Red apples reflect certain light frequencies(interact with light) regardless of whether or not it is under direct observation, and regardless of whether or not the frequencies are perceptible to a creature who may be looking at the apple. — creativesoul

Of course, and I asked Andrew if that is what he meant by saying an apple is red and he answered in the negative. In any case if the apple is red only when it is reflecting certain light frequencies, then we cannot say it is red when it is in the dark can we? The other point is that even to accept this definition you gave you must be OK with 'red' being an ambiguous term, since it also refers to the seeing of certain colours.

...so the argument is that the apple is not red when it is dark, and hence that is it never red... it only seems, or appears, or is experienced as... red...

What?

I don't know about Andrew.

We call those frequencies "red". It's the properties, features, and/or characteristics of red things interacting with light that make them reflect the frequencies we've named "red". Red things reflect those frequencies regardless of whether or not those things are under observation.

Red cups are red(reflect certain frequencies of light consistently). That has nothing at all to do with us.

No, it is red when it appears red. It always has the potential to appear red, but does not always fulfill that potential due to other conditions not obtaining.

We call those frequencies "red". It's the properties, features, and/or characteristics of red things interacting with light that make them reflect the frequencies we've named "red". Things reflect those frequencies regardless of whether or not those things are under observation. — creativesoul

Is it the frequencies we are calling red, or the objects that reflect those frequencies. In any case, as I said, I have no argument with ordinary usage in its place, but when examined it yields some other factors that make it not so straightforward as it might first appear.

Is it the frequencies we are calling red, or the objects that reflect those frequencies. — Janus

That all depends upon the refinement of one's language use and/or understanding of how our eyes work. What difference does that make here? In both cases, the apple is red due to how it interacts with light.

The point is that it reflects those frequencies only under certain light conditions; so the redness of an apple is not an inherent property, it also depends on conditions external to it.

The point is that it reflects those frequencies only under certain light conditions; so the redness of an apple is not an inherent property... — Janus

Ok. I agree.

So, do you reject redness as a quale(property of conscious experience) as well?

I think 'seeing red' is a valid way of talking about certain visual perceptions. But it is abstracted from the usual context where the red belongs to an object of a particular size, shape texture and so on, and the red is of a particular tone, intensity, hue and so on. One way of simply seeing red would be to place someone in front of a screen emitting red light, or a surface painted red, that fills the visual field entirely.

I certainly don't believe in subjective visual perceptions that are somehow "in the brain" and stand as intermediaries between us and the objects we see.

The other meaning of 'qualia' is something like 'raw percept' where what is seen is not seen 'as anything'. I guess this is only possible in rare instances, or with infants, because most everything we see is always already conceptually mediated.

You said apples are not red; they only appear red. — Banno

I said that when someone says “the apple is red” they really mean “the apple appears red/invokes a certain experience I call ‘red’”. I don’t think that’s even a controversial claim. Whether or not you assign a property “red” to the apple, my claim remains true.

yet you deny that we all have the same experience. — Banno

Incorrect. I deny that there is a reason to assume we all have the same experience, but we may. Because as I said, whether or not we have the same experience when seeing a red apple is irrelevant, all that we need to understand each other is to have a “homomorphism” of experiences.

But when we point out that the experience seems therefore to be irrelevant, you disagree. — Banno

Incorrect. I agree. I already said that talk of qualia is pointless (with them being ineffable and all that) for describing our experiences but that qualia clearly have a referent. So saying they don’t exist is at best purposely misleading and at worst ridiculous.

What difference does that make here? In both cases, the apple is red due to how it interacts with light. — creativesoul

But it's only red because that's the color we see. We see that color because of the way or visual system works. If our visual system was different, we might not have an rgb vocabulary. The rest of the EM spectrum does not have color labels, because we don't see the rest of the electromagnetic radiation interacting with the environment.

That's something which is getting lost here. The apple just doesn't reflect light of certain wavelength. It also has other light reflecting off and going through it and what not. Insects and birds can see colors we can't. The full EM spectrum is all around us, but we only see a small fraction of it.

I said that when someone says “the apple is red” they really mean “the apple appears red/invokes a certain experience I call ‘red’”. I don’t think that’s even a controversial claim. — khaled

What do you make of my claims today regarding that? Seems contentious by my lights. Wrong even.

That's because you ignore the naive realist assumption in ordinary language that apples look red because they are red, because the world is at it looks to us, end of story. But it's not. It's just the beginning of the story.

Talking about apples 'seeming to be' and/or 'appearing' red is based upon doubting one's own physiological sensory perception — creativesoul

Not really. Even if we pretend to have a hotline to “true reality” then the sentence “The apple seems red” would still be true and would be identical to “The apple is red”.

Doubting one's own physiological sensory perception requires metacognition. Cognition comes first — creativesoul

I don’t understand the significance of this. So what if meta cognition comes later? As marchesk just said:

apples look red because they are red, because the world is at it looks to us, end of story. But it's not. — Marchesk

Or doesn’t have to be at least. Also this:

We call those frequencies "red". It's the properties, features, and/or characteristics of red things interacting with light that make them reflect the frequencies we've named "red". — creativesoul

Can’t be true. Red can’t indicate a certain frequency or wavelength. Or else the word “red” would have only been conceived of after we were able to measure frequencies and after we figured out light was a wave. But there are Greek words for “red” even as they were questioning what light was. Unless you suggest that when we say “red” today is different from when we said it in the past.

Furthermore, if this is your conception of red, then we would have to teach children the properties of light before being able to teach them colors. But again that is not the case. And I doubt that understanding light and wavelengths changes the referent of the word either. When a child says “the apple is red” and when einstein says “the apple is red” they mean the same thing.

:up:

Unless, of course, you want to argue that meaning and use are the same thing. — Banno

Why do you write posts if those posts mean nothing at all?

Why do you write posts if those posts mean nothing at all? — Olivier5

Because of what they do.

And what do your meaningless posts do, pray tell?

All different things. Elicit silly replies, for one.

You can do better, Oliver. You have some understanding of Wittgenstein. You have a better grasp of the argument than you pretend here.

You see, the funny thing is that you presume we all use the same word, "red", for a certain experience; and yet you deny that we all have the same experience. But when we point out that the experience seems therefore to be irrelevant, you disagree. — Banno

I said that when someone says “the apple is red” they really mean “the apple appears red/invokes a certain experience I call ‘red’”. I don’t think that’s even a controversial claim. Whether or not you assign a property “red” to the apple, my claim remains true. — khaled

Well, I could go back and point out again hat the red of the sportscar and the red of the sunset are not the same experience. That's closer to the OP, but the point is lost.

Tell me, have you read Austin's Sense and Sensibilia? Just curious, as to the derivation of our difference in our opinions. You appear to have a somewhat idealist view, or perhaps anti-realist...?

Well, I could go back and point out again hat the red of the sportscar and the red of the sunset — Banno

Yes there are different shades of red. We couldn't possibly have a word for every possible shade of colors so we lumped similar ones under one word. So I guess it was incorrect to say that "red" refers to a certain experience but rather a range of experiences. And all we need to be able to communicate is for these ranges to be largely similar. For instance I would say that a sunset is orange (the 'range' of experiences included under "orange" includes the shade of a sunset) but small differences like these shouldn't be a problem for understanding.

However if someone says the sunset is green he is either colorblind (his experiences are not a homomorphism of ours to begin with) or doesn't understand what the word means (the "pointer" he uses is incorrect even if the experience itself is a homomorphism of ours)

Tell me, have you read Austin's Sense and Sensibilia? — Banno

No.

You can do better, Oliver. You have some understanding of Wittgenstein. You have a better grasp of the argument than you pretend here. — Banno

You too can do better than your silly attempts at undermining perfectly fine concepts. You cannot destroy any concept anyway, least of all the concept of "meaning". Your attempts are futile.

Our eyes can make out ten million shades of color. I wonder how many shades have names? Here's a site with a bunch of shade names grouped by color:

https://graf1x.com/list-of-colors-with-color-names/

The red ones:

But there is still an enormous number of shades between Scarlet and Ferrari so both of them are still describing a range of experiences. And where did you get that 10 million shades of color thing? Just curious.

PS: I shall now call sunsets "Candy Apple" colored.

just a few of them, that is...

Right. I've seen that mentioned several times, but googling right now I find this BBC article (below) which says about 1 million from combinations of 100 basic colors. It also mentions some interesting stuff about ultraviolet and infrared detection by humans under certain connditions. And it claims that tetrochromats can see 100 million.

A healthy human eye has three types of cone cells, each of which can register about 100 different colour shades, therefore most researchers ballpark the number of colours we can distinguish at around a million. Still, perception of colour is a highly subjective ability that varies from person to person, thus making any hard-and-fast figure difficult to pinpoint.

The average number of colours we can distinguish is around a million
"You'd be hard-pressed to put a number on it," says Kimberly Jameson, an associate project scientist at the University of California, Irvine. "What might be possible with one person is only a fraction of the colours that another person sees.

https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20150727-what-are-the-limits-of-human-vision

Yes, just a few that stand out enough to be named for their use in paints and web design.

Your attempts are futile. — Olivier5

Silly.

...and idealist sentiments?

Just trying to map differences.

I liked it. But I'm tired.