Where, in the article, does he argue for this?It is also why Daniel Dennett is obliged to deny that 'qualia', and indeed, the mind or consciousness as we understand it are real. They must be derivative of physical processes, the output of molecular interactions. — Wayfarer
That surprises me. It's what I have maintained since the start fo the thread:I'm surprised by this response. — Luke
qualia are after all ineffable. — Banno
In 2013, I said I do not think that there is worth in giving a name to the subjective experience of a colour or a smell. In 2014, I doubted the usefulness of differentiating a smell from the experience-of-that-smell. Never understood qualia. I still don't see their purpose. — Banno
You want to say that a feeling is of something "in the world", and not of something "in your mind". Okay, but you are either aware or not aware of being touched, and it is the awareness (or not) that makes it a feeling (or not). You are aware of the experience; you are not having an experience of the experience. — Luke
What about the feeling of pain - is that a feeling of something "in the world"? — Luke
If so, then what is the distinction between the feeler of pain (i.e. the person) and the world? Do you consider a person to be identical with their physical body? — Luke
Ontological pluralism does say there are different ways of being, so perhaps I misspoke. — Janus
It depends on whether you count different ways of being as amounting to different forms or different constitutions.
If the latter, then the claim would have to be that there are no fundamental constituents of the different forms, or that there are a plurality of fundamental constituents that are not all of the same basic nature; i.e. not all physical, or even not all in the categories of physical and mental.
Modern physics tells us that the basic nature of everything is energy and that energy is equivalent to matter. We do have the four fundamental forces: the electromagnetic, the strong and weak nuclear forces and gravity. (Maybe add to that Dark Matter and Dark Energy) They are all counted as physical forces, though, insofar as we can detect and measure their effects.
Do you know of any philosophers who deny ontological pluralism? No abstracts, no numbers? — magritte
T-sentences set this out as clearly as possible: — Banno
The left hand side is about words, ... — Banno
... the right hand side is about the world, ... — Banno
... and truth is what brings them together. — Banno
The stuff on the right hand side is in unmediated contact with the world; — Banno
that is, it just says how things are. — Banno
And it does this simply because that is what words do. — Banno
Is a colourblind person capable of seeing things as they are? — Daemon
In game theory, a focal point (or Schelling point) is a solution that people tend to choose by default in the absence of communication. The concept was introduced by the American economist Thomas Schelling in his book The Strategy of Conflict (1960).[1] Schelling states that "(p)eople can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows that the other is trying to do the same" in a cooperative situation (at page 57), so their action would converge on a focal point which has some kind of prominence compared with the environment. However, the conspicuousness of the focal point depends on time, place and people themselves. It may not be a definite solution. — Focal point (game theory)
But we are still capable of seeing things as they are, no? — Andrew M
But I thought you were advocating what Dennett says in the article. Doesn’t he deny that qualia are ineffable? — Luke
See William James, 'A Pluralistic Universe'Do you know of any philosophers who espouse(d) OntPlu? — Daemon
I'm interested to know where that forms/constitutions terminology comes from — Daemon
Or, we can't see the world as it really is, because we take delusory appearances to be reality. Which is much more likely, given our cultural context.
— Wayfarer
Indeed that can and does happen. But we are still capable of seeing things as they are, no? — Andrew M
But I thought you were advocating what Dennett says in the article. Doesn’t he deny that qualia are ineffable?
— Luke
I'm not sure what to do with this. — Banno
If qualia are ineffable, then we can't talk about them.
If not, then they are just everyday tastes and smells and sights; talk of qualia would add nothing tot he conversation... — Banno
The verb "to quine" is even more esoteric. It comes from The Philosophical Lexicon (Dennett 1978c, 8th edn., 1987), a satirical dictionary of eponyms: "quine, v. To deny resolutely the existence or importance of something real or significant." — Quining Qualia
Which idea of qualia am I trying to extirpate? Everything real has properties, and since I don't deny the reality of conscious experience, I grant that conscious experience has properties. I grant moreover that each person's states of consciousness have properties in virtue of which those states have the experiential content that they do. That is to say, whenever someone experiences something as being one way rather than another, this is true in virtue of some property of something happening in them at the time, — Quining Qualia
And that is just what we do when we seem to ostend, with the mental finger of inner intention, a quale or qualia-complex in our experience. We refer to a property--a public property of uncharted boundaries--via reference to our personal and idiosyncratic capacity to respond to it. That idiosyncracy is the extent of our privacy. If I wonder whether your blue is my blue, your middle-C is my middle-C, I can coherently be wondering whether our discrimination profiles over a wide variation in conditions will be approximately the same. And they may not be; people experience the world quite differently. But that is empiricially discoverable by all the usual objective testing procedures. — Quining Qualia
if I have your experiences, then those experiences are mine and not yours. — SEP article on Other Minds
Qualia exist if they make a difference. They make no difference. Hence they do not exist. — Banno
304. “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain-behaviour without pain.” — Admit it? What greater difference could there be? — “And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing.” — Not at all. It’s not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said.
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