Rather than the Wikipedia article, why not read the original. It's not very long. — Wayfarer

I've read it before. Is the summary in Wikipedia incorrect?

Do you believe it is accurate to say, according to the conceptual act theory of emotion (the Barrett paper you linked earlier and I reread) that while there are no neural correlates that match the aggregate state of "anger", there are neural correlates that match conceptualising (summarising inferentially) sufficiently similar neural correlates together with "anger"? — fdrake

Yes, so long as we see 'sufficiently' as culturally mediated. I think interoception features are no different to perception features (which is the motivation for Barrett's collaboration with both Friston and Seth), so your list of four individually underdetermining variables is no less appropriate here than it is with perception. The cultural/linguistic priors were the missing element in the effort to map neural states to phenomenological reports.

Even if the role "anger" plays is as a character in a play, that doesn't make it cease existing, it might exist with a changed interpretation (that it's no longer a natural kind with a devoted and human-wide neural mechanism for it, it's instead a contextualised inferential summary for arousal and valence). Ie, there are angers which "anger" marks as a post-processed, publicly accessible, summary. — fdrake

I think it's difficult to for me to make any ontological commitment here. People use the word. The term plays a role, I'm not so sure the thing itself does.

Though that the two things are distortions of the same base image might break the analogy; it could be that the neural correlates of state classes conceptualised as anger wouldn't "feel the same" if you took one process and put it into another brain - the patterns might differ quite a bit over people — fdrake

This is the key to the issue I have with committing to it. I'm not sure though. Do 'games' exist despite only having a family resemblance, or do we only commit to 'activities' with 'games' being a functional term, a speech act which achieves some task in context but doesn't refer? I'm inclined to think of more and more of language as speech acts rather than sortal terms, but there may be limits to this tendency.

I've read it before. Is the summary in Wikipedia incorrect? — Daemon

No, but with respect, I don't think you're conveying an appreciation of it.

This is the key to the issue I have with committing to it. I'm not sure though. Do 'games' exist despite only having a family resemblance, or do we only commit to 'activities' with 'games' being a functional term, a speech act which achieves some task in context but doesn't refer? I'm inclined to think of more and more of language as speech acts rather than sortal terms, but there may be limits to this tendency. — Isaac

If the issue turns on whether patterns summarising and aggregating other patterns are real, I don't think the dispute is rooted in neuroscience. If the issue is specifically with emotions being natural kinds and whether there are neural correlates for those natural kinds, I think Barrett's critique applies. I believe those are very separate issues; the first is something like a nominalism/realism dispute, the second concerns modelling emotion accurately.

Do you believe it is accurate to say, according to the conceptual act theory of emotion (the Barrett paper you linked earlier and I reread) that while there are no neural correlates that match the aggregate state of "anger", there are neural correlates that match conceptualising (summarising inferentially) sufficiently similar neural correlates together with "anger"? — fdrake

Yes, so long as we see 'sufficiently' as culturally mediated. I think interoception features are no different to perception features (which is the motivation for Barrett's collaboration with both Friston and Seth), so your list of four individually underdetermining variables is no less appropriate here than it is with perception. The cultural/linguistic priors were the missing element in the effort to map neural states to phenomenological reports. — Isaac

This exchange makes me believe you do commit to neural correlates for states that can be said to be like anger or, "angry", so long as those are understood in terms of the conceptual act theory of emotion. If having a neural correlate suffices for the existence of a state, and we grant Barrett's work, that gives us commitments to neural correlates of emotions as situated conceptions. So you are committed to emotions as situated conceptions, no?

A VALID AND USEFUL function, yes, which therefore fails to eliminate anything in it. — Olivier5

What's being eliminated is the notion that the mind is non-physical, not the notion that it is important.

Assuming the physical exhausts the mental, which i don't believe anyone has successfully shown to be the case.

Do 'games' exist despite only having a family resemblance, or do we only commit to 'activities' with 'games' being a functional term, a speech act which achieves some task in context but doesn't refer? — Isaac

What about Dennett's quasi-realism with a focus on patterns underlying emotions or beliefs?

What's being eliminated is the notion that the mind is non-physical, not the notion that it is important. — Janus

By physical, you mean natural, like, not involving a supernatural being or substance? Because one usual, common meaning of ‘physical’ is in opposition to ‘mental’...

Physicalism is a metaphysical assumption which, just as is the case with any metaphysical assumption, cannot be definitively demonstrated. The point is that it is not, as some of its critics want to claim, inconsistent or self-contradictory.

No one has successfully shown that the mental is not exhausted by the physical either. Whether you adhere to one position or the other will depend on what seems the more coherent and plausible to you. Metaphysical dualism is plagued by the so-called interaction problem. Physicalism eliminates that problem.

And there's nothing that says nature must be physical. That's an assumption.

Metaphysical dualism is plagued by the so-called interaction problem. Physicalism eliminates that problem. — Janus

Yes, but it's not the only thing it eliminates. Also, property dualism and panpsychism don't have an interaction problem.

I'm more in favor of a neutral monism. Nature is something other than merely physical (or mathematical, informational, functional) which includes whatever consciousness is. Something which both (or our understanding/mapping of both) emerges from.

That common use of physical seems to be an artefactual assumption. The kind of default folksy dualistic thinking that seems to naturally proceed from linguistic reification of formal identities. Of course that's not the only possibility, and I'm not denying that dualism could be the case; but it seems to be the less consistent, less coherent, less plausible alternative to me. It also seems that it is the position which would be the one to be more likely motivated by wishful thinking.

I understand ‘natural’. It excludes some central decision making center directing the whole thing. Causality stems from things themselves, from their qualities, in a decentralized and local manner. But ‘physical’ to me refers to what is not mental... and yet mental events are evidently natural.

But what do you mean by physical?

Yes, but it's not the only thing it eliminates. Also, property dualism and panpsychism don't have an interaction problem. — Marchesk

What is property dualism, but merely an acknowledgement that we reify our linguistic concepts and think in dualistic categories? If you want to say it's more than that, the next step seems to be metaphysical dualism. Is there an intermediate position?

But what do you mean by physical? — Olivier5

Something is physical if it, or its effects are detectable. We count something as physical if we can form a causal hypothesis as to its detectable effects.

What is property dualism, but merely an acknowledgement that we reify our linguistic concepts and think in dualistic categories. — Janus

You mean perceptual sensations?

If you want to say it's more than that, the next step seems to be metaphysical dualism. — Janus

Property dualism isn't substance dualism. It's just saying that are additional properties beyond the physical. Chalmers has defended a functional property dualism where integrated information has the extra properties of some conscious experience. Which I guess is a form of limited panpsychism.

Something is physical if it, or its effects are detectable. We count something as physical if we can form a causal hypothesis as to its detectable effects. — Janus

That's empirical. A Kantian would agree, while not being a physicalist, for example. So would Berkeley, for that matter.

Physical means mind independent stuff supervening on the fundamental microstructure physicists posit, like particles, forces and fields in a spacetime topology.

Something is physical if it, or its effects are detectable. — Janus

Well, that’s an easy decision then: the effects of the human mind cannot be denied. We’re even screwing up the climate now, thanks to our sciences and technology... we don’t need much philosophy to establish that.

We count something as physical if we can form a causal hypothesis as to its detectable effects.

That’s much too easy. Anyone can form a causal hypothesis as to the detectable effects of God and the Devil, or the great Tao or something. This criteria simply doesn’t work. It doesn’t exclude anything.

Well, that’s an easy decision then: the effects of the human mind cannot be denied. We’re even screwing up the climate now, thanks to our sciences and technology... we don’t need much philosophy to establish that. — Olivier5

I think it's truer to say we are screwing up the climate due to our prior ignorance of the effects of our technology. It is only science itself that tells us how we are screwing up the climate. Wilful ignorance of science is now the problem.

That’s much too easy. Anyone can form a causal hypothesis as to the detectable effects of God and the Devil, or the great Tao or something. This criteria simply doesn’t work. It doesn’t exclude anything. — Olivier5

A causal hypothesis must be testable to count as such. Hypotheses about God, the Devil or the Tao are metaphysical hypotheses and are not testable.

I think it's truer to say we are screwing up the climate due to our prior ignorance of the effects of our technology. It is only science itself that tells us how we are screwing up the climate. Wilful ignorance of science is now the problem. — Janus

Our scientific knowledge of climate change as a theoretical possibility dates from the mid 19th century. In other words, it’s as old as the industrial revolution. Climatology validated the predictions in the 1960’s and 70’s.

A causal hypothesis must be testable to count as such. Hypotheses about God, the Devil or the Tao are metaphysical hypotheses and are not testable.

Okay so by ‘physical’ you mean ‘testable’? Minds are testable all right. But more importantly, minds are what is testing anything. In order to test anything, you first need a mind to do the testing... So your very criteria for physicality presupposes the existence, centrality and effectiveness of minds.

Our scientific knowledge of climate change as a theoretical possibility dates from the mid 19th century. In other words, it’s as old as the industrial revolution. Climatology validated the predictions in the 1960’s and 70’s. — Olivier5

Yes, I know that; so what?

Okay so by ‘physical’ you mean ‘testable’? Minds are testable all right. But more importantly, minds are what is testing anything. In order to test anything, you first need a mind to do the testing... So your very criteria for physicality presupposes the existence, centrality and effectiveness of minds. — Olivier5

I haven't anywhere claimed that minds are not central to all our investigations. We investigate with our minds (and bodies of course). Physicalism, even eliminative physicalism, does not necessarily claim that minds are not central, or that they are illusory, all it necessarily claims is that there is nothing substantively non-physical about minds and their thoughts.

That's empirical. A Kantian would agree, while not being a physicalist, for example. So would Berkeley, for that matter.

Physical means mind independent stuff supervening on the fundamental microstructure physicists posit, like particles, forces and fields in a spacetime topology. — Marchesk

Of course a Kantian or a subjective idealist can agree with the definition. So what? If they purported to reject physicalism then they would necessarily be postulating "something else". What do you think that "something else" could be?

It's also true that the physicalist thinks that physical reality (what we are modeling, but not our models though) is "mind-independent". Don't you? Don't you believe there were dinosaurs prior to humans? Or better, since dinosaurs presumably also were minded, don't you believe there were stars and nebulae prior to the dinosaurs? And that those stars and nebulae were physical?

so what? — Janus

The point is that the human mind is having a huge ‘physical’ impact. Through science and technology for instance.

I haven't anywhere claimed that minds are not central to all our investigations. We investigate with our minds (and bodies of course). Physicalism, even eliminative physicalism, does not necessarily claim that minds are not central, or that they are illusory, all it necessarily claims is that there is nothing substantively non-physical about minds and their thoughts. — Janus

The point is that your criteria for ‘physicality’ is based on the existence of minds able to have phenomenological experiences. So if one applies your criteria, the question ought not to be if minds are physical, since minds decide what is physical... The question should be: beside minds, what else is physical.

So if one applies your criteria, the question ought not to be if minds are physical, since minds decide what is physical... — Olivier5

In other words, if one applies your criteria, minds are evidently physical, since minds decide what is physical.

I conclude that ‘physical’, if not defined in opposition to minds, is a vague and empty concept. And if defined in opposition to minds (is physical what is mind-independent) then of course minds are not physical.

I prefer the term ‘natural’, in the sense of excluding the intervention of a supernatural being. No magic, not local anyway. Only universal laws apply, which of course can be created by some gods but the gods obey and observe their own laws so to speak, so there’s no local exception to the rules. ‘Natural’ also evokes biology rather than physics, and I am a strong believer in the powers of biology to explain (ultimately) symbolic human thought.

What do you think that "something else" could be? — Janus

Kantians would be talking about categories of the mind as they structure experience, and idealists would be talking about ideas. Physical for both is something mental.

It's also true that the physicalist thinks that physical reality (what we are modeling, but not our models though) is "mind-independent". Don't you? Don't you believe there were dinosaurs prior to humans? Or better, since dinosaurs presumably also were minded, don't you believe there were stars and nebulae prior to the dinosaurs? And that those stars and nebulae were physical? — Janus

Yes, but is a physical description exhaustive? We can say the world is physical, but what is meant by that? Does it mean it's only made of the stuff that physicists posit and nothing else?

So the question ought not to be if minds are physical since minds decide what is physical... — Olivier5

From the fact that minds decide what is physical, it certainly does not follow that minds are not physical.
Humans decide what is human; does it follow that humans are not human?

In other words, if one applies your criteria, minds are evidently physical, since minds decide what is physical. — Olivier5

This doesn't follow either. There is no logical proof that minds are physical or not. Both are metaphysical assumptions based on what we found most coherent, consistent, parsimonious and plausible.

Kantians would be talking about categories of the mind as they structure experience, and idealists would be talking about ideas. Physical for both is something mental. — Marchesk

Yes, but then you get the problem of the speculative realists' "arche-fossil". There is no coherent way to subsume the category "physical" under the category "mental". because mental just means, in its ordinary sense, non-physical. Things we can detect are, by definition, physical, at least insofar as we are modeling them. Whether what we are modeling should be counted as physical is another (metaphysical) question. If it were mental, then under that definition it would think and experience; it would be a universal mind or some such. If it were physical it would not think and experience. It would not be a universal mind that thinks and experiences but rather would be some kind of energetic/ informational dynamic. Which seems the more plausible to you?

There is no logical proof that minds are physical or not. — Janus

Okay so the question is not important. The important thing is that minds decide what is physical and what is not.

An even more important thing is that minds are natural. Forget ‘physical’.

An even more important thing is that minds are natural. Forget ‘physical’. — Olivier5

I agree that minds are natural (as opposed to supernatural or transcendent or of another substance). I just don't see any point in claiming they are non-physical, if you are not claiming that they are not more than the physical; since physical just is what we count the natural world to be.

Just saying that the word ‘physical’ means nothing in this context. ‘Natural’ does mean something though, so I would rather use this concept here. Transcendental is natural, by the way, as it does not require the intervention of any god.

Transcendental is natural, by the way, as it does not require the intervention of any god. — Olivier5

That is an interesting topic for debate in its own right. In practice, naturalism is suspicious of transcendentals, because by definition they're not defineable in purely naturalistic terms; nature is what they're transcendent in respect of, you might say. This shows up in debates about platonic realism and whether maths is invented or discovered.

The point about the mind being non-physical was traditionally understood as an aspect of its nature 'imago dei'. In scholastic philosophy (and derived from Aristotle), the 'rational soul' was the aspect of the intellect that could grasp transcendentals, and was therefore associated with the immortal.