It's senseless to talk of inverted spectra. — Banno

You don't understand what it means?

No. It means nothing.

Make a point.

No. It means nothing. — Banno

Dennett seems to think it means something:

The original version of intuition pump #3: the inverted spectrum (Locke, 1690: II, xxxii, 15) is a speculation about two people: how do I know that you and I see the same subjective color when we look at something? Since we both learned color words by being shown public colored objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colors. — Dennett

Make a point. — Banno

You said that "Colours ain't coming from in here, either, since we overwhelmingly agree on them". The point is that our qualia may be different despite using the same colour words, so I'm questioning what you claim we "agree on". That your wife says its violet while you say its blue is beside the point.

The answer poses a puzzle.

I wonder how Dennett or for that matter half the people on this thread would explain what just happened here.

wonder how Dennett or for that matter half the people on this thread would explain what just happened here. — khaled

I'm not sure. I think Isaac is the only one asserting that there is no such thing as phenomenal consciousness. I don't know what the others are saying.

Woo tech putting the sound quivers into her brain. — Marchesk

Does insurance cover that? :razz:

Not in America.

A logical condition of what? Or, what do you mean by a "logical condition"? — Luke

A perspective (or a point-of-view) is a logical precondition for making natural distinctions and observing things.

Consider Alice taking a photograph of a landscape. A logical precondition is that she needs to be standing somewhere, and thus will be taking the photograph from a particular perspective. She can't be standing everywhere, and she can't be standing nowhere.

Alice points the camera, presses the button and the camera takes the picture. That's a physical process. At the end of that process, Alice has a snapshot of the landscape from a particular perspective.

So the photograph doesn't represent an objective "view from nowhere." Which is an analogy for the situation humans are in with respect to the world they are embedded in. They have a perspective of the world, and use human language to express that perspective.

I take it there is a particular way things seem to you at particular times, including the way things look, sound, smell, taste and touch. Simply because science cannot directly observe this particular way things seem to you, and/or simply because no direct intersubjective comparison is available, does not make these into "ghostly entities". — Luke

Intersubjective comparison is available via public language. We can both agree that the straight stick appears bent (when partly submerged in water) because we can point to actual bent sticks and recognize the superficial similarity.

Similarly, normally-sighted people can distinguish red, green and yellow apples, so there's nothing ineffable in saying that red and green apples appear dim yellow for dichromatics. And the dichromatic will agree they all appear dim yellow. That the dichromatic lacks the ability to distinguish these three colors is a kind of privacy in practice, but not in principle, since their lack of color discrimination has a physical basis.

It is only a subject who has a perspective of the world (object), so how can this be a rejection or replacement of the subject/object duality? It seems more like a bolstering of it. — Luke

The subject/object duality that I'm arguing against is the idea that a person has radically private and ineffable experiences and, on the other hand, that the world can be represented independent of a perspective. Neither are true.

What I'm arguing for is that our experiences are not radically private or ineffable (which our public language attests to) and also that we represent the world from a particular perspective (since our public language reflects the natural distinctions we make when we observe and interact in the world).

Yes, but could B&W Mary know what yellow looks like before seeing it? — Marchesk

I think that with her knowledge Mary could have learned to visualize yellow before seeing it (in the world). Whether or not she would make that connection when later seeing a yellow object, I don't know.

Similarly consider: could Mary know what a circle looks like before seeing one? Or a $50 bill? Or a bent stick?

Of particular relevance to this thread, is visualizing (and dreaming, imagining, hallucinating, etc.) a form of seeing or perception? Or are they different kinds of activities?

Sorry for not responding sooner. I had intended to, but life intervened.

So take "I enjoy spicy food", I believe Dennett would see that as quite unproblematic. I can taste things, I can have taste preferences. I have a taste preference for spicy food. But what he would see as problematic is an unrestricted commitment to the existence of tastes, spiciness feelings and so on. As if spiciness, enjoyment as we typically conceive of them are somehow instantiated in my mind and body. — fdrake

It seems that Dennett finds our talk about tasting food and experiencing spiciness to be on a par with our talk about Santa Claus. I would concede that what might be problematic here are words like "existence" or "instantiation" in the body, but does anyone seriously doubt that they actually taste food or experience spiciness feelings (besides, maybe, @Isaac)?

Dennett's intentional stance seems like an extension of this idea: to treat our external behaviour as if we had internal states, but ultimately denying we have them.

Take "fdrake enjoys spicy food", when I write that I've got a few memories associated with it, and I'm attributing an a pattern of behaviour and sensation to myself. I've made a whole type out of "spicy food", but in particular I had some memories of flavours from a vindaloo I'd had a few years ago and the burrito I'd described previously. The particulars of the flavour memories didn't really matter (I can give both more and different "supporting evidence" for the statement), as I'm summarising my engagement with an aggregate of foods, feelings and eating behaviours with discriminable characteristics (sensations, flavour profiles, event memories) etc. — fdrake

Yes, but what you seem to be granting here, which Dennett seems to deny, is that you have memories, tastes and sensations. Further quotes from Wittgenstein on private language are relevant here:

306. Why ever should I deny that there is a mental process? It is only that “There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering . . .” means nothing more than “I have just remembered . . .” To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone ever remembers anything.

If remembering were nothing more than the external behaviours that we typically associate with remembering, as Dennett seems to indicate, then this "would mean to deny the remembering, to deny that anyone ever remembers anything." Of course, it is evident from people's external behaviours that people can and do remember things, e.g. a person recalls where they left their car keys and then looks in that place, or just plain old learning of any sort, is evidence of remembering. In fact, it is this external third-person perspective of our shared language that gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "remember", according to Wittgenstein. We would be grammatically mistaken to assume that the word is used to refer to an inner process, but without that inner process there would be no such thing as remembering:

305. “But you surely can’t deny that, for example, in remembering, an inner process takes place.” — What gives the impression that we want to deny anything? When one says, “Still, an inner process does take place here” — one wants to go on: “After all, you see it.” And it is this inner process that one means by the word “remembering”. — The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our face against the picture of an ‘inner process’. What we deny is that the picture of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word “remember”. Indeed, we’re saying that this picture, with its ramifications, stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is.

Ineffability of experience as a feature of the descriptive strategies we adopt regarding experience, rather than of the abstract entities we are committed to when using those strategies. Analogously, the computer's exact reaction to my call command for "2+2" is also practically ineffable; there are thousands of transistors coming on and off, there are allocation patterns for memory etc; and not because it's trying to express the natural number 2 added to the natural number 2 producing the natural number 4 through the flawed media of binary representations and changes in voltage states of transistors. — fdrake

I'm not sure that's comparable. You want to compare our own experiences - of which we are aware - with the mechanical workings of a computer, of which we are (in this example) unaware. This analogy might work when dealing with other people, but I don't see how it works on ourselves. We might infer or attribute beliefs and desires to a calculator just as we might do to another person, but I think we tend to have better and more direct knowledge about these things when it comes to ourselves. Of course, there are cases where this will not be true, as some psychologists might attest. But I think you would agree that you know better than most people whether or not you like spicy food.

A perspective (or a point-of-view) is a logical precondition for making natural distinctions and observing things. — Andrew M

I don't see why making natural distinctions and observing things could not be a logical precondition for having a perspective (or a point-of-view). But I see neither as a pre-condition of the other; merely that the two go hand-in-hand.

Alice points the camera, presses the button and the camera takes the picture. That's a physical process. At the end of that process, Alice has a snapshot of the landscape from a particular perspective. — Andrew M

None of that makes any sense unless there are conscious people to look at snapshots of landscapes.

She can't be standing everywhere, and she can't be standing nowhere. — Andrew M

I understand that you want to argue against the "view from nowhere". I'm not trying to argue for it, but I don't think that you can just stipulate having a perspective as a pre-condition. But perhaps I'm not understanding your point.

Intersubjective comparison is available via public language. — Andrew M

I can't directly show you my perceptions or sensations, and neither can anyone else.

We can both agree that the stick appears bent (when partly submerged in water) because we can point to actual bent sticks and recognize the superficial similarity. — Andrew M

We can do that, but it's not directly comparing our perceptions or sensations. Consider Locke's spectrum inversion: Since we both learned colour words by being shown public coloured objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colours. It seems to me more likely that what "straight" and "bent" looks like to you will be the same as what they look like to me, but the same issue could apply if only as a matter of degree (or perhaps if I had some sort of condition or brain malfunction that made me see differently than most people).

Similarly, normally-sighted people can distinguish red, green and yellow apples, so there's nothing ineffable in saying that red and green apples appear dim yellow for dichromatics. And the dichromatic will agree they all appear dim yellow. That the dichromatic lacks the ability to distinguish these three colors is a kind of privacy in practice, but not in principle, since their lack of color discrimination has a physical basis. — Andrew M

I don't disagree that our minds have a physical basis, but I don't see why the same "privacy in practice" doesn't equally apply to everyone, including statistically "normal" people. This could be another case of spectrum inversion, in principle.

What I'm arguing for is that our experiences are not radically private or ineffable (which our public language attests to) — Andrew M

How does our public language attest to the fact that you see the same colour as I do when we both refer to "red"? How can our public language help to show me your sensations?

and also that we represent the world from a particular perspective (since our public language reflects the natural distinctions we make when we observe and interact in the world). — Andrew M

I don't believe that it is a "particular perspective", unless you mean some ideal, statistically normal "average person" - which is not a view from nowhere, but not a view from somewhere, either.

But you're Australian??? You don't know what Thanksgiving turkey is like!

The point is that our qualia may be different despite using the same colour words, so I'm questioning what you claim we "agree on". — Luke

How could you possibly ever determine that? You can't, and hence it is an irrelevance.

When my wife tells me it is violet, the conclusion is not that she is seeing a different colour to me, but that I have mis-used the word "blue".

The point is that our qualia may be different despite using the same colour words, so I'm questioning what you claim we "agree on".
— Luke

How could you possibly ever determine that? You can't — Banno

It is still a possibility that our qualia may be different. Besides, if you can’t “ever determine that” our qualia may be different despite us using the same colour words, then it must be because our qualia are private. Unless there is another reason that you can’t “ever determine that”?

and hence it is an irrelevance.

When my wife tells me it is violet, the conclusion is not that she is seeing a different colour to me, but that I have mis-used the word "blue". — Banno

Irrelevant to what? Qualia may be irrelevant to language use - as Wittgenstein notes with his private language argument - but I don’t consider qualia irrelevant to philosophy of mind.

It is still a possibility that our qualia may be different. — Luke

There is no sense in which the notion that "the quali could be different" could be meaningful. It cannot have a role in a language game.

Or it's no more than the difference between what I call blue and Wife calls violet.

If you want to have long conversations about the Beetle in the box, be my guest. It can make no difference.

Qualia may be irrelevant to language use - as Wittgenstein notes with his private language argument - but I don’t consider qualia irrelevant to philosophy of mind. — Luke

But don't complain that there is a problem of consciousness here. It only appears to be a problem because you choose to talk in such an odd way. Go ahead and develop a philosophy of mind that cannot connect to anything in the world.

Indeed; nor do I care. Turkey is so overrated. Give me a lamb leg.

There is no sense in which the notion that "the quali could be different" could be meaningful. It cannot have a role in a language game. — Banno

What cannot have a role in the language game? Qualia? I thought it was the subject of this discussion.

With regards to intuition pump #3, you know what is being indicated by "we experience entirely different subjective colors", don't you? I assume you must, since you asserted in your previous post that we can't "ever determine that".

I take it that you know how pain feels and how the colour red looks to you, even though it is not from your own case that the words "pain" or "red" get their meaning. What is "how pain feels to you" or "how red looks to you" - an illusion? Meaningless gibberish? Can't we talk about how red looks to a colour-blind person or to someone with cerebral achromatopsia? Surely the private language argument excludes something (whatever it may be) from providing the basis for linguistic meaning.

But don't complain that there is a problem of consciousness here. — Banno

If qualia are not definitive aspects of the mind, then I don't know what is. Are you an eliminative materialist?

There is no sense in which the notion that "the quali could be different" could be meaningful. It cannot have a role in a language game.
— Banno

What cannot have a role in the language game? Qualia? I thought it was the subject of this discussion.

With regards to intuition pump #3, you know what is being indicated by "we experience entirely different subjective colors", don't you? I assume you must, since you asserted in your previous post that we can't "ever determine that".

I take it that you know how pain feels and how the colour red looks to you, even though it is not from your own case that the words "pain" or "red" get their meaning. What is "how pain feels to you" or "how red looks to you" - an illusion? Meaningless gibberish? Can't we talk about how red looks to a colour-blind person or to someone with cerebral achromatopsia? Surely the private language argument excludes something (whatever it may be) from providing the basis for linguistic meaning. — Luke

"Qualia" is the name of all that?

"Qualia"" is the name of all that? — creativesoul

"Qualia" is an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us. — Dennett, Quining Qualia (opening line)

I thought it was the subject of this discussion. — Luke

Indeed; and in much the same way that the subject of Antigonish is the little man who wasn't there, or the Jabberwock the subject of Jabberwocky.

Indeed; and in much the same way that the subject of Antigonish is the little man who wasn't there, or the Jabberwock the subject of Jabberwocky. — Banno

You said that qualia "cannot have a role in the language game", so how can it be that there are language games about qualia? You are not merely saying that qualia don't exist; you are saying that we can't talk about qualia. Yet, qualia is the subject of this discussion, the subject of Dennett's paper, and here we are talking about qualia.

I understand that you want to argue against the "view from nowhere". I'm not trying to argue for it, but I don't think that you can just stipulate having a perspective as a pre-condition. But perhaps I'm not understanding your point. — Luke

My point is that we view the world in a particular way that depends on the kind of physical and perceptual characteristics we have (in our case, as human beings). We explain the world in terms of observable distinctions (such as the distinction between red and green objects). It's a mistake to suppose that one can "get behind" one's perception and invalidate those distinctions when one's perception is assumed in the attempt.

I can't directly show you my perceptions or sensations, and neither can anyone else. — Luke

That's a Cartesian view of perception and experience. But ordinary perception and experience involves contact with the world which grounds our language and communication.

So when you and I observe this red apple we are perceiving the same red apple. That's our contact with the world, and I'm showing you what I'm perceiving.

Is that an infallible demonstration? No. If you're dichromatic, the red apple will appear dim yellow to you. But even in that case, your perception of the apple is not private or ineffable since I just described it.

We can do that, but it's not directly comparing our perceptions or sensations. Consider Locke's spectrum inversion: Since we both learned colour words by being shown public coloured objects, our verbal behavior will match even if we experience entirely different subjective colours. It seems to me more likely that what "straight" and "bent" looks like to you will be the same as what they look like to me, but the same issue could apply if only as a matter of degree (or perhaps if I had some sort of condition or brain malfunction that made me see differently than most people). — Luke

Yes, a red apple could appear green to Alice and vice versa. But there would be a relevant physical difference between Alice and Alice's twin who sees things normally. This difference is potentially discoverable, and therefore potentially comparable. That is, if discovered, Alice would then know that red apples appear green to her. Just as a dichromatic already knows that red apples appear yellow to them.

I don't disagree that our minds have a physical basis, but I don't see why the same "privacy in practice" doesn't equally apply to everyone, including statistically "normal" people. This could be another case of spectrum inversion, in principle. — Luke

Could be. But once it is recognized that this is due to some physical difference (and not radical privacy or ineffability), then there is no longer a philosophical hard problem. Investigating physical differences is within the scope of scientific inquiry.

What I'm arguing for is that our experiences are not radically private or ineffable (which our public language attests to)
— Andrew M

How does our public language attest to the fact that you see the same colour as I do when we both refer to "red"? How can our public language help to show me your sensations? — Luke

There's no guarantee it will. However when differences in people's observations are detected (such as a failure to discriminate colors), language can be used to describe it. For example, the dichromatic's experience can be described, and so is not radically private or ineffable.

and also that we represent the world from a particular perspective (since our public language reflects the natural distinctions we make when we observe and interact in the world).
— Andrew M

I don't believe that it is a "particular perspective", unless you mean some ideal, statistically normal "average person" - which is not a view from nowhere, but not a view from somewhere, either. — Luke

Everyone has their own perspective. But language norms emerge. This works in practice because we are observing the same world, have generally similar physical and perceptual characteristics (as human beings), and the same laws of nature are operative for each of us (principle of relativity).

There is no sense in which the notion that "the quali could be different" could be meaningful — Banno

Maybe if you’re making a sci-fi movie about switching bodies and the struggles that come with getting used to a new homomorphism of experiences. Seems like a situation where talk of qualia makes a difference. So “your blue is my red” would make perfect sense in that setting.

Trivial. Let's make a game about Prefflings; were the game is to answer the question "what is a Preffling?" The game spins by itself, never making contact.

Read intuition pump #4, #5 and #6.

Well argued.

I'd add that the 'view form nowhere' argument seems to me to be non more than sophistry. Consider instead that third person speech is the view from anywhere... that it is phrased so that perspective is irrelevant.

That's pretty much how the Principle of Relativity insists we phrase things.

Let's make a game about Prefflings; were the game is to answer the question "what is a Preffling?" The game spins by itself, never making contact. — Banno

Try again. There are no language games about “Prefflings”, but there are plenty about qualia, Moreover, if Prefflings and qualia “cannot have a role in the language game”, then we would be unable to talk about them, yet here we are. Surely being the subject of discussion is “having a role in the language game”. Otherwise, please explain why it isn’t.

Are you an eliminative materialist? — Luke

Here's the thing: I do not have to have an alternative explanation in order to show that qualia are not helpful.

But since you asked, it seems to me that the hard problem is a result of looking at the issue the wrong way. Here's a post of mine from a while back:

Painted using a matte house paint with the least possible gloss, on stretched canvas, 3.5 meters tall and 7.8 meters wide, in the Museo Reina Sofia in Madrid.

An anti-war statement displaying the terror and suffering of people and animals.

Two ways of talking about the very same thing.

Do we need to reduce one to the other?

There is indeed a discussion to be had about how the selection of paint leads to the impact that Guernica has on the viewer. In the end you might be able to show the effect, but not to say it; there is nothing to say, when what is left is to look a the painting. A complete description of the tones and materials will not have the same impact.

Here's another:

Philosophy is a jigsaw puzzle.

Descartes thought the best way to finish the puzzle was to start by finding the corners. The corners are fixed, he thought, so if we get them in place, we can work our way around the edge by finding the straight edges, and work our way into the middle. He argued that "I think therefore I am" was a corner.

Other folk thought he was mistaken. They looked for other corners. A priori concepts, perhaps; or dialectic, or the Will, or falsification, or logic, language, choice... And on and on

Wittgenstein's contribution consists in his pointing out that this particular jigsaw does not have corners, nor edges. There are always bits that are outside any frame we might set up. And further, we don't really need corners and edges anyway. We can start anywhere and work in any direction. We can work on disjointed parts, perhaps bringing them together, perhaps not. We can even make new pieces as we go. — Philosophy is a jigsaw puzzle. Descartes thought the best way to finish the puzzle was to start by finding the corners. The corners are fixed, he thought, so if we get them in place, we can work our way around the edge by finding the straight edges, and work our way into the middle. He argued that

See what I did there?

Or the cliché, should we argue that this is reducible to an image of a rabbit?



Is it really just a rabbit? Is the mind really just matter?

This is the content of Wittgenstein's PI, and it seems to me to have an impact on many philosophical questions; to carry a great deal of weight.

But don't ask me to tell you what that impact weighs in kilograms. That's not a sensible question.