The point is that immediately understanding and/or apprehending redness as a property of conscious experience requires metacognition — creativesoul
However that use is derivative from situations where we observe an object in normal lighting which is where color distinctions are originally made. That's the reference point in the world. Without that reference point, you have to contend with the private language argument.
— Andrew M
That I do agree with! — Janus
For colors, the looking and the being are dentical. — Olivier5
An apple that receives no light cannot absorb part of the visible spectrum and reflect the other. It has the pigments to do so but not the light that would be playing with the pigments.
There's more: in the absence of light, maturing apples will become pallish, not red. So apples need to sense some light in order to even bother producing pigments to color that light. The same apply to leaves: if kept in the dark for a while, they will lose their green chlorophyll and turn white. — Olivier5
The point is that immediately understanding and/or apprehending redness as a property of conscious experience requires metacognition
— creativesoul
How is that different to saying that it requires language to identify the colour as "red"? — Luke
Identifying the color as "red" does not require metacognition. — creativesoul
That is, apples don't look red in the dark, yet they are red — Andrew M
I do not think that you understood the argument given. Merely distinguishing between red and blue is inadequate for understanding and/or immediately apprehending redness as a property of conscious experience. — creativesoul
Knowing that red things have that in common requires isolating and focusing upon the fact that the same frequencies are emitted/reflected by different things. — creativesoul
I'm trying to understand the distinction between "talk of redness" requires metacognition and "talk of redness" requires language... — Luke
Try not to cherry-pick. — Kenosha Kid
Understanding and/or immediately apprehending redness requires considerable previous usage of "red" to pick out red things, and then rather extensive subsequent careful consideration about that previous use of "red"(that's metacognition). — creativesoul
And it matters because qualia are supposed to be basic, fundamental, private, ineffable, immediately apprehensible, etc. but redness is none of those things. — creativesoul
And it matters because qualia are supposed to be basic, fundamental, private, ineffable, immediately apprehensible, etc. but redness is none of those things — creativesoul
Good point. People keep loading the concept with extraneous baggage.Not sure where you get "basic" and "fundamental" from. Not from Dennett's paper. — Luke
apples don't look red in the dark, yet they are red
— Andrew M
Okay, whatever. It makes no philosophical difference that I can see to my perception of red. — Olivier5
That is, apples don't look red in the dark, yet they are red
— Andrew M
That's two different meanings for the word "red". One is how it looks to us, the other is having the property of looking red to us under normal lighting conditions. That is to say, the chemical structure of the red apple's surface is such that it reflects visible light of a certain wavelength. — Marchesk
It relates to philosophical issues such as dualism, qualia, the hard problem, and what not. — Andrew M
You cannot actually reject anything if you are not a subject.this just comes down to whether one accepts the philosophical subject/object distinction or not. As I've mentioned before, I reject it. — Andrew M
Where's the concept of "redness" in all of that? It's nowhere to be found because it's not necessary in order to do all of those things. — creativesoul
The concept of "redness" emerges from careful and very deliberate consideration of previous normal everyday use of "red". — creativesoul
I agree that some language less creatures can perceive the frequencies of light that we've named "red", — creativesoul
The irony of pots and kettles... — creativesoul
Everyone gets by fine without careful and very deliberate consideration of "red", or indeed most other things. — Kenosha Kid
I still don't see much justification for "metacognition"... — Luke
Where's the concept of "redness" in all of that? It's nowhere to be found because it's not necessary in order to do all of those things. It's not even necessary in order to explain all of those things. — creativesoul
Yes it is. A crow cannot be trained to collect red things without some crow equivalent of a concept of redness. There is a phenomenological similarity that the crow must grasp in order to do this. For two phenomena to be similar, they must share properties. — Kenosha Kid
Indeed, and this shows us that "redness" is neither necessary nor useful aside from creating a bottle to buzz around in... — creativesoul
Indeed, and this shows us that "redness" is neither necessary nor useful aside from creating a bottle to buzz around in... — creativesoul
Try critical self-analysis, rather than metacognition. — Mww
It is perfectly possible to experience the redness of an object, and to call it thus... I don't see what your problem is.there is no such thing as a property of language-less conscious experience that we've called "redness" — creativesoul
I still don't see much justification for "metacognition"...
— Luke
And something tells me you never will... — creativesoul
Not to derail the discussion, but I think what you're discussing here is Sellars' distinction between "pattern governed behavior" and "rule obeying behavior"; see "Some Reflections on Language Games". Roughly, the former is a matter of conditioning, standard learning processes, etc., while the latter relies on a meta-level recognition of something having the status of a rule that authorizes inference. — Srap Tasmaner
this just comes down to whether one accepts the philosophical subject/object distinction or not. As I've mentioned before, I reject it.
— Andrew M
You cannot actually reject anything if you are not a subject. — Olivier5
You can't reject anything if you're not a human being. — Andrew M
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