Schopenhauer's metaphysical explanation of compassion and empirical explanations.

jancanc

Schopenhauer explains compassion metaphysically; through the concept of his will, all humans are manifestations of one identical will which lies beyond experience, we feel compassion since when we see another suffering we, as being form the same will, experience this suffering.
I have seen writers criticize this conception as being egoistic: I see that you are metaphysically me, so I act to help myself.

But some have come up with alterative accounts of compassion. Such as Julian Young, who states that

"what really moves the altruist is that she loves us, and is therefore moved to care equally for all members of the ‘us’, for self and others. On this representation of the altruist, no egoism of any sort is involved since the fundamental object of love is a nonego. Notice that an ‘us’, a community, is a natural entity a plurality of individuals. No appeal to metaphysics, to a non-spatio-temporal unity, is required to explain its existence."

How to classify this account? it seems empirical in the sense that it requires no appeal to metaphysics, but also seems to be a loosely phenomenological type of explanation since the person, via first person recognition, one recognizes that they belong to a community. However, strictly speaking, it can't be both an empirical and phenomenological account?

Pfhorrest

Empiricism is a subset of phenomenalism.

Mww

Schopenhauer explains compassion metaphysically; through the concept of his will, all humans are manifestations of one identical will which lies beyond experience — jancanc

Because it’s Schopenhauer, it is classified as transcendental, which is a metaphysical rendering. And it isn’t a concept of his will, but his concept of a will, from WWR, 1844.

Notice that an ‘us’, a community, is a natural entity a plurality of individuals. No appeal to metaphysics, to a non-spatio-temporal unity, is required to explain its existence." — jancanc

Unity is a schema, a member, of the category of quantity, community is a schema of the category of relation, both primarily Kantian, CPR,1787, hence also transcendental, therefore also a metaphysical rendering.

The entire notion is metaphysical.

Wayfarer

Schopenhauer explains compassion metaphysically; through the concept of his will, all humans are manifestations of one identical will which lies beyond experience, we feel compassion since when we see another suffering we, as being form the same will, experience this suffering. — jancanc

Could you be so kind as to indicate where Schopenhauer says this?

schopenhauer1

↪jancanc

I believe Schopenhauer's idea is not egoistic at all. Compassion is so lauded by Schop precisely because it is something which gets one out of the individuation cycle. Most interactions are egoistic but compassion sees everyone as the same metaphysical entity and we empathize by seeing someone else's suffering as the suffering that everyone shares and thus not individuated in the person at all but gets one out of one's own individuation. Compassion and aesthetic contemplation are two ways to get out of the individuation, while full asceticism would be the most complete way by completely denying the will.

8livesleft

Regarding altruistic acts, we can also see similar things in the animal world. Where you can even find animals taking care of other animals from a different species.

So, there seems to be this shared experience occurring where one can almost feel the other's distress. Because something is felt, it drives one towards action. The discomfort of others causes the self to sense discomfort as well and so there is the desire to alleviate that.

Putting the self in others' shoes seems to be innate. The experience felt by another is shared. Similar to how looking at a person yawning somehow causes us to yawn as well.

jancanc

↪Pfhorrest

in what sense would you say?

jancanc

↪Wayfarer

sure, mainly in Section 22 ofon the Basis of Morality.

jancanc

thanks for all the great answers. I do not agree with Young that Schopenhauer's metaphysics of compassion reduces to egoism, but I am more interested in how we would classify Young's account.

If we say Young's account is empirical and phenomenological, I seem to be conflating "empiricism" and "phenomenology"- surely these are not equivalent terms?

jancanc

↪8livesleft

The discomfort of others causes the self to sense discomfort as well and so there is the desire to alleviate that. — 8livesleft

but would you agree that the two "discomforts" are nevertheless empirically distinct?? You have your discomfort and I have mine, which is caused by yours?

jancanc

Compassion is so lauded by Schop precisely because it is something which gets one out of the individuation cycle. — schopenhauer1

Exactly! Egoism can only apply to individuation!

jancanc

"what really moves the altruist is that she loves us, and is therefore moved to care equally for all members of the ‘us’, for self and others. On this representation of the altruist, no egoism of any sort is involved since the fundamental object of love is a nonego. Notice that an ‘us’, a community, is a natural entity a plurality of individuals. No appeal to metaphysics, to a non-spatio-temporal unity, is required to explain its existence."

How to classify this account? it seems empirical in the sense that it requires no appeal to metaphysics, but also seems to be a loosely phenomenological type of explanation since the person, via first person recognition, one recognizes that they belong to a community. However, strictly speaking, it can't be both an empirical and phenomenological account? — jancanc

Empirical account in what way???
Phenomenological??

8livesleft

but would you agree that the two "discomforts" are nevertheless empirically distinct?? You have your discomfort and I have mine, which is caused by yours? — jancanc

Yes definitely distinct. The observer can only surmise what's happening based on their own personal experience. But there will still be that shared relatedness of observing another's experience that causes one to recall something that something similar also occurred to them.

With regards to yawning, you don't even have to be sleepy but when the person you're with (who is sleepy) yawns, it somehow causes you to yawn as well.

Or seeing your friends laughing at something you didn't yourself see but you still find yourself "copying" their reaction.

jancanc

Yes definitely distinct. The observer can only surmise what's happening based on their own personal experience. But there will still be that shared relatedness of observing another's experience that causes one to recall something that something similar also occurred to them.

With regards to yawning, you don't even have to be sleepy but when the person you're with (who is sleepy) yawns, it somehow causes you to yawn as well.

Or seeing your friends laughing at something you didn't yourself see but you still find yourself "copying" their reaction. — 8livesleft

Great answer, friend. But, when it comes to fellow feelings, would you personally term this phenomenon as empathy or compassion?

Possibility

Compassion is the extent to which the underlying impetus to increase awareness, connection and collaboration extends the perception of available value, capacity and resources (potentiality) beyond consolidation of the organism, determining interoceptive allocation of effort and attention.

Any perceived distinction between your discomfort and mine is a result of consolidation - ignorance, isolation or exclusion to preserve a level of integration against apparent structural limitations.

8livesleft

Great answer, friend. But, when it comes to fellow feelings, would you personally term this phenomenon as empathy or compassion? — jancanc

Well, empathy is more just sharing the feeling while compassion would be more of an outward expression of the desire to assist, alleviate. You would need empathy to first identify or confirm that the feelings are related. If you decide to do something about it then you would be expressing your compassion.

Wayfarer

↪jancanc

Thanks. I wasn't aware of the work, and found the Wikipedia entry on it. I note Schopenhauer submitted it in an essay competition, in which his was the only work, but it didn't receive a prize because it contained vituperative attacks on Hegel, and the judge was an Hegelian! (I love Schopenhauer's attacks on Hegel, btw. I think he was a much pithier writer than Hegel, although Hegel was always a model of bombastic verbosity.)

In any case, I can only agree with the sentiment expressed in the summary - that selfless compassion as the basis of morality. There's a work very well known in the East, Shantideva's Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra (Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life), which is a canonical text of Mahāyāna Buddhism, that expresses very similar ideas. Again the convergence of Schopenhauer's ideas and Eastern philosophy is evident, although any Buddhist would also add that understanding karma is equally important as a moral principle.

Of course, modern ethical theorists will generally try and ground any such accounts in the reality of social life alone, so as to avoid anything that hints of metaphysics. But I don't see how such accounts can be anything other than reductionist.

jancanc

modern ethical theorists will generally try and ground any such accounts in the reality of social life alone, so as to avoid anything that hints of metaphysics. But I don't see how such accounts can be anything other than reductionist. — Wayfarer

yes, agreed. In my opinion, try do reduce all ethics down to the empirical level. For example, in this chap's account...

"what really moves the altruist is that she loves us, and is therefore moved to care equally for all members of the ‘us’, for self and others. On this representation of the altruist, no egoism of any sort is involved since the fundamental object of love is a nonego. Notice that an ‘us’, a community, is a natural entity a plurality of individuals. No appeal to metaphysics, to a non-spatio-temporal unity, is required to explain its existence."

It seems to me to be empirical, but also a phenomenological account . But empiricism and phenomenology are distinct, so I am not sure how to characterise it. Like you said, it is reductionist....but empirically reductive...?

On the Basis of Morality is a great work. Here is a link to the full text: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/44929/44929-h/44929-h.htm

I agree with you about Hegel too... personally also Heidegger is similar....obfuscation of the highest oder. Using terms which really mean nothing. I never knew the judge (of OBM) was an Hegelian, but! He would have been most offended without a doubt hahah

Pfhorrest

↪jancanc

Phenomenalism is all about understand things in general from an experiential, first-person perspective. Empiricism is specifically about understanding reality through observation, which is a kind of experience.

True, empiricism is usually paired with a universalism about reality that thus requires agreement between different first-person experiences, i.e. intersubjectivity, but nothing ever said that phenomenalism has to be entirely solipsistic, caring about only one person’s experiences and no others.

jancanc

↪Pfhorrest

True, empiricism is usually paired with a universalism about reality that thus requires agreement between different first-person experiences, i.e. intersubjectivity, but nothing ever said that phenomenalism has to be entirely solipsistic, caring about only one person’s experiences and no others. — Pfhorrest

agreed. so, in a sense they are synonymous.... both require sense experience (of external world) as their bedrock? i think that is what you also mean?

(i think i will post my question again separately, I think the Schopenhauer part detracted from (people focused more on the Schopenhauer part rather than) the actual question I was posing!)

Schopenhauer's metaphysical explanation of compassion and empirical explanations.

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