More generally though, on this topic of the laws of nature not changing: that is not something we believe because of induction, but something we must believe to do induction. If we don’t assume that that’s the case, then there is no reason to expect patterns to continue as we have seen them do thus far. — Pfhorrest
So we can know that induction works (that we can extrapolate patterns into the future) because it always has before, so we can extrapolate that pattern into the future? — Pfhorrest
Hume’s argument is one of the most famous in philosophy. A number of philosophers have attempted solutions to the problem, but a significant number have embraced his conclusion that it is insoluble. There is also a wide spectrum of opinion on the significance of the problem. Some have argued that Hume’s argument does not establish any far-reaching skeptical conclusion, either because it was never intended to, or because the argument is in some way misformulated. Yet many have regarded it as one of the most profound philosophical challenges imaginable since it seems to call into question the justification of one of the most fundamental ways in which we form knowledge. Bertrand Russell, for example, expressed the view that if Hume’s problem cannot be solved, “there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity” — SEP
Denying induction is also irrational. — Banno
These are things like the assumption of objectivity about which we could not possibly know one way or the other whether they are true, but which we cannot help but assume one way or the other through our actions, and without the assumption of which we could not possibly hope to ever know anything, thus pragmatically requiring us to always act as though they are true or else give up all hope of knowledge. — Pfhorrest
Explaining things that do not need explanation. — Banno
But what of those who disagree, like Hume does on induction? — Pfhorrest
If anyone said that information about the past could not convince him that something would happen in the future, I should not understand him. One might ask him: what do you expect to be told, then? What sort of information do you call a ground for such a belief? … If these are not grounds, then what are grounds?—If you say these are not grounds, then you must surely be able to state what must be the case for us to have the right to say that there are grounds for our assumption….
Your program wants to reduce induction to deduction. — Banno
...pragmatically requiring us to always act as though they [things like induction] are true or else give up all hope of knowledge — Pfhorrest
Did you see this video I linked earlier? — Pfhorrest
Come back to the basic point; Polly put the kettle on in order to make tea. She did not put it on in order to test an hypothesis. — Banno
In general, I hold, we should tentatively adopt more specific and so risky beliefs when we can afford to risk being wrong, but when we cannot afford that risk, we should act in accordance with those beliefs that have the greatest probability of being true. — Pfhorrest
Polly's belief was not at all tentative. — Banno
So she is not at all open to the possibility that it could be wrong... — Pfhorrest
Well, yes; and indeed, she was correct to do so, as evidenced by the need for Sukey to take the kettle off again.She believes that dogmatically? — Pfhorrest
It can be amusing to watch someone defending their theory against obvious falsification. — Banno
Again, it would have been irrational, unreasonable, improper, even crazy, for her to doubt that the kettle would boil.
Yet you would make such doubt the cornerstone of epistemology. — Banno
You’re the only one bringing up any belief about being able to predict the future perfectly. That’s not anything I’m talking about at all. — Pfhorrest
I’m saying that if you see something and think “whoa a black swan, I didn’t think those were possible...” — Pfhorrest
If instead you see the same thing and think “oh look, somebody painted that swan black...” then you don’t have to revise any beliefs because a fake black swan is what your background beliefs initially lead you to perceive and that doesn’t contradict any other beliefs such as that all swans are white. — Pfhorrest
I’m saying that if P(A) is small and P(B) is small then P(A)*P(B) is small. “P(A)*P(B)” is the probabilistic equivalent of “A and B” in the same way that “P(A|B)” is the probabilistic equivalent of “A if B”. — Pfhorrest
is exactly that, a prediction about the future - that there would be no observations of black swans in it. — Isaac
Again, you're ignoring the effect of states of uncertainty. I know you keep saying that you've included uncertainty by attaching the word 'probably' to your original theses, but tacking on the word 'probably' doesn't even begin to address the complexities of adding probability and uncertainty (or it's opposite) to the understanding of beliefs. — Isaac
You treat them as if we can innumerate and resolve them one at a time (again, despite your protestations to the contrary, you keep coming back to simple examples as if they encapsulated a principle which applied more widely). In the situation regarding the observation of a black swan - if you isolate the observer from all social connections, all linguistics, all embodiment and all cognitive context - it may just be the case that he would simply choose between the two options you describe. But there are no such people, and in reality the situation is vastly more complex to a point where this simple algorithm is next to useless. — Isaac
Your program wants to reduce induction to deduction. — Banno
It does not, and I have repeatedly said as much.
It just doesn't rely on induction for the task of differentiating between competing beliefs. — Pfhorrest
So we can know that induction works (that we can extrapolate patterns into the future) because it always has before, so we can extrapolate that pattern into the future?
(If it's not clear, I'm pointing out that that's circular reasoning, which is the root of the problem of induction, and the post you're responding to is my solution to that problem). — Pfhorrest
More generally though, on this topic of the laws of nature not changing: that is not something we believe because of induction, but something we must believe to do induction. If we don’t assume that that’s the case, then there is no reason to expect patterns to continue as we have seen them do thus far. — Pfhorrest
Yes, but it does use an extensive interrelated network of inductively derived beliefs without which it would be operating in a vacuum, and be unable to confirm or dis-confirm any hypothesis. So, given that, it doesn't make sense to minimize the role of induction, and claim that is is really just falsification doing all the work. — Janus
This response shows again that you are trying to apply the criteria for valid deduction to inductive reasoning. It puzzles me that you apparently can't see that. — Janus
This again shows that you are not acknowledging the role of induction. The general regularities of nature that we all observe, and never consistently observe any counterexamples to, and are thus induced (induction) to believe in must persist, because otherwise there would be no science, no human life, no life at all, and thus certainly no falsification. — Janus
It operates ON that network of beliefs, or any other network of beliefs formed in any other way; it doesn’t at all depend on the network of beliefs being formed by induction. — Pfhorrest
Does not that argument rely on already accepting that inductive reasoning gives some reason to believe something, in order to show that inductive reasoning gives some reason to believe something? Is that not circular, even though no deduction is involved? — Pfhorrest
That assumption is in turn necessary to do induction — which is the whole Humean problem of induction, because he shows that it can’t be inductively proven without circularity and it can’t be deductively proven. I think the solution to that problem is that it can be pragmatically “proven”. — Pfhorrest
Without that network of beliefs there would be nothing to operate upon. — Janus
Sure, it's circular, but that doesn't matter for inductive purposes, The problem with circular deduction is that it tells you nothing. Induction however, tells you everything you know (or believe, if you prefer) about the world. — Janus
You said earlier that Hume has refuted induction — Janus
We accept experience and observation because we must; there simply is no other way to gain the material from which we can extrapolate our hypotheses about the way the world is and works. — Janus
It makes no sense to say that anything can be pragmatically proven — Janus
IF induction works, which you would have us believe on the grounds that “it aways has worked”, which would only be reason to believe induction worked if you already believed indiction worked. — Pfhorrest
I said that he presented the Problem of Induction, which needs to be addressed. — Pfhorrest
Induction obviously does work; to give us all our beliefs and understandings of the world. So, there is no need to provide an argument for that. — Janus
Are you denying that induction has worked, or what? — Janus
Every time someone critiques what they think you are claiming, you say 'no, it's not that', and yet you seem to be incapable of explaining what else it is you are trying to convey. — Janus
the problem of induction as I understand it, according to Hume, is that it cannot deliver deductive certainties. — Janus
"It's obvious" is not an argument, and you do need an argument if you want to convince anyone who doesn't agree with you to change their minds. — Pfhorrest
No, I've been saying all along that induction is just fine, it simply has nothing to do with the point of this thread. I was never arguing against induction as a means of coming to our beliefs, only that by itself it doesn't give us a way of choosing between competing beliefs, and that it's not necessarily the only way of coming to believe things either. — Pfhorrest
- don't demand absolute proof of anything before allowing yourself (or others) to believe it, go ahead and believe things for whatever reason you're inclined to (induction or whatever else);
- so long as everything you believe, you believe tentatively, fallibly, non-dogmatically, in a way such that you would discard that belief if you came across reason to do so. — Pfhorrest
As I understand it, the problem is not only that it can't deliver certainty, but that there's no good reason to think it would deliver any support at all, even merely probabilistic support. — Pfhorrest
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