there is no such thing as a property of language less conscious experience that we've called "redness" — creativesoul
I still don't see much justification for "metacognition"...
— Luke
And something tells me you never will...
— creativesoul
Perhaps, but not for lack of trying. I have asked for clarification. — Luke
Knowing that red things have that in common requires isolating and focusing upon the fact that the same frequencies are emitted/reflected by different things.
— creativesoul
No it doesn't, as had already been pointed out. Our concept of redness precedes our knowledge of the wave nature of light and cannot depend on such knowledge. — Kenosha Kid
Note the common etymology. — Olivier5
I'm not saying that one need to have knowledge that color is determined - in part - by reflected/emitted light, I'm saying that one needs to be able to focus upon the fact that different things reflect/emit the same light(that things are the same color) in order to gather like colored things for the sake of doing so. — creativesoul
You're claiming that that gathering ability requires a concept of redness. I'm saying that it only requires the ability to see and gather like colored things and hold some expectation of food upon doing so, and that seeing and gathering red things does not equate to having a conception of redness. — creativesoul
What's the difference between redness and red? — creativesoul
So association of color equals conception of color? — creativesoul
What you have described is an animal that can not only compare two objects of the same colour, but can compare that colour to a colour is associates with 'get foodness'. This 'get foodness' may well be identically the "crow equivalent of the concept of redness" I spoke of (seems likely). — Kenosha Kid
A human being has a perspective of the world. The distinctions we make and our representations of the world presuppose that human perspective. But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism. — Andrew M
A human being has a perspective of the world. The distinctions we make and our representations of the world presuppose that human perspective. But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism. — Andrew M
if that perspective is is coloring in the world, adding sound, taste, smell and various feels, then we're still left with something that needs to be explained — Marchesk
I don't doubt I've once again phrased some of this poorly; it is genuinely awkward to talk about, but I'm not convinced there's philosophical hay to make of that awkwardness. — Srap Tasmaner
f we have perspectives - if our perspectives exist - yet they do not have substantial (physical?) existence, then what type of existence do they have? — Luke
The problem is how is there a conscious experience at all? — Marchesk
nothing can be said to exist without the perspective provided by the observing mind. — Wayfarer
You can't turn around and look at it. That's the main issue here: that the observing mind is never the object — Wayfarer
the act of knowing is grounded in the observing mind, which itself is never an object. — Wayfarer
You appear to suggest that we define physical existence in terms of what “the observing mind” observes, or in terms of objects, and simply ignoring any problems posed by having minds or being subjects. — Luke
“having” a perspective still requires explanation in terms of how or whether it exists. — Luke
Your answer is suggestive of some mysterious 'other' form of existence; which we can never know. — Janus
The problem is how is there a conscious experience at all? We have detectors that can discriminate light and sound, yet they're not conscious. When we examine our brains, no consciousness is found there. It's not like some neural pattern is colored red. — Marchesk
Yes, but if we cannot know it as an object, as Wayfarer avers, then we cannot ever know it in the sense that we know the objects we can talk about. — Janus
Do we really know the objects we do talk about? — Outlander
So we can never, according to him, know what consciousness is, what form of existence (if any) it has. — Janus
Wittgenstein said, did he not, that 'in order to set a limit to thinking, you would have to think on both sides of the limit'? But sensing, being aware of, the limit, is not the same as saying you know what it is. If you say 'I know what it is', then you've already fallen back into the subject-object mode of analysis. — Wayfarer
“having” a perspective still requires explanation in terms of how or whether it exists.
— Luke
What is the terminus of explanation in respect of such a question? — Wayfarer
What is the 'it' which is the subject of the question 'does it exist?' — Wayfarer
'It' is that which every question presupposes, as without 'it' there is nobody to ask the question. — Wayfarer
A human being has a perspective of the world. The distinctions we make and our representations of the world presuppose that human perspective. But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism. — Andrew M
To echo Marchesk’s post, if we have perspectives - if our perspectives exist - yet they do not have substantial (physical?) existence, then what type of existence do they have? — Luke
And generally speaking, we regard that ‘substance’ as being material substance, something which exists whether we conceive of it or not, something independent of my saying so or believing so. That sense of ‘what is real’ as being ‘something which exists independently of my thinking about it’ is practically the definition of realism.
That is the sense in which I think you’re using the word ‘substantial’. — Wayfarer
So association of color equals conception of color?
— creativesoul
Refering back to myself:
What you have described is an animal that can not only compare two objects of the same colour, but can compare that colour to a colour is associates with 'get foodness'. This 'get foodness' may well be identically the "crow equivalent of the concept of redness" I spoke of (seems likely).
— Kenosha Kid
So that last sentence proposes that the association could be identity in that instance, allowing for the possibility that, for said crow, there's nothing to redness but 'get foodness'. I wasn't making a general observation. — Kenosha Kid
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