a string. — Olivier5

We're talking ultrasounds here, but similar "clicks" emitted by the infamous death's head hawk moth are audible to humans:

Don't take quotes out of context.

That's fine, but then all you've got is the intent behind the expression, but we're talking about ontological commitments here. — Isaac

Replying to this by saying "you're talking about ontological commitments here" is intended to say that I meant the alternative (the intent). As in the intent behind saying that "this apple is red" is to indicate a specific experience, that is my claim. If you have an issue with what I'm saying address it directly or not at all please.

The belief that a dictionary contains the meaning of a word.

What do they contain?

Perhaps it is your expression that is unclear; there's a vacillation going on in which you think apples are red at the grocer but not at the forum. I'm just trying to make sense of how you can hold on to this inconsistency.

So how is it so can look up a word I don’t know in the dictionary, read it’s definition, then use it meaningfully in conversation? — Marchesk

Because dictionaries give synonyms, and hence tell how to use a word. Nothing to do with that elusive, mysterious notion of meaning.

Unless, of course, you want to argue that meaning and use are the same thing.

Better, it has been argued, to look to the use of a sentence than the meaning of a word.

My, my this thread went off topic.

That's a proof, if you like, that color is a physical aspect of the apple, not a mental phenomenon. Instead it is theirs and our experiences that are different. And that experiential difference has a physical basis in the genetic/brain wiring difference. — Andrew M

As I've already agreed, the common usage of the term 'red' is fine. But what you say here goes to my argument, that there is no identifiable characteristic of the apple that the word 'red' signifies, other than that its appearance is distinguishable from apples of other colours, even for the colourblind. When the colourblind person uses 'red' she is referring to a different kind of appearance than the 'normal' person is, so they are not referring to a determinable common phenomenon, other than their ability to agree as to which apples the term is correctly applied, (and this is a circular semantic situation, not an identifiable physical characteristic) even though this would not be known absent testing for colourblindness.

The apple is red regardless, per the conventional use of the word "red". However there's no problem with having an alternative color language that denotes the color distinctions that a particular animal makes. And an animal that can't distinguish color at all is color-blind. — Andrew M

I've already acknowledged that in the conventional sense it is fine to say of a red apple that it is red; but when challenge to say what physical characteristic apart from its distinguishable appearance is being referred to by the term.

'Red' is a colour term. so it cannot be referring to physical characteristics that determine colour. It seems to me to make no analytically examined sense (as opposed to mere conventional sense) to say an apple is red when not seen, or when it is in the dark, because 'red' being a colour term cannot properly apply when there is no colour.

So, it looks to me as if, even though I am not arguing against conventional usage, you for some reason object to the greater accuracy of expression that comes with analysis. Are you afraid that analysis will undermine conventional usage? I see no reason why it should, any more than the discovery and analysis that reveals that the sun doesn't actually rise (since it doesn't move) undermines the perfectly serviceable, and within its context, still common sensible conventional usage that speaks of the sun rising.

there is no identifiable characteristic of the apple that the word 'red' signifies, — Janus

:rofl:

Here's a neat quote from Austin that gives an idea of how he thought about ordinary language:

So much, then, for ways in which the study of excuses may throw light on ethics. But there are also reasons why it is an attractive subject methodologically, at least if we are to proceed from 'ordinary language', that is, by examining what we should say when, and so why and what we should mean by it. Perhaps this method, at least as one philosophical method, scarcely requires justification at present—too evidently, there is gold in them thar hills: more opportune would be a warning about the care and thoroughness needed if it is not to fall into disrepute. I will, however, justify it very briefly.

First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us. Secondly, words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things: we need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can relook at the world without blinkers. Thirdly, and more hopefully, our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon—the most favoured alternative method.

As I've already agreed, the common usage of the term 'red' is fine. — Janus

I'm not sure it is fine for you, since you think that red, when analyzed, actually refers to how the apple appears, not what color it is. But my argument showed that it can't be referring to how it appears, since how it appears drops out in use. That is, even the person who is wired differently says the apple is red because "appearances" can't be compared between two people. Instead they can each only say that they are able to distinguish two differently colored apples and then use a color naming convention that captures that distinction. (For example, that "red" is the word we use to describe stop signs, and "green" to describe grass. Since this particular apple situation is similar to a stop sign situation and not a grass situation, then "red" is the correct term to describe it.)

That is a version of the private language argument.

Further, we find on analysis that the term "appears" doesn't designate subjective "appearances". It is instead a term that lets us say how two different situations are, in some sense, similar. For example, that wearing red-green inversion glasses makes the situation of seeing a red apple like the situation of seeing a green apple (even though we know that is not actually the situation). Compare with the example of the straight stick that appears bent in water. It's similar to seeing a bent stick, but we know they are different situations. The stick is straight, independently of how it appears to someone. And the apple is red, independently of how it appears to someone.

Here's a neat quote from Austin that gives an idea of how he thought about ordinary language:

"First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use clean tools: we should know what we mean and what we do not, and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language sets us." — Banno

:100: I think the word "appears" is one of those potential traps. It takes on a life of its own in philosophy!

Perhaps it is your expression that is unclear; there's a vacillation going on in which you think apples are red at the grocer but not at the forum. — Banno

When did it appear to you that I think apples are not red when I’m on the forum? I’m just clarifying what people mean when they say “the apple is red”. That is that the apple produces a certain experience.

The word "red" picks out a physical aspect of the apple, not how it appears (which is a qualifier meaning "seem; give the impression of being", not a reference to a mental entity or mental experience). — Andrew M

The apple appearing red came long before optics. You have the cart before the horse. It's like arguing that sunrise means the Earth revolves around the sun, or solid means objects are filled with mostly empty space, held together by tight EM bonds. There would be no "sunrise" if if the sun didn't appear to move through the sky, similarly we wouldn't have quite the same word for "solid" if we utilized X-Ray vision instead. Nor would apples look red.

I think the word "appears" is one of those potential traps. It takes on a life of its own in philosophy! — Andrew M

Sellars went through all this in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" too: "looks" talk, as in "the apple looks red to Andrew", is logically posterior to "is" talk. There's no way even to make sense of it otherwise. What does it mean to say that an apple looks red except that it looks like it is red?

I think of that passage more often than almost anything else I've ever read.

Another Austin gem:

One might almost say that oversimplification is the occupational hazard of a philosophy, if it were not the occupation.

I'm not sure it is fine for you, since you think that red, when analyzed, actually refers to how the apple appears, not what color it is. — Andrew M

What colour it is is how it appears under some specific "normal" conditions; what's the problem with that?

But my argument showed that it can't be referring to how it appears, since how it appears drops out in use. That is, even the person who is wired differently says the apple is red because "appearances" can't be compared between two people. — Andrew M

No, the apple appears red to the colourblind person, just as it does to us "normal" people. That is to say it appears as a colour that he calls red, just as it appears to us as a colour we call red. It just so happens that those two colours, those two appearances are not the same.

Further, we find on analysis that the term "appears" doesn't designate subjective "appearances". It is instead a term that lets us say how two different situations are, in some sense, similar. — Andrew M

This can't be right because you have said that the apple appears different to a colourblind person than it does to a "normal" person. You can't have it both ways.

The stick is straight, independently of how it appears to someone. And the apple is red, independently of how it appears to someone. — Andrew M

Not a good analogy because the stick appears bent to everyone, and can be felt or withdrawn from the water to confirm its straightness. The straightness of a stick is not something that refers to an appearance as colour words do.

You haven't said what it would mean (beyond the merely conventional usage) to say that an apple is red when no one is looking at it or when it is in the dark.

Red apples reflect certain light frequencies(interact with light) regardless of whether or not it is under direct observation, and regardless of whether or not the reflected frequencies are directly perceptible to a creature who may be looking at the apple.

The question is not how do we know that. Rather, it is what reason do we have to doubt it?

Talking about apples 'seeming to be' and/or 'appearing' red is based upon doubting one's own physiological sensory perception. Doubting one's own physiological sensory perception requires metacognition. Cognition comes first. Talking about apples being red, saying "the apple is red" does not require metacognition, it requires cognition. This order of events makes a big difference, especially when someone is attempting to say that the way an apple "appears" is somehow basic, raw, and/or fundamental to all conscious experience involving red apples.

It's not.

It's basic, raw, and/or fundamental to all conscious experience involving whether or not the apple really is red, as opposed and/or compared to 'appearing' or 'seeming' to be. Such conscious experience is language based and metacognitive whereas saying "the apple is red" is language based but not metacognitive.

When did it appear to you that I think apples are not red when I’m on the forum? — khaled

I am claiming that in general use (and assuming one isn't lying of course), "the apple is red" is used to indicate a certain experience produced by the apple. — khaled

You said apples are not red; they only appear red.

You see, the funny thing is that you presume we all use the same word, "red", for a certain experience; and yet you deny that we all have the same experience. But when we point out that the experience seems therefore to be irrelevant, you disagree.

Makes no sense to me.