No it's the same old why. Just this time it's harder to answer. Because we cannot gather data about something private. — khaled
That's not what I'm saying. I said that things seem to me a way. That is a fact. You keep saying things like "there is no phenomenological layer" or "you do not see red" but those are false. I do, in fact, have an experience. There is, in fact, a phenomenological layer. Me knowing how my brain works does not remove the phenomenological layer. — khaled
I know when the stimuli is removed, the experience is removed. — khaled
I therefore conclude that the brain processing of stimuli is causing the experience. Where is the issue with this line of logic? — khaled
Ok so my experience is largely shaped by my language and culture. First off, no one is disagreeing (at least I'm not). Secondly, how does this undermine the claim that there is a phenomenological layer? It doesn't. — khaled
I have long believed that culture and language influence experience. For instance, there's nothing in the visual information I get from standing in front of a tree that tells me it's a tree. It's all just shapes and colors. The tree is an idea.
So yeah, I see ideas. I think we all do. This doesn't conflict with the idea of qualia, though.
If your view does, how so? — frank
The way the world seems is not a theory, is it? To try and put it another way, the biological machinery produces some end-product of consciousness, and that end-product is not theoretical, is it? It's a real end-product. — Luke
Phenomenology is a philosophical position that aims to explain conscious experience. It is an explanation. — creativesoul
I mean, I certainly can — creativesoul
By the way, you're committing an equivocation fallacy with the word qualia. — creativesoul
"Phenomenology is the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view" — khaled
Claiming to have "an experience of redness" puts 'redness' as the cause of your experience. — Isaac
Now contract the timescale. Even in the milliseconds between the conscious awareness of some state and the formation of a report of that state (especially a linguistic one), that report has already become inaccurate. — Isaac
Even if we put it later it's problematic. We could get around the first problem by positing hidden state> model>qualia (of model). Here we run into the problem I outline to Khaled above (the timescale issue). — Isaac
Experiences are caused by brains. — Isaac
Again, no-one's denying that we have something we could call experiences. — Isaac
what they are experiences of — Isaac
how private they are — Isaac
the degree to which they're in flux — Isaac
To claim that phenomenology is the 'study' of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point of view, rather than merely the report of them you'd need to be able to learn something new from it. But if you can't possibly be wrong about what the structures of consciousness are from this perspective (they are exactly how they seem to you to be), then how is it a 'study' and not a mere 'report'? — Isaac
The place it purportedly plays in the process of perception. Mostly hidden state>qualia>introspective perception (of qualia). The colours and shapes are processed sub-consciously (ie not available to introspection), so the first part of the process available to introspection is the model 'tree — Isaac
Also, all the issues of privacy, ineffability, availability which have already been discussed are not thus removed. — Isaac
or at lest spooky emergentism. I recently listened to a podcast where a physicist explained why she thought information strongly emerged. But it was fundamental to understanding life: — Marchesk
Concepts like qualia, p-zombies and the hard problem are purely philosophical inventions that derive from Cartesian dualism.
— Andrew M
Is non-reductive physicalism a form if Cartesian dualism? — frank
Skepticism about the existence of qualia derives from several sources. One source is historical. Prior to the seventeenth century, people did not endorse a private conception of mental phenomena. Most philosophers claimed that psychological discourse was expressive of the ways animals like us interact with each other and the environment. So entrenched was this idea in the philosophical culture of the time that Descartes felt compelled to argue for a different, private conception of mental phenomena. Descartes' audience did not believe the existence of qualia was too obvious to require argument, and neither did Descartes. He came to endorse a private conception of mental phenomena not because of its alleged obviousness, but because it played a central role in his broader project. He was concerned with establishing an indubitable foundation for the natural sciences. As a first step, he sought to establish that the contents of his mind were better known than anything else, and argued on behalf of that claim. Historical considerations of this sort raise questions about whether the existence of qualia is really too obvious to require any argument. — Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction, p216-218 - William Jaworski
Another source of qualia skepticism derives from a competing explanation for the alleged obviousness of qualia. It claims that the existence of qualia only seems obvious to exponents of qualia because they have been indoctrinated in post-Cartesian ways of thinking - they have been trained to see mental phenomena through the lens of a post-Cartesian theory. On this skeptical view, our intuitions are theory-laden: what seems obvious to us is shaped in part by the kinds of theories we endorse. If intuitions are theory-laden, this suggests that qualia are not pre-theoretical data that a theory of mind must try to explain; they instead represent a particular kind of theoretical commitment; they are entities postulated by a private conception of mental phenomena. But if the existence of qualia seems obvious to people who endorse a private conception of mental phenomena, this does not automatically imply that a private conception of mental phenomena is true. It seems true to the people who endorse it, but it does not seem true to people who reject it - it would not have seemed true to philosophers prior to the seventeenth century, for instance, or to Descartes' contemporaries. In that case, however, it will not do for exponents of qualia to claim that their ideas are too obvious to require argument. If qualia represent a particular kind of theoretical commitment, then exponents of qualia must argue for their theory, and that means they have to argue that qualia exist. — Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction, p216-218 - William Jaworski
A fourth source of qualia skepticism derives from the failure of a private conception of mental phenomena to cohere with a naturalistic picture of human mental life. This argument stands the epiphenomenalist argument on its head: if Premise (2) of the argument is true [*], say qualia skeptics, if it is true that qualia cannot be explained in physical terms, then there must be something wrong with the very idea of qualia. Nor are physicalists the only ones inclined to argue this way. Emergentists, hylomorphists, and anyone else who demands a naturalistic or scientifically respectable account of human psychological capacities might be skeptical of qualia for the same reason: the alleged disconnect between qualia and physical explanation. — Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction, p216-218 - William Jaworski
The connection between this "internal" experience and the "external" world is consequently mysterious.
— Andrew M
Loosely speaking, 'the connection' is the experience, on my view.
It consists of both internal and external, physical and non physical, subjective and objective. The problem I seem to see is that both sides miss this. Experience is neither objective, nor subjective; neither internal nor external; neither physical nor non physical...
It is both. — creativesoul
Incorrect. I do not know where you get that impression. — khaled
Cool. Has nothing to say about whether or not we have experiences (as usual). — khaled
The timescale issue amounts to "Things are not how you remember them to be or exactly how you describe them to be". This is not an issue of the model. The model is fine, all you have said is that when trying to report this last step (qualia) we give inaccurate reports. I think everyone here already knew that. — khaled
can you imagine a robot that acts identically to a human but doesn't have these "experiences" — khaled
Well you seemed to be denying for the longest time. What with "You don't see colors" and all. — khaled
what they are experiences of — Isaac
I'm not sure what this question means. — khaled
we do not know that the same experiences are caused by everyone's brains. — khaled
I don't know if when I look at a red apple and you look at a red apple we both have the same expereince. — khaled
I know we both call it "red" and it has largely the same relationship in our brains. As in mostly everything I call red you also call red or orange or something around there (assuming neither is colorblind). That does not give evidence that we are experiencing the same thing. — khaled
I think you're interpreting ”qualia" as "sensory data." — frank
A quale is an instance of a type of consciousness. "Instance" connotes an event here. As Luke put it, it's the end product, which is seamless and unified. That is what we mean by "qualia". — frank
Privacy is just related to the idea that people aren't telepathic. Obviously, in a non-woo sense, we are. I'm trying to read your mind now. The technology I'm using is the written word. So here the discussion would pass into the topic of meaning and truth. — frank
describes the suspension of judgment about the the objects of experience so as to develop a detached awareness of the nature of immediate experience.
As Frank points out above, the 'raw' nature of experience is generally straighaway incorporated into 'stories' which attempts to situate it in so-called 'objective' terms. We generally do that instinctively, immediately, without noticing. The point of the phenomenological suspension is to notice that. — Wayfarer
Skepticism about the existence of qualia derives from several sources. One source is historical. Prior to the seventeenth century, people did not endorse a private conception of mental phenomena. Most philosophers claimed that psychological discourse was expressive of the ways animals like us interact with each other and the environmen — Philosophy of Mind: A Comprehensive Introduction, p216-218 - William Jaworski
Then how can we have a 'red' quale? Red is not the end result of any stimuli at all. If qualia are now being reduced to just another word for experience where we mean just the recollection of mental states, then it's a) useless, we already have a word, and b)very confusing because there's already a word 'qualia' which is used to talk about subsets of perception (like 'red'). — Isaac
If instead you want to say "the experience I just had is called 'redness'", then I don't know how you'd ever come to learn the word. — Isaac
The way things seem to you (as such a fact is available to form part of any philosophical investigation) is not an unarguable fact. — Isaac
when trying to report this last step (qualia) we give inaccurate reports. I think everyone here already knew that. — khaled
then no-one can claim to be having an experience of redness with any more authority than I can claim you're not. You are no more accurate a reporter of the way an event actually felt than I am. — Isaac
I really can't see why people are finding it so hard to tell the difference between "we don't have experiences" and "we don't have experiences of colours". — Isaac
'Experience' is no less slippery a term unless pinned down. Equivocation is the weapon of choice for most woo-merchants. — Isaac
Agreed, to a certain level of accuracy. — Isaac
And, as we've just established, you telling me you do has no validity because we've all just agreed that you cannot give an accurate account of you experiences. — Isaac
We were talking about experiences - whole events. You don't experience red. — Isaac
What new information is being learned? — Isaac
I discussed this previously here. Cartesian dualism has no practical application in everyday life or in scientific inquiry. Concepts like qualia, p-zombies and the hard problem are purely philosophical inventions that derive from Cartesian dualism. — Andrew M
How can the structure and dynamics of the brain, in connection with the body and environment, account for the subjective phenomenological properties of consciousness. — anil seth
As to how I learned, I looked at all the situations where people said "red" and found out the common factor in my experience, that is "redness". — khaled
I claimed that that I am experiencing things in the first place is an unarguable fact. — khaled
I want to emphasize that the statement "the world seems like X to me" is not negated by any neurological evidence you can throw at it. The world still seems the way it seems. — khaled
as we decrease the time frame the inaccuracies decrease as well. — khaled
Because you claim at the same time that we have experiences which "we later reach for the word 'red' to describe". People say "we have experiences of colours" as a shorthand for that. — khaled
So if, hypothetically, we could take a screen shot of what I'm seeing and show it to you, how big of a difference do you think can exist? Can you imagine a situation where you remark: "Why is the sky red?" — khaled
What new information is being learned? — Isaac
Which group each belongs to for one. How they're related. — khaled
But one could say the same thing for using words like model for sensation. — Marchesk
I did start a thread a year or so ago where neuroscientists Anil Seth discussed in a podcast his research into consciousness and marking progress on the hard problem. — Marchesk
So not just a few misguided philosophers. — Marchesk
I don't think so. The idea of sensation being filtered through Bayesian models is expounded in great detail in the various papers on the subject. Not everyone agrees that it's a good or even accurate way of modelling cognition, — Isaac
You know Anil has categorically said there's no hard problem of consciousness, right? — Isaac
Yeah, but he doesn't dismiss the problem as just a philosophical misuse of language. — Marchesk
it's a topic for neuroscience to resolve. I'm open to that if it actually explains how colors and pains arise from brain processes. — Marchesk
Actually he does (to an extent). I'm fairly certain he used almost those exact words in a lecture. — Isaac
If you're open to neuroscience explaining these things then whence the resistance? Are there some explanations you find particularly unpalatable? — Isaac
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.