But understanding that takes a gestalt shift. This is well-understood, if not always well articulated, by the various forms of Eastern philosophy that fall under the umbrella term of 'non-dualism'. The 'duality of subject and object' is precisely the subject of their analysis. That is why non-dualism has become a subject of consideration by modern theories such as 'enactivism'. — Wayfarer
The issue of the part/whole relationship which is more relevant here, is the question of whether parts can be said to be things, in the same context in which the whole is a thing. The nature of a "part" is that it necessarily exists in specific relations to other parts which collectively make up the whole. In this context, the whole is the thing, and the part is a part of that thing. Notice the necessity in the part's relationship with others, as essential to the word "part". There is no such necessary relationship in the concept of "thing", or "object". An object is an independent entity having relations with others, but not having any specific necessary relations. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore it is inherently contradictory to say that a part is itself an object, or thing, in the same context in which it is a part. The "part" is constrained by the necessity which makes it a part, and an object has no such constraint. Therefore to be both is contradiction. This logic of part/whole relations reflects the fact that in order to make a part into a proper object, the whole needs to be divided. When the whole is divided, it is annihilated. So it is impossible that the part exists as an individual object at the same time while it is a part. And we should never apprehend a part as an object because this is a logical incoherency. — Metaphysician Undercover
If the assertion is that everything has a soul/mind, then not only do the parts of the car, (if each can exist as an individual thing), have a soul/mind, but also the car itself, as a thing has a soul/mind. There is no fallacy of composition here. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Magic" on this forum tends to be used instead of "mysterious", including here. When anyone on TPF fails to understand something, he declares it "magic" and hence feels allowed to deny phenomena that he can't explain.The standard view adds two more assumptions on top:
1- At some point things stop being conscious.
2- When enough non conscious things come together consciousness magically pops up. — khaled
The basic issue with panpsychism is its ignorance of life as a prerequisite for any psychism. Dead people don't talk much. There must be a reason for that...
— Olivier5
The two do seem to be closely related.
Dead people don't talk much. There must be a reason for that.
If pulling a bunny out of an empty hat is magic then pulling consciousness out of non conscoius blocks is also magic in exactly the same way. — khaled
Mutes don't talk either, but I'm pretty sure they're conscious. These two properties aren't related then. — khaled
It is the unity and the flux of reality which dominates.
The distinction between subject and object, between self and other and any attachment to the impermanent things of the world are all false dichotomy. — prothero
Consciousness can be equated with living — Punshhh
But when we seek to ‘explain consciousness’, we have no such division - we are that which we are seeking to explain. So there simply cannot be an objective explanation of the nature of consciousness analogous to objective explanations of phenomena, as a matter of principle (which is another way of stating the hard problem.) — Wayfarer
How is that related to consciousness if at all? — khaled
The two are similar in that they're both understood to have intentionality or ententionality. — frank
Did it ever occur to you that they may be perfectly rational explanations unknown to you in both the cases of the rabbit and consciousness? — Olivier5
So you think dead people are still conscious but can't say it anymore? — Olivier5
Based on what? Your ignorance or your knowledge? If knowledge, of what? What is there objectively or logically, that makes it impossible for new combinations to fold or unfold in a new way, and for new phenomena to appear as a result?Maybe but I don't think there are. — khaled
I'm pointing out that the ability to talk is not indicitive of consciousness. — khaled
On the contrary, a requirement of a proper definition of consciousness such that explaining consciousness is actually explaining something is that we can identify it in something that has it that is not ourselves, otherwise our explanation is nothing more than personal testimony. — Kenosha Kid
Things like the hard problem exist specifically to add by hand a component that does nothing at all, and therefore is not amenable to scientific study — Kenosha Kid
Life emerged. It wasn't there at the beginning. Atoms are not alive. — Olivier5
The scientific study of all aspects of consciousness, such as perception and identity, fall within psychology and therefore, where possible, neurology. — Kenosha Kid
Perfect knowledge of how atoms operate will lead you to understand how "clusters" of them operate. If you could predict accurately all the motions of every single atom you would have been able to predict the second world war. — khaled
Can you conceive of a clone of your self acting in the exact same way you do but without conciousness?
If no then you would be implying that consciousness is necessary for our function, that it natrually comes out of the particles that make us up. In this setup "consciousness" is akin to "temperature". — khaled
No knowledge of atoms will ever allow you to predict this monster: — Olivier5
Chaperone proteins "Heat Shock Protein 60" and HSP10 (the cap), so called because their molecular mass is approximately 60 and 10 kDa. This means that the whole complex composed of two "baskets" (HSP60) and two "caps" (HSP 10) is more than 8000 times larger than methane, the simplest organic compound (CH4, of molecular mass 16). — Olivier5
combination of things adds information that was not present in the things being combined — Olivier5
Consciousness may be necessary for our function, and yet totally different from temperature in that it may require an actual dedicated mechanism, an organ, a structure, in order to happen rather than just piling things up with no particular structure. — Olivier5
...which is ruled out by the uncertainty principle.... — Wayfarer
A thing is just a thing, anything, and there are no necessary relationships in being a thing. Ergo, a part is just as much a thing as a whole is a thing. I agree with you so far. — TheMadFool
So, once I talk about things I can't talk about parts. How come then that you talk about the car having a soul then? After all, the car is, essentially, the whole consisting of parts and you said, in your own words, "....to make a part into a proper object, the whole needs to be divided. When the whole is divided, it is annihilated" (in the second paragraph of your post) and this is exactly what you've done when you made the claim that "...not only do the parts of the car (if each can exist as an individual), have a soul/mind..." — TheMadFool
To make things easier, let's continue with the example of a car. At one point, you're saying that the parts of a car are things and ergo have souls/minds (accepted) and that you can't view them as parts to do that (accepted). Then you go on to say the car is also a thing and so has a soul/mind but the problem is you can't talk of a car anymore because when you took the parts of the car as individual things, you, by your own admission, believe that"...the whole (the car) needs to be divided. When the whole (the car) is divided, it (the car) is annihilated". — TheMadFool
The question is, does a 4 meter long wooden plank have one soul or an infinite number of souls (assuming halving ad infinitum)? — TheMadFool
. I'm sure you mean "won't help you predict that this monster would form in the process of evolution". — khaled
What I said is that a part is not a thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
The soul is not a thing — Metaphysician Undercover
Again, you are making the same mistake I pointed out already. The four meter plank is one thing, it has not been divided. You cannot speak about it as if it were a large number of things, just because you have the capacity to divide it. It has not been divided. If it were divided you could not call the pieces a 4 meter plank. To talk about the plank as if it is both divided and not divided at the same time is simple contradiction. — Metaphysician Undercover
Sorry but I can't see your point. Begin from any point in an organized system - bottom-up or top-down, you're eventually going to have to make a jump from a whole to its parts and wherever, whenever, this happens, you're at risk of commiting the fallacy of composition/division. — TheMadFool
The theory and the definition need to integrate well. You can't have a definition that contradicts the theory. And your definition has to make sense enough to be explainable in the first place."theory of consciousness" is different from "definition of consciousness". I am bad at defining things but if I were to define consciousness it would be "Having a first person view" or something like that. I definitely have a first person view, but I can't tell if you do or not. I may not know what conditions produce consciousness as I defined it but I definitely know I have it. It's like how I can know that I am typing on a PC right now but not understand how a PC works or how the internet works. — khaled
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