If we're making astonishing progress, shouldn't somebody have seen something that points the way to a mechanism by now? What's your timeframe on how long we should tolerate the lack of progress on the mind/body problem before we start questioning fundamental assumptions?

If we're making astonishing progress, shouldn't somebody have seen something that points the way to a mechanism by now? — RogueAI

https://www.sciencedirect.com/book/9780128005385/neuroscience-of-pain-stress-and-emotion

The pain is to some degree quantum superposition, and that is what "qualia" can refer to. The what it is like is a property of physical matter (maybe a quantum field phenomenon?), as unintuitive as it seems to our wiring mechanism corrupted brains. The matter brains are composed of is intrinsically thinking/feeling stuff, just like it has a shape, size and texture. There are more than ten thousand kinds of neurons in the human brain and their electric fields interacting with different combinations of glial cells, probably explaining much of the variety.

This sounds like panpsychism. The matter that makes up the brain is intrinsically thinking/feeling stuff? I assume you mean neurons? What about the matter what makes up the neurons? Is it thinking/feeling too?

http://consc.net/papers/facing.html

Was I asking what Chalmer's thought about consciousness?

You are confusing the easy problem (neural correlates of mental states) with the Hard Problem (how does non-conscious stuff produce conscious experience). Chalmer's paper is a great place to start. This is also good: https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/

This sounds like panpsychism. The matter that makes up the brain is intrinsically thinking/feeling stuff? I assume you mean neurons? What about the matter what makes up the neurons? Is it thinking/feeling too? — RogueAI

My theory is that qualia are quantum superpositions which rapidly flit in and out of existence as matter moves, so for instance a cloud of gas has some properties of feeling and image generation without a level of organization that we could regard as constituting experience. Its when these qualia get metaorganized in association with for instance an organic body that qualitative experience emerges, and I probably don't have to tell you how much more of consciousness this accounts for. The mechanism is analogous with the combination of light waves to make the visible color palette. The human "what it is like" essentially amounts to synthetic arrays of quantum resonance, roughly speaking extremely complex color fields. Turns out qualia aren't so ineffable after all!

For all these reasons, It is highly dubious that Libet’s apparatus could predict any real-life choice, because in my view it picks up clues from our deliberation that sometimes prepares decision making. When the deliberation time is reduced, when the alternatives have to be invented or imagined prior to deliberation, or when emotions systemically affect deliberations in sudden ways, I predict that no computer can predict my choices in advance. — Olivier5

Variations of the test have been performed for decades now as criticism of this form of yes-buttery is ongoing, all verifying the original result. To put it another way, the number of scenarios in which the effect has been seen is always increasing. No one believes this is true of all decision-making: it is almost certainly not true of chess decisions. However, driving is probably a great example of where it *would* kick in, precisely because the timescales are often short, requiring action to be taken faster than conscious decision-making processes are adept at.

You are confusing the easy problem (neural correlates of mental states) with the Hard Problem (how does non-conscious stuff produce conscious experience). Chalmer's paper is a great place to start. This is also good: https://iep.utm.edu/hard-con/ — RogueAI

How do you know that the work I've linked doesn't tell you how non-conscious stuff produces conscious experience?

Look, the means by which this non-conscious stuff produces consciousness must, if it exists, be some process or mechanism that is a property of this non-conscious suff. It just seems really odd to me that you'd claim interest in such a mechanism and then refuse a study of the exact non-conscious stuff you would need to know about in order to ascertain if the production of consciousness was among their feasible properties.

How do you know that the work I've linked doesn't tell you how non-conscious stuff produces conscious experience?

Because the Hard Problem hasn't been solved. Ergo, the book you linked doesn't solve it.

"Look, the means by which this non-conscious stuff produces consciousness must, if it exists, be some process or mechanism that is a property of this non-conscious suff. It just seems really odd to me that you'd claim interest in such a mechanism and then refuse a study of the exact non-conscious stuff you would need to know about in order to ascertain if the production of consciousness was among their feasible properties."

I don't think neuroscience is going to solve the hard problem. The idea that you can mix non-conscious stuff around in a certain way and add some electricity to it and get consciousness from it is magical thinking. Since we know consciousness exists, we should doubt the non-conscious stuff exists. We have no evidence that it does anyway. Why assume it exists?

Because the Hard Problem hasn't been solved. Ergo, the book you linked doesn't solve it. — RogueAI

Who judges whether it's been solved or not? You? Chalmers?...

I don't think neuroscience is going to solve the hard problem. The idea that you can mix non-conscious stuff around in a certain way and add some electricity to it and get consciousness from it is magical thinking. — RogueAI

Why? Without having studied the properties and functions of all non-conscious stuff, how are you in a position to say what it can and cannot produce?

Since we know consciousness exists — RogueAI

We do?

we should doubt the non-conscious stuff exists. We have no evidence that it does anyway. Why assume it exists? — RogueAI

If non-conscious stuff doesn't exist then how can you conceive of a problem with it's producing consciousness? How have you aquired some rules regarding what this non-conscious stuff can and cannot do if it doesn't even exist?

Since we know consciousness exists
— RogueAI

We do?

Do you see the absurdity of your question? This is why I don't waste my time with Dennett or his followers. They inevitably end up doubting really obvious stuff like their own consciousness, and then it devolves into a semantics game. No thanks.

They inevitably end up doubting really obvious stuff like their own consciousness — RogueAI

What is so difficult to grasp about the fact that what seems obvious to you is not obvious to others? Are you suggesting that 'obviousness' is some kind of objective property of posited entities?

If everything is physical (physicalism), then how do we account for (i.e. categorise) the mental/experiential? — Luke

Experience could emerge from brute matter, but then it is not identical with brute matter, and is therefore not itself physical (matter). — Luke

Are you not just saying that the mental/experiential are not perceptible material objects? Life itself is not a perceptible material object; would it follow that life is not physical?

I take it you are using "emerge from" here to mean "evolve from", whereas the putative emergence of experience from matter occurs as a process of a (current) functioning body. Experience itself may have emerged/evolved as life evolved, but that's not the same use of the term associated with the "emergence" of experience/consciousness from the matter of a functioning body, which occurs concurrently. — Luke

Yes, but doesn't it "occur concurrently" only by virtue of having originally emerged or evolved, both in the individual's and the species' cases? I mean you were a zygote before you were conscious, no?

Should we just give up on these philosophical questions? Perhaps they are conceptual problems - if so, why not try and resolve them? — Luke

Perhaps they have been dissolved to the satisfaction of some.Whether or not someone thinks they have been dissolved seems to be a function of the person's presuppositions, which is back to what I have been saying.

Perhaps they have been dissolved to the satisfaction of some.Whether or not someone thinks they have been dissolved seems to be a function of the person's presuppositions, which is back to what I have been saying. — Janus

But our presuppositions are based on what we believe to be the facts, so its a matter of how much we are willing to pool into a common discourse. As per some comments by contributors to this forum, we may need a whole new "language game", and this might not be the most ideal period in human history to realize that requisite. Doesn't mean its not possible though. I think this new language game can begin with concepts such as superposition and entanglement as they apply to biological systems and cognitive science.

But our presuppositions are based on what we believe to be the facts, so its a matter of how much we are willing to pool into a common discourse. — Enrique

I could equally well say that what we believe to be the facts is based on our presuppositions. As to "how much we are willing to pool into a common discourse", if what you are saying is based on presuppositions I don't share, don't accept, then "common discourse" may thus be limited. In the worst case we will be talking past one another, like ships passing in the darkest night. So, "a whole new language game" would need to be based on a sufficient commonality of presupposition.

Most biochemical reactions happen too fast to be accounted for without near instantaneous motion such as in entanglement. Systems of entangled particles like subatomic bodies of water conjoin molecules in photosynthetic reaction centers, the foundation of the ecosystem, and will probably be discovered in much functionality throughout nature. Magnetoreception in birds and butterflies relies on a quantum process called the fast triplet reaction that is sensitive enough to register the magnetic field of the earth. The brain produces a similar field as standing waves measured by an EEG. Biochemistry of the nervous system and especially the brain may be fine tuned for responding to this field, generating the synthetic holism of human consciousness. Fields on fields cause superpositions analogous to hybrid wavelengths of the visible light spectrum. Entanglement systems similar to photosynthetic reaction centers could have comparable superposition effects with the brain's electric field. Qualitative consciousness is the brain's electric field superposed with these entanglement systems as honed by evolution.

Its the only possible explanation. — Enrique

These are facts/presuppositions we can share, and an adequate foundation for research. I think this resolves the issue on an initiating conceptual/hypothetical level, but neither of us are scientists I suspect. Someone's going to have to fund experimental investigation of a quantum consciousness theory. I wish I could get the chance to participate in some capacity.

These are facts/presuppositions we can share, and an adequate foundation for research. — Enrique

I am not a scientist, and I have no way of assessing whether or not what you presented there should be counted as fact. To be honest, I don't even know what much of it means; but that could be down to my ignorance, of course.

So, it is not just commonalities of presuppositions that are important, but similar kinds and levels of education in the fields under discussion.

Variations of the test have been performed for decades now as criticism of this form of yes-buttery is ongoing, all verifying the original result. — Kenosha Kid

I seriously doubt it. Don’t believe all the hype.

I seriously doubt it. — Olivier5

An interesting thesis. So for your first port of call I recommend the Manchester undergrad course

https://www.manchester.ac.uk/study/undergraduate/courses/2021/00550/bsc-cognitive-neuroscience-and-psychology/

Then there's some really good masters work there, but also at UCL

https://www.ucl.ac.uk/pals/study/masters/msc-cognitive-neuroscience

The most exiting place to do doctoral and post doc work is the lab at Sussex

https://www.sussex.ac.uk/research/centres/sussex-neuroscience/research/consciousness

Hopefully they'll have some research opportunities for you.

When you've finished all that, it would be great if you could report back on your findings, in the meantime...perhaps just look up some actual source material before regaling us with how you 'reckon' the brain works?

Your recommendations are noted. Do you have any evidence regarding the issue being discussed, which was FYI:

There was a famous experiment a while ago that showed that neurological behaviour associated with motor responses fired before correlated decision-making processes in the prefrontal cortex.
— Kenosha Kid — Daemon

This is from Frankish's article published in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23 (11-12), 2016, pp. 11-39, later reprinted in K. Frankish (ed.) Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness, Imprint Academic, 2017

"Another common objection to illusionism is that in the case of qualitative states there is no gap between illusion and reality. Something can look like a Penrose triangle without being a Penrose triangle, but an experience that seems to have a greenish phenomenal character really does have a greenish phenomenal character*. As Searle puts it, ‘where consciousness is concerned the existence of the appearance is the reality. If it seems to me exactly as if I am having conscious experiences, then I am having conscious experiences’ (Searle, 1997, p. 112, italics in original).12 This is often presented as a crushing objection to illusionism, but it is far from compelling. It turns on what we mean by seeming to have a greenish experience. If we mean having an introspective experience with the same phenomenal feel as a greenish experience, then, trivially, there is no distinction between seeming and reality. But of course that is not what illusionists mean. They mean introspectively representing oneself as having a greenish experience, and one can do this without having a greenish experience.

* I follow Levine’s practice of using ‘greenish’ for the (putative) feel associated with perception of a green object"

_____________________________________________________________________

So a quale for Frankish consists of introspectively representing oneself as having an experience, and this is to be distinguished fromhaving an introspective experience.

I'm still trying to apply the Principle of Charity, but he's not making it easy. Is it clear to anyone what introspectively representing oneself means?

↪Daemon
If we're making astonishing progress, shouldn't somebody have seen something that points the way to a mechanism by now? What's your timeframe on how long we should tolerate the lack of progress on the mind/body problem before we start questioning fundamental assumptions? — RogueAI

We've been questioning fundamental assumptions throughout and will continue to do so. In my view Searle has solved the mind/body problem, it's Chalmers' Hard Problem that we are currently making progress with.

This begs the question then, what use is personal phenomenal experience in an evolutionary "survival of the genes" sense? — Harry Hindu

Well, what use is it in day-to-day life? Isaac, Banno et al would argue that there isn't a meaningful separate phenomenal experience, i.e. it isn't useful at all even if it exists. The transformations and augmentations of raw sensory input with memory, motivation, etc., are sufficient to account for consciousness. And I agree to an extent. In my view, when we talk about qualia, we're talking about these transformations and augmentations, at least as available to access consciousness (which is all we can report on). The usefulness might be summed up as: it is quicker and easier to work with 'lion' than it is to work with an unadorned granular image.

What would it look like for someone to change their mind? — Harry Hindu

That's probably not one thing. I've touched on an example from Kahneman's work earlier. There are decisions we make that are not consciously made, that is we are not conscious of making them in the way we do, but rather, once those decisions are made unconsciously, they are presented to consciousness as if for ratification in such a way that we'll swear blind we did make them consciously. (NB: Kahneman doesn't speak in terms of unconscious and conscious decision making but in terms of System 1 (fast, e.g. pattern-matching) and System 2 (slow, algorithmic). But the implication is there.) Consciously we can change our minds, i.e. System 2 will come up with a different answer.

I could equally well say that what we believe to be the facts is based on our presuppositions. As to "how much we are willing to pool into a common discourse", if what you are saying is based on presuppositions I don't share, don't accept, then "common discourse" may thus be limited. In the worst case we will be talking past one another, like ships passing in the darkest night. So, "a whole new language game" would need to be based on a sufficient commonality of presupposition — Janus

And, in science such common presuppositions can be called working hypotheses that need not be believed by any scientist involved. The argument is made, research is carried out, and everyone gets paid. The relevance of the research in terms of broader theories comes later by the way of review and assessment.

Most biochemical reactions happen too fast to be accounted for without near instantaneous motion such as in entanglement. — Enrique

Everything is quantum mechanical at magnification levels great enough to reach that deep, but the evidence that those physical processes have any bearing whatsoever on greater issues that we like to discuss are very difficult if not impossible to verify. The gaps between physical levels in terms of speed and range are very wide, and it may not be possible to leap past intermediate levels.

Well, what use is it in day-to-day life? Isaac, Banno et al would argue that there isn't a meaningful separate phenomenal experience, i.e. it isn't useful at all even if it exists. The transformations and augmentations of raw sensory input with memory, motivation, etc., are sufficient to account for consciousness. And I agree to an extent. In my view, when we talk about qualia, we're talking about these transformations and augmentations, at least as available to access consciousness (which is all we can report on). The usefulness might be summed up as: it is quicker and easier to work with 'lion' than it is to work with an unadorned granular image. — Kenosha Kid

None of this explains why have a different experience of my raw sensory input with memory, motivation, etc. than you have of my raw sensory input with memory, motivation. From my view, I don't experience neurons. I experience colors, shapes and sounds of the world. From your view, you experience neurons in the format of colors and shapes. How can on one end you point to a visual of neurons, while I point to an experience of a sound.

I could point to blind-sight patients as evidence that phenomenal experience is necessary. Blind-sight patients don't behave, or think like normal humans. They don't have the level of detail about their environment that normal people do. Their different behavior is the result of their phenomenal experience, or the lack of one, compared to those that have it. In other words, p-zombies would behave differently than normal humans, and would therefore be distinguishable from human beings.

That's probably not one thing. I've touched on an example from Kahneman's work earlier. There are decisions we make that are not consciously made, that is we are not conscious of making them in the way we do, but rather, once those decisions are made unconsciously, they are presented to consciousness as if for ratification in such a way that we'll swear blind we did make them consciously. (NB: Kahneman doesn't speak in terms of unconscious and conscious decision making but in terms of System 1 (fast, e.g. pattern-matching) and System 2 (slow, algorithmic). But the implication is there.) Consciously we can change our minds, i.e. System 2 will come up with a different answer. — Kenosha Kid

This assumes that consciousness only exists in one part of the brain. How do you know that there are not other consciousnesses in other parts of the brain making those decisions?

You say that "we" are not conscious of our decision, then how can we associate the decision with "we"? Who made the decision? Is the "you" morally culpable for those decisions? Why present anything to consciousness, if not for ratification - meaning that consciousness would be part of the whole decision-making process. If you asked another person for advice, have you made the decision yet?

What progress? The theories about how matter produces consciousness are highly speculative, all over the map, and there's nothing close to a consensus around any of them.

Everything is quantum mechanical at magnification levels great enough to reach that deep, but the evidence that those physical processes have any bearing whatsoever on greater issues that we like to discuss are very difficult if not impossible to verify. The gaps between physical levels in terms of speed and range are very wide, and it may not be possible to leap past intermediate levels. — magritte

It seems to me there is an intermediate level in biochemical mechanisms such as entanglement systems within photosynthetic reaction centers, a kind of quantum machinery within cells, perhaps an energy transfer process capable of transcending membrane barriers that could permeate some macroscopic structures to the point of being core to their function. In my own musings, I called these macroscopic entanglement systems "coherence fields". We don't have the technology, experimental designs or models for this yet, but like you said, someone needs to run with the hypotheses.

Maybe physicists can work at the problem from the foundational angle of superposition principles, integrating quantum mechanics with molecular chemistry, and the neuroscientists and psychologists can look for molecular mechanisms and behaviors that harness these superposition principles in the brain, just as magnetoreception was discovered by collaboration between field biologists observing animal behavior and chemists investigating the composition of biologically active substances from a quantum angle, with some commonly held intuition thrown into the mix.

It can't be a coincidence that the brain is so rich in apparent qualia and produces an uncommon kind of electrification as standing waves. A close linkage must exist between quantum fields like the electrical field of the brain and qualitative experience.

↪Daemon
What progress? The theories about how matter produces consciousness are highly speculative, all over the map, and there's nothing close to a consensus around any of them — RogueAI

I found this a very interesting read:

https://www.academia.edu/42985813/The_Idea_of_the_Brain_A_History_By_Matthew_Cobb

Our latest theories allow us to create artificial memories in the mind of a mouse. Very recently the theories about memory were highly speculative and all over the map, and now we understand the mechanism (for one kind of memory). I think new knowledge like this will lead to the discovery of the mechanisms underlying conscious experience.

I have a family member working in this field and I'm hoping that he will be the one to make the breakthrough. I reckon people his age can expect to live to at least 120 and to be active at least into their 80s. So I'm confident that within another 40 or so years I can give you an answer.

I found this a very interesting read:

https://www.academia.edu/42985813/The_Idea_of_the_Brain_A_History_By_Matthew_Cobb

Our latest theories allow us to create artificial memories in the mind of a mouse. Very recently the theories about memory were highly speculative and all over the map, and now we understand the mechanism (for one kind of memory). I think new knowledge like this will lead to the discovery of the mechanisms underlying conscious experience.

I have a family member working in this field and I'm hoping that he will be the one to make the breakthrough. I reckon people his age can expect to live to at least 120 and to be active at least into their 80s. So I'm confident that within another 40 or so years I can give you an answer.

Solving the memory problem is an "easy" problem, because the answer is simply some brain mechanism. Solving the question: why does a working brain produce the sensation of stubbing a toe, but when I put it in the blender and add some electricity, I don't get anything? So there are three questions that need to be answered: what is it about a particular configuration of atoms and forces that gives rise to conscious experience? How does a particular configuration of atoms and forces give rise to conscious experience? Why are we conscious, what purpose does it serve?

Solving the memory problem won't get you anywhere closer to the answer to those three questions. And if you think there will be an answer in 40 years, you would expect there to be some progress in the short term. I see progress on solving mechanical issues, but I don't see any progress in solving any Hard Problems.