I think this is mostly down to interpretation. — Echarmion

Agreed.

I mean if you don't care about whether rules like "you cannot kill people" can be derived from more basic principles, that's fine. But it is kinda the point of moral philosophy. — Echarmion

Well whatever "more basic principles" you find from which "you cannot kill people" derives I can still ask that question about. As in "where do these more basic principles derive from". You have to stop at some point. And I don't really care to dig 50 layers in for no reason. A handful will do.

I only really associate "conservative" with a political movement and an approach to social questions. In that sense it's very much associated with the root "to conserve". I don't know where you take your usage of the word from, but if that's the definition you wanna go with, I am not going to argue. — Echarmion

Definition of conservative by marriam webster: 2-b: Marked by moderation or caution.

It's trivially true only if you suppose that people that don't exist nevertheless exist — Echarmion

That's just false.
Grass is greener than freedom. Because freedom has no color.

The problem is that you then have to answer why we're not nuking the planet into oblivion. — Echarmion

Because that hurts people, and Antinatalists are striving to eradicate all suffering. I don't understand why people keep using this ridiculous argument. It's tiring.

And if we cannot divine what the child's feelings are about being forced to live, isn't that a great reason to refrain from forcing it to?
— Tzeentch

This implies that there is a child with feelings, floating around as a disembodied soul or something, before the decision to even have a child is made.

Otherwise, the sequence of events doesn't work out, because by the time there is a child, it's already living, and the relevant decision is in the past. — Echarmion

It doesn't imply that. It implies precisely what it says. That by taking this course of action you can have a child that hates life. And that is reason enough to not have them.

"The relevant decision is in the past" so what? Doesn't say anything about whether or not the decision was right to take.

If you’re indifferent, then you don’t care enough either way to make the issue a moral one. — Pinprick

That doesn't make it not a moral issue. Gangsters are indifferent to your suffering. Doesn't mean they can go around shooting people.

Not putting much thought into an action doesn't make it okay to do...

Then we arrive at the problem already presented:

Let's say one lives in absolutely dire poverty and there is no doubt that any offspring one may bring forth will also lead a short and miserable life.

The line of reasoning you present would see no issue with birthing children in such conditions, since there's no individual whose well-being we need to take into account preceding the birth. — Tzeentch

If a baby is 99% sure to get tortured if born, we don't need it to be born to have torture, so that torture exists so that we can then say it is wrong. — schopenhauer1

This is a straw man by the way. Nobody argues this.

Have you even read the OP? Because this was dealt with in there. It's not a problem.

It wasn't dealt with. It was cleverly avoided.

You're presented your premise. I've presented you with an implication of that premise. If you accept one, you accept the other.

It's not avoided at all. I specifically mention unavoidable poverty.

Because that hurts people, and Antinatalists are striving to eradicate all suffering. I don't understand why people keep using this ridiculous argument. It's tiring. — khaled

It won't hurt if you use enough bombs. And anyways, what is the very brief suffering of a few billion compared to the unfathomable suffering of billions upon billions of future generations?

That's just false.
Grass is greener than freedom. Because freedom has no color. — khaled

Well then, nothing else needs to be said. Your argument ultimately rests on nonsense, in the most literal sense of the word.

Then we arrive at the problem already presented: — Tzeentch

I'm not sure I see this as a problem. There are other ways that the situation can be avoided without establishing a moral injunction against "irresponsible parents".

there needs to be an acceptance of the relativistic framework. — Isaac


There is. And I've repeatedly said there is. On multiple threads. — khaled

What I'm referring to is when you say...

if I grew up in a neighbourhood where theft and murder are the norm, and I was reprimanded for not participating, I think most people would say that I do NOT have a moral duty to steal and murder. — khaled

...you imply there's a moral duty beyond that which any community merely 'think' is a moral duty. Again, basic equivocation is all that carries this argument. When we say people consider social censure to be equivalent to moral duties you play the objectivist and point to negative examples. When we say that morality is about more than just consent and harm reduction you play the relativist and say "not for me it isn't". It's disingenuous to keep switching as it suits your argument. @schopenhauer1 is far worse than you, but it's nonetheless a feature of antinatalist argument it seems.

How would one argue as a moral relativist in your book if "you wouldn't do X would you?" is somehow indicating moral naturalism. I would think a moral naturalist would say "You shouldn't do X". He won't ask what you think because that is irrelevant to him, within his framework he already knows he's right.

I don't think there is anything that implies that the speaker there is a moral naturalist. I think you have a bad habit of reading what you want into what others write. — khaled

Anything which attempts to work forward from some premise to undermine an already held position is a form of moral realism.

We have a moral intuition that we should not cause unnecessary harm without consent. We also have a moral intuition that ending the human race would be wrong. The task of any moral relativist might be to document and maybe explain both those sentiments. It is only the task of a moral realist to attempt to show one to e 'wrong' by use of the other.

Maybe despite being relativistic, I am trying to see whether or not there are people who share the same premises but don't end up with the same conclusion, and if so how they do it, just out of personal interest. — khaled

Fair enough, but your comments often bely this approach.

It's not avoided at all. I specifically mention unavoidable poverty. — Benkei

So then, do you accept the implication of your premise?

I'm not sure I see this as a problem. — Echarmion

The problem is simple. If one accepts the premise that children do not have a well-being to take into account before they are born, this implies that it is perfectly acceptable to have children even when one is fully aware that they are causing them a life-time of suffering.

To me this contradicts any conceivable notion of parenting and morality.

It won't hurt if you use enough bombs. — Echarmion

The way I define harm is doing something to someone that they don't want done. People don't want to die. Simple.

Well then, nothing else needs to be said. Your argument ultimately rests on nonsense, in the most literal sense of the word. — Echarmion

I wouldn't be so sure. Your main problem is that you cannot compare the suffering of someone to the "suffering of nothing". Maybe that's true. But that would imply some nasty things I'll start with one.

Malicious genetic engineering is fine. Even if your next child would have been born healthy. Because there is no actual harm being done when you genetically engineer a child to be blind and deaf for example. There was not a child that was harmed, as once the child is born they are already blind and deaf, the relevant decision is in the past.

I am sure you don't agree. But how do you justify it? There is no one being harmed here, and so no comparison can be made. You cannot compare the non-existent "potential" unmodified child with the one you genetically modified. Because one of those doesn't exist.

This is why I think the comparison is legitimate. I don't see another way you can have malicious genetic engineering be wrong without it.

...you imply there's a moral duty beyond that which any community merely 'think' is a moral duty. — Isaac

Incorrect. Look at my wording:

I think most people would say that I do NOT have a moral duty to steal and murder. — khaled

Had I been a moral objectivist I wouldn't have included the bolded area. I would have just outright said that you have a moral duty not to steal and murder.

I never play the objectivist, I operate within premises I think we agree on.

Anything which attempts to work forward from some premise to undermine an already held position is a form of moral realism. — Isaac

Incorrect. I could work from a commonly held premise to undermine a conclusion that does not follow from it by showing inconsistencies, or connections people have not noticed. Or I could show that some commonly held premises lead to contradictory conclusions.

We also have a moral intuition that ending the human race would be wrong. — Isaac

You*. As I said, we don't agree here. So by your own words:

It's disingenuous to keep switching as it suits your argument — Isaac

It is only the task of a moral realist to attempt to show one to e 'wrong' by use of the other. — Isaac

Agreed. Which is why I don't do it.

Your main problem is that you cannot compare the suffering of someone to the "suffering of nothing". Maybe that's true. But that would imply some nasty things I'll start with one. — khaled

I've noticed that these implications have been pointed out on several occasions by you, and I, and none of us have received much response.

So then, do you accept the implication of your premise? — Tzeentch

What premisse and what implication?

Premise: The interests of a future child do not exist.

Implication: Actions that willfully undermine said child's non-existent interests are acceptable.

Read the OP again. Then tell me where you find that premisse.

It's what and I were discussing before you interjected.

You noted it was "dealt with" and "not a problem".

Yes, because you're misunderstanding the objection made by both him and me.

The problem is simple. If one accepts the premise that children do not have a well-being to take into account before they are born, this implies that it is perfectly acceptable to have children even when one is fully aware that they are causing them a life-time of suffering.

To me this contradicts any conceivable notion of parenting and morality. — Tzeentch

Malicious genetic engineering is fine. Even if your next child would have been born healthy. Because there is no actual harm being done when you genetically engineer a child to be blind and deaf for example. There was not a child that was harmed, as once the child is born they are already blind and deaf, the relevant decision is in the past.

I am sure you don't agree. But how do you justify it? — khaled

Both these problems stem from looking at morality as a set of injunctions against specific outcomes, like a criminal law code listing a bunch of injuries you are not allowed to cause. And if a victim cannot be found and thus a prohibition not established, it then follows whatever you do is moral.

The alternative view is to ask what reasons we have for doing something, and whether those reasons are "good". Should I follow these reasons in other circumstance? Shoud everyone? Creating suffering for the sake of suffering is not an acceptable motivation regardless of the outcome. It doesn't matter if I apply it by genetically engineering beings that suffer, or whether I punch my neighbor in the face for fun.

Torture already exists. It's the individual child that does not. — Echarmion

So, I'm not going to bother with the previous comments, because this answers your supposed problems with the metaphysics of no existing person prior to their birth.

This isn't the same argument though. This goes back to what I said earlier. You can avoid the problem of causality and attributing a will to nonexistence by committing to just eradicating suffering as a phenomenon. The problem is that you then have to answer why we're not nuking the planet into oblivion. — Echarmion

So how many times does consent and the individual matters do I have to say? How is nuking someone who already exists respecting the individual? Now that they exist, indeed they do have thoughts, desires, fears, preferences, etc. Ironically, this is back to making a decision for someone else again.

I am absolutely NOT an aggregate utilitarian. That is to say, it should be based on individual's decisions as to their own state's of being (which obviously, cannot even in theory be had prior to birth).

Also, another thing to consider is there is a difference between starting existence and continuing it. As I said many times earlier, prior to birth, there is no person who could be harmed by not being born. There is no person also who has any interests that would like to be preserved. Once born, people often fear death, have their own interests thy want to pursue. This doesn't negate being better off not existing, it only means that there are interests and values held once born that would be taken away. So it is not a symmetry, it is not the same preventing birth and discontinuing already existing life. So both from a consent issue, respecting the individual, and from the perspective of a person with interests vs. a person who never existed to have interests, this would be incomparable.

But then it's me who gets to judge, isn't it? — Echarmion

Yes. You can follow principles I disagree with. It's like veganism. Maybe veganism is right, but it shouldn't be forced.

I do believe in future outcomes. The problem is that you want us to act as if the outcome has simultaneously happened and not happened. — Echarmion

I don't see why you say that. We know suffering exists, with almost 100% certainty. We know of the varieties and kinds that could happen. We also know there is unknown sufferings we didn't even think of. All these things can be prevented. Doesn't seem hard to me.

Explain it then, instead of beating around the bush.

Both these problems stem from looking at morality as a set of injunctions against specific outcomes, like a criminal law code listing a bunch of injuries you are not allowed to cause. And if a victim cannot be found and thus a prohibition not established, it then follows whatever you do is moral.

The alternative view is to ask what reasons we have for doing something — Echarmion

The latter must include the former. When looking at reasons to do something, some of those reasons will be "bad" and therefore the action should not be done. For example malicious genetic engineering. I am asking why that is bad.

Creating suffering for the sake of suffering is not an acceptable motivation regardless of the outcome. It doesn't matter if I apply it by genetically engineering beings that suffer, or whether I punch my neighbor in the face for fun. — Echarmion

What is the reason that makes creating suffering acceptable in the case of having children then?

It's in the OP. Since you weren't able to distill the premisse you thought we meant, why don't you ask questions about the part you don't seem to understand instead?

This is a straw man by the way. Nobody argues this. — Benkei

Yet, perhaps inadvertently you seem to be arguing this.

It doesn't logically follow from anything said and alluding to it like this as if it does makes a piss poor argument.

It doesn't logically follow from anything said and alluding to it like this as if it does makes a piss poor argument. — Benkei

Let's go back. I am essentially saying that you do not account for a future child who will exist and you do not seem to like the idea of generalizing the idea that suffering exists and a child will be born that will almost certainly suffer. You don't like taking instances of suffering and summing it up and then applying it for the future child. These are perfectly in the realm of human reasoning. We can take specific instances and group them as instances of the same category. We can project these instances in the future.

If you think these indeed are legitimate moves, then your argument about proximate causes and metaphysical limitations are moot.

Both these problems stem from looking at morality as a set of injunctions against specific outcomes, like a criminal law code listing a bunch of injuries you are not allowed to cause. And if a victim cannot be found and thus a prohibition not established, it then follows whatever you do is moral. — Echarmion

Not quite.

My premise started with an analysis of what child birth is; forcing an individual to experience life without their consent.

Your objection was that an individual that does not yet exist, has no will or well-being to take into account, thus no consent is required.

What I sought to point out is that your objection implies that actions that undermine the well-being of a future child cannot be considered wrong or immoral under your premise, which goes against all notions that I am able to conceive of what is considered "good".

The alternative view is to ask what reasons we have for doing something, and whether those reasons are "good". Should I follow these reasons in other circumstance? Shoud everyone? Creating suffering for the sake of suffering is not an acceptable motivation regardless of the outcome. It doesn't matter if I apply it by genetically engineering beings that suffer, or whether I punch my neighbor in the face for fun. — Echarmion

If you wish to shift morality from being about outcomes to being about intentions, I'll take the next step and state that "good" behavior requires both intention and outcome.

Either way I do not see how this deals with the problem I have presented.

The latter must include the former. When looking at reasons to do something, some of those reasons will be "bad" and therefore the action should not be done. For example malicious genetic engineering. I am asking why that is bad. — khaled

We'd need to know the reason why we're doing it thoug. For example, if we're creating some sort of slave caste, because we'd like others to serve us as slaves, this seems like "bad" motivation regardless of the fact that no slaves are yet around. Should we act with the intention to make other sentient being serve us? I'd say no.

What is the reason that makes creating suffering acceptable in the case of having children then? — khaled

For example, you may want children so you can help create a new generation of compassionate and capable humans.

What I sought to point out is that your objection implies that actions that undermine the well-being of a future child cannot be considered wrong or immoral under your premise, which goes against all notions that I am able to conceive of what is considered "good". — Tzeentch

As I already said, it doesn't imply that such actions cannot be considered wrong or immoral. Only that the moral weight cannot come from the will or interest of the non-existent child. We haven't actually excluded that there is an overarching moral principle hat says to not have children when you cannot adequately support them.

If you wish to shift morality from being about outcomes to being about intentions, I'll take the next step and state that "good" behavior requires both intention and outcome. — Tzeentch

You don't control the outcomes though.

Either way I do not see how this deals with the problem I have presented. — Tzeentch

I don't have a problem with admitting that there are some things I still need to figure out regarding the moral weight of future people. But I nevertheless feel very confident that tying yourself into knots trying to somehow attribute personhood to unborn children while maintaining that they don't exist is the solution.

Also, another thing to consider is there is a difference between starting existence and continuing it. As I said many times earlier, prior to birth, there is no person who could be harmed by not being born. — schopenhauer1

Then it follows that necessarily there is also no person who could be harmed by being born.

So how many times does consent and the individual matters do I have to say? How is nuking someone who already exists respecting the individual? Now that they exist, indeed they do have thoughts, desires, fears, preferences, etc. Ironically, this is back to making a decision for someone else again. — schopenhauer1

You're ignoring the context of my comment. As I said over and over, you can either focus on consent, but then run into the problems discussed at length, or you focus on eliminating on suffeirng, but then you run into the question of why bother with consent if it's ultimately suffering we care about.

Both legs of the argument fail on their own terms. Stitching them together to form an inorganic whole doesn't help.

I don't see why you say that. We know suffering exists, with almost 100% certainty. We know of the varieties and kinds that could happen. We also know there is unknown sufferings we didn't even think of. All these things can be prevented. Doesn't seem hard to me. — schopenhauer1

Sure they can be prevented. By nuking everyone, like I said. But you don't want to do that, because you care about consent. But when I bring up that consent cannot possibly apply, you go back and say that this doesn't matter because it's about preventing suffering, and so round and round we go.

You have chosen to use two fundamentally incompatible principles, and switch between them as the defense of your position requires.

Then it follows that necessarily there is also no person who could be harmed by being born. — Echarmion

No that does not follow.

You're ignoring the context of my comment. As I said over and over, you can either focus on consent, but then run into the problems discussed at length, or you focus on eliminating on suffeirng, but then you run into the question of why bother with consent if it's ultimately suffering we care about.

Both legs of the argument fail on their own terms. Stitching them together to form an inorganic whole doesn't help. — Echarmion

I think you can combine them as the locus of ethics is at the individual level, and one of the most important implications here is what people decide to do with their own lives, especially something like ending their own state of existence. However, even suffering taken in its own accord, there is an asymmetry between starting and continuing an existence. Starting existence, there is no person to be harmed. If born, they will be harmed. As for discontinuing someone born, most people would say death is a great harm to them. And yes, you can have it such that suffering is sufficiently bad enough to never have been, but life sufficiently good enough that once born, would not want one's interests obliterated.

Sure they can be prevented. By nuking everyone, like I said. But you don't want to do that, because you care about consent. But when I bring up that consent cannot possibly apply, you go back and say that this doesn't matter because it's about preventing suffering, and so round and round we go.

You have chosen to use two fundamentally incompatible principles, and switch between them as the defense of your position requires. — Echarmion

It can work on both fronts, and both fronts combined. My position has always had the element that ethics is at the locus of the individual and not for some cause. Killing someone to stop suffering would bypass the individual would not be respecting the individual as a person with dignity. Perhaps the very basis why issues of harm/suffering/causing unnecessary impositions on another should be the basis of ethics.