Can you show that he rejected that aphorism? — Banno
You selectively quoted Wittgenstein and when challenged used another misplaced quote to defend your misreading. — Banno
How can you not see the contradiction here? How can someone claim that we can't be aware of the causes while at the same time explaining the causes as if they had "direct" knowledge of the causes? :chin:No, I'm saying that no one is conscious of the causes of our phenomena: we have no knowledge of objects that cause phenomena except indirectly through phenomena; we have no awareness of light lensing through the eyeball and being projected onto the retina; we have no consciousness of outline detection occurring, of images being turned upside down, of colour being whiteshifted, or any of the other processes of the brain that create qualia: the objects of experience and their properties. What we get is, if not an *end* result, a late iteration of a metaview of the data. That is immediacy of qualia. — Kenosha Kid
How can someone claim that we can't be aware of the causes while at the same time explaining the causes as if they had "direct" knowledge of the causes? :chin: — Harry Hindu
If everything is physical (physicalism), then how do we account for (i.e. categorise) the mental/experiential? — Luke
Either you can explain what you're referring to when you use "conscious sensations" or you cannot. — creativesoul
You imply that you have "direct" awareness by describing these facts. What is missing from your explanation of the facts of the causes of our experiences? My point was that "direct" and "indirect" are meaningless if you are still able to know the facts, which you just reported, unless you are saying that you don't know what you are talking about.By all means, point out where I suggested that I have direct awareness of, say, stabilising my field of view or whiteshifting the colours I see. — Kenosha Kid
If you aren't aware of the cause, then how can you even say anything about it? What is missing from your report of the state-of-affairs that precede our experience of something? How would someone who has direct awareness of these states-of-affairs describe them compared to someone who has indirect awareness of those same states-of-affairs? If they both say the same things, then what is the difference between indirect and direct awareness? If the person that had direct awareness says something different, then does that not mean that you don't know what you are talking about because you are only aware indirectly?My statement was that abstraction from subjective experience is a necessary part of understanding subjective experience because the causes of subjective experience are not part of subjective experience. For instance, I am not aware of turning the retinal image upside down; I am only aware of the transformed image (which is why I am happy to talk about qualia at all). The fact that I can be extremely confident that this transformation occurs does not rely on subjective experience, or divine revelation for that matter, but on scientific progress and study. It might yet transpire that science and books and research journals are a conspiracy to mislead us or some such, but I'm happy that that's a vanishingly small likelihood. — Kenosha Kid
You imply that you have "direct" awareness by describing these facts. — Harry Hindu
That wasn't the type of argument I was making. If your "indirect" description of events that cause experiences is no different than a "direct" description then what is the point of even using the terms "direct" and "indirect" when it comes to awareness/knowledge of some event preceding the experience?No, you might infer it. I do not imply it. By explicitly stating that we don't, there is no implication that we do. "My name begins with J and is not John" does not imply "My name is John and is not John." — Kenosha Kid
What is an indirect experience of phenomena? If there is no such thing, then why use the term, "direct" in the first place? All experience is of phenomena. Then I would ask, Is there anything else, other than experience, that can be of phenomena? For instance, could effects be of their causes?All direct experience is of phenomena. — Kenosha Kid
If your "indirect" description of events that cause experiences is no different than a "direct" description then what is the point of even using the terms "direct" and "indirect" — Harry Hindu
What is an indirect experience of phenomena? If there is no such thing, then why use the term, "direct" in the first place? — Harry Hindu
How do you know? Isn't what you said prior to your present experience of what you said? Can't you only infer what you previously said since it happened prior to your present statement of what you previously said?But they are different. Again, I said quite the opposite. — Kenosha Kid
If confusing me is your intent, then you have succeeded.Precisely because you seem confused by it. — Kenosha Kid
oh, Marchesk, when you gonna listen?
an intrinsic aspect of quantum superposition in matter is the qualia constituents that contribute to colors, sounds and feels, conjoined in specific and relatively rare ways to generate qualitative experience in brains and elsewhere....(and so on)
— Enrique
Tell me again how talk of qualia clarifies things. — Banno
...Human qualia are not action potentials alone, they're wave interferences between quantum resonances in cells and the global quantum field of the brain that is exuded by trillions of simultaneous action potentials, producing along with additional factors an extremely complex array of superpositions. — Enrique
1. It's not clear to me what it is that Frankish is claiming to be an illusion. — Daemon
I've come to think that qualia are really too mysterious to be explained in physical terms. — Keith Frankish
So instead, he suggests that qualia are an illusion — Marchesk
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