Yes that is laughable. Since when is a gun jamming an action by a moral actor? It's not relevant to the moral question.

First, are you claiming that doing an act that doesn't 100% guarantee harm is okay? Because that's what it sounds like you're saying here:

the second are not caused by because it's not a sufficient condition without proximate causes — Benkei

and here:

The fact that all living things suffer at some point in time, is not a valid argument to conclude that living is a sufficient condition for suffering so this does not resolve the causal chain. — Benkei

In both you seem to be saying that since birth does not guarantee suffering, you cannot say that having children causes suffering, and therefore it is okay to have children.

If that is the case then the fact that the act (pulling the trigger) does not cause harm should be enough of a reason to say pulling the trigger is okay.

In both you seem to be saying that since birth does not guarantee suffering, you cannot say that having children causes suffering, and therefore it is okay to have children.

If that is the case then the fact that the act (pulling the trigger) does not cause harm should be enough of a reason to say pulling the trigger is okay. — khaled

People who are born are guaranteed to suffer but being born doesn't cause suffering. There's an important moral difference here and the analogy breaks down because of it.

People who are born are guaranteed to suffer but being born doesn't cause suffering. There's an important moral difference here and the analogy breaks down because of it. — Benkei

Nah. Sounds like bs to me. Will have to go back and read more closely. Anyways, about the whole charity/drowning thing. Care to answer why one is obligatory and another is optional? That's what I'm really interested in.

Nah. Sounds like bs to me. Will have to go back and read more closely. — khaled

The universe guarantees life. The big bang did it! That would be the bs.

I'd go further to say that there is no such thing as a "positive moral duty". If it's a duty then doing it is what is expected, it is not positive. — khaled

"Positive" here is used in a similar vein as "positivism" or "to posit". It's a positive duty because it obliges you to act in a specific way. A negative duty on the other proscribes certain behaviour. It establishes ways you should not act, the command includes a negation, hence it's called "negative".

If you have a duty not to harm others for instance, and so you do not harm others, you are not being virtuous, you're doing the bare minimum. To be virtuous you have to go out of your way and actually help someone with something, which I repeat you don't have to do. — khaled

I'm not sure I follow this distinction. If virtue is to act in accordance with a system of morality, then it doesn't seem to matter what grammatical form any obligation takes.

There are almost unlimited ways to formulate rules/obligations/imperatives. You could say that you should help those in need according to your ability as well as saying you should not withhold help you're capable of giving without danger to yourself. What matters is less how you formulate your rules and more how the system as a whole functions.

For example, the rule "first, do no harm" has very different effects in a system where "harm" is understood to be a specific violation of an enumerated "freedom" as opposed to a system where "harm" is understood to be any consequence by which a moral subject ends up with less ability for self-actualisation than before.

I agree but am not sure how to understand "owing someone" as a basis to accept a moral duty — Benkei

David Graeber's "Debt, the first 5000 years" has quite a lot on the relationships of debt and morality. Not a logical argument for why they must go together though!

The universe guarantees life. The big bang did it! That would be the bs. — Benkei

The problem I see with your argument is you don't give enough account for what we know about the impositions of life. We can generalize what they are without knowing each particular case. We know these would be impositions. The Big Bang and other non-deliberative things cannot evaluate this and prevent these impositions but we can. I think this is a case of ignoring what doesn't fit your case. We know the impositions that occur, both structurally, and even contingently what is in range of what people often have to deal with. There is even the case that because we don't know all the contingent harms, this is even more evidence that it is best to prevent those unknown harms from occurring. But, even if you think unknown harms are not enough reason, even if you don't believe in necessary harms, even the known contingent harms should be enough evidence to prevent it.

so you have no intention of actually answering my question?

There's certainly a value to philosophical pessimism. I don't believe in progress as much as the next because of philosophical pessimism — Benkei

It seems we're a better lot than we were overall 1,000 years ago. It's a historical question I suppose, but it seems we do a better job not bludgeoning each other than we did back then.

This is a different sort of pessimism you now discuss, which is one where you've lost hope in mankind, expecting cycles of peace and violence with no forward movement, with us now being fortunate enough to live in an apparent peace cycle. The pessimism of the OP was that life is nothing more than suffering, so it'd be best if we just stopped producing new generations of sufferers. These two different types of pessimisms do share the similar trait of suckiness, so neither would go under the Christmas tree as a particularly good thing to have bestowed upon you.

Even if we were to accept an optimistic outlook in the first regard, meaning there were actual evidence that the world is evolving toward Nirvana, I don't know if that would resolve the pessimism of the second regard, which is that life today isn't worth living. That is, just because I know that generation 10 will be wonderful, does that really justify generations 1 to 9 living horrible existences, considering that 1 to 9 will be dead and won't see the benefits of their suffering. To argue that future happiness of a distant generation is a virtuous goal is an interesting concept because it posits inherent value in the enterprise of being human. If you're willing to assert as a foundational statement of faith that humanity is worth it in the distant future, why not just assert that there is something inherently sacred about every human life that is achieved in each life without regard to whether we are meandering toward a better state of humankind or not.

Hard antinatalism is the view that no one should have kids. Soft antinatalism is just the view that this is a bad world to bring kids into. Would you say yes to the softer version?

I agreed with your points earlier Hanover, but I think you should answer Schopenhauer1's question from earlier. He calls it "paternalistic BS" to impose known suffering on someone else just because you think it has a higher meaning. I don't agree with him here, but this is an excellent and critical question I think ought to be adressed

He calls it "paternalistic BS" to impose known suffering on someone else just because you think it has a higher meaning. I don't agree with him here, but this is an excellent and critical question I think ought to be adressed — Albero

"X is paternalistic BS" is not a question.

Because I am part of this calculation too. The "expected value" of the harm I would cause unto others is much lower than the "expected value" of the harm I would cause myself by killing myself. So I continue to exist. You have to consider alternatives. — khaled

So, in your view, do you consider the expected harm a person being born will experience through life greater than the expected harm experienced by those who wish to have children if they follow antinatalism? I’d also be interested to hear how you quantify harm. For example, is 1,000 people getting paper cut equal to one person breaking their leg?

So, in your view, do you consider the expected harm a person being born will experience through life greater than the expected harm experienced by those who wish to have children if they follow antinatalism? — Pinprick

Yes but this is not just a “consideration” it’s a logical argument. If you say that a person experiences X harm due to not having children then all having children does is pushes this X harm onto one or more people (depending on how many children they have) unless THEY (the children) also have children. So the only way to avoid causing X or more harm is for people to reproduce forever. But I’m pretty sure we can agree that Adam and Eve experiencing X harm is less than all the suffering of humanity thus far. There is almost no case where procreation causes less harm than the harm due to not having children.

I’d also be interested to hear how you quantify harm. For example, is 1,000 people getting paper cut equal to one person breaking their leg? — Pinprick

I don’t think these questions are productive. I don’t put a number on it if that’s what you’re asking. I just compare alternatives.

It's a positive duty because it obliges you to act in a specific way. — Echarmion

I don’t have many of those. Outside of having to try and make up to someone after harming them you don’t really have to do anything morally speaking outside of just not harm people in my view.

If virtue is to act in accordance with a system of morality — Echarmion

Not for me. For me virtue is doing more good than the system demands without expecting any compensation for it.

There are almost unlimited ways to formulate rules/obligations/imperatives — Echarmion

Agreed

I don’t have many of those. Outside of having to try and make up to someone after harming them you don’t really have to do anything morally speaking outside of just not harm people in my view. — khaled

As I have noted before, society can be conceptualised as a net of obligations to one another, from being obliged to protect the life of your children to being at least expected to give strangers directions if they ask. The idea that you're an island whose only duty is to not interfere with other islands unless in a transaction is not only counterfactual, it's downright distopian.

The idea that you're an island whose only duty is to not interfere with other islands unless in a transaction is not only counterfactual, it's downright distopian. — Echarmion

And also not my idea. Where did I say "Whose only duty is not to interfere". You can help if you want, you just don't have to. I don't understand why whenever I share this view people worry that it will somehow suddenly make people cold and uncaring towards each other. The idea that I don't have a moral obligation to save a drowning person doesn't mean I won't.

Also, counterfactual? Since when are we talking about facts?

I'd like to ask about your view then. Do you think that people are obligated to donate to charity? And if not why do you think people are obligated to save others from drowning when they can but are not obligated to donate to charity?

Obviously your question is rhetorical and it leaves little room to move, because you put donating and saving someone from drowning on the same footing. In donating money your taking part in a slow process. The effect is not immediate. The money is managed and spent without you really knowing how it was spent. It’s a very abstract action. You may decide your money is better spent in other ways, you may feel the charity is not very effective or doubt it will change things. No one feels obliged to do it. Society asks for the money as a donation. It’s a gift.

Society also functions on people looking out for each other. That society regards your assistance to someone in immediate need as an obligation. It doesn’t ask you to risk your life, it just asks you to do what you can. This sense of obligation means that you will receive it if in need yourself. But more importantly it’s an impulse to help someone in immediate need. Many have lost their life trying to help someone in trouble in the water. Obviously that’s a powerful emotion and it’s an emotion or feeling that binds communities. If you live within a community and receive benefits from that community in the way that communities function then you are obliged to live according to the mores of that community.

And also not my idea. Where did I say "Whose only duty is not to interfere". You can help if you want, you just don't have to. I don't understand why whenever I share this view people worry that it will somehow suddenly make people cold and uncaring towards each other. The idea that I don't have a moral obligation to save a drowning person doesn't mean I won't.

Also, counterfactual? Since when are we talking about facts? — khaled

My goal was more to point out exactly the difference you set out here, which to me looks like a performative contradiction. You're presumably not "cold and uncaring", nor do you act as if you have no duties to help strangers - e.g. help a drowning man. Yet you insist that it isn't your duty. But why shouldn't something we'd all agree to do be a duty? If it's what we should do, then it is our moral duty.

I'd like to ask about your view then. Do you think that people are obligated to donate to charity? And if not why do you think people are obligated to save others from drowning when they can but are not obligated to donate to charity? — khaled

Donating to charity is an impersonal process. There are
also manyy different kinds of charity. So "donating to charity" is too broad to make any singular moral judgement about. Helping a specific drowning person is a concrete situation you can judge.

We could use a more direct example instead of donating to charity, like giving money to a beggar on the street. There are obvious moral complications, like whether you are supporting a drug addiction or somesuch, but I think one can establish a moral duty to give to people in need. The more pressing moral concern though would be to support systematic changes to ensure less people are in need.

That society regards your assistance to someone in immediate need as an obligation — Brett

If someone drowns and there are 20 people watching, do they get incarcerated? No. So I don't think society sees this as an obligation.

This sense of obligation means that you will receive it if in need yourself. — Brett

How come you can find countless videos of people asking for help to no avail and everyone just walking by? How often do you see beggars without anyone donating anything to them?

If you live within a community and receive benefits from that community in the way that communities function then you are obliged to live according to the mores of that community. — Brett

Agreed. However you have yet to show that part of these obligations is that one must save a drowning person.

No one feels obliged to do it. — Brett

Again, the question is why. No one has answered this so far. Lets assume we have found the "perfect charity" where you know exactly what your money is getting used for and it directly improves the lives of others. If such a thing existed would people be obligated to donate now? Your only gripe against saying that people are obligated to donate seems to be that they are unsure how their money will be used, so it should follow that if they were sure, then they would be obligated to donate no?

But why shouldn't something we'd all agree to do be a duty? — Echarmion

What do you mean "agree on"? All we've established is that we would both save a drowning person. That says nothing about the morality of it. If we both happen to be video game enthusiasts and we both buy a particular game, how does it make it a moral duty for us to buy said game? I don't think morality should be deduced from what we all would do.

If it's what we should do, then it is our moral duty. — Echarmion

It's not what I should do if "should" implies that I would be wrong not to do it.

but I think one can establish a moral duty to give to people in need — Echarmion

By that standard our society is totally morally bankrupt. If helping homeless people was a duty, there would be no homeless people.

Donating to charity is an impersonal process. There are
also manyy different kinds of charity. So "donating to charity" is too broad to make any singular moral judgement about. Helping a specific drowning person is a concrete situation you can judge. — Echarmion

So

Lets assume we have found the "perfect charity" where you know exactly what your money is getting used for and it directly improves the lives of others. If such a thing existed would people be obligated to donate now? — khaled

I don't think morality should be deduced from what we all would do. — khaled

How else could it be deduced, other than by asking, in some form, what rules we would want everyone to follow?

It's not what I should do if "should" implies that I would be wrong not to do it. — khaled

What use would morality be if it didn't tell you right from wrong?

By that standard our society is totally morally bankrupt. — khaled

Perhaps it is. There are certainly problems with exploitation, both of other humans and of nature in general.

If helping homeless people was a duty, there would be no homeless people. — khaled

This doesn't follow, since even if everyone agrees to a single moral philosophy, not everyone would always act in accordance with it.

Lets assume we have found the "perfect charity" where you know exactly what your money is getting used for and it directly improves the lives of others. If such a thing existed would people be obligated to donate now? — khaled

Yes, provided you have the means. Though this is essentially a circular argument, because by saying it's the "perfect charity" in this context we're basically already starting that it would be moral to give to it.

If someone drowns and there are 20 people watching, do they get incarcerated? No. So I don't think society sees this as an obligation. — khaled

I don’t see how you connect a moral obligation to law.

How come you can find countless videos of people asking for help to no avail and everyone just walking by? How often do you see beggars without anyone donating anything to them? — khaled

Exactly. This is the consequence of refusing their obligation to others. See how it ends up?

If you live within a community and receive benefits from that community in the way that communities function then you are obliged to live according to the mores of that community.
— Brett

Agreed. However you have yet to show that part of these obligations is that one must save a drowning person. — khaled

Okay. Then you fail to understand the idea of community and so you are part of the problem.

How else could it be deduced, other than by asking, in some form, what rules we would want everyone to follow? — Echarmion

Right. But "what rules would we want everyone to follow" is not answered by "What does everyone usually do" (in this case save drowning person).

I don't think morality should be deduced from what we all would do. — khaled

because I don't see a connection between what we would do and what we should do.

What use would morality be if it didn't tell you right from wrong? — Echarmion

I don't see how that follows form what I said. Morality tells you what's wrong, what's neutral and what's good.

This doesn't follow, since even if everyone agrees to a single moral philosophy, not everyone would always act in accordance with it. — Echarmion

Yes but I find it easier to believe that people do not agree on a single moral philosophy than that we do agree, but are just morally bankrupt.

in this context we're basically already starting that it would be moral to give to it. — Echarmion

For you maybe. I always said that giving to charity is optional, never an obligation.

I don’t see how you connect a moral obligation to law. — Brett

I'm implying that if everyone agreed on a moral obligation to save drowning people, it is very likely that there would be a law incarcerating people who were able to help but didn't.

Exactly. This is the consequence of refusing their obligation to others. See how it ends up? — Brett

As I said to echarmion, I find it easier to believe that people do not share the same sense of moral obligations than to believe that they do (what are the odds of that?) and that they are just morally bankrupt.

Okay. Then you fail to understand the idea of community and so you are part of the problem. — Brett

I am part of the problem even though I would save the drowning person? What "problem" exactly?

I am part of the problem even though I would save the drowning person? What "problem" exactly? — khaled

That you do not see an obligation to assist someone who needs help.

But I would assist them so what difference does it make? And I would furthermore argue, again, that I'm not the only one that doesn't see such an obligation. That this isn't some universal law or anything inherent in the definition of community.

I'm more so surprised by people who must make it a duty to help. Is that to imply that if it wasn't a duty you wouldn't do it?

But I would assist them — khaled

Why would you?

That this isn't some universal law or anything inherent in the definition of community. — khaled

What is community then?