Internal, external, that which consists of both. Conscious experience being of the third; part physical, part non physical; part internal, part external, part neither.
— creativesoul

Those predicates are inapplicable if Cartesian dualism is rejected. — Andrew M

I'm not at all understanding what reason there is for any one of us to believe that the terms "internal", "external", "physical", "non-physical" have no use unless they are being used within a Cartesian influenced framework, particularly mind/body dualism???

Yeah, I'm not following that at all, Andrew.

Everything I've said supports the notion of embodied consciousness, and nothing I've said supports any form of disembodied consciousness.

Nothing meaningful is added by characterizing those experiences with physical/non-physical, or internal/external qualifiers.

Oh, but I do beg to differ...

Perception involves the minimisation of prediction error simultaneously across many levels of processing within the brain’s sensory systems, by continuously updating the brain’s predictions. In this view, which is often called ‘predictive coding’ or ‘predictive processing’, perception is a controlled hallucination, in which the brain’s hypotheses are continually reined in by sensory signals arriving from the world and the body. ‘A fantasy that coincides with reality,’ as the psychologist Chris Frith eloquently put it in Making Up the Mind (2007)
— https://aeon.co/essays/the-hard-problem-of-consciousness-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-one

Hoo-boy! That will drive some of direct realists on here battty. — Marchesk

:smile: And is sanity a controlled form of battiness? Slogans and metaphors are all good fun and might be useful to illustrate a point. But to actually be coherent, a model needs to be defined without equivocation or circularity. Otherwise it's Cartesian theaters all the way down.

In this case, one might ask how "controlled" is defined. That's what is doing all the work here.

Don't be a dick. You won't like it.

You do realize intentionality is separate debate in philosophy of mind?

What does that have to do with anything I've written here?

If anyone wants to read a paper on how Dennett treats the folk psychology categories ("pain", "spicy" etc) as a useful models without giving them the same strength of ontological commitment he gives to neurons, electrons etc, his essay Real Patterns seems illuminative.

I'm not at all understanding what reason there is for any one of us to believe that the terms "internal", "external", "physical", "non-physical" have no use unless they are being used within a Cartesian influenced framework.

Yeah, I'm not following that at all, Andrew. — creativesoul

Well, internal and external are useful when talking about a house (or a theater). They can refer to the internal and external walls of the house, for example. But I'm not seeing their applicability when talking about experience. Their use in that context instead implies a Cartesian theater model.

If you disagree, perhaps you could give a non-Cartesian example.

What does that have to do with anything I've written here? — creativesoul

Attributing meaning sounds like something to do with "the quality of mental states (e.g., thoughts, beliefs, desires, hopes) that consists in their being directed toward some object or state of affairs.".

Now obviously you think this is a conscious activity. But it sounds like a different topic than the sensations that make up consciousness. If you agree there are any.

So you have your own definition for consciousness. — Marchesk

Well, you could say that. We've spent the last two thousand years failing to come to acceptable terms with our minds and how they work. Why not offer a much better 'definition', one that is capable of taking proper account of conscious experience that does not succumb to the historical pitfalls and problems that all of the other ones have?

:smirk:

What's the problem with it? I'm fairly certain that you do not understand it. I could be wrong, but there are not too many folks around here that seem to be capable of unpacking that. That's not a problem with the definition, for it takes into proper account what all conscious experience consists of. Rather, it shows the problem of academia having some very important aspects of the human 'mind' wrong to begin with. The beauty lies in killing several birds with one stone.

Well, internal and external are useful when talking about a house (or a theater). They can refer to the internal and external walls of the house, for example. But I'm not seeing their applicability when talking about experience. Their use in that context instead implies a Cartesian theater model.

If you disagree, perhaps you could give a non-Cartesian example. — Andrew M

I've offered nothing but. I'd be more than happy to unpack something I've already said should it seem like it implies such a linguistic framework. I can assure you that I reject mind/body dualism.

Do not be misled by my stage name.

Descartes, had he better understanding of all human thought and belief, would have said...

I think about my own thoughts and/or beliefs as well as others', therefore, I am, and he would have been right.

So, I take it that you've no idea what it takes to attribute meaning? Thought and belief are not mental states on my view, by the way.

Are you ready to listen yet?

Should this be its own thread? Or do you we just continue since we left Dennett's quning in the dust long ago?

That sounds like a worthy project. So consciousness is an overloaded word with different meanings. That's probably why qualia was used to denote sensations. Dennett wants to quine some of the proported properties of those sensations, undermining any hard problem or explanatory gap. I have my doubts as to his success.

But this thread has broadened to other related matters so ...

Should this be its own thread? Or do you we just continue since we left Dennett's quning in the dust long ago? — Marchesk

Whose thread is it?

Oh!

Nah, we can keep it here. It's relevant.

I've offered nothing but. I'd be more than happy to unpack something I've already said should it seem like it implies such a linguistic framework. I can assure you that I reject mind/body dualism. — creativesoul

You seemed to want to defend the use of internal/external and physical/non-physical qualifiers as meaningful when talking about experiences. If not, all fine and good - we agree. But if you think there is a use for them, can you give a concrete example that doesn't assume Cartesian thinking?

You seemed to want to defend the use of internal/external and physical/non-physical qualifiers as meaningful when talking about experiences. — Andrew M

Defend? Against what? Was there a valid objection to anything I've said somewhere that I missed?

Are you claiming that red cups are not external, or that biological machinery is not internal?

So, I take it that you've no idea what it takes to attribute meaning? — creativesoul

Kantian? I should know better than to argue consciousness or direct/indirect perception with a Kantian, if that's the case. That's a different enough position to make those irrelevant. It's the bloody physicalists and functionalists that need to shouted down.

Thought and belief are not mental states on my view, by the way. — creativesoul

I don't know what you mean here. What are they?

So, I take it that you've no idea what it takes to attribute meaning?
— creativesoul

Kantian? — Marchesk

No. Simple, basic, primitive(if you like) conscious experience kan't be so difficult to understand. Not with today's knowledge.

Thought and belief are not mental states on my view, by the way.
— creativesoul

I don't know what you mean here. What are they? — Marchesk

They are meaningful correlations drawn between different things. They are what all conscious experience consists of. They are the basic elements thereof.

The red cup, the bitterness in one's mouth, and the connection drawn between the cup and the bitterness by the very creature who just tasted Maxwell House coffee from the red cup.

That's exactly what all conscious experience of tasting bitter Maxwell House coffee from a red cup consists of.

hey are meaningful correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

And by attribute meaning, do you mean we project these correlations onto the world? We're conscious of correlations we draw among cats and mats?

See the edit, and it ought answer that first question. In short...

No. I meant what I said.

Yes. We can become conscious of the correlations we draw between cats and mats.

And by attribute meaning... — Marchesk

I mean draw correlations between different things.

I mean draw correlations between different things. — creativesoul

So our conscious experience consists of relations we notice in the world between things like coffee drinking and cats on mats. The tastes and colors are relational properties, then.

I've already answered the question of what all conscious experience consists of. Meaningful correlations drawn between different things. I've accounted for all conscious experience of tasting bitter Maxwell House coffee from a red cup.

Did you notice?

Are you claiming that red cups are not external, or that biological machinery is not internal? — creativesoul

No, and I already gave a similar example here (with internal and external house walls). I'm just trying to make sense of your earlier comments which are still unclear to me:

Internal, external, that which consists of both. Conscious experience being of the third; part physical, part non physical; part internal, part external, part neither. — creativesoul

've already answered the question of what all conscious experience consists of. Meaningful correlations drawn between different things. — creativesoul

But those meaningful correlations might include the coffee being bitter when you drink it and the cat being black on a white mat when you see it over in the corner.

If you disagree, perhaps you could give a non-Cartesian example. — Andrew M

Sideline question: could you give a checklist for a position not to count as Cartesian? Just to be clear, I'm not trying to "gotcha" question you into "lol the term is meaningless", since non-Cartesians are good company, but I'd struggle to write a list.

I have some more questions in that direction:

Does Cartesian = adhering to subject/object and the attendant distinctions (internal/external, mental/physical)?

Would you throw a doctrine like "environmental patterns are represented by mental patterns + mental pattern = neural pattern" in the Cartesian bin because what it's trying to reduce (mental patterns) still adheres to a Cartesian model?

Can you do an "in the body/in the environment" distinction without being a Cartesian?

I'd also add questions about non-perceptual experiences and how those avoid some sort of movie in the head. Dreams being the number one concern, but things like inner dialog sound like a stream of consciousness podcast is running in your skull. Or when a song gets "stuck in your mind".

Are you claiming that red cups are not external, or that biological machinery is not internal? — creativesoul

No... ...I'm just trying to make sense of your earlier comments which are still unclear to me:

Internal, external, that which consists of both. Conscious experience being of the third; part physical, part non physical; part internal, part external, part neither. — Andrew M

Fair enough.

Conscious experience of tasting bitter Maxwell House coffee from a red cup...

So, the red cups are external, the biological machinery is internal, and conscious experience of drinking bitter Maxwell House coffee from red cups consists entirely of correlations drawn between the bitterness(which results from the biological machinery) and the Maxwell House coffee by a creature capable of doing so.

The content of the conscious experience is the content of the correlations... that includes both internal things and external things, however the correlation drawn between those things is neither for it consists of both.

The content of the conscious experience is the content of the correlations... that includes both internal things and external things, however the correlation drawn between those things is neither for it consists of both. — creativesoul

That's not half bad.