And then conceded that the intent behind the expression is as I described. I’m not proposing a neurological theory here, I’m saying what the intent behind the expression “the apple is red” is — khaled
The intent is that the apple corresponds to the public meaning of 'red' — Isaac
When I tell you “the apple is red” I am saying “the apple produces the experience we all dubbed red”. — khaled
I definitely see something when looking at a red apple. — khaled
I do not know if you see the same thing. — khaled
Maybe what you’re seeing I would describe as “blue”. — khaled
Correct. Does this imply that we are experiencing the same thing when looking at the apple? — khaled
Smells and tastes are words that point to certain qualia. “Red” points to a certain experience. When I tell you “the apple is red” I am saying “the apple produces the experience we all dubbed red”. — khaled
There's something a bit odd going on here. If "red" points to the experience of red, and they are incomparable, then what you call "red" is different to what I call"red"...This experience itself is very real, yet incomparable. — khaled
...do you know what a homomorphism is? — khaled
Yes. A red apple. — Isaac
If you ask people to pass you the red apple, do you generally find they pass you the one you were expecting? — Isaac
How? We're you taught to use the word 'blue' incorrectly? — Isaac
Yes. We're experiencing the apple. As I said, our response to the colour of the apple will be different, but this is what our experience actually consists of, it's not the subject matter of our experience (that's the apple) it is the constitution of it. — Isaac
then what you call "red" is different to what I call"red"... — Banno
I'm not sure. I'm aware that it is a term used in maths — Banno
Are you familiar with Wittgenstein's, or Austin's, or any, of the large numebr of arguents form the middle of last century that laid to rest the notion that the meaning of a word is the thing to which it points? — Banno
Yes. A red apple. — Isaac
More accurately “what we all call a red apple”. Public meaning and all that. — khaled
If you ask people to pass you the red apple, do you generally find they pass you the one you were expecting? — Isaac
Correct. That is no evidence to indicate they have the same experience when holding the red apple as I do when I hold it. — khaled
Say I was wearing glasses that inverted all the color going into my eye. — khaled
So in this previous example I just said, am I still seeing a red apple with those devices on? Even though the light coming into my eye is inverted? — khaled
Not necessarily but it could be different. To say that they are different would mean you compared them and found that they are. — khaled
That's what 'a red apple' means. adding 'what we call...' to it implies that there might actually be a red apple other than what we call one. — Isaac
Colour doesn't go into your eye. Photons go into your eye. Colour is a public concept. — Isaac
Yes — Isaac
I don’t think many would answer that but if that’s your answer then I see why you’d say qualia don’t exist. Seems nonsensical to me to say that if I’m literally forced to lie about the color I’m seeing that I’m actually seeing the color that is the lie. — khaled
The apple has a taste - two ontological commitments, that there is an apple, and that it has a taste. Why the third, that in addition to there being an apple and there being it's taste, there is also 'the way' it tastes? — Isaac
The sensation of taste cannot have those properties to me because those are public words, those properties have public meanings. — Isaac
I can't possibly think one thing is 'sweet' whilst other people think a different thing is 'sweet' — Isaac
I might be able to detect sweetness in something that other people cannot, but what sweetness is must be public. — Isaac
We learn what 'sweet' means by experiencing the use of the word in our shared world, not our private one. — Isaac
You don't see a colour. Why Am I having to repeat this? You do not see a colour. There's no part of your brain which represents a particular colour. It doesn't happen, not there, absent, not present, unrepresented, lacking, missing , devoid. — Isaac
If the meaning of "red" is the experience it points to, then what you call red and what I call red are different - because your experiences are not mine. — Banno
But overwhelmingly, we do get by talking about red things. — Banno
I would surmise that it is because the taste exists as an experience, and it does not exist unless it is experienced by someone. Therefore, it's the way it tastes for someone, or when someone experiences it. That is, the way it tastes is the taste experience. — Luke
You mean that the sensation of taste cannot have those properties only to you. That doesn't mean that it cannot have those properties to you. But neither does it mean that it has those properties to everyone. — Luke
I can't possibly think one thing is 'sweet' whilst other people think a different thing is 'sweet' — Isaac
Then what of intuition pump #10? Perhaps perceptual norms affect linguistic norms? — Luke
I might be able to detect sweetness in something that other people cannot, but what sweetness is must be public. — Isaac
If it's not sweet/bitter for everybody, then maybe it's only public for some people but not for others? — Luke
We learn what 'sweet' means by experiencing the use of the word in our shared world, not our private one. — Isaac
Yes, but "if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ‘object and name’, then the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." So our spectra could very well be inverted without either of us noticing. — Luke
You don't see a colour. Why Am I having to repeat this? You do not see a colour. There's no part of your brain which represents a particular colour. It doesn't happen, not there, absent, not present, unrepresented, lacking, missing , devoid. — Isaac
Then how do we distinguish colours? How is it that I am able to fetch a red object upon request? — Luke
The taste is a public concept. The experience is a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc resulting from the taste. — Isaac
I don't understand the process you're suggesting here. — Isaac
I might think the coffee is bitter, you might think it less so, but 'bitter' is a public concept, we're both talking about the same thing. What's different is our ability to detect it in the coffee. — Isaac
No, our spectra could not possibly be inverted. — Isaac
Receptors in the retina sens trichromous signals to the retinal basal ganglia. These are combined in the V1 area of the occipital cortex to form signals responsive to combinations of wavelengths, different combinations will (normally) fire different neurons (or fuzzy combination fire clusters of neurons - we're not sure yet). These start two chain reaction processes - one along the dorsal pathway, and one along the ventral pathway. The former leads toward responses, the latter toward recall. All along the signals are suppressed by regions higher in the chain to minimise surprise signals. Eventually such chains will reach a response (fetching the red apple) and a recall (other things which are red apples from your memory), as well as emotions, desires etc. — Isaac
The taste doesn't exist as an experience for someone. The taste is a public concept. — Isaac
The experience is a unique set of memories, emotions, desires, sematic associations etc resulting from the taste. — Isaac
If I have experience X and I want to get another person to understand what it was for me to go through experience X, I have only two imperfect methods. Put them through experience Y which I think is similar enough to experience X to invoke the same feelings, or describe experience X in terms of experiences A, B and C which they've already had and recall. Neither are really any better than the other, they each have their merits in different situations, neither actually communicate what experience X was, for me. — Isaac
It's not at issue. We don't just make up neuroscience to have a discussion about it. There is no part of your brain which shows you a colour, it cannot happen, brains are made up of neurons, not colours. — Isaac
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.