Anomalous Monism is a theory about the scientific status of psychology, the physical status of mental events, and the relation between these issues developed by Donald Davidson. It claims that psychology cannot be a science like basic physics, in that it cannot in principle yield exceptionless laws for predicting or explaining human thoughts and actions (mental anomalism). It also holds that thoughts and actions must be physical (monism, or token-identity).
'Thoughts must be physical'. There's the problem. — Wayfarer
Still, we don’t know what matter is. We only know the forms it takes. — Olivier5
I see the mind as being an activity of the body. — Janus
Or vice versa, in the sense that the body without the mind becomes vegetative. — Olivier5
Any form of dualism faces the issue of explaining how these simple things can happen. Somehow, thoughts are causally linked to the world.
Indeed, not just dualism but anything apart from monism. — Banno
OK. I think of dualism as an ontological separation thesis, where each dual has its own nature and principles for understanding them.
— Andrew M
Fair. But ontology is elusive. We don’t really know what matter ‘is’, for instance. Personally I try to stay away from it. (ontology I mean, not matter, as staying away from matter would be difficult) — Olivier5
I show that Aristotelian physics is a correct and non-intuitive approximation of Newtonian physics in the suitable domain (motion in fluids), in the same technical sense in which Newton theory is an approximation of Einstein’s theory. Aristotelian physics lasted long not because it became dogma, but because it is a very good empirically grounded theory. The observation suggests some general considerations on inter-theoretical relations. — Aristotle’s Physics: a Physicist’s Look - Carlo Rovelli, 2014
What I find interesting in this view — which must have many precedents — is that the Platonic world of ideas is not ‘out there’ and objective; rather it is grounded in human subjectivity, and built by our intersubjective dialogue and intellectual efforts generation after generation. — Olivier5
if you dislike the word physical, drop it. but I can't see how one could escape monism. 'Thoughts must be physical' is an expression of the fact that thought is a part of the world. — Banno
Anyway, it sounds to me like that Cyrenaics and other ancient skeptical schools anticipated much of the modern debate around qualia, minus the physicalism and neurological part. I do recall that one criticism of ancient atomism was that atoms and the void couldn't create sensations of color and taste. — Marchesk
The Cyrenaics note that the same object can cause different perceivers to experience different sensible qualities, depending on the bodily condition of the perceivers. For instance, honey will taste sweet to most people, but bitter to somebody with an illness, and the same wall that appears white to one person will look yellow to somebody with jaundice. And if a person presses his eye, he sees double.
From the fact that the wall appears white to me and yellow to you, the Cyrenaics think we should infer that we cannot know which quality the wall itself has on the basis of our experience of it, presumably because we have no criterion outside of our experiences to use to adjudicate which one (if either) of our experiences is correct. — Cyrenaics - i. The Relativity of Perception - IEP
How about the healthy person under normal conditions? — Andrew M
You agree that qualia are ineffable?
— Luke
Short answer, Yes. — Banno
There is a way of talking about qualia that is not ineffable, but it appears to be no different to our talk of tastes, sights, fellings and so on - all quite adequatly dealt with without reference to qualia. — Banno
Agreed, though I would say that [objectivity] is grounded in human experience, rather than human subjectivity, which I think captures the empirical nature of the enterprise. — Andrew M
Still, we don’t know what matter is. We only know the forms it takes.
— Olivier5
I'm not sure the question as to what matter is is really coherent. We may find other particles in the future, but how would we ever know if we had arrived at an "ultimate constituent" or if the idea of ultimate constituency is a valid one? — Janus
The thing is their are bodies without minds, albeit vegetative or dead; but we know of no minds without bodies, so what supervenes on what seems fairly clear in the light of that. — Janus
Now that is very old-fashioned view, some would even say archaic. But that's what I am arguing. — Wayfarer
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