As physical waves, not experiences of color or sound. — Marchesk

There you go again.

There you go again. — bongo fury

Do you think photons are actually colored?

Do you think photons are actually colored? — Marchesk

I think illumination events are actually colored i.e. ordered into hues.

I think illuminations events are actually colored i.e. ordered into hues. — bongo fury

For the entire electromagnetic spectrum? Do these hues correspond exactly to the three cone combinations in human eyes?

For the entire electromagnetic spectrum? — Marchesk

Not sure what you're getting at.

Do these hues correspond exactly to the three cone combinations in our eyes? — Marchesk

Isn't there a whole science about that, and the huge inexactness?

Not sure what you're getting at. — bongo fury

Visible light is part of the EM spectrum. We call it visible because that's what we evolved to see, since it reflects off surfaces. But what makes the visible light special such that its colored, unlike radio and gamma rays? They have the same kinds of properties in terms of frequencies and wavelengths.

Isn't there a whole science about that, and the huge inexactness? — bongo fury

Yes, so what makes the colors real?

But what makes the visible light special such that it's colored, unlike radio and gamma rays? — Marchesk

I would need to translate that: what makes human visual orderings of illumination events special such that they are discernible by humans, unlike machine or alien or (dunno) insect (?) orderings of the same events?

Still don't see your point.

Yes, so what makes the colors real? — Marchesk

You lost me.

Are the colors we experience out there in the world as such? Or are they generated by our conscious visual system, often (but not always) in response to stimulation from the eyes when there's illumination?

Are the colors we experience out there in the world as such? Or are they generated by our conscious visual system? — Marchesk

Are our orderings of illumination events out there in the world as such?

Are the ducks in a row?

*Sigh* So yet once again another game of changing the language to avoid the hard problem. Your side is nothing if not persistent.

Connect eyeballs to a brain, or a camera to a computer, and then you have interpretations of images. — Harry Hindu

Computers are metaphors for how the mind works, but the mind is not a computer. It doesn’t process bits of data. Conversely, computers don’t make judgments.

Actually, the hard problem of consciousness is recognised by neuroscience. In a paper called The Neural Binding Problem(s), Jerome S. Feldman addresses the 'problem of the subjective unity of perception':

We will now address the deepest and most interesting variant of the NBP, the phenomenal unity of perception. There are intractable problems in all branches of science; for Neuroscience a major one is the mystery of subjective personal experience. This is one instance of the famous mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996) concerning the relation of our subjective experience (aka qualia) to neural function. Different visual features (color, size, shape, motion, etc.) are computed by largely distinct neural circuits, but we experience an integrated whole. This is closely related to the problem known as the illusion of a stable visual world (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008).

We normally make about three saccades per second and detailed vision is possible only for about 1 degree at the fovea (cf. Figure 1). These facts will be important when we consider the version of the Visual Feature-Binding NBP in next section. There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry. Closely related problems include change- (Simons and Rensink 2005) and inattentional-blindness (Mack 2003), and the subjective unity of perception arising from activity in many separate brain areas (Fries 2009; Engel and Singer 2001).

Traditionally, the NBP concerns instantaneous perception and does not consider integration over saccades. But in both cases the hard problem is explaining why we experience the world the way we do. As is well known, current science has nothing to say about subjective (phenomenal) experience and this discrepancy between science and experience is also called the “explanatory gap” and “the hard problem” (Chalmers 1996). There is continuing effort to elucidate the neural correlates of conscious experience; these often invoke some version of temporal synchrony as discussed above.

There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.

But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the NBP really is a scientific mystery at this time. — Feldman

The same can be said about eyeballs. Connect eyeballs to a brain, or a camera to a computer, and then you have interpretations of images. — Harry Hindu

Where is and what is the image that the brain interprets? Does it make another image of the original image? is that the interpretation?

It's just if consciousness can be an illusion, why not the external world? — Marchesk

The Matrix movies illustrate that philosophical quandary : how can we distinguish between the illusion and reality? Maybe that's the job of empirical Science, which is an extension of the role of Philosophy. :smile:

Cypher : "You know, I know this steak doesn't exist. I know that when I put it in my mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain that it is juicy and delicious".

For some reason, it's never broached in the Matrix Trilogy. Neo and the rest of the unplugged just accept that being outside the Matrix is the real world. Now for someone born naturally, that makes sense. But for someone unplugged, what makes them any more confident in the nightmare world they wake up to? If one world was a simulation, how do they know the next one isn't?

The Thirteenth Floor explores that a little bit better, but the movie eXistenZ ends on that note of doubt.



So does Inception, for that matter.

Worlds of difference. A camera image is either chemical emulsion if it's old-fashioned film, or patterns of pixels if it's digital photography. It's arguably not even 'an image' until it's recognised by an observer; cameras don't recognise images. An image is not an image to a camera, because no camera is capable of intentional action or interpretation.

Let me ask you a counter question: do you know what an 'ontological distinction' is? Do you know why it might be argued that there is an ontological distinction to be made between devices (which are constructed by humans) and sentient beings? — Wayfarer

I forgot to mention this to you but when I talk of images, whether in a camera or the mind, I refer to the finished product - the final output as it were. The physical processes/chemical reactions on an image sensor/film and the purported neural processes of vision, both, eventually become images that, if the same object is being photographed or looked at, are indistinguishable from each other. Kindly note the fact that the alleged neural processes that are involved in seeing aren't things we are/can be aware of to my knowledge - they take place outside our consciousness - and so the difference you're talking about - that the processes in photography and that of the eye are not the same - are irrelevant insofar as consciousness is concerned.

As an illustrative analogy, consider how we buy the things we need for our home - a microwave, TV, bulbs, etc. - these items are bought/consumed only after the manufacturing process is complete. There's an entire chain of processing that have to be completed before these items hit the shelves - mining the raw materials, transporting them to the manufacturing centers, treating them chemically/physically, putting them on an assembly line, etc. - but, for better or worse, we're not involved in them. We only see/handle the end product of all these processes.

The same with the mind. There maybe many neurochemical steps that go into vision, hearing, taste, etc. but we're not, as far as I can tell, aware of them. All we're aware of is, as I've been saying, the finished product.

The problem for those who feel that there's such a thing as consciousness is that the image in a camera is identical to the image in our eyes and by extension every kind of perception (states of awareness) - whether of the external world of oneself - must be identical to one that can be replicated in a non-human sense as for example in an instrument or, if we're clever enough, in a robot. This being the case, to see a difference between human awareness and non-human awareness can only be an illusory difference for the simple reason that they're identical. This illusory difference is what we've labeled as consciousness. Consciousness is an illusion.

Again, what image in your eye? As I mentioned upthread, there is lots of reason to doubt that a single image mapped to the world exists anywhere except on the retina*.
A hell of a lot of processing of image components happens within the neurons of the eye, long before it gets to the brain, and those pieces appear to be separately processed on different sections of the visual cortex. Meanwhile, a huge number of neurons feed back to the eye, because what we see is also in large part a function of what our prediction and categorization engines are expecting to see based on the past data.

* And even in the case of the surface of the retina, the cells do not fire synchronously, so even there there is no image corresponding to a single time slice of reality. — Mijin

Please read my reply to Wayfarer

I always know that someone is about to handwave consciousness, because they focus on awareness.
Awareness is the low-hanging fruit. A good description of awareness, that makes testable predictions, would indeed be incredibly useful, but it would be a foundational step in understanding consciousness.

Instead the tendency with people like Dennett is to throw out some explanation for awareness that they find plausible, and imply that solves the much harder problems of consciousness because reasons. — Mijin

Awareness is the cornerstone of consciousness. If it weren't then there would be no difference between you and a stone - again the same difficulty of seeing a difference (consciousness) that, as per your own claim, isn't there rears its ugly head.

I forgot to mention this to you but when I talk of images, whether in a camera or the mind, I refer to the finished product - the final output as it were. — TheMadFool

You do know this is a philosophy forum, right? Not a home electronics or photography forum, right?

Because the question here is not about what photographic images are or how cameras work. You keep saying that 'an image in a camera is identical to an image in a mind.' Now there's a philosophical issue with that assertion, that really has nothing to do with the workings of cameras. But I won't try to explain it further at this point, because I don't think it will be understood.

Please read my reply to Wayfarer — TheMadFool

Your response is just to again assert your claim:

The physical processes/chemical reactions on an image sensor/film and the purported neural processes of vision, both, eventually become images that, if the same object is being photographed or looked at, are indistinguishable from each other. — TheMadFool

This claim is false, and I'm trying to explain to you, repeatedly, why.

Consider for example that the eye only has a narrow range of high-resolution vision within the fovea. However, there is a two-way communication between eye and brain that allows us both to interpret the low-resolution peripheral data in a specific way, while at the same time directing the post-processing in the eye in the best way to get a meaningful categorization of objects, edges etc.

There is likely no single merged image, but if there were, it wouldn't look like a camera image. It would be some kind of metadata image.

Awareness is the cornerstone of consciousness. If it weren't then there would be no difference between you and a stone - again the same difficulty of seeing a difference (consciousness) that, as per your own claim, isn't there rears its ugly head. — TheMadFool

I'm aware of the importance of awareness. I myself called it foundational.
The point is, if you had a good explanation of awareness (and I don't think you have), you would still have all the work of explaining the hard problem of consciousness still to do. And there would still be no justification for the thread claim of consciousness being an "illusion".

You do know this is a philosophy forum, right? Not a home electronics or photography forum, right?

Because the question here is not about what photographic images are or how cameras work. You keep saying that 'an image in a camera is identical to an image in a mind.' Now there's a philosophical issue with that assertion, that really has nothing to do with the workings of cameras. But I won't try to explain it further at this point, because I don't think it will be understood. — Wayfarer

It is, right? If it weren't the very purpose of cameras becomes moot. Why have them at all if they aren't or can't be faithful to the eyes? Since the image in a camera and one in our eye are identical to see a difference between them must mean that difference is illusory.

For the sake of clarity, consider the following argument,

C = image in camera, E = image in the eye

C = E means the image in the camera is identical to the image in the eye

"~" means not or is false that

1. IF consciousness is real THEN (C is not consciousness AND E is consciousness)

2 If (C is not consciousness AND E is consciousness) THEN ~(C = E)

3. If ~(C = E) THEN cameras, ceteris paribus, don't faithfully reproduce what the eyes see.

4. Cameras, ceteris paribus, do faithfully reproduce what the eyes see

5. ~~(C = E) [from 3, 4 modus tollens]

6. ~(C is not consciousness AND E is consciousness) [from 2, 5 modus tollens]

7. Consciousness isn't real OR Consciousness is an illusion [from 1, 6 modus tollens]

This claim is false — Mijin

Read above.

perpetuating the myth of an internal world. — bongo fury

"Conscious" is what we call certain kinds of thinking, which are real brain shivers. Those kinds of thinking cause us to indulge fictions about an internal world, which are fictional. — bongo fury

If there is no internal world, why don’t you see what other people think? They don’t really think? You’re a solipsist?

If there is no internal world, why don’t you see what other people think? They don’t really think? You’re a solipsist? — leo

Reminds me of the aliens in Liu Cixin's Three Body Problem trilogy. Their thoughts are always visible to one another as patterns of lights which was the result of their neural activity. They communicate directly in that sense. Which means they can only engage in primitive forms of deception when separated by enough distance. When they figure out how deceptive humans can be, they become afraid of us.

C = image in camera, E = image in the eye — TheMadFool

C is misleading at best. There is no image per se, only data which may be meaningful for a human running a program that can parse a particular file format.

E doesn't point unambiguously to any single thing. As I've explained about three times already and you continue to ignore.

1. IF consciousness is real THEN (C is not consciousness AND E is consciousness) — TheMadFool

The notion of labelling representations or data as themselves "consciousness" seems absolutely absurd and of course I don't agree with the logical inference. So you argument falls immediately IMO.

Please do not simply post your assertions yet again, without actually trying to address what I am telling you about neurocognition.

C is misleading at best. — Mijin

First, look at your phone's or computer's screen. Then, if you're on a phone, take a screenshot or if you're on a computer, use the PrtScrn button. Is there any difference between what you saw and the screenshot and the image you get with the PrtScrn button? No! I rest my case.

First, look at your phone's or computer's screen. Then, if you're on a phone, take a screenshot or if you're on a computer, use the PrtScrn button. Is there any difference between what you saw and the screenshot and the image you get with the PrtScrn button? No! I rest my case. — TheMadFool

Oh brilliant, just throwing out another argument and ignoring the points being put to you, yet again.

The first answer to your rhetorical question is of course, yes, there is a difference because of the differences between my eyes and the camera's sensor, and my brain and the internals of the computer or camera.
Take the famous example of a gorilla walking across a basketball court that volunteers don't notice because they were given a task of counting the number of times the basketball was passed.
Did the volunteers see the gorilla?

---------------

But I think perhaps what your question means, is that if you were to ask me whether the screengrab matches what I saw, would I answer that they are the same?
If so, that's a question about memory. While it's true that I would say the screengrab is the same as my recollection, there are numerous ways we could nefariously change the screengrab and I would still identify it as the same. Even an image I'd seen a thousand times.
If you do figure out how this relates to "images" in the brain (including with things like the gorilla example), and can show your working, I would really love to see that. And you'd probably get the Nobel for Phys or Med.

Computers are metaphors for how the mind works, but the mind is not a computer. It doesn’t process bits of data. Conversely, computers don’t make judgments. — Wayfarer

This is circular. Why is the computer a metaphor for the mind, and not a chair? It seems to me that it is because computers do make judgements (IF-THEN-ELSE), just like we do. Brains process bits of data. The bits are the distinct "boxes" that we put everything in. We think in bits of sensory data - shapes, colors, sounds, feelings, etc - the smallest, most fundamental forms that we can think in.

Actually, the hard problem of consciousness is recognised by neuroscience. In a paper called The Neural Binding Problem(s), Jerome S. Feldman addresses the 'problem of the subjective unity of perception': — Wayfarer

Sure, because the problem is dividing the world into physical and mental parts, and then explaining how the two interact. The solution is to not divide the world into two separate parts - monism.

The solution is to not divide the world into two separate parts - monism. — Harry Hindu

But then you're stuck with explaining everything from that monism. And some things don't fit quite so well. Take information before the evolution of life. What does it mean for a bunch of rocks to be information? Information to whom?

Computers are metaphors for how the mind works, but the mind is not a computer. — Wayfarer

Is the brain a metaphor for how the mind works? Is the computer a metaphor for how the brain works, or how the mind works? What is the relationship between brain and mind?

But then you're stuck with explaining everything from that monism. And some things don't fit quite so well. Take information before the evolution of life. What does it mean for a bunch of rocks to be information? Information to whom? — Marchesk

As I have said numerous times: Information is the relationship between cause and effect. A bunch of rocks is the effect of what caused the bunch of rocks - a landside, earthquake, etc., therefore a whom is not a necessary part for information to exist - only causal relationships are necessary.

Your second question is asking what information is useful, and for what purpose, so you are asking questions about usefulness and purpose, not information. Do you agree that some information is useful and some is not? It's not that the information doesn't exist. It's a judgement of which information is useful or not for some goal in the mind.

Is the computer a metaphor for how the brain works, or how the mind works? — Harry Hindu

It is often used that way.

What is the relationship between brain and mind? — Harry Hindu

One is three pounds of flesh, and the other has something to do with the resulting subjectivity, intelligence, intentionality and behavior of a person or animal.

Is the computer a metaphor for how the brain works, or how the mind works?
— Harry Hindu

It is often used that way. — Marchesk

What is often used that way? It was a question. Read it again.

What is the relationship between brain and mind?
— Harry Hindu

One's three pounds of flesh, and the other has something to do with the resulting subjectivity, intelligence, intentionality and behavior. — Marchesk

This doesn't tell us anything about the relationship between mind and brain. All you are doing is just re-explaining the differences. How do these different things relate to the point where they can be metaphors for each other? IS the brain a metaphor for the mind?