Certainly one should not unnecessarily impose suffering on others no matter what. But it also stands to reason, which I will just call Argument Against Paternalism, is to try to benefit someone else by imposing on them challenges to overcome which they could not consent. — schopenhauer1

Calling it an argument doesn't make it into one. Where is the 'Argument Against Paternalism'? All we've read so far is the 'Assertion Against Paternalism'.

So it's mistaken to assume that because you now would act kindly even without the censure of your community that you would have reached that point without it. — Isaac

When did I claim that? — khaled

Because I'm not a heartless bastard? Why are you implying that if it wasn't a duty people wouldn't do it? — khaled

Why would I not save a drowning person if I can? — khaled

For me virtue is doing more good than the system demands without expecting any compensation for it. — khaled

I don't understand why whenever I share this view people worry that it will somehow suddenly make people cold and uncaring towards each other. — khaled

I would assist them so what difference does it make? And I would furthermore argue, again, that I'm not the only one that doesn't see such an obligation. That this isn't some universal law or anything inherent in the definition of community.

I'm more so surprised by people who must make it a duty to help. Is that to imply that if it wasn't a duty you wouldn't do it? — khaled

If you meant that it's better to save a drowning person than to not, then no one is disagreeing there, sorry for misunderstanding if that's the case. — khaled

You don't usually apply your own judgement in place of others, no. But the reasons why matter. Note that we got here from this:

If you're in an abusive relationship, surely you should cause heartbreak. It'd be just as easy to come up with situations where you should cause pain.
— Echarmion

via this:

When I talk of “harm” I mean causing more than you alleviate. So vaccinating a child isn’t harm, even though it hurts and is against their wishes. — Echarmion

In an abusive relationship you could cause harm by breaking up because doing so will alleviate more form yourself.

So is harm different for children and adults? Or is harm really only relevant when dealing with children or other dependents, and the general rule is actually about choice or consent or freedom? — Echarmion

I don't know what you mean by "harm is different", I don't know what I said to make you think that in any way. But regardless, even applying this "general rule" when do we have consent to give birth to people?

Which part precisely? When did I ever say life had “more harm than good”? Please quote me this supposed BS.
— khaled

As per above, does it matter whether life is, overall, harmful or not? — Echarmion

I asked you to quote me when I said "life had more harm than good" as I don't think that sentence makes sense. You failed at doing so. And I already told you that life is not "overall" objectively more harmful or good. So why are you now still trying to get me to make a claim that I never made for a reason?

You're asking for something that's impossible ("you'd need a time machine"), but instead of concluding that, therefore, the standard cannot be applied, you apply it anyways and then claim it's actually violated. — Echarmion

It is not uncommon for consent to be impossible to obtain. For instance, we don't pull the plug on comatose patients. The whole POINT of consent is that the default value for any request is "no" until that request is actually made and answered positively.

Well, perhaps it was just a misunderstanding then. What are virtuous or right actions? — Echarmion

I already said "virtuous" is doing more good than the system demands.

"right" is the best possible outcome (donating to charity/saving the drowning person/ etc)

"moral" is the outcome that is not bad. So not donating to charity is moral in my view. Because you are not obligated to do so. "moral" is basically the least you have to do.

There are probably going to be things you end up doing just because you don't want to damage the relationship (and I don't necessarily refer to a romantic relationship here). — Echarmion

Well if I were to take this to the extreme, then you have an abusive relationship. And I am pretty sure we can agree that the abusers in an abusive relationship are being immoral.

After all, even in extremely oppressive circumstances, there is usually some kind of choice you could make. — Echarmion

What do you mean?

I don't see "I would act kindly without censure of my community and without any biological priming" anywhere there.

All those quotes imply that you would act kindly toward the victim, and that there is therefore no need for censure in order to reach that point. I'm saying that you can't know this to be the case because you don't know what role censure played in forming those feelings which you now apply without need for such rules.

The alternative interpretation is that you see it as unimportant to society that there are people like you - who would act kindly.

If you think it's important to society that such people exist, then it is important to know how to mould such people. If it is unimportant then why the defensiveness in "I don't understand why whenever I share this view people worry that it will somehow suddenly make people cold and uncaring towards each other."

So I suppose I skipped a stage in my assessment. Do you think it's important to a society that at least a large proportion of it's members are kind? Or do you just not care what we do to each other?

and that there is therefore no need for censure in order to reach that point — Isaac

Where was this implied exactly?

So I suppose I skipped a stage in my assessment. Do you think it's important to a society that at least a large proportion of it's members are kind? Or do you just not care what we do to each other? — Isaac

It'd be much better if that were the case. But the most important is for the members to not harm each other. Acting kindly is an added bonus on top of that.

As I said, I assumed you'd prefer a world in which there were kind people. If I'm wrong about that, and you just simply don't care whether we're kind to each other or not, then let me know.

As I said, I assumed you'd prefer a world in which there were kind people. — Isaac

You're correct and so would anybody. Now, where did I imply that there was no need for societal pressure to make me act kindly?

where did I imply that there was no need for societal pressure to make me act kindly? — khaled

I don't understand why whenever I share this view [that we do not need moral obligations] people worry that it will somehow suddenly make people cold and uncaring towards each other. — khaled — Isaac

And what does that have to do with my argument? — khaled

You are arguing that moral obligations to, say, give to charity, are unnecessary. Part of that argument relies on the fact that society would not stop doing kind acts (like giving to charity) if it were not a moral duty to do so. I'm saying you have no justification for that assumptions because the mere fact that adults now don't require a moral duty to perform acts of kindness does not mean that a world in which such moral duty did not exist would continue to behave that way.

But I see from your other posts that a lot of this hinges on your idiosyncratic conflation of 'moral duty' with 'law'. If you're going to make up your own meanings for terms it's going to be very difficult to have a conversation using them.

I'm saying you have no justification for that assumptions because the mere fact that adults now don't require a moral duty to perform acts of kindness does not mean that a world in which such moral duty did not exist would continue to behave that way. — Isaac

This assumes that at some point in time there was a moral duty to be kind. I don't think there was. This is not to say that there is no social pressure to be kind. You seem to be conflating "moral duty" with "social censure".

But I see from your other posts that a lot of this hinges on your idiosyncratic conflation of 'moral duty' with 'law'. — Isaac

I didn't conflate them. I was arguing that if everybody agreed that there was a moral duty to donate to charity, then there would be a law forcing people to do it. It's not that laws are moral duties, it's that moral duties typically lead to laws.

I haven't made up my mind about anti-natalism yet, but I think the most difficult question it raises is what exactly justifies the act of forcing someone to experience life.

If we can agree that forcing individuals to do things without their consent is inherently problematic, then this raises a lot of questions regarding the act of having children.

You seem to be conflating "moral duty" with "social censure" — khaled

moral duties typically lead to laws. — khaled

Where are you getting this stuff from?

The first:

I'm saying you have no justification for that assumptions because the mere fact that adults now don't require a moral duty to perform acts of kindness does not mean that a world in which such moral duty did not exist would continue to behave that way. — Isaac

So it's mistaken to assume that because you now would act kindly even without the censure of your community that you would have reached that point without it. — Isaac

Because you are using them interchangeably.

And the second I thought was common sense.

Because you are using them interchangeably. — khaled

I meant to ask where you're getting the assumption that they're not interchangeable.

And the second I thought was common sense. — khaled

Right. Well that's the source if a lot of confusion. I don't think any if the other commentators here are using the term in that way, but more in the manner it's used in moral philosophy.

I meant to ask where you're getting the assumption that they're not interchangeable. — Isaac

It's not an assumption it's a definition. I think most here would agree that social censure and moral duty are different things. For instance, if I grew up in a neighbourhood where theft and murder are the norm, and I was reprimanded for not participating, I think most people would say that I do NOT have a moral duty to steal and murder.

if I grew up in a neighbourhood where theft and murder are the norm, and I was reprimanded for not participating, I think most people would say that I do NOT have a moral duty to steal and murder. — khaled

But those doing the reprimanding would consider it your moral duty to participate (gang loyalty, or whatever).

Not that I'm saying all social censure is in the form if moral duties - something like etiquette would be an example - but the expression of a communities moral duties largely takes the form of social censure, not legal recourse.

Nit that I'm saying all social censure is in the form if moral duties — Isaac

So not all social censure is a form of a moral duty.

but the expression of a communities moral duties largely takes the form of social censure, not legal recourse. — Isaac

And not all moral duties are expressed in the form of social censure.

Therefore the "assumption" that they're not interchangeable is warranted.

Therefore the "assumption" that they're not interchangeable is warranted. — khaled

It is when we're talking about morality in general. There, assumptions about the general case are entirely appropriate.

But this is all getting very much besides the point as my synonymous use was very specific and need not be generalised. The point is that you cannot assume people would act as they do in isolation from the social pressures around them and some of those social pressures are the expression of what society considers to be moral duties.

But if consent is something that matters, then the imposition is necessary, because its the conditio sine qua non for consent. If the core of morality is people deciding their own destiny, then it seems to follow that it's a moral good to create that ability. — Echarmion

Creating situations for suffering so you can get to consent.. This is honestly why I rarely form the argument around consent and just keep it at unnecessary suffering because at the end of the day, you are creating the suffering so you can ask consent. That is why I brought up the idea of let's say you know that a baby will get tortured if it is born. But it doesn't exist yet, so does this consideration matter? I mean according to your view nope, there is no thing to give consent, so who cares right? Fine, at that point the original AN argument stands.. causing unnecessary suffering onto another is wrong. You can make an argument combining both too. Unless you get consent, you shouldn't put someone into a negative state without knowing what the person wants. Why would the assumption be that this is okay?
Surely this goes back to something about suffering itself which makes its imposition on someone else wrong. That is not something intuitive or relevant to your judgements? If not, I'd like to know why you think you can just do that on behalf of someone else other than rhetoric for the sake of argument. Cause I doubt you really do, other than this case of procreation. I can't find out if this guy wants to be put in a state of negative situations.. so I'll go ahead and proceed. Wrong.

I mean obviously I do think it's permissible to cause impositions if you cannot get consent. Else we'd not be allowed to operate on unconscious patients etc. — Echarmion

And here's why in my first formulation in the post I said unnecessarily and absolute not instrumental.

The point is that you cannot assume people would act as they do in isolation from the social pressures around them and some of those social pressures are the expression of what society considers to be moral duties. — Isaac

Agreed. I didn't say people would act as they do in isolation from social pressures. However I think it's important to note that these "social pressures" are not shared. For example: When was the last time people censured you for not donating to charity? I find it likely that has never even happened (at least it's never happened to me). So we cannot say that donating to charity is obligatory by "social morality".

I don't see much point in talking about what "society considers moral" in the first place if by that you mean what we are socially pressured to do. As that is not constant across a society, much less across the world, so why should we care?

I don't see much point in talking about what "society considers moral" in the first place if by that you mean what we are socially pressured to do. As that is not constant across a society, much less across the world, so why should we care? — khaled

The thread is about antinatalism, which makes a moral claim. So we're talking about morality in some form. Since no moral claims are constant (shared across a society or the world), then antinatalism has to either demonstrate the source of its objectivity, or make arguments from within the relativistic framework, or just stop.

If we can agree that forcing individuals to do things without their consent is inherently problematic, then this raises a lot of questions regarding the act of having children. — Tzeentch

The question that needs answering first here is why consent is important. If it's because we care about some notion of "choosing your destiny", the conclusion doesn't seem to be to not have children, but the opposite.

In an abusive relationship you could cause harm by breaking up because doing so will alleviate more form yourself. — khaled

But how does this work if you're at the same time saying I am not allowed to assess harm for others?

I don't know what you mean by "harm is different", I don't know what I said to make you think that in any way. — khaled

The question was essentially when we are allowed to cause harm on the basis of our assessment that doing so is better than the alternative.

But regardless, even applying this "general rule" when do we have consent to give birth to people? — khaled

What would it mean to have consent from nonexistence?

So why are you now still trying to get me to make a claim that I never made for a reason? — khaled

I was asking you whether the question is relevant I'm your view.

It is not uncommon for consent to be impossible to obtain. For instance, we don't pull the plug on comatose patients. The whole POINT of consent is that the default value for any request is "no" until that request is actually made and answered positively. — khaled

We're not asking comatose patients for their consent. That'd be a pointless exercise. We ask what their interest is, according to our best guesses.

And saying "the default answer is no" doesn't help, because you can arbitrarily change the wording of the question to fit any result.

I already said "virtuous" is doing more good than the system demands.

"right" is the best possible outcome (donating to charity/saving the drowning person/ etc) — khaled

How can you have a moral system that doesn't demand the best possible outcome? If you know a better outcome is possible, why would you not demand that outcome?

Well if I were to take this to the extreme, then you have an abusive relationship. And I am pretty sure we can agree that the abusers in an abusive relationship are being immoral. — khaled

As I said, it seems that there is some kind of scale between everything being completely voluntary and everything being forced.

What do you mean? — khaled

You usually have the theoretical choice to not comply. Oppression doesn't take away your ability to make choices, it takes away your ability to make those choices operative by imposing consequences.

The thread is about antinatalism, which makes a moral claim. So we're talking about morality in some form. Since no moral claims are constant (shared across a society or the world), then antinatalism has to either demonstrate the source of its objectivity, or make arguments from within the relativistic framework, or just stop. — Isaac

I don't remember anyone making arguments from objectivity. But regardless you haven't said what is accomplished by talking about "societal morality" in this case.

But how does this work if you're at the same time saying I am not allowed to assess harm for others? — Echarmion

I have explained this countless times now. You are part of the calculation. You are part of these "others". Harming others is fine if it either you or them (again, because you are part of the calculation).

Edit: I misread. I never actually claimed that you are not allowed to assess harm for others though.

The question was essentially when we are allowed to cause harm on the basis of our assessment that doing so is better than the alternative. — Echarmion

When it is our job to minimize the other party's suffering AND when we know that our choice is actually minimizng suffering (vaccines for example). Which only really happens with dependents.

What would it mean to have consent from nonexistence? — Echarmion

What would it mean to have consent from an unconscious person? In both cases: Meaningless question. Point is, you need consent, and you don't have it. Doesn't matter why you don't have it.

I was asking you whether the question is relevant I'm your view. — Echarmion

It isn't because life isn't objectively good or bad.

We're not asking comatose patients for their consent. That'd be a pointless exercise. We ask what their interest is, according to our best guesses. — Echarmion

Not really. We don't pull the plug. Period. You don't "guess" you only look at the amount of harm done in both cases and pick the one with least harm. You take the conservative approach. I challenge you to come up with a situation where you pick the option that does more harm when consent is not available.

How can you have a moral system that doesn't demand the best possible outcome? If you know a better outcome is possible, why would you not demand that outcome? — Echarmion

What's wrong with having such a moral system? Why would you demand?

You usually have the theoretical choice to not comply. Oppression doesn't take away your ability to make choices, it takes away your ability to make those choices operative by imposing consequences. — Echarmion

Yes but when non compliance results in severe harm that's not really a choice. That scenario is what people call "an imposition". For instance: You theoretically could kill someone in public, you'll just be executed for it. In this scenario, while techincally there is a choice, practically there isn't. That is what impositions do, practically remove choices.

The question that needs answering first here is why consent is important. — Echarmion

Because without it one risks causing harm or distress against an individual's will, regardless of one's intention.

moral duties typically lead to laws. — khaled

It's a misunderstanding to think law is about morality. It's not. It's about economics first. Just claims have statutory limitations and lapse into moral claims that aren't legally enforceable. Crimes have statutory limitations too. The obligation to account based on IFRS or GAAP or to drive left instead of right aren't moral rules themselves. The majority of laws regulate, they don't enforce morality.

Not really. We don't pull the plug. Period. You don't "guess" you only look at the amount of harm done in both cases and pick the one with least harm. You take the conservative approach. I challenge you to come up with a situation where you pick the option that does more harm when consent is not available. — khaled

:100: :up:

Yes but when non compliance results in severe harm that's not really a choice. That scenario is what people call "an imposition". For instance: You theoretically could kill someone in public, you'll just be executed for it. In this scenario, while techincally there is a choice, practically there isn't. That is what impositions do, practically remove choices. — khaled

Yes, people fail to recognize de facto forced choices. For example, we can follow the impositions that are demanded of life or die. That is a de facto forced choice.

Fair enough.

Creating situations for suffering so you can get to consent.. — schopenhauer1

It's not about getting consent from some individual after they have been born. That'd be ridiculous. The point is realizing that consent is based on respect for an individuals freedom. It'd be entirely backwards to protect freedom by taking it away.

This is honestly why I rarely form the argument around consent and just keep it at unnecessary suffering because at the end of the day, you are creating the suffering so you can ask consent. That is why I brought up the idea of let's say you know that a baby will get tortured if it is born. But it doesn't exist yet, so does this consideration matter? I mean according to your view nope, there is no thing to give consent, so who cares right? Fine, at that point the original AN argument stands.. causing unnecessary suffering onto another is wrong. — schopenhauer1

So your approach to this discussion is to just use whatever argument is convenient? What's the point is you're putting the conclusion first and select arguments according to happenstance?

Can you name the first principles you base your view on?

You can make an argument combining both too. Unless you get consent, you shouldn't put someone into a negative state without knowing what the person wants. Why would the assumption be that this is okay?
Surely this goes back to something about suffering itself which makes its imposition on someone else wrong. That is not something intuitive or relevant to your judgements? — schopenhauer1

You cannot simply combine utilitarian and deontological approaches to the problem. The assumptions underlying them are fundamentally incompatible. If you're talking about suffering, you are talking about some kind of state of affairs. Something that exists "out there". If you're talking about consent, you're talking about a relationship between subjects, an idea.

If it is "something about suffering itself" then how does it then matter about how it's imposed? Suffering is either bad in and of itself or it isn't.

If not, I'd like to know why you think you can just do that on behalf of someone else other than rhetoric for the sake of argument. Cause I doubt you really do, other than this case of procreation. I can't find out if this guy wants to be put in a state of negative situations.. so I'll go ahead and proceed. Wrong. — schopenhauer1

We put people in jail against their will, do we not? The justification is that putting them in jail is necessary to preserve the freedom of everyone.

And here's why in my first formulation in the post I said unnecessarily and absolute not instrumental. — schopenhauer1

And who judges what is and isn't necessary? Whose goals define instrumentality?

When it is our job to minimize the other party's suffering AND when we know that our choice is actually minimizng suffering (vaccines for example). Which only really happens with dependents. — khaled

Why isn't it always our job to minimize suffering?

What would it mean to have consent from an unconscious person? In both cases: Meaningless question. Point is, you need consent, and you don't have it. Doesn't matter why you don't have it. — khaled

If you admit the question is meaningless, you cannot then go ahead and require it answered.

Not really. We don't pull the plug. Period. — khaled

I don't know where you live, but where I live we absolutely do pull the plug if there is sufficient evidence that this would be what the person wanted.

You don't "guess" you only look at the amount of harm done in both cases and pick the one with least harm. You take the conservative approach. I challenge you to come up with a situation where you pick the option that does more harm when consent is not available. — khaled

So if consent is not available, we then default to least harm? Then why do antinatalists bring up consent? Anyways this is basically what I said: When consent is not avialable, we don't default to "no". We default to figuring out what the person would want, their interest, which is the same as asking what is the least harm to them.

What's wrong with having such a moral system? Why would you demand? — khaled

It just seem absurd. You have figured out what the best thing to do would be, but then you go out and do something else, because why pick the best option?

Yes but when non compliance results in severe harm that's not really a choice. That scenario is what people call "an imposition". For instance: You theoretically could kill someone in public, you'll just be executed for it. In this scenario, while techincally there is a choice, practically there isn't. That is what impositions do, practically remove choices. — khaled

Ok, I guess we ultimately agree on this point. But I would go from this and conclude that therefore, being born is not an imposition, because it doesn't practically remove any choice. In fact it does the opposite: Create any and all choice.

Because without it one risks causing harm or distress against an individual's will, regardless of one's intention. — Tzeentch

And I think this puts an anti-natalist in a bind, because they would now need to argue that we must protect your will by preventing you from having a will, which just seem absurd.