You can study the processes of consciousness scientifically through cognitive science, psychology and other disciplines. You can arrive at an understanding through introspection or through philosophical analysis (as Kant did, and phenomenology attempts to do). — Wayfarer
What does all conscious experience of red consist in/of such that it is by virtue of having that constituency that makes it count as conscious experience of red. — creativesoul
it's not determinate scientific knowledge that can be confirmed or falsified by inter-subjective observations. — Janus
as to whether consciousness exists, and if so what kind of existence it enjoys, is a misguided question. — Janus
However, if that perspective is is coloring in the world, adding sound, taste, smell and various feels, then we're still left with something that needs to be explained, because the rest of the world isn't colored in, doesn't have feels and tastes and what not. It's only that way to a perceiver. So somehow the perceiver adds those sensations to their interaction with the world. The hard problem remains in some form until there is some way to account for these sensations. — Marchesk
And yes, perceivers are part of the same world, not walled off from it, but still the question needs to be answered: from whence comes the colors, sounds, etc? — Marchesk
A human being has a perspective of the world. The distinctions we make and our representations of the world presuppose that human perspective. But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism.
— Andrew M
To echo Marchesk’s post, if we have perspectives - if our perspectives exist - yet they do not have substantial (physical?) existence, then what type of existence do they have? — Luke
But also whence comes distance, mass, time, motion, molecules, plant life and lower organism sentience? — Andrew M
These features are all defined in reference to our human perspective (consider Einstein with his measuring-rods, clocks and observers giving an operational meaning to his relativistic theories). — Andrew M
As with the train speed example, there is no "view from nowhere". — Andrew M
All of these features are part of the world as we perceive it. Without that perspective - our primary point of reference in the world - nothing is distinguished or defined at all. — Andrew M
Physics, chemistry and biology already account for that stuff. — Marchesk
Their perspective is not a "thing" that has any existence separate from that human activity. But we can consider it separately (i.e., in an abstract sense). — Andrew M
So what is a reference frame? It's simply an abstract coordinate system that measurements are made relative to. — Andrew M
What does all conscious experience of red consist in/of such that it is by virtue of having that constituency that makes it count as conscious experience of red.
— creativesoul
I don't expect all animals to have the same concept of the same colour. As you pointed out, we have a linguistic component to our understanding of red that other animals would not. — Kenosha Kid
I'd say that any commonality between conceptions of redness between different animals would rest in commonality between how those animals' brains transform raw sensory input into phenomenal data (qualia).
Language less conscious experience of red/redness cannot consist of correlations drawn between the color red and language use. The color and food items for the trained crow is an adequate example. If the crow was trained to gather red items after hearing the name "red" being spoken aloud, then it would no longer be language less for the correlations would include the language use, along with the red items and the food items. Should the crow be brilliant enough to learn how to talk about it's own conscious experiences of red/redness , that would be a metacognitive crow. — creativesoul
All conscious experience consists of correlations drawn between the color red and other things. In that very real sense, they are all the same. — creativesoul
If crows are capable, and I expect they are, they might learn a voiced instruction to alert other crows to press buttons, and which buttons to press. A noise that means 'press the red buttons' followed by a noise that means 'this is red' as the tutor presses only the red buttons might suffice. If this were the case, newer crows might be said to have a linguistic understanding of redness. — Kenosha Kid
Language less conscious experience of red/redness cannot consist of correlations drawn between the color red and language use. The color and food items for the trained crow is an adequate example. If the crow was trained to gather red items after hearing the name "red" being spoken aloud, then it would no longer be language less for the correlations would include the language use, along with the red items and the food items. Should the crow be brilliant enough to learn how to talk about it's own conscious experiences of red/redness , that would be a metacognitive crow.
— creativesoul
:up: Looks good to me.
All conscious experience of the color red consists of correlations drawn between the color red and other things. In that very real sense, they are all the same.
— creativesoul
In some qualitative sense... — Kenosha Kid
That has to do with the speed of light and inertial frames, not perceivers. Perceivers are only used for thought experiments to show their clocks and measuring-rods are different, but there's no need for that. Happens for any objects and events. — Marchesk
As with the train speed example, there is no "view from nowhere".
— Andrew M
But there is, because life evolved long after the universe was around, and science can detail the universe in places where there is no life and no perceivers. — Marchesk
However, if you're arguing from a Kantian/correlationist position and not a realist one, then that's another matter. I'm pretty sure Dennett is a realist/physicalist, as is Chalmers, except for consciousness.
I'm not sure the consciousness debate matters for Kantians, since the empirical world includes all the colors, sounds, etc. So I get why you would deny Nagel's "view from nowhere". The consciousness debate seems to only matter for physicalism, pun unintended. At least that's how Chalmers approaches it, with his talk of supervenience and p-zombies. — Marchesk
All of these features are part of the world as we perceive it. Without that perspective - our primary point of reference in the world - nothing is distinguished or defined at all.
— Andrew M
'Perspective' implies or requires an observing mind, does it not? I mean, it is something I'm in complete agreement with, but it seems to me that it is more often than not overlooked. — Wayfarer
Their perspective is not a "thing" that has any existence separate from that human activity. But we can consider it separately (i.e., in an abstract sense).
— Andrew M
In the same way that e.g. breathing, perspiration and digestion are not "things" that have any existence separate from human activity? Or, in the same way that the game of chess and economic markets are not "things" that have any existence separate from human activity? — Luke
Does separability from human activity help to decide whether these "things" are physical or real? — Luke
Are perspectives identical to reference frames, then? Is a perspective also "an abstract coordinate system that measurements are made relative to"? If it's not the same, then in what way is it comparable? — Luke
Does separability from human activity help to decide whether these "things" are physical or real?
— Luke
I'm not sure I understand your question. — Andrew M
A human being has a perspective of the world... But that perspective doesn't itself have properties (qualia) or a substantial existence (res cogitans), contra dualism. — Andrew M
In an everyday sense, we regard the things we can observe as real. — Andrew M
The main point of comparison with relativity is that distinctions/measurements are relative to some reference point, not absolute. That is, the perceiver is implied in any statement about the world. — Andrew M
Redness seems to be a property of objects of perception (no abstract redness is observed, but we can collate red things), and a property is that which causes some particular effect in a particular circumstance (to be is to do) which is the correlation I think we're speaking of. — Kenosha Kid
The particular effect may vary from beast to beast, but the property can be established as the same through additional correlations between effects: the crows collate the same things we call red. — Kenosha Kid
If a perspective is no different to aspiration, perspiration and digestion in terms of their inseparability from human activity, then why does a perspective differ in terms of having substantial existence and properties? — Luke
But we don't observe a perspective. — Luke
What I'm questioning about the analogy is your statement that we have a perspective just like we (or other objects) have a reference frame, and yet neither of these has substantial existence. I think I'm still not sold on what you seem to be implying: that we can have them without them existing. — Luke
I should probably make clear that I have no interest in preserving 'res cogitans' or the human perspective as a non-physical substance. I am looking for a purely physical explanation, but one which retains the first-person perspective and the reality of its properties/qualities. — Luke
we (or other objects) have a reference frame — Luke
The difference is that aspiration, etc., are bodily processes or functions. Whereas a perspective is a logical condition for being able to make distinctions. — Andrew M
Concrete particulars such as people, apples and rocks have substantial existence, being substances. — Andrew M
They [abstractions] depend on (are not separable from) concrete particulars. They exist, to the extent that they do, because the concrete particulars that they are predicated of exist. — Andrew M
The difference is that aspiration, etc., are bodily processes or functions. Whereas a perspective is a logical condition for being able to make distinctions. — Andrew M
Compare running a race to winning a race. Both are predicated of people (i.e., are not separable from people). But they are different kinds of predicates. Running is a physical process, whereas winning is the logical condition of having passed the finish line first and is not itself a process. — Andrew M
We don't, but it is implied in a person's activity which we do observe. — Andrew M
Linguistically, we wouldn't normally say that breathing exists — Andrew M
As I see it, the first-person/third-person division excludes the possibility of a physical explanation — Andrew M
So, from my perspective, the apple is spherical and red (i.e., they are properties of the apple). Not that the apple is objectively spherical and subjectively red (which is subject/object dualism). — Andrew M
Can ‘we’ be categorised with ‘other objects’? Do objects have a reference frame? Or do reference frames only pertain to observers? — Wayfarer
a perspective is applicable to human beings and, potentially, other sentient creatures for whom it makes sense. But not trees or rocks (which nonetheless qualify as reference frames). — Andrew M
But I stand by my argument that only rational beings are capable of entertaining perspectives. I suppose, from the human perspective, you can see that animals have a unique perspective, but I think that kind of 'perspective' can be understood solely in terms of stimulus and response; they don't abstract from that, as abstraction is dependent on the power of reason. They cannot, for example, create scientific models or hypotheses. — Wayfarer
...only rational beings are capable of entertaining perspectives. I suppose, from the human perspective, you can see that animals have a unique perspective, but I think that kind of 'perspective' can be understood solely in terms of stimulus and response; they don't abstract from that, as abstraction is dependent on the power of reason. They cannot, for example, create scientific models or hypotheses... — Wayfarer
Neither can children — creativesoul
The saddest moment of the film [about Nim's life] comes when Terrace [who had adopted him and] who spent years spoiling Nim with attention and luxury only to suddenly abandon him to the life of a captive animal returns to Oklahoma a year later for a visit; we see Nim recognize Terrace, and explode with obvious joy, rushing to hug him. Bob Ingersoll, a raspy-voiced hippie who comes across as a saintly presence in the second half of Nim’s life, says of Nim seeing Terrace again that he was thinking, “Holy shit! I’m goin’ back to New York!” But it’s only a show for the cameras. Terrace left the next day, never to be seen again by Nim, and Nim fell into a deep depression.
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.