I don't really see the problem, at least as you've described it. Physicists have no problem using "solid", and it's consistent with one of the main ways we use it in everyday life. Tables and walls and rocks are solid, and the scientist explains what a solid is down at the atomic level etc.

Why not? — Banno

Maybe it's just me that disagrees then. Minds don't see, not least because minds don't have eyes.

I see.

:rofl:

I was checking that you agreed there was an apple. — Banno

I know, and I was checking that you agreed there was a mind seeing the apple. As pointed by Jamal, there was some legitimate reasons to doubt that. Now that we agree that there exist both an apple and a mind, we could explore (or meaningfully exchange about) the perception of the former by the latter. See if we can agree on something else.

Like, is the apple red?

Minds don't see, not least because minds don't have eyes. — jamalrob

By this token, eyes don't see, because eyes don't have eyes... :lol:

It's a system. It's made of interconnected pieces. Each piece does its own work, in synch with the other pieces.

It's a system. It's made of interconnected pieces. Each piece does its own work, in synch with the other pieces. — Olivier5

Meh. It's not systematic, so much as metaphoric. There is not a causal chain starting at the apple and ending at a mind. Minds are a different sort of thing to apples.

By this token, eyes don't see, because eyes don't have eyes — Olivier5

According to the most relevant sense of "see", I agree that our eyes don't see, that it's better here to say that we see by means of our eyes. We can use words in different ways, and in philosophy we have to be careful not to use two senses of a word without realizing it.

We agreed already that it's red. What we still disagree about, I think, is what we mean when we say that it's red. I mean (among other things) that I can perceive and recognize the meaningful signal of a ripe, eatable apple, detach it somehow as an 'object' from a background that is supposedly not red. That this helps me locate the apple in relation to my own position, using as a proxy some 3D simulation of the world that I happen to constantly create and maintain, a 3D simulation which helps me grab the apple, peal it and cut it without cutting my own fingers, and eat it.

According to the most relevant sense of "see", I agree that our eyes don't see, that it's better here to say that we see by means of our eyes. — jamalrob

And who is "we", in this context? How would you describe these things you call "I", "we", "you"?

People, I suppose. Why do you ask?

We agreed already that it's red. What we still disagree about, I think, is what we mean when we say that it's red. I mean (among other things) that I can perceive and recognise the meaningful signal of an ripe, eatable apple, that this helps me locate the apple in relation to my own position, using as a proxy some 3D simulation of the world that I happen to constantly create and maintain, a 3D simulation which helps me grab the apple, peal it and cut it without cutting my own fingers, and eat it... — Olivier5

...while I mean that it's red.

I don't really see the problem, at least as you've described it. Physicists have no problem using "solid", and it's consistent with one of the main ways we use it in everyday life. Tables and walls and rocks are solid, and the scientist explains what a solid is down at the atomic level etc. — jamalrob

You said...

I think that this is as confused as saying that solid things are not actually solid. — jamalrob

If you say to me "this block of wood is solid", and I cut it open to find a hollow in the centre, I'd be liable to say "no, this is not solid". When the scientist 'cuts open' the wood even smaller and find no less of a hollow you want to deny him recourse to the same language to describe his findings.

Likewise with a magic trick where it appears there's an apple before you, the magician might later say "there wasn't 'actually' an apple", by which he means the way things seemed to you was not as there were. Then, when the neuroscientist finds such a relationship between the world as we respond to it mentally and the world as we detect it with other instruments (say cameras), you want again to deny him use of the same language to describe his findings.

People, I suppose. Why do you ask? — jamalrob

Because of the menagerie of fantastic creatures that populates this site, and that must come from some old medieval treatise on exotic beasts with two heads and one leg or something... I mean, you could mean zombies, or automatons, or winged rabbits... People is a good answer, it's human and familiar.

Then I'll eat it before you do...

If you say to me "this block of wood is solid", and i cut it open to find a hollow in the centre, I'd be liable to say "no, this is not solid". When the scientist 'cuts open' the wood even smaller and find no less of a hollow you want to deny him recourse to the same language to describe his findings. — Isaac

You appear to be under the impression that scientists claim that what we call solid objects are not actually solid. This isn't true. Ever heard of the states of matter, or solid-state physics?

Same for neuroscientists.

But if you just mean that they should be allowed to say, speaking loosely, "tables are not really solid", and "we don't really see apples", then I guess it's a way of getting their point across. It seems far too misleading to me, and I've only seen it from bad popularizations.

Minds are a different sort of thing to apples. — Banno

And yet they can perceive apples.

...burp.

So...when I'm looking at the the moon I can cover it with my hand, but the moon is too big to be covered by my hand, therefore I'm not seeing the moon, but just a mental object. Is that about right? — jamalrob

I quoted eight objections to direct realism from a paper countering those objections a few posts back, while making what the author thought were some necessary concessions to defeat all eight. I'm not sure which objection your example falls into, but it's not a very convincing one in my book, and not what the color argument is about. Some of the objections are stronger than others, and some of the concessions made to defeat all eight are more troubling for direct reaiism than others.

And yet they can perceive apples. — Olivier5

That surprises you?

That should surprise you, who think of them existing in some separate planes.

Because of the menagerie of fantastic creatures that populates this site, and that must come from some old medieval treatise on exotic beasts with two heads and one leg or something... I mean, you could mean zombies, or automatons, or winged rabbits — Olivier5

...or brains in vats, or rational animals, or vehicles for genes, or eternal souls...

Yeh, it makes you dizzy.

But if you just mean that they should be allowed to say, speaking loosely, "tables are not really solid", and "we don't really see apples", then I guess it's a way of getting their point across. It seems far too misleading to me, and I've only seen it from bad popularizations. — jamalrob

It means the world is different than it appears to us. Now whether that's a problem for direct realism is what the debate is about. I say the evidence is the world isn't colored the way we perceive it to be, and this means that naive realism (or primitivism) about visual objects is false, although a more sophisticated causal argument for direct realism could be true.

Same for neuroscientists. — jamalrob

What is 'the same'? I'm not sure what you're saying here. We use terms Luke 'solid', 'really', 'actually' differently in different contexts and we seem to manage fine. A scientist might well say he studies 'solids' and at the same time say "of course, they're not really 'solid'" and a competent English speaker would have little trouble recognising the change of context.

Likewise here. It seems to you, looking at your fruit bowl, that you 'see' the red apples which are actually there outside of you, in our shared world. That's what 'actually' does in that context. If I then find, by experiment, that the way things seem to you is informed more by your prior expectations than by what is, right now, in our shared world, why does it now become 'misleading' to use the exact same contextual meaning to say you're not seeing the fruit bowl as it 'actually' is?

That should surprise you, who think of them existing in some separate planes. — Olivier5

...so we should digress to reasons as causes. That might be interesting.

..or brains in vats, or rational animals, or vehicles for genes, or eternal souls...

Yeh, it makes you dizzy. — jamalrob

Not at all, you just need to keep tabs on the menagerie. Don't confuse the brains in vats with the brains in bats, for instance.

In the final analysis, we cannot understand perception by throwing away the perceived and/or the perceiver. So whether you call us people or brains or minds makes no significant difference to the problem.

We're still on the topic of what it means to perceive. We agreed it implies an object and a mind perceiving it. This characterization seems to make biological sense, at least. It follows that there must be a causal chain 'starting' at the apple and 'ending' at a mind. (in brackets because nothing ever starts and ends beyond our subjective segmentation of time, it's all part of the big flow)

In the final analysis, we cannot understand perception by throwing away the perceived and/or the perceiver. So whether you call us people or brains or minds makes no significant difference to the problem. — Olivier5

I think it makes a big difference, but if you can accept that people see apples and that apples are red, then we're close enough to agreement for me.

I think it makes a big difference, — jamalrob

Why do you think so? Why is it so important to correctly (or not too incorrectly) define ourselves?

Sorry, this debate is making me feel nauseous, so I'm gonna duck out. Nothing personal.