Yep.

The proceeding posts, amusing as they are, did not address the issue.

Sure, there is a difference between being in pain and pretending to be in pain. No one has denied that.

That's good coffee.

I use a pulverised coffee imported from the middle east. Almost equal amounts of coffee and sugar, bring it to the boil in a pan, pour it immediately into cup. Allow to cool. There is a bitterness that rolls around one's mouth that is quite delightful; along with the rush of sugar and caffeine. It's not smooth.

And no qualia were used.

So, I'm asking any of the proponents of Qualia...

What meets these standards? Better yet what could? — creativesoul

My question would rather be: who gives a flying rat’s ass, and why? If Dennett prefers to use another term than qualia, who is stopping him? Why does he care so much for the words other people use?

Pfft. You don't have to be here, yet you are. If Olivier prefers to use a term, who is to stop him? So that argument looks to be a bit disingenuous.

It's interesting to me because of the way it fits with the Investigations. I am enjoying delineating and iterating the beetle and private language - putting them to the test, as it were.

Exactly what qualia are is the topic here. IS the argument just angry dolphins?

But further, I've cited several examples of very poor philosophical theories that use qualia. Qualia are misleading.

I've cited several examples of very poor philosophical theories that use qualia. Qualia are misleading. — Banno

Well then, drop qualia and use another concept to try to say what you want to say...

When I'm not on a thread that is about qualia, that's exactly what I do.

Indeed, one of the arguments that has been used in this thread is exactly that; to take examples of the use of "qualia" and translate them into example without that term, hence showing that the term is not needed.

You might try the opposite; give us an example in which we cannot do without the notion of qualia, and you may well carry the argument.

I think the concept is useful, as it allows for an understanding of how we can recognize tastes, smells, colours and voices, by assuming the existence in the human mind of somewhat stable, memorizable and comparable elements in the form of ‘patterns’ or ‘qualities’.

To the extent that the concept is treacherous, it may be in giving:

1. a false impression of permanence, when qualia can evolve through life;
2. a false sense of absoluteness, while it would intuitively seem to me that qualia are always relative to a context and to other qualia;
3. a false idea of an unbreakable atom, while qualia are always aggregates and hence I never use the singular ‘quale’ - qualia is to me always plural like data; there’s no such thing as one datum or one quale;
4. an illusion of objective reality, when qualia are obviously symbolic, they code for something else, eg for physical variables such as wavelengths of light or for chemical composition of food.

From this POV, qualia are to perception what concepts are to articulated language: infinitely adaptative and breakable and recomposable elements of a language that tries to describe the world. Their flexibility is a bit bewildering at first but it’s an asset, and we can still memorize them, recognize them, and use them to think. Or to perceive, in the case of qualia.

Yes, I do consider it as a possibility. Do you consider it a possibility that there could be differences in our colour vision (yours and mine), however slight? — Luke

Yes. And such differences would be potentially discoverable as we've seen with color-blindness, etc.

But, again, if how the colour of the apple appears to a normally-sighted person was public (and not private), then we shouldn't need to ask them in order to find out. — Luke

So color-blindness implies a kind of privacy in practice - they can't make the color distinctions that normally-sighted people can. But that is a practical problem, not a philosophical problem.

The philosophical problem (which leads to the hard problem) is the Cartesian Theater and the radical privacy it entails. That is, that everyone's experiences are intrinsically private including the experiences of normally-sighted people.

Whereas ordinary perception starts with the ordinary distinctions that normally-sighted people make in normal conditions (e.g., between red and green apples). That's the paradigm context - the norm - which grounds color language.

When those physical conditions change - when the context is not normal in the relevant respect - then those ordinary distinctions may no longer be obvious. So there is a need to qualify one's statements in those contexts. Terms such as "seems", "appears" and "looks" have that role. For example, a red apple looks green when I wear filtered glasses. The condition that is different here is that I'm wearing filtered glasses.

The physical conditions for color-blindness are also outside the paradigmatic norm. As with the filtered-glasses example, those conditions can potentially be identified, investigated and explained (and, ultimately, changed in the cases where a person's vision is restored through surgery or technology).

Your reference to "how the colour...appears to a...person" is all that I mean by qualia, so why do you get to avoid "the Cartesian theatre model of perception" but I don't? — Luke

Because you seem to be invoking privacy even between normally-sighted people. That would be true if there were an intermediary (phenomenal) layer between the person and the world that they are perceiving. That intermediary layer is what I'm rejecting.

Now a color-blind person's experience is different to a normal-sighted person. But there is no intermediary layer for them either. Their options are to develop their own color terms or, as actually happens, use the color terms that derive from normal-sighted people's experience.

So how does this model deal with disagreements about what is perceived? Via norms that function much like the standard meter length bar that used to be held in Paris. If you want to check whether the apple is red, find a normally-sighted person and ask them.
— Andrew M

Like that blue/gold dress? — Marchesk

The dress itself was confirmed as a royal blue "Lace Bodycon Dress" from the retailer Roman Originals, which was actually black and blue in colour; — Real colours of dress confirmed - Wikipedia

Because you're describing your perceptions and experiences as private and inaccessible to others. That's the Cartesian theater model of perception.
— Andrew M

That our perceptions and experiences are private and inaccessible to others is a fact, which empiricists should respect I think. I cannot read your mind and you cannot read mine. René Descartes did not invent this fact. — Olivier5

It seems the dress retailers are not familiar with the Cartesian "facts".

Sure, there is a difference between being in pain and pretending to be in pain. No one has denied that. — Banno

And what is the difference exactly? In both cases the outward action is identical. Given that there is no way to tell whether or not someone is in pain or only pretending to be in pain, what exactly is this difference?

The way I see it is: Things produce experiences which we use words to describe. So if I trip and smash my face into the concrete that would produce experience X. If I stub my toe that would be experience Y. We categorize both Y and X as “pain”. We could come up with more detailed words, such as how German has dozens of words that can only be translated to “Angry” in English, but there seems to be no practical need to describe our experiences in more detail in this case. Trying to remove the middle step (the experience of Y or X) makes it so that there should be no difference between someone pretending to be in pain and someone in pain (assuming we cannot test for pain).

However the problem is this is a self imposed limit that doesn’t need to be there. I can be in pain. I can also pretend to be in pain. There is a very distinct difference in my experience in both cases. Even if this difference was not testable for in a lab, I see no reason we shouldn’t be able to express it since we can clearly imagine the difference.

Again, think back to the speech altering device + light altering glasses example, now imagine we removed the speech altering device and now I’m just straight up lying and saying the inverse color each time. Am I still seeing a red apple? I can see a red apple and then describe it as “red”. I can see a blue apple then lie about it and describe it as “red”. There is a very clear difference in my experience there even if my outward behavior is the same. I see no reason why we shouldn’t be able to express this difference.

Additionally, how do you talk about imagination without talking about Qualia? If there was no X and Y, no “middle man” then what exactly is imagination?

It seems the dress retailers are not familiar with the Cartesian "facts". — Andrew M

When we ask “is this dress blue and black or gold and white” we ask what experience you are having. It is a fact that some people saw a white and gold dress, even though the dress was blue and black. It is furthermore a fact that you cannot tell if someone is actually seeing gold and white or only lying about it. That’s what it means that you can’t “read minds”.

That would be true if there were an intermediary (phenomenal) layer between the person and the world that they are perceiving. That intermediary layer is what I'm rejecting.

Now a color-blind person's experience... — Andrew M

I don’t understand how there can be no intermediary layer, but there can be an experience. Isn’t the experience the intermediary layer? Or else what does “experience” mean.

Also what is imagination without the intermediary phenomenological layer?

And what is the difference exactly? — khaled

Well, in the one case, the person is in pain; whereas, and in contradistinction, in the other, they are not.

However the problem is this is a self imposed limit that doesn’t need to be there. I can be in pain. I can also pretend to be in pain. There is a very distinct difference in my experience in both cases. Even if this difference was not testable for in a lab, I see no reason we shouldn’t be able to express it since we can clearly imagine the difference. — khaled

Yes; indeed. As we did, with the English sentence "In one case the person is in pain; in the other, they are not". No mention of qualia here.

What you have said had no traction.

...how do you talk about imagination without talking about Qualia? If there was no X and Y, no “middle man” then what exactly is imagination? — khaled

So you would now extend qualia to imaginings as well as experiences.

Fine. Cheers.

Well, in the one case, the person is in pain; whereas, and in contradistinction, in the other, they are not. — Banno

Correct. Now what’s the difference? Assume I do not understand what the word “pain” means. What does it mean to be in pain vs to not be in pain in the absence of a scientific method of telling the difference? You insist that there is a difference so what is it?

You keep saying “no mention of qualia” but as my first reply to you said: “red” “pain” “bitter” are all referring to Qualia.

Also please answer this:

Again, think back to the speech altering device + light altering glasses example, now imagine we removed the speech altering device and now I’m just straight up lying and saying the inverse color each time. Am I still seeing a red apple? — khaled

Correct. Now what’s the difference? Assume I do not understand what the word “pain” means. What does it mean to be in pain vs to not be in pain in the absence of a scientific method of telling the difference? You insist that there is a difference so what is it? — khaled

...and you think "Pain is a quale" answers this?

Answer your own question; what is added to the understanding of pain by introducing qualia?

Answer your own question; what is added to the understanding of pain by introducing qualia? — Banno

The middle man. The X and Y. That’s what Qualia is. And introducing it is what allows people to first understand words such as “red” “bitter” and “pain”. If you want to explain what pain is to someone you say something like “the experience that occurs when you stub your toe”. That satisfies as an explanation because there is a specific experience X that occurs every time you stub your toe. Without Qualia, without there being some middle man (an experience) that occurs each time you stub your toe, you would never be able to explain to children what “red” or “pain” or “bitter” means. The word would simply have no referent. What is added by Qualia is an actual referent.

Your turn. Without having this middle man, how do you explain to someone what “pain” is if they don’t understand what the word means. In such a way so as to make a distinction between actually being in pain and only pretending to be in pain that does not rely on a scientific explanation.

Also, again, please answer this:

Again, think back to the speech altering device + light altering glasses example, now imagine we removed the speech altering device and now I’m just straight up lying and saying the inverse color each time. Am I still seeing a red apple? — khaled

The middle man. The X and Y. That’s what Qualia is. And introducing it is what allows people to first understand words such as “red” “bitter” and “pain”. If you want to explain what pain is to someone you say something like “the experience that occurs when you stub your toe”. That satisfies as an explanation because there is a specific experience X that occurs every time you stub your toe. Without Qualia, without there being some middle man (an experience) that occurs each time you stub your toe, you would never be able to explain to children what “red” or “pain” or “bitter” means. The word would simply have no referent. What is added by Qualia is an actual referent. — khaled

My bolding.

Notice that the explanation bit makes no use of qualia, only of pain.

Adding "qualia" into the explanation achieves nothing.

Which was to be shown.

@khaled
And yes, I know you will find that answer frustrating; but that's it...

Did you read The Mark of Zombie?

Adding "qualia" into the explanation achieves nothing. — Banno

The point is adding that middle man there. Call it whatever you want. So in the color altering the device + speech altering device example, the person in question is seeing a blue apple despite claiming that they are seeing a red apple.

Without the middle man the explanation would make no sense. “The experience that arises when....” is a satisfactory explanation only if an experience actually arises. We refer to these experiences in general as “Qualia”. But you can just call them experiences if you want.

For instance my explanation would be unsatisfactory to Isaac, because he doesn’t believe (or I suspect just refuses to admit the reality of) that middle man. He would claim “Again, you don’t experience pain, there is no point in your brain that experiences pain....”. By adding the middle man inverted vision makes sense, even if it is untestable. I’m curious how Isaac would explain what “pain” means to a child without referring to any experiences.

Did you read The Mark of Zombie? — Banno

Yes. But that article relies on the assumption that you can make identical humans that are not conscious. Which is something I never claimed. And indeed sounds ridiculous.

Cheers. It's been interesting.

Ok sure but you still haven’t explained some of the things you said.

Like how even if the light entering your eye has the wavelength which is typically associated with blue, if a device overwrites your speech and changes “blue” to “red” that that somehow means you’re seeing a red apple. And you haven’t answered whether or not removing the speech altering device, and instead lying about the results by choice means you’re seeing a red or blue apple. How about if the glasses were not even glasses but were just blocks of wood blocking my vision and I just said “I’m seeing a red apple” randomly and happened to be correct, am I still seeing a red apple?

Because your answer implies that “red” does not refer to any sort of middle man or experience produced by the wavelength entering your eye. In which case, again, what does it refer to?

SO far as I can see, this was addressed at length by @creativesoul, @Andrew M and @Isaac and I; I see no point in going over it again. Cutting it short, "red" refers to red things, not red experiences or qualia or anything else. The referent of "red" is the extension of "red".

I see no point in going over it again. Cutting it short, "red" refers to red things, not red experiences or qualia or anything else. The referent of "red" is the extension of "red". — Banno

The point is that I still don’t think it makes any sense. And I don’t see where they addressed the point. I’ll go scouring later but a link or a few quotes would be appreciated

That our perceptions and experiences are private and inaccessible to others is a fact, which empiricists should respect I think. I cannot read your mind and you cannot read mine. René Descartes did not invent this fact.
— Olivier5

It seems the dress retailers are not familiar with the Cartesian "facts". — Andrew M

It seems you are not particularly familiar with facts either....

The point is that I still don’t think it makes any sense. — khaled

Respectfully, I can see it makes no sense to you; but that's not my problem. At this stage, I don't see a point in continuing.

Cheers.

Fair enough.

Dennett was trying to attack the idea of qualia as ineffable, private and directly apprehensible in consciousness. Yet all he achieves with his intuition pumping is to show that qualia are ineffable, subjective and private, but also objective, scientific phenomena. The scientists who objectively and verifiably invert poor Chase’s taste buds in IP #8, the pill that changes Dennett’s experience of cauliflower in IP #11, and the inverted spectacles of IP #12 affirm the objective existence of qualia, since they imply that taste and visual qualia can be objectively manipulated by science.

Why did he fail?

For one, he is attempting the impossible: concepts are always ambiguous so they cannot be ‘nailed’ like he is trying to do.

For two, deconstructing a concept is only useful if you can propose an alternative, which he doesn’t, and therefore he cannot show a better way to speak about subjective apprehension of qualities.

For three, he is attacking the wrong aspects of the concept. There was something useful to be said about qualia being a risky concept to use, but you won’t find it in Quining Qualia. The correct and useful critique of the concept ‘qualia’ is related to them not being atomistic, permanent, absolute and objective. This is perhaps why some materialists have trouble understanding them.

Yet all he achieves with his intuition pumping is to show that qualia are ineffable, subjective and private, but also objective, scientific phenomena. — Olivier5

They are subjective and objective?

They are subjective and objective? — Banno

Correct, like a lot of other things. Words for instance.

Well, I suppose that's one way to deal with the confusion of the subject/object distinction.

As you must be aware of, one can objectify a subject without difficulty...

The terms rarely help to clarify things. Too much baggage.