Haha, then why are you using a word that you don't know what it means. You literally don't know what you are talking about.
[...]
Then why do you use terms that you don't what they mean? That is ludicrous. — Harry Hindu

All this started from me suggesting that your argument was a subtle shift of the burden of proof.
Call me naive, but I honestly expected a simple response like "oh, you're right, let me rephrase that" or "I don't believe it is, because..."

But instead of that we get this bizarre freakout of you claiming I don't know what "pain" means.
Well I just gave a definition of pain, in the very post you are replying to.
But, since pain sensation was a core part of my postgraduate degree I can actually talk a lot about it. At the end of that, would you respond to the point?

What does it even mean for "an unpleasant subjective experience that follows activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system"? How do subjective states follow from physical states? — Harry Hindu

Nobody knows. There is no scientific model (meaning: having explanatory and predictive power) for that part. If this is a "gotcha" consider yourself, and every other human, "got".

You assume that other humans have it because they claim it, and don't assume it if a pzombie or computer claims it. You assume IT exist in humans without even knowing what IT is. You're losing me. — Harry Hindu

Possibly I am losing you because you don't read my posts? I just said I could believe that a computer could experience subjective states if it were to claim it i.e. the exact opposite of the thing you're accusing me of saying.

But on p-zombies, think through what you're saying. You're suggesting that I am wrong to assume p-zombies don't have subjective experience? Their definition is that they do not have subjective experience.

Nope. Your reply doesn't address how memory is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery.

All this started from me suggesting that your argument was a subtle shift of the burden of proof.
Call me naive, but I honestly expected a simple response like "oh, you're right, let me rephrase that" or "I don't believe it is, because..."

But instead of that we get this bizarre freakout of you claiming I don't know what "pain" means.
Well I just gave a definition of pain, in the very post you are replying to.
But, since pain sensation was a core part of my postgraduate degree I can actually talk a lot about it. At the end of that, would you respond to the point? — Mijin

I didn't claim to know what pain is, — Mijin

That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. — Mijin

You keep contradicting yourself. You go back and forth between knowing what pain is and not knowing what pain is. You call it a subjective experience and then claim to not know what a subjective experience is. You aren't being very helpful.

Nobody knows. There is no scientific model (meaning: having explanatory and predictive power) for that part. If this is a "gotcha" consider yourself, and every other human, "got". — Mijin

I'm not playing "Gotcha". The fact that you think that I am just shows how you aren't even attempting to think about what you are saying. I am simply trying to get you to clarify the terms that you are using.

Possibly I am losing you because you don't read my posts? I just said I could believe that a computer could experience subjective states if it were to claim it i.e. the exact opposite of the thing you're accusing me of saying. — Mijin

Then all I have to do is program a computer to produce some text on your screen, "I have subjective states" and you would assume that the computer has conscious states?

But on p-zombies, think through what you're saying. You're suggesting that I am wrong to assume p-zombies don't have subjective experience? Their definition is that they do not have subjective experience. — Mijin

Yet, you claim that no one knows what subjective experiences are. :roll:

You keep contradicting yourself. You go back and forth between knowing what pain is and not knowing what pain is. You call it a subjective experience and then claim to not know what a subjective experience is. You aren't being very helpful. — Harry Hindu

Not at all; those are different concepts. What pain is, how pain sensation works, what we mean by subjective experience and how much we (don't) know about how exactly subjective experience works.
And I note that you still haven't said why your argument is not a shift of the burden of proof. i.e. The whole reason you and I are in this exchange in the first place.

Then all I have to do is program a computer to produce some text on your screen, "I have subjective states" and you would assume that the computer has conscious states? — Harry Hindu

Again, try reading my posts.
I said that under certain conditions I could gain belief that a computer was experiencing pain, and I mentioned what those conditions were. Does the program PRINT "Ouch!" fulfill those conditions?
If you read what I wrote, you would know the answer to this.

You're suggesting that I am wrong to assume p-zombies don't have subjective experience? Their definition is that they do not have subjective experience — Mijin

Yet, you claim that no one knows what subjective experiences are. — Harry Hindu

This response is a complete non sequitur.

All these arguments over consciousness might as well take place inside a simulation.

What pain is, how pain sensation works, what we mean by subjective experience and how much we (don't) know about how exactly subjective experience works. — Mijin

If you can't tell me what pain is then how do you expect to tell me how it works? Can you use a word when you don't know it's meaning?

And I note that you still haven't said why your argument is not a shift of the burden of proof. i.e. The whole reason you and I are in this exchange in the first place. — Mijin

You haven't provided a consistent method of determining what type of system is conscious and which type of system isnt.

I said that under certain conditions I could gain belief that a computer was experiencing pain, and I mentioned what those conditions were. Does the program PRINT "Ouch!" fulfill those conditions?
If you read what I wrote, you would know the answer to this. — Mijin

What were those conditions?

This response is a complete non sequitur. — Mijin

No. If a pzombie is defined as having no subjective experiences and you can't define subjective experiences, then You haven't properly defined P zombies much less subjective experiences. How can you use words when you don't know what they mean?

If you can't tell me what pain is then how do you expect to tell me how it works? — Harry Hindu

Don't you already know what pain is? Are you one of those rare individuals who can't feel pain? What's that like?

Don't you already know what pain is? Are you one of those rare individuals who can't feel pain? What's that like? — Marchesk

I already said that its information.

Mijin is the one that doesnt know what pain is.

Are you asking what pain feels like, or asking what pain is? Is it the same thing?

If you can't tell me what pain is then how do you expect to tell me how it works? Can you use a word when you don't know it's meaning? — Harry Hindu

:roll: This is beyond infantile at this point.
I defined pain. I've answered all your questions about pain. I've told you I can elaborate on the mechanisms of pain as much as you like, because it's a topic I've studied at postgrad level.
The only one of your questions I couldn't answer, was how physical mechanisms within the brain give rise to subjective experience because no-one can.

So drop this nonsense about me not knowing what pain is, unless you also mention that you're defining "knowing pain" in such a way that no living human knows what pain is.

You haven't provided a consistent method of determining what type of system is conscious and which type of system isnt. — Harry Hindu

That's still not responding to the point. We're probably at around 8-9 posts at this point with your only response to my original objection being "no", with zero elaboration, and these various dodges.

What were those conditions? — Harry Hindu

Here is what I said on that matter:

With regards to computers, yes, if an AI were able to freely converse in natural language, and it repeatedly made the claim that it felt pain, despite such sentiments not being explicitly part of its programming, and it having nothing immediate to gain by lying...then sure, I'd give it the benefit of the doubt. I wouldn't know that it felt pain, but I'd start to lean towards it being true. — Mijin

Your response to that post, was to then say I would not believe an AI could be conscious even if it claimed it was i.e. the exact opposite of what I said.

If a pzombie is defined as having no subjective experiences and you can't define subjective experiences, then You haven't properly defined P zombies much less subjective experiences. How can you use words when you don't know what they mean? — Harry Hindu

You were saying I was wrong to assume p-zombies don't have subjective experiences. This showed that it is you that do not understand what a word (p-zombie) means.

With regard to you point, in this context, there is absolutely no need to try to break down the mechanism of subjective experience. It's like if we were to have a term "Dalaxy" meaning a galaxy that contains no dark matter. That's would still be a meaningful term even if we don't know exactly what dark matter is yet.

I defined pain. I've answered all your questions about pain. I've told you I can elaborate on the mechanisms of pain as much as you like, because it's a topic I've studied at postgrad level.
The only one of your questions I couldn't answer, was how physical mechanisms within the brain give rise to subjective experience because no-one can.

So drop this nonsense about me not knowing what pain is, unless you also mention that you're defining "knowing pain" in such a way that no living human knows what pain is. — Mijin

You said:

I didn't claim to know what pain is — Mijin

Then you said:

I feel pain. — Mijin

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system.
That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve. — Mijin

So what you seem to be defining pain as is a unpleasant subjective experience, and then go on to say that you don't know what a subjective experience is. If pain is a subjective experience and you don't know what a subjective experience is, then you don't know what pain is. You aren't saying anything useful about pain by asserting that pain is a subjective experience and you don't know what a subjective experience is. It's really that simple.

I have defined pain without the use of the phrase, "subjective experience", because it's a meaningless term, as you point out. Pain is information. What is information? The relationship between cause and effect. Pain informs you of injury. Injury informs you of the cause of the injury, etc. If it's causal, it's information.

Your response to that post, was to then say I would not believe an AI could be conscious even if it claimed it was i.e. the exact opposite of what I said. — Mijin

My response was a question trying to confirm what you had said. I often paraphrase what people say, and they often recant what they said because the paraphrasing gives them a different look on what they said. But this is beyond the point. The point being that if you don't know what subjective experiences are, then you aren't in any position to make judgements about who, or what has them, or not. It's like saying a blind person doesn't know what polka-dots are, but then they can pick out what has them and what doesn't have them. It's illogical.

With regards to computers, yes, if an AI were able to freely converse in natural language, and it repeatedly made the claim that it felt pain, despite such sentiments not being explicitly part of its programming, and it having nothing immediate to gain by lying...then sure, I'd give it the benefit of the doubt. I wouldn't know that it felt pain, but I'd start to lean towards it being true. — Mijin

What do you mean, "not explicitly part of its programming"?

You were saying I was wrong to assume p-zombies don't have subjective experiences. This showed that it is you that do not understand what a word (p-zombie) means. — Mijin

Where did I say that? I have only been questioning your use of the phrase, "subjective experience" because you use the phrase without knowing what it means. Why use terms that you don't know what they mean, especially if there are alternative ways of describing pain with words we do understand? :chin:

So what you seem to be defining pain as is a unpleasant subjective experience, and then go on to say that you don't know what a subjective experience is. If pain is a subjective experience and you don't know what a subjective experience is, then you don't know what pain is. — Harry Hindu

I said no such thing -- you were asking me about the mechanism by which physical neurology causes subjective experience. That's what we don't know.

It's like I am saying we don't know exactly what dark matter is, and you're repeatedly saying "If you don't know what dark matter is, how can you use the word?". The word still has meaning in referring to a specific phenomenon, even if we have no concrete scientific model yet.

What do you mean, "not explicitly part of its programming"? — Harry Hindu

Well the program PRINT "Ouch!" has an exclamation of pain as part of its programming, so does not fulfill the requirements.
Beyond that, in very complex programs, sure it may be much harder to say. I didn't claim we would be able to make such a judgement immediately.

Where did I say that? — Harry Hindu

Here:

You assume that other humans have [subjective experience] because they claim it, and don't assume it if a pzombie or computer claims it. — Harry Hindu

Note that this single quote from you has two issues: firstly chastizing me for assuming that p-zombies don't have subjective experience, when this is true by definition. But also secondly, saying I would not believe a computer that claimed to have subjective experience, when the post you are quoting actually says the precise opposite.

I said no such thing — Mijin

I quoted you:

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system.
That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve. — Mijin

:roll:

you were asking me about the mechanism by which physical neurology causes subjective experience. That's what we don't know. — Mijin

That's part of the problem - dualism. You're left with the impossible task of explaining how physical processes cause subjective processes.

It's like I am saying we don't know exactly what dark matter is, and you're repeatedly saying "If you don't know what dark matter is, how can you use the word?". The word still has meaning in referring to a specific phenomenon, even if we have no concrete scientific model yet. — Mijin

No one has ever observed dark matter. Dark matter is just an idea to account for the observed behavior of real matter, just like how subjective experiences is an idea to account for the observed behavior of human beings.

Well the program PRINT "Ouch!" has an exclamation of pain as part of its programming, so does not fulfill the requirements. — Mijin

You were programmed (learned to) to say, "Ouch" from copying the actions of those around you. If you were born in another country with a different language, you would have been programmed differently. Your genetic code is a program defining the limits of your behaviors and logic defines the limits of your ideas.

What if we designed a robot to program itself (teach itself), or learn from it's mistakes?

You assume that other humans have [subjective experience] because they claim it, and don't assume it if a pzombie or computer claims it.
— Harry Hindu

Note that this single quote from you has two issues: firstly chastizing me for assuming that p-zombies don't have subjective experience, when this is true by definition. But also secondly, saying I would not believe a computer that claimed to have subjective experience, when the post you are quoting actually says the precise opposite. — Mijin

My point was that you had already claimed to not know what a subjective experience is, yet you go on to claim that you know what has it and what doesn't. I already went over this in my last post, which you ignored. I'm done going back and forth with you.

That's part of the problem - dualism. You're left with the impossible task of explaining how physical processes cause subjective processes. — Harry Hindu

I am not a dualist, I am a neuroscientist. I want to understand pain because there are people both with painful injuries and diseases, or indeed simply neurological issues that cause intense pain on their own (e.g. cluster headaches). Handwaving their subjective experiences as not existing, or merely "information" is completely unhelpful.

I will never understand why some people are happier to do a handwave than actually work on solving the problem.

No one has ever observed dark matter. Dark matter is just an idea to account for the observed behavior of real matter, just like how subjective experiences is an idea to account for the observed behavior of human beings. — Harry Hindu

How should science proceed in your view? Is it all-or-nothing where the only way we can talk about a phenomenon is at the point where we have completely solved every aspect of it, otherwise the very words are verboden?

"Dark matter" definitely refers to a real phenomenon, likely to be a form of matter because we can see things like gravitational lensing from it. No, it's not understood yet, but that's why we want to talk about it and talk about what to investigate next to tease out more data.

You were programmed (learned to) to say, "Ouch" from copying the actions of those around you. — Harry Hindu

The specific word or exclamation here is obviously completely irrelevant. We don't need to be taught to experience pain.

I'm done going back and forth with you. — Harry Hindu

You won't be missed. I would have preferred if you responded to the original point I put to you though.

All these arguments over consciousness might as well take place inside a simulation. — Marchesk

Daydreams could very well be simulated subjective experiences, or views of some process or event. The only difference between daydreams and nightdreams is that you don't have the real world imposing itself on your senses. Daydreams are like an overlay of the real world subjective experience. When sleeping, there is nothing but the simulation so the mind assumes it is reality.

You were programmed (learned to) to say, "Ouch" from copying the actions of those around you.
— Harry Hindu

The specific word or exclamation here is obviously completely irrelevant. We don't need to be taught to experience pain. — Mijin

You said that you are able to determine that something has subjective experiences by its behavior - by exclaiming, "Ouch!", yet now you are saying that the word or exclamation is completely irrelevant. If they exclaimed, "Yippee!", would you say that they are having a subjective experience of pain?

You said that you are able to determine that something has subjective experiences by its behavior - by exclaiming, "Ouch!", yet now you are saying that the word or exclamation is completely irrelevant. If they exclaimed, "Yippee!", would you say that they are having a subjective experience of pain? — Harry Hindu

I think perhaps you're trolling now, as this post contains numerous errors:

1. I never said that exclaiming "ouch" would be evidence that anything was in pain. In fact it was the opposite. "Ouch" was mentioned in the context of an example of a program that I would not believe had displayed evidence of subjective experience.

2. "determine that something has subjective experiences by its behavior" -- behavior was your wording, not mine. I said that if there was an AI capable of expressing itself in natural language, and it claimed to be in pain, I would have grounds for believing it to be true.

3a. I said that the word itself was irrelevant, because you were making some point about us learning to say "ouch". It's unclear if this new post is even trying to defend that point.
3b. I said that the word itself was irrelevant, so now you're asking me What if the word is "Yippee"? :roll:

The problem is that this approach explains nothing. What are footprints in the sand? Information. What is consciousness? Information. What is memory? Information. — Daemon

Sure it does. It explains that everything is information. The problem is that you just don't like the idea because you haven't been able to supply a logical argument against it. — Harry Hindu

I don't like it because it doesn't explain anything. What we need is to find the differences between things. Waves on the sea, footprints on the beach, a piano, a digital computer, a biological brain.

The circuitry in a digital computer is designed to do stuff like making my text appear on your screen. It isn't designed to have consciousness.

Your brain is designed (metaphorically, through evolution) to be conscious. That's what its machinery is for. It's the most complex machinery we know. Consciousness is the dynamic state of this machinery.

It isn't like the machinery in a computer. If we wanted to make a conscious machine, we would need to make something with the same capacities as a brain.

The fact that we can feel is what makes meaning. The waves on the sea can be interpreted as information, but there's no feeling so no meaning. The electrical flows in a computer can be interpreted as information, but again, no feeling so no meaning. No reason to think a computer can feel. Its machinery isn't designed to do that.

If we made a machine that could feel it would raise serious moral questions.

We know that other people feel, that's what life's about. We know that computers, pianos, the sand on the beach and the waves on the sea don't feel, that's why nobody worries about our moral obligations towards them. Saying "it's all just information" loses this all-important distinction.

You must know this Harry. You don't worry about hurting the beach by walking on it. You don't worry whether your computer is living a happy life. You do care about the beings around you that do have feelings.

I don't like it because it doesn't explain anything. What we need is to find the differences between things. Waves on the sea, footprints on the beach, a piano, a digital computer, a biological brain. — Daemon

Then I would assume that you would also assert that everything is "physical" doesn't explain anything either.

You do realize that different causal relations would be different information? Of course you would if you had been paying attention to anything I have said.

It isn't like the machinery in a computer. If we wanted to make a conscious machine, we would need to make something with the same capacities as a brain. — Daemon

I've already asked numerous times, what makes the brain special in that has feelings and consciousness and other things can't. When you look at an image of someone's brain, do you see feelings and consciousness, or a mass of neurons? What about when you look at a computer - any difference in seeing a mass of circuits?

The fact that we can feel is what makes meaning. — Daemon

I have no idea what this means. How do brains feel? When you look at brains do you see feelings?

You don't worry about hurting the beach by walking on it — Daemon

Who said the beach is bothered by someone walking on it? It could be that the beach likes being walked on.

Then I would assume that you would also assert that everything is "physical" doesn't explain anything either. — Harry Hindu

That's correct.

You do realize that different causal relations would be different information? Of course you would if you had been paying attention to anything I have said. — Harry Hindu

I have been paying attention to what you've said, but I'm sorry to say a lot of it doesn't make sense.

I've already asked numerous times, what makes the brain special in that has feelings and consciousness and other things can't. — Harry Hindu

Because everything is information right? And a computer has a lot of information so it should be able to have feelings too?

It just seems like crazy talk Harry. You must know something about the complexity of the brain, it's the most complex thing we know about. And you must know something about the highly specific, highly sensitive mechanisms that make it work, and how they can be affected by injury, disease. I sometimes think you young people nowadays don't take enough drugs.

The fact that we can feel is what makes meaning. — Daemon

I have no idea what this means. — Harry Hindu

Really no idea? Cool!

Well imagine a time before there were any conscious beings. To keep it simple, imagine a time before life. There was no feeling going on, and then there was life and eventually some creature came along that was able to feel, maybe it could feel heat and cold, and heat made it feel good and cold made it feel bad. So before that time, good and bad didn't exist, didn't have meaning, and after that time, they did.

Who said the beach is bothered by someone walking on it? It could be that the beach likes being walked on. — Harry Hindu

So there were beaches before there was life, before there was feeling. Beaches don't have feelings. You know that, right?

Then I would assume that you would also assert that everything is "physical" doesn't explain anything either.
— Harry Hindu

That's correct. — Daemon

Then we at least agree on something.

Instead of "information", what if I said that everything is causal?

I've already asked numerous times, what makes the brain special in that has feelings and consciousness and other things can't.
— Harry Hindu
— Daemon

It just seems like crazy talk Harry. You must know something about the complexity of the brain, it's the most complex thing we know about. And you must know something about the highly specific, highly sensitive mechanisms that make it work, and how they can be affected by injury, disease. I sometimes think you young people nowadays don't take enough drugs. — Daemon

So your answer to the question: "What makes brains special from other things that allows it to possess feelings?" is that the brain is the most complex thing that we know? I don't think this is a very good answer to the question, if you don't mind me saying.

For instance, isn't the universe the most complex thing we know? After all it is composed of billions of brains, and an unknown number of other things, possibly other universes, etc. Does that mean that the universe, or multiverse has feelings? Does the Earth have feelings since it is where all these complex brains reside? What about dark matter and energy? Is that more complex than a brain, and what about when we find processes more complex than brains that aren't brains?

Instead of "information", what if I said that everything is causal? — Harry Hindu

None of these "everything is X" explanations are any good Harry. As I said before, an explanation needs to tell us what is different about different aspects of the world. Suppose you want to explain vision. A good explanation will tell us that it uses rods and cones on the retina, and so on. Suppose you want to explain hearing. A good explanation will tell us that it uses hair cells in the cochlea, and so on.

If we take your approach, all we can say is "vision is causal, hearing is causal".

For instance, isn't the universe the most complex thing we know? — Harry Hindu

This is just more of the same. We need to know about differences. Certain parts of the universe are more complex than others, The complexity isn't spread out everywhere like jam.

I do wonder what motivates you to think of things in this way. Are you a fan of Fritov Capra, like Pop? Is it mysticism?

None of these "everything is X" explanations are any good Harry. As I said before, an explanation needs to tell us what is different about different aspects of the world. Suppose you want to explain vision. A good explanation will tell us that it uses rods and cones on the retina, and so on. Suppose you want to explain hearing. A good explanation will tell us that it uses hair cells in the cochlea, and so on.

If we take your approach, all we can say is "vision is causal, hearing is causal". — Daemon

:confused: Saying that a dog or a cat is a pet isn't saying that they aren't different, only that they share a property of being a pet.

I do wonder what motivates you to think of things in this way. Are you a fan of Fritov Capra, like Pop? Is it mysticism? — Daemon

No. It's just logic and the principle of Occam's Razor.

No. It's just logic and the principle of Occam's Razor. — Harry Hindu

Since Occam's Razor ought to be invoked only when several hypotheses explain the same set of facts equally well, in practice its domain will be very limited…[C]ases where competing hypotheses explain a phenomenon equally well are comparatively rare. — Kent Holsinger

My hypothesis is that I am conscious as the result of very specific and highly organised brain states, and computers, pianos, beaches and waves on the sea are not conscious because they don't have the appropriate equipment to achieve such states.

What's your hypothesis?

My hypothesis is that we currently don't know what is conscious or not because we don't know what makes brains special equipment in that regard.

When you have stories like this:



I tend to lean more toward the idea that information processing is related to consciousness.

Is the computer reading the woman's thoughts or brain signals? What's the difference?

What is the difference between computer memory and human memory?

By coincidence I am reading about exactly this amazing research right now, in an excellent book called The Idea of the Brain by Matthew Cobb. He is Professor of Zoology at the University of Manchester where his research focuses on the sense of smell, insect behaviour and the history of science. The book is described as "a monumental, sweeping journey from the ancient roots of neurology to the most astonishing recent research".

He discusses the lady drinking using the robot arm, and other related research, and then he says:

"Important as all these developments are, they do not imply that brains are actually computers, or that we know how they work. In reality they highlight the plasticity of our brains - Donoghue's group has not cracked the neural code in the brain for volition and planning; instead their computer programs are able to translate patterns of neuronal firing in the brain into the movement of the robot arm, and the patients are able to rapidly tune the activity of their brains so as to manipulate the arm in the desired way.

So the information processing in the computer is piggybacking on the neuronal activity in the brain, which is not like digital computation.

The book explores the similarities and the differences between brains and computers in some detail. It's not a philosophy book, but it, and the research you point to, supports my view and not yours.