Nobody's denying that people have conscious experience, just qualia. :up: — frank

This seems to be a large part of the misunderstanding here - that it's qualia or there's no consciousness.

That's because qualia are defined at first as conscious experiences. The sections of PI that @Luke quoted earlier in the thread show that so far as conscious experiences can be discussed, we can and already do have a tried-and-true language for them; and so far as conscious experiences are private, they cannot be a part of our conversation.

That seems pretty clear and unequivocal to me, and I suspect to others, but is apparently incomprehensible to Luke and a few others.

Would that there were a way to rephrase this so that it was understood.

If apples have a taste then you can taste them (or not), which means they taste some way to you. I’m not suggesting it becomes some other thing in your mind, but it becomes something in your mind: a sensation of taste. That sensation of taste probably has properties, such as sweet, bitter, juicy, sharp, etc. — Luke

All of which we can talk about, without the extra structure of qualia.

Do you really think that anyone here doubts that apples taste of apple?

Do you suppose that the taste of an apple is somehow only available to you?

All of which we can talk about — Banno

Here you go again conflating qualia with language use. It is not the language use which is private, but the sensations.

Would that there were a way to rephrase this so that it was understood. — Banno

Phenomenal consciousness has been a topic of discussion for about 100 years. It's a science fiction theme, it's a significant issue in philosophy. Scientists speculate how it's produced.

I think most people would understand the term if given the definition.

I honestly do not understand the objection. Dennett I understand. You, I don't.

experiences are always already qualitative, so we have no need, in fact it will just produce reificatory confusion, to speak of the quality of an experience — Janus

If experiences are qualitative, then what’s the problem in speaking of their qualities?

You know, it's like the taste of beer; there's no experience of the taste of beer since the taste of beer is the experience, and to say that there is an experience of the taste of beer is like saying there is an experience of the experience. — Janus

I don’t see why it’s necessary to phrase it like that.

If experiences are qualitative, then what’s the problem in speaking of their qualities? — Luke

There's no problem; to speak of experiences just is to speak to speak of their qualities; the danger would be in being led to think that the qualities are somehow separate from, or "over and above", the experience.

I don’t see why it’s necessary to phrase it like that. — Luke

I think it helps to see the reificatory hazards that lurk in speaking in ways like "the experience of the taste of beer". At the very least it is a redundant expression, and so should be avoided on purely technical grounds.

It is not the language use which is private, but the sensations. — Luke

SO you are claiming to be the only person who can taste apples?

Do you suppose that the taste of an apple is somehow only available to you? — Banno

I don’t know; how does an apple taste to you (or to anyone else)? Can you show me how it tastes to you? What reason is there to assume that how it tastes to you is identical to how it tastes to me?

Otherwise how would we select the words which might constitute such a conversation if there were no public meanings to which they might refer? — Isaac

Here’s how I see it:

There is a public meaning for each, but that is not the experience itself. When people say “The apple is red” they do not really care about what color gets imagined in your head. They care about the relative position of that color in your map of experiences to words.

For instance, if we’re seeing inverted colors from each other and I say “the apple is red” then I don’t really care what you’re seeing, all I care about is to indicate a property of said apple relative to other properties. For instance: saying the apple is red is to say that it produces the same experience as blood when it comes to color. Also that it produces the same experience as parts of the US flag, etc. Basically, when I say the apple is red I am pointing to the corresponding element in a homomorphism.

However a problem arises when I say the apple is red, and then you think that that means the apple produces the same experience as grass. Then our experiences are no longer homomorphisms. What I would use “red” to describe is no longer what you use “red” to describe. Then communication problems arise. And we call people whose map of experiences to words strays too far from the majority “colorblind” in this case. But some straying is likely and not a big issue. For example here:

That apple tastes sweet to me, bitter to you. — Banno

However, whatever I actually experience as I’m seeing a red apple is qualia, and that is useless to talk about outside of a sci-fi setting.

these are questions about a little man who isn’t there.

That apple tastes sweet to me, bitter to you. See? Are we talking about qualia now?

Read intuition pump #4, #5 and #6 — Banno

Which is why I said "sci-fi". You were fine with startrek having changelings. But I don't care to continue this because you said that there are language games about qualia (even if useless-which no one was arguing they weren't)

and so far as conscious experiences are private, they cannot be a part of our conversation. — Banno

The problem comes when you say "and thus qualia do not exist". If you had said "And thus it is useless to talk about qualia" then I think this thread would have been dead by now. Notice how no advocate of qualia has made the attempt to seriously argue that anyone here has "inverted vision". Because they can't.

I honestly do not understand the objection. — frank

I think the whole thing with Banno is that to him "Qualia do not exist" and "It is futile to talk of or attempt to prove cases when we have different Qualia (when the same stimulus produces different conscious experiences)" are identical statements. The wittgenstein is strong in this one.

I don’t know; how does an apple taste to you (or to anyone else)? Can you show me how it tastes to you?What reason is there to assume that how it tastes to you will be identical to how it tastes to me? — Luke

An apple tastes precisely and exactly just like an apple... to all apple eaters. That's how...

I think the whole thing with Banno is that to him "Qualia do not exist" and "It is futile to talk of or attempt to prove cases when we have different Qualia (when the same stimulus produces different conscious experiences)" are identical statements. The wittgenstein is strong in this one. — khaled

Proof is the one thing nobody has. So Chalmers says Dennett's view is so extraordinary, he carries the burden of proof. Dennett says there is strong reasons to doubt common knowledge in this case, and so he lays out the pumps.

What I'll note is that through all the discussion in this thread, no one has tried to elicit doubt using Dennett's stuff.

I think that proves that Dennett is boring. :cool:

I'd add that the 'view form nowhere' argument seems to me to be non more than sophistry. Consider instead that third person speech is the view from anywhere... that it is phrased so that perspective is irrelevant.

That's pretty much how the Principle of Relativity insists we phrase things. — Banno

Yes, when we represent the world in language, we generalize and abstract from our experience in the world, not in separation from our experience. The former is natural (and is useful in everyday life and scientific investigation), the latter is dualist (and is useful for creating interminable philosophical discussion).

ou know, it's like the taste of beer; there's no experience of the taste of beer since the taste of beer is the experience, and to say that there is an experience of the taste of beer is like saying there is an experience of the experience. So how much less is there a quality of the experience of the taste of beer? — Janus

No, it's just noting that there is a conscious experience to tasting beer, and this taste is not in the beer itself, but rather the taster.

An apple tastes precisely and exactly just like an apple... to all apple eaters. That's how... — creativesoul

Owing to the "circumstances, conditions or dispositions," the same objects appear different. The same temperature, as established by instrument, feels very different after an extended period of cold winter weather (it feels warm) than after mild weather in the autumn (it feels cold). Time appears slow when young and fast as aging proceeds. Honey tastes sweet to most but bitter to someone with jaundice. A person with influenza will feel cold and shiver even though she is hot with a fever. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pyrrhonism#The_ten_modes_of_Aenesidemus

The apple isn't always going to taste the same to everyone. It won't always taste the same to you, depending on your "circumstances, conditions or dispositions".

Sure, it could be construed as denoting conscious awareness of the taste as opposed to drinking the beer without being consciously aware of the taste. Does the beer have a taste if you are not aware of it? Of course it does in the sense that the beer can be tasted. But what does it mean to taste the beer? Is it merely a physiological response, or must you be aware of the taste in order to be said to have tasted it? Is this a merely a matter of terminology?

It’s like when you’re listening to a boring lecture, and you start thinking of other things. Your conscious experience of the talk goes in and out. Maybe you hear every other sentence.

Sure, but if distracted enough (or pissed enough) you could finish an entire beer without noticing its taste. So then would we say the beer had a taste, but wasn't tasted on that occasion?

The apple isn't always going to taste the same to everyone. — Marchesk

Without the apple, there is no apple taste for anything or anyone, and yet you wish to claim that the taste of apples is in the perceiver. Yeah...

No.

The problem comes when you say "and thus qualia do not exist". — khaled

Ok: qualia exist in a way not like smells and tastes, but like the little man who wasn't there and the Jabberwock.

I find that risible. But if that's how you need me to say it...

Yep.

No, it's just noting that there is a conscious experience to tasting beer, and this taste is not in the beer itself, but rather the taster. — Marchesk

AH. Does the taster often taste beer without the beer being present?

It seems that the beer has something to do with it's taste...

I can't directly show you my perceptions or sensations, and neither can anyone else.
— Luke

That's a Cartesian view of perception and experience. — Andrew M

Why must it be?

So when you and I observe this red apple we are perceiving the same red apple. That's our contact with the world, and I'm showing you what I'm perceiving. — Andrew M

I don't disagree, but that's not showing me your perceptions or sensations. Maybe you're colour-blind and you perceive it differently to me. You can show me the object you are looking at, but that's not showing me how it looks to you.

If you're dichromatic, the red apple will appear dim yellow to you. But even in that case, your perception of the apple is not private or ineffable since I just described it. — Andrew M

Your description might tell me how it appears, but your description doesn't show me how it appears, which would make all the difference if our spectra were inverted.

Yes, a red apple could appear green to Alice and vice versa. But there would be a relevant physical difference between Alice and Alice's twin who sees things normally. This difference is potentially discoverable, and therefore potentially comparable. — Andrew M

I agree, it is potentially discoverable and comparable - I'm not trying to argue for anything supernatural. However, it remains private until then. Anyway, it's not really the privacy that's at issue here, but whether there is, in fact, some way that things seem to a person, i.e. some "inner" phenomenal experience. That's the definition of qualia given by Dennett, and what I understand eliminative materialists consider as somehow unreal.

once it is recognized that this is due to some physical difference (and not radical privacy or ineffability), then there is no longer a philosophical hard problem. Investigating physical differences is within the scope of scientific inquiry. — Andrew M

I have long considerd the hard problem to be a question of why, rather than how. Namely: why do we have phenomenal experiences at all? That question would not seem to be answered by a complete "map" of how all phenomenal experience corresponds to the body/brain.

How does our public language attest to the fact that you see the same colour as I do when we both refer to "red"? How can our public language help to show me your sensations?
— Luke

There's no guarantee it will. However when differences in people's observations are detected (such as a failure to discriminate colors), language can be used to describe it. For example, the dichromatic's experience can be described, and so is not radically private or ineffable. — Andrew M

A problem with this might be that a perceptual difference needs to be noticeable in order to...get noticed, and therefore some perceptual differences could remain undiscovered and private.

but like the little man who wasn't there and the Jabberwock. — Banno

I don’t know what those are so I don’t get what you’re saying.

qualia exist in a way not like smells and tastes — Banno

Smells and tastes are words that point to certain qualia. “Red” points to a certain experience. When I tell you “the apple is red” I am saying “the apple produces the experience we all dubbed red”. This experience itself is very real, yet incomparable. I don’t know whether or not you’re experiencing the same thing when looking at the apple. But I do know, assuming you’re not colorblind, that whatever experience you do have when looking at a red apple is the same as when looking at blood or certain parts of the US flag.

I really have to ask though, do you know what a homomorphism is?

The two other best pieces of nonsense -

Twas bryllyg, and ye slythy toves
Did gyre and gymble in ye wabe:
All mimsy were ye borogoves;
And ye mome raths outgrabe.

and

Yesterday upon the stair
I met a man who wasn’t there
He wasn’t there again today
I wish, I wish he’d go away

But qualia is there.

If an apple has a taste, then there is a way it tastes. Am I Englishing wrong? — Luke

No, just inventing an extra entity without any apparent reason. The apple has a taste - two ontological commitments, that there is an apple, and that it has a taste. Why the third, that in addition to there being an apple and there being it's taste, there is also 'the way' it tastes?

If apples have a taste then you can taste them (or not), which means they taste some way to you. I’m not suggesting it becomes some other thing in your mind, but it becomes something in your mind: a sensation of taste. That sensation of taste probably has properties, such as sweet, bitter, juicy, sharp, etc. — Luke

Nope. The sensation of taste cannot have those properties to me because those are public words, those properties have public meanings. I can't possibly think one thing is 'sweet' whilst other people think a different thing is 'sweet', otherwise there's no public meaning of 'sweet' for us to use and the word ceases to have any function. I might be able to detect sweetness in something that other people cannot, but what sweetness is must be public. We learn what 'sweet' means by experiencing the use of the word in our shared world, not our private one.

When people say “The apple is red” they do not really care about what color gets imagined in your head. — khaled

This is why I went to all the effort of explaining the neurological process.

No colour gets imagined in your head.

End of story. It simply doesn't happen. You do not have a bit of your brain which lights up red for another bit of your brain to see. You do not have a bit of your brain which represents 'red' that is distinguishable in any way from the bit of your brain which represents 'green'. It just doesn't happen. I don't know how much more clear I can be about this, you can't just make up neuroscience to suit your preferred view of the world.

___

There is the colour of the apple - that is a public property it has, a shared fiction (I'm a model-dependant realist). It's the colour we call red, the colour of stop lights, the colour that the grocer reaches for when I ask for red apples.

Then there is our response to the colour of the apple - different for different people. Memories, emotions, desires, connections, associated words... all of this is unique to the individual and unique to the very moment, but none of it is the colour of the apple. All of it can be observed in one way or another - it's not radically private.

And - what's more important - all of it is in constant flux at a speed faster than our working memory can retain (again, this is not really up for debate). So not even we are aware of what all these responses are, we're only aware of the story we later tell about what all these responses were.

Then - all of it actually feeds back to our sensory inputs (again, in constant flux) to mediate and filter what we 'sense' to make it more suit the story, much of this story is influenced by the public meaning of 'red'.

What's completely absent throughout this process is any identifiable step at which there is a sensation, unique to the individual, which can be identified as a particular colour. There's no neurological evidence for it, there's no phenomenological evidence for it, there's no sematic evidence for it. I've really no idea why this concept continues.

This is why I went to all the effort of explaining the neurological process. — Isaac

And then conceded that the intent behind the expression is as I described. I’m not proposing a neurological theory here, I’m saying what the intent behind the expression “the apple is red” is.

It's the colour we call red, the colour of stop lights, the colour that the grocer reaches for when I ask for red apples. — Isaac

Agreed. But individually that color may be different. If your red was my blue, and stop lights and apples were both my blue from your point of view, there would be no issue of communication.