For me that depends on an odd sort of private language (maybe not 'private', but oddly technical). To claim that one's process is addressing 'moral' decision-making, one must already know what type of decision-making is 'moral' as opposed to any other sort. And to know if one's process works, one must know what a 'good' decision should be, which again one would learn from experience.

So in order to understand the meaning of 'morality' and 'morally right' one must have learnt it by example from other people, and the evidence we have of the process other people are using is varied in the manner I described. Thus one is inevitably talking about the decision-making we actually do. — Isaac

We learn how to use moral language from other people, but we don't necessarily learn how to be moral in the same way (although there is an overlap between these two learning processes). We acquire a common language, but we don't generally acquire a common morality with all language users - which, of course, is what makes moral disagreement possible.

One could, I suppose, having learnt how to use the terms say "scrap all that and decide thus", but what would make anyone do so aside from their moral desires, the satisfaction of which has just been described.

It would seem like setting out an algorithm which we've no intention of following to solve a problem we already have the answer to. — Isaac

The problem that you are pointing at is that of persuasion. How persuasion happens is not simple and straightforward, but we know that it does happen.

We learn how to use moral language from other people, but we don't necessarily learn how to be moral in the same way — SophistiCat

So how is it that you imagine we do learn how to be moral?

We acquire a common language, but we don't generally acquire a common morality with all language users - which, of course, is what makes moral disagreement possible. — SophistiCat

Definitional disagreements are common too, so I don't see the presence of disagreements as an indicator on it's own of a radically different process.

The problem that you are pointing at is that of persuasion. How persuasion happens is not simple and straightforward, but we know that it does happen. — SophistiCat

I was actually referring to the individual themselves (although I suppose you could still see this a 'persuading oneself' but that seems a little schizophrenic). Writing a spiel about one's moral process is not indicative that one actually makes moral decisions that way. The overwhelming weight of evidence is to the contrary.

So, let's make ourselves happy. — TheMadFool

Just want to point out that the knowledge required to do this for any sustained length of time almost certainly must include knowing the interconnectedness of us all. So, in order for me to be happy, at the very least those I deeply care about must also be relatively happy. Ensuring that likely means that I will need to put forth some effort into their happiness as well, which may require sacrifice on my part. So, ironically, in order to be egotistical, I must also at times be altruistic. I suppose the out is to simply not care about others, but then you have to deal with loneliness and having virtually no support system. I think the idea of self-actualization is basically just an expansion of this model from one’s inner circle, to one’s community, country, world, universe, or even all life itself.

That is, I think, a very good principle in itself, and the moral analogue of critical rationalism, which I think is the correct epistemology. Both in deciding what to believe and in deciding what to intend, the focus is best put on avoiding the most wrong options, rather than on identifying one specific uniquely right option. — Pfhorrest

Appreciate your input in all of this. I just wanted to also say that I personally seem to lack much empathy. So, my principles are somewhat of a tangible line I don’t want to allow myself to cross, because it’s likely that my emotional response wouldn’t be strong enough by itself to prevent me from doing bad things. So for me personally, I probably need to develop some principles that guide me towards positive actions as well. Otherwise, I come across as being self-absorbed and inconsiderate, which I suppose I probably am. But that’s probably just a “me” thing.

So, ironically, in order to be egotistical, I must also at times be altruistic. — Pinprick

That's not just ironic, it's a contradiction.

Let's be pragmatic here, shall we? The human condition either already is or is on the verge of becoming the way I'll describe it below:

Humanity is like a spaceship leaking precious air, there are 4 astronauts, and only 1 oxygen tank available containing just enough of the precious gas for 1 person.

If you're altruistic and share the oxygen tank all of you will die and, unfortunately, sacrificing, another act of altruism, will require 3 astronauts to give up their lives. Only 1 astronaut will make it.

If you're egoistic, you'll take the oxygen tank and live to see another day. The result, 1 astronaut will survive.

As you can see, it doesn't matter whether you're egoistic or altruistic, only 1 person will get out of this harrowing situation with their life still intact.

Well, I don’t really see how life is analogous to your spaceship scenario, but after thinking about it if you’re only being altruistic because it benefits you, it probably doesn’t actually qualify as altruism.

... if you’re only being altruistic because it benefits you, it probably doesn’t actually qualify as altruism. — Pinprick

Why not? It seems to me selfishness (i.e. ego(centr)ism), not self-interestedness (i.e. conatus), is the opposite of altruism, which benefits the altruist - indirectly, non-reciprocally - iff others benefit (e.g. parenting, eldercare, teaching / mentoring, emergency first response (rescue), socially responsible investing / donating, etc).

Maybe you’re right, but I just always viewed altruism as helping others while gaining nothing (I.e. helping others strictly for their sake). An example of this being jumping in front of a train to save someone’s life, while sacrificing your own (although even in this case there is the argument that being viewed as a hero, and that the posthumous recognition/praise for the act is the determining motivation; thereby not altruistic either).

Selfishness may be altruism’s opposite (as white is to black), but that doesn’t make self-interestedness it’s equal (just as red is not black, but also not white).

Appreciate your input in all of this. I just wanted to also say that I personally seem to lack much empathy. So, my principles are somewhat of a tangible line I don’t want to allow myself to cross, because it’s likely that my emotional response wouldn’t be strong enough by itself to prevent me from doing bad things. So for me personally, I probably need to develop some principles that guide me towards positive actions as well. Otherwise, I come across as being self-absorbed and inconsiderate, which I suppose I probably am. But that’s probably just a “me” thing. — Pinprick

That also sounds a lot like me.

Honestly I think emotional empathy is a pretty weak justification for any notion of morality. I want to say to some people who think that it grounds all of everyone's morality "so the only reason that you don't [insert awful thing] is because you just don't happen to feel like it, but if you did feel like it you'd just do it!?" And these same people seem to need some kind of self-interested excuse to do something nice for someone else.

Whereas on the other hand I feel like doing pretty awful things pretty frequently, but don't (usually, when I'm not in some kind of crisis state losing all self-control), because those aren't the kinds of things I think should be done, so why the hell would I do them if I could help it? And likewise, the question of "why do nice things for people" just perplexes me -- that's just the thing to do, and if it's not some kind of awful burden to do so, why wouldn't you just do that by default?

And not because my heart bleeds for all the poor souls out there. I shrugged the morning of 9/11 because that's something far away that I doesn't affect me personally (at least not immediately) and I can't do anything about. I don't really give a fuck about other people, emotionally, but when I'm deciding what to do myself, in my life, why wouldn't I do the thing (like help someone) that I think people generally should do (since I'm a person too), so long as I can manage it?

Whereas on the other hand I feel like doing pretty awful things pretty frequently, but don't (usually, when I'm not in some kind of crisis state losing all self-control), because those aren't the kinds of things I think should be done, — Pfhorrest

Why do you think those things shouldn’t be done?

Short version is suffering (phenomenologically, like as in pain) is bad, and nobody's suffering is any more or less important than anyone else's, and those things would cause someone to suffer. Suffering is bad and everyone's is equally important for the same reasons that observations can falsify beliefs and all observations matter. Which reason is pretty much because if we assumed otherwise (and we cannot help but tacitly assume one way or the other), we would be unable to rationally resolve disagreements or otherwise answer questions, either about what is true or what is good, and so would not have that map of where to go from where we are (so to speak), and so would be acting without that guidance and so would most likely fail (unless we just got super lucky) at whatever we're ultimately trying to do. Those assumptions could of course be false, but we could never be sure of that, and it would be imprudent to merely assume that rather than the contrary.

Honestly I think emotional empathy is a pretty weak justification for any notion of morality. — Pfhorrest

So yours is a sort of intellectual empathy, right? Cognitive empathy.

Yeah I guess you could call it that.

Suffering is bad and everyone's is equally important for the same reasons that observations can falsify beliefs and all observations matter. — Pfhorrest

bert1's suffering is much more important than anyone else's, because I am bert1. Under the spreading chestnut tree, I sold you and you sold me. Do it to Julia.

That doesn't work for observations about beliefs. It doesn't matter if I observe that bricks don't hang in the air, or someone else observes it and tells me about it.

Have I completely missed your point?

:up:

Cognitive empathy. — Brett

Yes! Thanks for this term. I’ve been trying to think of a way to explain it...

It doesn’t matter to you whether or not someone else’s observations match your own?

Edit to elaborate: When it comes to figuring out what is real, people generally find it intuitively "crazy" if someone denies either that their empirical experiences tell them anything about what's true or false, or that if something is true at all then it's true for everyone (and so whatever is true must satisfy everyone's empirical experiences). It's a little more common but still widely considered bad form to either insist that something just is definitely true regardless of its impact on empirical experience, or to insist that someone justify something beyond all shadow of a doubt or else be compelled to accept that it's false.

The analogous errors regarding morality are to deny either that hedonic experiences tell us anything about what's good or bad, or that if something is good at all then it's good for everyone (and so whatever is good must satisfy everyone's hedonic experiences); or to either insist that something just is good regardless of its impact on hedonic experience, or to insist that someone justify something beyond all shadow of a doubt or else be compelled to accept that it's bad.

Applied in practice, those moral principles mean, in reverse order: giving everything the benefit of the doubt that it might be good, by default; but defeasibly, accepting the possibility that it could be shown bad; treating anything (a particular event, not a whole class of events) that can be shown bad for anyone to be just bad period, even if other people don't think so; and appealing to hedonic experiences, suffering and enjoyment, pleasure and pain, as the measure of whether it's good or bad for someone.

I had always considered us to be empathic creatures by nature, hence the forming of successful, cohesive communities. But if one form of empathy is cognitive and some are like that and others aren’t, then I have to assume that empathy for those people, going right back in time, could only come about when cognitive faculties had reached a certain point of development. So therefor empathy could not happen until that point was reached. That also suggests that different groups of mankind reached a point of empathising at different stages.

I think there’s other possibilities. My lack of empathy could very well be the product of desensitization, mental illness, or something else entirely. Also, I’m not saying I have zero empathy, it just doesn’t seem as prominent as most other people.