For colors, the looking and the being are dentical. An apple that receives no light cannot absorb part of the visible spectrum and reflect the other. It has the pigments to do so but not the light that would be playing with the pigments., "All cats look grey in the dark". No disagreement from me.
However that use is derivative from situations where we observe an object in normal lighting which is where color distinctions are originally made. That's the reference point in the world. — Andrew M
...eliminative materialism...
Folk suppose that if they can't sensibly talk about qualia then the eliminative materialists have won.
But that ain't so. — Banno
LOL. Talk for yourself, Banno. You can of course contend that you personally cannot make sense of the concept. But don't deny other people's use of it. I for one will use the word whether you can understand it or not. I'm not going to ask you for permission...Folk suppose that if they can't sensibly talk about qualia then the eliminative materialists have won. — Banno
Is the cat really black, or is it reddish? — Marchesk
Folk suppose that if they can't sensibly talk about qualia then the eliminative materialists have won. — Banno
But there's a general, philosophical way of asking, is that red ball really red? — Srap Tasmaner
Wittgenstein was railing against the idea of private meaning/language, not private experience: — Luke
(1) There are no qualia as they are commonly theorised or intuited.
(2) People do not have minds, sensations, feelings.
(1) does not imply (2), but (2) does imply (1). — fdrake
There are no minds, sensations, feelings as they are commonly theorised or intuited.. — bongo fury
It's asking whether the red ball is red in the way it looks red to us. — Marchesk
Regarding the temporal order of emergence, elemental constituency, and thus existential dependency, I suspect we're largely in agreement. When it comes to thought and belief about red, naming things that consistently reflect/emit certain frequencies of light "red" happens first. In our own linguistically/conceptually mediated ways of making sense of the world(which includes ourselves) we begin/began making sense of red things by virtue of picking out things that consistently reflect/emit the frequencies of light that we've named "red". Those things are red things. We first picked out the things reflecting/emitting those particular frequencies, called them "red".
Put more simply:Red things reflect/emit certain frequencies of light. We first named red things. We then further described red things in terms of properties/attributes/qualities. We then began to wonder if red things really are red or if they just appear red to us as a result of our physiological sensory apparatus(is your red the same as mine, etc.). Then came talk of "redness" as a so called private directly/immediately apprehensible property of subjective conscious experience.
Talk of "redness" is existentially dependent upon language use. Reflecting the frequencies we've named "red" does not. Which is basic, raw, and fundamental to consciousness? Surely not talking about it. — creativesoul
We call those frequencies "red". It's the properties, features, and/or characteristics of red things interacting with light that make them reflect the frequencies we've named "red".
— creativesoul
Can’t be true. Red can’t indicate a certain frequency or wavelength. Or else the word “red” would have only been conceived of after we were able to measure frequencies and after we figured out light was a wave. — khaled
Immediately apprehending and/or understanding the property of redness requires already knowing how to use "red", and is metacognitive in it's constitution. Already knowing how to use the term "red" to talk about red things is thought and belief that is linguistic in it's constitution but not metacognitive. So, it is either the case that raw, basic, fundamental, private, ineffable immediately apprehensible conscious experience involving red cups, balls, and tulips does not include the property of redness, or raw, basic, fundamental, private, ineffable conscious experience requires metacognition. Not all conscious experience involving red cups, balls, and tulips requires language. All metacognition does. So, the property of redness is disqualified(pun intended). — creativesoul
Immediately apprehending [...] the property of redness requires already knowing how to use "red"...
...Not all conscious experience involving red cups, balls, and tulips requires language. — creativesoul
...to know that there is something in common between the red ball and the red cup that is not in common between the red ball and the blue ball, does not require language, not the kind of verbal language you mean anyway. — Kenosha Kid
Your point is that humans and animals can both perceive or consciously experience red, but it requires language to identify the colour as “red”? — Luke
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