What do you think about the harm principle? As in "prevent unnecessary harm and suffering?"

People are likely to follow that more than anything else and our laws are pretty much based on that principle.

What do you think about the harm principle? As in "prevent unnecessary harm and suffering?"

People are likely to follow that more than anything else and our laws are pretty much based on that principle. — 8livesleft

Certainly a good basis for antinatalism.. No reason to unnecessarily cause conditions of harm for the future person.

Selfish realist.

I found that defining "morality" or "moral behaviour" is the hardest. Well, maybe the second hardest, after defining "beauty". There is no consensus, although all living people have a working definition of morality and almost all living people agree that morality exists. But what it is, escapes definition.

This gets more convoluted when people don't consider morality just passively, but actively, such as Immanuel Kant did. Most modern moralists dont' just ask, "was this or that act moral", but they try to establish how to behave in the future to make one's life and actions ethical.

1. Nihilism- I conclude that nihilism is true due to the inability to logically justify any moral judgement (why rape is wrong, why I should help others, etc.).

2. Emotivism- I consider this to simply be factual, as evidence seems to show that we use the emotional part of our brain when answering moral questions.

4. Relativism- True because people have varying moral systems depending on culture, etc. — Pinprick

Emotivism is a theory of moral semantics. It's not just a theory that we use the emotional part of our brains when answering moral questions, but a theory that moral claims are just expressions of emotion like "boo this" and "yay that", the likes of which are not semantically capable of being true or false.

Nihilism and relativism, meanwhile, are theories of... moral ontology, maybe? About whether and in what way any moral claims are true. The former is a subset of the other, in any case; relativism is anything non-universalist, and nihilism, being radially anti-universalist, thus cannot help but be relativist.

And emotivism entails nihilism (since according to emotivism no moral claims can be true, or false for that matter), so if you just say "emotivism" then you imply nihilism and so relativism for free.

3. Hedonism- Essentially factual just like 2. It’s obvious that we avoid pain and pursue pleasure. — Pinprick

Hedonism isn't just the view that we do seek pleasure and avoid pain, it's the view that we should, and so is contrary to nihilism and thus emotivism. (But it can be of either an altruistic variety, like in utilitarianism, or an egoistic variety, like people usually assume it means; and the egoistic version is thus relativist, see below).

5. Egoism- True by default. Evolutionary pressures have led us to experience pleasure when we make choices that benefit ourselves (also, helping others oftentimes helps us as well). — Pinprick

Again, egoism isn't a view about what people do do, but what they should do. If egoism is true, then it is good for people to do what benefits them; and there is something that actually does benefit them. That means nihilism, strictly speaking, can't be true (if egoism is true).

Egoism entails relativism, though, since what is good according to egoism depends on which ego you ask.

6. Pragmatism- In life, I essentially ignore all of the above and instead just try to do whatever feels right and works for the particular situation. — Pinprick

This sounds like you don't actually agree with any of the above, since you ignore it all in practice.

I suspect what you're actually going for here is denying that there are any kind of moral facts about reality, but then in practice you still aim to do what is good. (I.e. what "works". What exactly does that mean here? There's the big question. What are we trying to do, in deciding on our moral opinions?) You just don't have any notion of how you can rigorously sort out what is good, since you can't apply the rigorous methods of sorting out what is real to morality, since morality isn't a part of reality, so you're just left with whatever you intuitively feel about it.

But maybe you could at least apply analogous methods?

I would suggest looking into non-descriptivist cognitivism, which I think will resolve that dilemma for you. It is a theory of moral semantics which holds that moral claims aren't aiming to describe facts about reality at all, much like emotivism, but that they are nevertheless cognitive claims, i.e. the likes of which are capable of being true or false in some sense or another, not just expressions of emotions that aren't even truth-apt.

This then enables universalism, but without supposing that there are some kind of weird metaphysically spooky moral features of reality that those universally true moral claims are describing. Which then leaves the question of how to tell which moral claims are true or false... but you've already got hedonism for that. It'll just have to be an altruistic hedonism, like utilitarianism, since universalism precludes egoism.

(But if you then apply the analogue of critical rationalist epistemology to that process of sorting out what's good in an altruistic hedoistic sense, you end up precluding consequentialism, as the moral analogue of confirmationism, leaving you with a kind of liberal deontology instead of straightforward utilitarianism).

values are both objective and subjective — Pinprick

Perhaps objective as in universal (i.e. altruistic), but not objective as in transcendent; and subjective as in phenomenal (e.g. hedonistic), but not subjective as in relative?

Agreeing with several parts of different theories may not have a label but it's basically as close to scientifically accurate as you can get. Several different brain regions are involved in different types of moral decision-making and these regions are variously associated with status, disgust, pleasure, group-identity, empathy, planning and fear (of punishment usually). So any and all philosophical systems which try to make out that morality is about harm reduction, or cultural norms, or golden-rules, or nothing at all...are all categorically wrong. We have irrefutable evidence that moral decisions are not made by consultation of any one of these rules, but rather by a varying, often contradictory consultation of several models at once depending on the specifics of the moral choice to be made.

Of course if you want to completely ignore the science and build your own castle in the air like everyone else seems to then I suggest nihilo-hedo-emoto-relativo-pragma-dubism.

Nihilism- I conclude that nihilism is true due to the inability to logically justify any moral judgement — Pinprick

Which nullifies the prospect of any discussion, because nothing that could be said would make any difference.

Which nullifies the prospect of any discussion, because nothing that could be said would make any difference. — Wayfarer

And you presume that logical justification is the only possible means of making any difference why...?

No, it's because to a nihilist, nothing you could say would make any difference. If it could make a difference, then they wouldn't be nihilist, because something - i.e. what you said - would matter.

to a nihilist, nothing you could say would make any difference. If it could make a difference, then they wouldn't be nihilist, because something - i.e. what you said - would matter. — Wayfarer

I thought it quite clear that 'moral nihilism' was being referred to, not universal nihilism. But maybe that was not as clear as it seemed to me.

What do you think about the harm principle? As in "prevent unnecessary harm and suffering?" — 8livesleft

I don’t think it can be applied universally in all situations.

Nothing is absolute. But what do you think of the principle in terms of the likelihood that it will be followed?

Basically, the question is just what label fits my moral views? I seem to agree with parts of several different theories... — Pinprick

Subjective Prescriptivism.

Emotivism is a theory of moral semantics. It's not just a theory that we use the emotional part of our brains when answering moral questions, but a theory that moral claims are just expressions of emotion like "boo this" and "yay that", the likes of which are not semantically capable of being true or false. — Pfhorrest

I agree with that also. I think it’s entailed from which part(s) of our brain is used.

Hedonism isn't just the view that we do seek pleasure and avoid pain, it's the view that we should, and so is contrary to nihilism and thus emotivism. — Pfhorrest

Considering the fact of hedonism render the “should” question moot. If that’s all we can do it doesn’t matter what we should do.

Again, egoism isn't a view about what people do do, but what they should do. — Pfhorrest

Again this seems an irrelevant question. If we cannot do otherwise, then it doesn’t matter, because there are no other viable alternatives.

What exactly does that mean here? — Pfhorrest

The short response is that it is whatever I feel is right. The keyword being feel. It isn’t rational or logical, and it isn’t based on facts. I can say that I consider outcomes before acting, at least some of the time, but whether or not the predicted outcome is good or bad depends on whether or not it benefits me, or is otherwise desirable. Things like potentially feeling guilty, or the likelihood of being punished are also factored in. Basically, I avoid pain and pursue pleasure, and what is painful/pleasurable is based entirely on emotion (and biology of course).

Perhaps objective as in universal (i.e. altruistic), but not objective as in transcendent; and subjective as in phenomenal (e.g. hedonistic), but not subjective as in relative? — Pfhorrest

Universal may be a better way to say it, but also relative, because they vary from culture to culture. Sort of like language, I suppose. All cultures have a word for beauty, but what they consider beautiful varies.

We have irrefutable evidence that moral decisions are not made by consultation of any one of these rules, but rather by a varying, often contradictory consultation of several models at once depending on the specifics of the moral choice to be made. — Isaac

Are you referring to dual process theory?

But what do you think of the principle in terms of the likelihood that it will be followed? — 8livesleft

I’m sure most people follow it...

:up:

Perhaps rather than ask others to try and find a label to categorize you it would more helpful for you to work out what you believe exactly. Labels are only markers, and trying to label oneself may be a way of sidestepping your actual philosophical exploration.

Are you referring to dual process theory? — Pinprick

Not necessarily. It could be a single process at a given time (though I do think dual process theory has it's place). It's only that there's no single method we use to determine a course of action in moral dilemmas, we use different approaches as the context changes. Any moral 'system' which tries to claim moral decisions are based on a single metric is just pointless armchair speculation without any reference to the real world in which this simply doesn't happen.

Any moral 'system' which tries to claim moral decisions are based on a single metric is just pointless armchair speculation without any reference to the real world in which this simply doesn't happen. — Isaac

Whether this is a relevant objection depends on what one is trying to achieve. If your goal is to describe how moral reasoning functions in general, then of course you want to be "as close to scientifically accurate as you can get." But moral philosophy is primarily concerned with normative questions. Objecting to Peter Singer's utilitarianism, for example, on the grounds that it doesn't fit the moral profile of the general population would be missing the point.

:up: :100: :clap:

For me that depends on an odd sort of private language (maybe not 'private', but oddly technical). To claim that one's process is addressing 'moral' decision-making, one must already know what type of decision-making is 'moral' as opposed to any other sort. And to know if one's process works, one must know what a 'good' decision should be, which again one would learn from experience.

So in order to understand the meaning of 'morality' and 'morally right' one must have learnt it by example from other people, and the evidence we have of the process other people are using is varied in the manner I described. Thus one is inevitably talking about the decision-making we actually do.

One could, I suppose, having learnt how to use the terms say "scrap all that and decide thus", but what would make anyone do so aside from their moral desires, the satisfaction of which has just been described.

It would seem like setting out an algorithm which we've no intention of following to solve a problem we already have the answer to.

But yes, you're right in that my comment is of no consequence to such a project.

If it could make a difference, then they wouldn't be nihilist, because something - i.e. what you said - would matter. — Wayfarer

Meaning (mattering) isn’t tied to truth, reason, or really anything else for that matter. Superstitious beliefs/actions demonstrate this rather easily.

It's only that there's no single method we use to determine a course of action in moral dilemmas, we use different approaches as the context changes. — Isaac

I won’t argue against that, but I would venture to say that the method (faculty?) that actually does the deciding is the one that appeals to us emotionally. Very often there are competing “reasons” for performing a certain action, or not; but the reason that is most appealing is the one that wins.

And I’m using the term emotion very broadly to include things like feelings, desires, intuitions, etc.

That’s not what’s going on here. I’ve thought out my moral positions, but of course I’d value input into any obvious contradictions in my thinking. This is more about finding a way to answer someone who asks what morality I ascribe to. It would be a lot easier if there was a term that fit me that I could just say, and the other person would understand the gist of my position, rather than having to explain all the various aspects of it.

This is more about finding a way to answer someone who asks what morality I ascribe to. — Pinprick

From what you’ve said so far I think emotivist is the most succinct and comprehensive label for what you say you think, since it strictly entails nihilism, which strictly entails relativism and pragmatically entails egotism, usually a presumably hedonistic egotism.

But since you say that in practice you ignore all those things that you say you think, it still looks like you don’t actually think them, but just say you do. So I’d recommend instead saying that you think the things that you act like you think, and finding the right label for that instead.

But since you say that in practice you ignore all those things that you say you think, it still looks like you don’t actually think them, but just say you do. So I’d recommend instead saying that you think the things that you act like you think, and finding the right label for that instead. — Pfhorrest

I get what you’re saying, but it’s just difficult for me to say I believe something that I know is irrational. IOW, all of my moral actions are irrational in my view. As such, I really see no need in trying to justify them since it can’t be accomplished. That said, in practice I have general principles that I try not to violate for emotional/pragmatic reasons (guilt, punishment, undesirable outcomes, etc.). And my principles are heavily weighted towards what I shouldn’t do, as opposed to what I should do. Otherwise, that’s about it, unless you think it’s necessary to get into what my principles actually are.

delete :lol:

I think I have it figured out. Emotivism leads to relativism, relativism leads to nihilism, nihilism leads to pragmatism, pragmatism leads to egoism, and, last but not the least, egoism leads to hedonism.

The fact that morality is by and large an emotional entity implies that it'll vary more than agree. That being the case, we come face to face with being unable to justify morality in any universally acceptable sense. Ergo, we must be practical and the only person we can actually take care of is ourselves. So, let's make ourselves happy.

:lol:

I get what you’re saying, but it’s just difficult for me to say I believe something that I know is irrational. IOW, all of my moral actions are irrational in my view. As such, I really see no need in trying to justify them since it can’t be accomplished. That said, in practice I have general principles that I try not to violate for emotional/pragmatic reasons (guilt, punishment, undesirable outcomes, etc.). — Pinprick

I guess I'm just seeing echoes of my past self in your self-description. There was a period in my philosophical development where although I had definite opinions on a bunch of philosophical questions, regarding both reality and morality, it looked like it wasn't possible for any such opinions (mine or others') to be grounded in any way that made any justifiably better than any others, any of them anything other than just as equally baseless as anything else.

But I did eventually figure out a pragmatic basis for grounding my philosophy -- both sides of it, the descriptive side and the prescriptive side -- and since you say of yourself that in practice you disregard all of those broadly-speaking "skeptical" moral viewpoints and act on other principles instead, I feel a glimmer of hope that you too will recognize the rationality of pragmatic justification, and so be able to hold up the principles that you act on in practice as rationally justifiable principles, and not just your baseless opinions.

Something that I hope might help in that regard, which was part of my journey too, is to look into how all of the arguments for moral skepticism have analogues about reality as well, analogues that most people (probably yourself included) are much more easily inclined to refute for obvious-seeming practical reasons. Those same reasons, applied analogously against the arguments for moral skepticism, helped me to ground my moral principles on equal footing as my epistemological/ontological principles.

And my principles are heavily weighted towards what I shouldn’t do, as opposed to what I should do. — Pinprick

That is, I think, a very good principle in itself, and the moral analogue of critical rationalism, which I think is the correct epistemology. Both in deciding what to believe and in deciding what to intend, the focus is best put on avoiding the most wrong options, rather than on identifying one specific uniquely right option.

(And that right there is 25% of the way to completing the analogy between reality and morality already).