Hence when subjects try to understand subjectivity as an object, they must try to take a distance with their own subjectivity, which tends to lead to logical paradoxes. — Olivier5
It just seems infinitely more useful to pin down what people actually mean by the word... — Kenosha Kid
Concrete things here seem to be just individuals. It's a cup and a person, not cups and people.A concrete thing is something that is not predicated of anything else. So the cup and the person are examples of concrete things. Whereas physical contact is a relation between concrete things. Since it's predicated of those concrete things, it is abstract, not concrete. — Andrew M
I think this correct; consider:...this is the position taken by Dennett. — Banno
The standard reaction to this claim is the complacent acknowledgment that while some people may indeed have succumbed to one confusion or fanaticism or another, one's own appeal to a modest, innocent notion of properties of subjective experience is surely safe. It is just that presumption of innocence I want to overthrow. I want to shift the burden of proof, so that anyone who wants to appeal to private, subjective properties has to prove first that in so doing they are not making a mistake. This status of guilty until proven innocent is neither unprecedented nor indefensible (so long as we restrict ourselves to concepts). Today, no biologist would dream of supposing that it was quite all right to appeal to some innocent concept of lan vital. Of course one could use the term to mean something in good standing; one could use lan vital as one's name for DNA, for instance, but this would be foolish nomenclature, considering the deserved suspicion with which the term is nowadays burdened. I want to make it just as uncomfortable for anyone to talk of qualia--or "raw feels" or "phenomenal properties" or "subjective and intrinsic properties" or "the qualitative character" of experience--with the standard presumption that they, and everyone else, knows what on earth they are talking about.
I don't see how. Any belief is a belief that... and the "that..." is always a proposition. — Banno
What more argument could you want? — Banno
beliefs regarding where to look next — fdrake
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/belief/Most contemporary philosophers characterize belief as a “propositional attitude”. Propositions are generally taken to be whatever it is that sentences express (see the entry on propositions). For example, if two sentences mean the same thing (e.g., “snow is white” in English, “Schnee ist weiss” in German), they express the same proposition, and if two sentences differ in meaning, they express different propositions. (Here we are setting aside some complications about that might arise in connection with indexicals; see the entry on indexicals.) A propositional attitude, then, is the mental state of having some attitude, stance, take, or opinion about a proposition or about the potential state of affairs in which that proposition is true—a mental state of the sort canonically expressible in the form “S A that P”, where S picks out the individual possessing the mental state, A picks out the attitude, and P is a sentence expressing a proposition. For example: Ahmed [the subject] hopes [the attitude] that Alpha Centauri hosts intelligent life [the proposition], or Yifeng [the subject] doubts [the attitude] that New York City will exist in four hundred years. What one person doubts or hopes, another might fear, or believe, or desire, or intend—different attitudes, all toward the same proposition. Contemporary discussions of belief are often embedded in more general discussions of the propositional attitudes; and treatments of the propositional attitudes often take belief as the first and foremost example.
You've just greatly enlarged the scope of belief... — Banno
Do you really form a belief that you will now look at your keyboard, and then look at your keyboard, or do you just look at your keyboard? — Banno
Are you going to posit that any action one performs is actually a belief? — Banno
All that's required is a single example of a belief that does not regard a statement. I gave you an example of a process of forming beliefs that do not regard statements. — fdrake
"highly weighted present visual information fits best into nose category which is anticipated to belong on a face therefore since previous experience of faces entails they are shaped in such and such a configuration and their salient features are expected to be in configuration Y promote eye movement towards expected location (given recalled face information) of salient facial features assuming they are in configuration Y" — fdrake
No, you havn't. YOu've just presented some fumbling words about faces... — Banno
You might be skirting about Bayesian analysis, which hangs on belief. What you describe is reminiscent of the function of neural network; neural networks are described in Bayesian terms. But look with care and you will see that Bayesian analysis uses belief as a propositional analysis. — Banno
Does it really have to be pointed out that any belief that A is a beleif that A is true? — Banno
If it is the case that we are both objects in the world and subjects taking account of it and/or ourselves, then the dichotomy cannot be used as a means to draw a distinction between us and our accounts...
— creativesoul
Us and our accounts are not the dichotomy, they are the same thing, in that the account is contained in us. An account is, after all, merely a judgement, thus the account belongs to that which judges. — Mww
...My body (in the world of things) has arms and legs (objects included in the world of things) is an account I make as a judge of things in the world belonging to my body. My account is not in the world, it is in me as the judge of the relatedness of things. — Mww
The only way to reject the counter-argument favoring the necessary subject/object dualism, is to deny the human cognitive system is inherently a logical system... — Mww
It isn’t my subjectivity I’m attempting to understand, in which would be found the logical paradox. — Mww
That’s where Michel Bitbol is going in his paper It is never known but it is the knower (thanks Wayfarer), following an intuition by Kitaro Nishida that our effort toward objective knowledge comes from consciousness and subjectivity but turns its back to it, while looking at its objects. — Olivier5
A concrete thing is something that is not predicated of anything else. So the cup and the person are examples of concrete things. Whereas physical contact is a relation between concrete things. Since it's predicated of those concrete things, it is abstract, not concrete.
— Andrew M
Concrete things here seem to be just individuals. It's a cup and a person, not cups and people. — Banno
While there are all sorts of language less creatures incapable of drawing correlations between different things, those aren't of interest here, for such creatures aren't capable of attributing meaning, and consciousness is the ability to attribute meaning.
— creativesoul
Good. Now we can remove the ghost of anthropomorphism from the dialectic. I just needed assurance, if not actual verification, so....thanks for that. — Mww
I’m not onboard with your rendering of consciousness, but that’s ok.We may return to that after I’ve a better understanding of the intricacies of your account. — Mww
Your body is not an account. Your account is most certainly in the world. — creativesoul
Can we at least agree that there is a difference between our bodies and our reports thereof? — creativesoul
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