I think a child of a parent is in the ideal place to judge the ethics of the actions that created them.

If there was a rape you wouldn't ask the perpetrator what they thought about the ethics of their action as measure of its morality.

We can all judge what we feel about our parents in bringing us into existence here. And you can't refute this analysis because the individual is the final arbiter of their moral stance.

If you don't respect the sanctity of the individual then there is no reason for them to respect you.

Why is charity a moral act but saving a drowning person is a moral obligation? — khaled

There's a huge difference between seeing someone right in front of you who will die if you don't help them, and deciding whether or not to give to charity. I find it remarkable that you apparently can't see that difference.

There's a huge difference between seeing someone right in front of you who will die if you don't help them, and deciding whether or not to give to charity. I find it remarkable that you apparently can't see that difference. — Janus

Enlighten me. In both cases: someone will probably die if I don't help (depending on the charity). The only difference I see is that in one that death is near, and in the other I can't see it.

A naturalistic fallacy is when you say "We should do this because it's natrual". For example: "People naturally want to steal therefore they should". That seems to me what you're doing.

There is no 'should'. — Isaac


Bit late for that. — khaled

Not sure what you're trying to say here. To be clear, my position is that morality is not imposed from some divine (or otherwise non-physical) external source. That means that our desire to act morally (such as it is) arises naturally. That means that 'should' is irrelevant at the level of "why 'should' we behave morally?" It's not a question which makes any sense - the idea of 'moral' behaviour is just that behaviour we find ourselves generally inclined toward with a certain category of effect (either internal or external). The inclination (ceteris paribus) is already there.

So when we say "You should give the poor", we're saying "in order to fulfil that moral inclination we, ceteris paribus, have, you should give to the poor". Proceeding to ask "why 'should' we fulfil such a moral inclination makes no sense. It's like asking "why 'should' I like whisky?" It's not a question that has a normative answer.

To be clear, my position is that morality is not imposed from some divine (or otherwise non-physical) external source — Isaac

Agreed.

the idea of 'moral' behaviour is just that behaviour we find ourselves generally inclined toward with a certain category of effect (either internal or external). The inclination (ceteris paribus) is already there. — Isaac

But not everything we are inclined toward doing is moral. That's the naturalistic fallacy. We are inclined to steal. We are also inclined to help the poor. One is moral one is not. Deciding which is ethics.

But not everything we are inclined toward doing is moral. That's the naturalistic fallacy. We are inclined to steal. We are also inclined to help the poor. One is moral one is not. Deciding which is ethics. — khaled

On what grounds do we decide?

On what grounds do we decide? — Isaac

Arbitrary ones. I think.

On what grounds do we decide? — Isaac


Arbitrary ones. I think. — khaled

Then how does anyone learn what the word 'moral' means?

Then how does anyone learn what the word 'moral' means? — Isaac

By sharing the same arbitrary starting point.

Then how does anyone learn what the word 'moral' means? — Isaac


By sharing the same arbitrary starting point. — khaled

Well then it's not arbitrary, is it. Unless there was some global coordinated government ruling on what counted as 'moral', that I missed. If we generally share the same starting point (and we're ruling out divine intervention) then that fact stands in need of explanation. If that explanation is natural, then there exists a naturalistic basis for that shared understanding.

Well then it's not arbitrary, is it. — Isaac

Arbitrary in the sense that there is no reason you should favor it over another one.

If that explanation is natural, then there exists a naturalistic basis for that shared understanding. — Isaac

Agreed. There is a naturalistic explanation for why we have the starting premises we do. However that does not invalidate using alternative premises.

Well then it's not arbitrary, is it. — Isaac


Arbitrary in the sense that there is no reason you should favor it over another one. — khaled

There is a naturalistic explanation for why we have the starting premises we do. However that does not invalidate using alternative premises. — khaled

You're missing the point. We have those imperetives. That's what we just established. The's not some 'other' you that gets to decide what the 'natural' you wants. There's just your wants. Some of which are 'moral' according to the definition of the word, which is a community reflection of some grouping.

At no point is there some external judge.

We have those imperetives. That's what we just established. The's not some 'other' you that gets to decide what the 'natural' you wants. — Isaac

Agreed. I wasn't talking about whether or not we have this or that inclination. I was arguing which should count as "moral".

Some of which are 'moral' according to the definition of the word. — Isaac

But which becomes the problem. We have an incentive not to harm others. We also have an incentive not to want our species extinct. What do we do when those clash? The answer to THAT is not natrualistic. You can explain the instincts and evolution behind both incentives but that doesn't tell you which one we should favor in which circumstance. That's the job of ethics.

the definition of the word, which is a community reflection of some grouping. — Isaac

What do you mean here? Just sounds like word salad to me.

What do we do when those clash? The answer to THAT is not natrualistic. You can explain the instincts and evolution behind both incentives but that doesn't tell you which one we should favor in which circumstance. That's the job of ethics. — khaled

Again, you haven't explained a) how this 'job of ethics' is to be done - what do we use to judge, and b) if there's not a naturalistic explanation (predictive model) to be had regarding which we will choose, then what does the choosing? If, on the other hand, the choosing is done by some natural mechanism, then there exists a naturalistic account of the choice.

the definition of the word, which is a community reflection of some grouping. — Isaac


What do you mean here? Just sounds like word salad to me. — khaled

Just that words are not defined by individuals alone, nor by some rational process. They are defined in the use they are put to in a community. We cannot 'work out' what counts as moral, it is already worked out by the ways we use the word, all we can do as individuals is describe that meaning.

a) how this 'job of ethics' is to be done - what do we use to judge — Isaac

Arbitrary standards, again.

b) if there's not a naturalistic explanation (predictive model) to be had regarding which we will choose, then what does the choosing? If, on the other hand, the choosing is done by some natural mechanism, then there exists a naturalistic account of the choice. — Isaac

I never denied that there is a naturalistic explanation behind our choices. I denied that that gives any choice legitimacy. Say you have a 5 year old that says "two times two is six". There is a natrualistic explanation behind that utterance, that we can get by going into the neurology. However that does not say anything about 2x2 or 6 and certainly doesn't make them equal.

In the same way, figuring out why you favor this or that moral premise while I favor a different one does not say anything about the premises themselves, or which is better (if there is such a thing), or which is consistent. That is the job of ethics. That is what we are debating.

When I say "we use arbitrary standards to judge" I am not denying that there is not a natrualistic explanation for why I picked this premise and you picked that. There is nothing in the former statement that implies the latter, they're speaking at different levels. But you seem to me to have a habit of thinking things imply things they don't imply (usually a neurological theory), fom talking to you on multiple occasions now.

Just that words are not defined by individuals alone, nor by some rational process. They are defined in the use they are put to in a community. — Isaac

Agreed. And clearly we have had hundreds of uses of the word "moral" in context of antinatalism. So I'm not sure where your objection that the conclusion is "not moral" but is "just a plan" comes from. It could only come from arbitrarily deciding that one use of the word is "illegitimate" even though we have had threads going into hundreds of posts using it in the context of antinatalism.

We cannot 'work out' what counts as moral, it is already worked out by the ways we use the word, all we can do as individuals is describe that meaning. — Isaac

And as we said, the word has some room for error. And I think "having children is immoral" falls squarely within legitimate bounds of its use. You also think this, or you wouldn't have understood what was being said. It would have sounded like "having children is 134". But it doesn't.

a) how this 'job of ethics' is to be done - what do we use to judge — Isaac


Arbitrary standards, again. — khaled

It's not a job if the standards are arbitrary. There's nothing to be done. Plucking a rule out of thin air is not a 'job' in any normal use of the term.

In the same way, figuring out why you favor this or that moral premise while I favor a different one does not say anything about the premises themselves, or which is better (if there is such a thing), or which is consistent. That is the job of ethics. That is what we are debating. — khaled

What I'm saying is the judgement of which is better must also have a naturalistic explanation, or be non-physical in origin. If the former, then there is no 'better' in objective terms, nothing to debate.

clearly we have had hundreds of uses of the word "moral" in context of antinatalism. So I'm not sure where your objection that the conclusion is "not moral" but is "just a plan" comes from. It could only come from arbitrarily deciding that one use of the word is "illegitimate" even though we have had threads going into hundreds of posts using it in the context of antinatalism.

We cannot 'work out' what counts as moral, it is already worked out by the ways we use the word, all we can do as individuals is describe that meaning. — Isaac


And as we said, the word has some room for error. And I think "having children is immoral" falls squarely within legitimate bounds of its use. You also think this, or you wouldn't have understood what was being said. It would have sounded like "having children is 134". But it doesn't. — khaled

This is not at all true. If I said elephants are a type of cat you'd know exactly what I was talking about, but I'd still be wrong - elephants are not a type of cat. The mere fact that antinatalist premises make claims to be moral and that we can understand what those claims mean does not make then automatically right about that claim.

It's not a job if the standards are arbitrary. There's nothing to be done. Plucking a rule out of thin air is not a 'job' in any normal use of the term. — Isaac

I think the standards are arbitrary. Moral objectivists think they're not. Also there is no job called "ethicist" for this reason.

What I'm saying is the judgement of which is better must also have a naturalistic explanation, or be non-physical in origin. If the former, then there is no 'better' in objective terms, nothing to debate. — Isaac

There is never "better" in objective terms. Objective terms are just what is. Since when does that mean there is nothing to debate? I really don't understand what you're trying to get at here. Why are you on this site? After all, all of what we are doing here has a natrualistic explanation, including every thought and typed word. If this means that there is nothing to debate then what are you doing here?

It's so bizzare to me that we are 17 pages in and you keep saying "Well actually, your view and my view are both caused by natrualistic means therefore there is nothing to talk about". That there is a natrualistic explanation does not mean there is nothing to talk about. There is nothing about the former statement that implies the latter. And it is clear there ARE things to talk about or you would have stopped talking.

The mere fact that antinatalist premises make claims to be moral and that we can understand what those claims mean does not make then automatically right about that claim. — Isaac

Agreed. Now, we check the premises and check the reasoning. If we agree with the premises and reasoning then the conclusion must be true. You don't just say "Well actually there is a natrualistic explanation for what we are doing here therefore there is nothing to talk about". That makes no sense.

Haven't read every single reply in this discussion but have the following been addressed or at least touched on?:

- Conditional anti-natalism which doesn't state all human existence is and will always be immoral simply for whatever reason be it the specific country, life circumstance, or state of society/the world one is in doing so would be "bad" or unwise ie. having kids if you're in a third world village that is already struggling to survive.

- Utilitarian? anti-natalism meaning you should only have kids if they will be your (more or less) main focus in life until they are able to live under a similar or better situation than you yourself, where said outcome is more likely than less likely due to planning, etc. As in, due to the horrors and potential misery that can be experienced in life you shouldn't "just have kids" because you "just wanted to" one day or are infatuated with your partner so much you want to "make one flesh" out of passion or otherwise just have something to do for in life for 18 years.

- Reactive? anti-natalism as in the belief that life (being born) causes suffering and so should be avoided at all costs unless you will raise or can otherwise be reasonably assured the life you bring into existence will actively work to make the world, society, life, etc. a better place for all thus defeating the anti-natalist premise. So, if you want your kid to "do what makes them happy" in life and you and your partner (or other children) don't seem to be exceptionally talented in skills that can help make the world a better place (being a genius, etc.) it should be avoided. However, if you will tirelessly ensure they end up on a path to helping others and improving the quality of life in general (being a doctor, scientist[?], all-around good and selfless person to be around, etc.) or perhaps you yourself, your partner or other children happen to be incredibly talented and therefore capable of doing great works to improve the quality of life and state of the world, it's "OK".

The terms I used are probably poor word choices but you can see the various forms that exist outside of the standard, resolute definition in the OP.

I think there are a couple ways of going about answering these conditional versions.

1) The risk factor. There is still a non-zero chance the child itself or other he/she interacts with will be/cause harm that is not worth the risk, so why risk such a possibly devastating outcome?

Although this is the most accessible claim, as everyone can understand risk, I don't think it's actually the most important.

2) The imposition/don't cause harm premise. A lot of universal antinatalism (as I'll call it) is that causing impositions unnecessarily on others, and causing conditions which inevitably lead to harm unnecessarily on others is always wrong. In the case of antinatalism, there is a unique choice, perhaps unique amongst all others (so not special pleading) that all harm for a future individual can be prevented, without that child also being deprived in the present state (as they are not born yet). Unlike being born already and already being harmed and harming others (even unintentionally), the situation of procreation is a case of preventing all harm and not needing to harm someone else in order to "improve" a situation either. For example, a lot of times, we cause impositions or minor harms on others so that they can get to an even less harmful situation in the future. However, even this is not an excuse to cause conditions of harm in the procreation decision as there is no one who exists yet that needs to be harmed a little for a greater good (as they don't exist yet). Thus, this really is a unique case, again, because one would be creating conditions of harm and impositions on another completely unnecessarily and not for a greater good in terms of for that individual's sake.

Now, couching this in terms of greatest good for greatest number and not focusing just on harm of the individual being born doesn't persuade me either. I think this is actually non-moral or even immoral as it is now not basing morality on the dignity of the individual but rather how that individual can be used for some aggregated cause. However, as I've explained elsewhere, I see the locus of ethics at the dignity of the individual. People should not be used for others ends. However, there are varying things one might give up living in a society. However, certainly these kind of mini-violations that we must weigh once born are not a consideration in the procreation decision, as again, no conditions of harm needed to be created in the first place in order to use those individuals for aggregated needs. So those mini-violations for the "greater good" don't even need to take place. It would still be completely unnecessary to create conditions of harm for that individual for "greater good" community reason outside of the very child whose whole existence will be predicated on this abstraction.

The imposition/don't cause harm premise. — schopenhauer1

What are your views on the trolley problem?

I'm sure you know people who actually think enough to consider anti-natalism and it's arguments are the minority. People will still keep having kids without a care in the world. So, just let them? This would seem to place any alleged concern of "human suffering" along with any alleged efforts or attempts to reduce it secondary to simple avoidance of personal responsibility. Would it not? Perhaps that's all it is to some, elimination of (personal) imposition. So this definition of anti-natalism it is not a "humanitarian" or "moral" belief that "delves into the deepest wells of selfless concern for one's fellow man in hopes of preventing suffering" but rather a simple and independent whim of one's own selfish, personal prerogative. Is it not?

What are your views on the trolley problem?

I'm sure you know people who actually think enough to consider anti-natalism and it's arguments are the minority. People will still keep having kids without a care in the world. So, just let them? This would seem to place any alleged concern of "human suffering" along with any alleged efforts or attempts to reduce it secondary to simple avoidance of personal responsibility. Would it not? Perhaps that's all it is to some, elimination of (personal) imposition. So this definition of anti-natalism it is not a "humanitarian" or "moral" belief that "delves into the deepest wells of selfless concern for one's fellow man in hopes of preventing suffering" but rather a simple and independent whim of one's own selfish, personal prerogative. Is it not? — Outlander

Using people is not respecting the dignity of the individual. If a person self-sacrifices, that is different than sacrificing someone else for some cause.

What I don't get in all this is people don't understand de facto forced situations. Certainly, if I tied you up and made you work at some factory you did not want to.. eventually came to think it was okay because, what other choice do you have? Is that good? I'm guessing you'd say no.

Yet life is basically a much wider version of that. Instead of the factory it is working via social institutions. The illusion of choices doesn't cut back the actual decision made on someone's behalf that this is indeed "Just needs to happen for other people". People have to live, because why? So they can experience the wonders of blah blah and so and so? Not an excuse.

So we are not here to reduce suffering. We are not here so more plastic can be created, more technology happening, more movies watched, more people singing Kumbaya around a campfire, more presents can be given, more food can be distributed.. That is using people's lives for some cause outside the very people being created. Bypassing suffering for the future individual is what matters. Principles of this or that are not focusing on the individual being created.. and their dignity as people. Wanting to see some X outcome outside of the individual is where this goes off the rails...

It's so bizzare to me that we are 17 pages in and you keep saying "Well actually, your view and my view are both caused by natrualistic means therefore there is nothing to talk about". That there is a natrualistic explanation does not mean there is nothing to talk about. There is nothing about the former statement that implies the latter. And it is clear there ARE things to talk about or you would have stopped talking. — khaled

I don't think Isaac is censoring anyone, merely pointing out that the assumptions of certain arguments are unjustifiable. It's always interesting, even necessary to talk about what we should and shouldn't do because these are the bases of our laws and we are, in part, responsible for shaping them.

What should be called out is when an unjustified argument is being defended by a demand for necessary omniscience in an opposing argument. It is unfeasible to give a complete description of how we ended up with the precise moral culture we have. We can understand more and more about evolutionary biology, and we have records of key historical paradigm shifts (Christianity, abolition, suffrage, civil rights, LGBT rights, trans rights, animal rights) that fed into our current moral structures, but you can always tack on a 'Why?' to any answer. But as well as unfeasible, it's also unnecessary. That we do not tolerate certain behaviours under certain circumstances (e.g. allowing a person to die who can easily be saved) but are fine with others under other circumstances (not giving to charity at noon tomorrow) is sufficient to demonstrate that the the moral claim that all suffering is equivalent and any action or inaction that might yield or fail to quell it is as bad as terminal negligence is simply not a reflection of human morality and, in the absence of any other moral authority (like God), cannot be justified this way.

The 'why' *is* interesting, but is not necessary to dismiss antinatalism as bunkum. Now... If an antinatalist could argue on pragmatic, naturalistic grounds, e.g. that it is hypocritical to not extend permanent non-existence to our potential offspring... That would be both interesting and relevant, but also places the burden of proof correctly with the claimant, not the sceptic.

Using people is not respecting the dignity of the individual. — schopenhauer1

But that's my point, friend. You may choose not to participate and create a person who you will raise to not only not do that but do everything in their power to prevent that. Not because they're "forced to" simply because you raised them to view doing so as beneficial and bringing joy to their person. Meanwhile, those who are raised without said belief will continue to do so and thanks to your non-participation will continue this unabated and unrestricted.

If a person self-sacrifices, that is different than sacrificing someone else for some cause. — schopenhauer1

The child will undoubtedly do what the child wants. The assumption that a child raised to receive joy from selflessness is "sacrificed" or otherwise forced to do something against their will is on par with the same idea toward a child raised to feel joy from selfishness, is it not?

Yet life is basically a much wider version of that. — schopenhauer1

Again, people will continue to be born, and without proper guidance, continue to be subject to the scenarios you provided. Until, someone with knowledge and perhaps guts, decides to raise others in opposition to this.

Bypassing suffering for the future individual is what matters. — schopenhauer1

What future individual? You're an anti-natalist!

and their dignity as people. — schopenhauer1

See above. People will continue to be born, either with the mission or at least inclination that they should or perhaps could better their fellow man and thus future selves in the process, or not. Regardless, births will continue. So. Do you, as someone who recognizes or at least identifies the current state of society and the world as "in need of improvement" enough to imply it needs to be improved have kids who may be taught to do so, or do others who either don't realize or couldn't care less have kids that just contribute to the degeneracy. The choice is and has always been yours.

but you can always tack on a 'Why?' — Kenosha Kid

That's not the kind of why I'm tacking on. I'm not asking for exactly why we ended up with a desire not to harm others or whatever, that is irrelevant to the argument. To think it was relevant is a naturalistic fallcy.

I'm asking "Okay, so due to [insert neurological, biological, evolutionary process here (no omniscience required)] we ended up with a desire to steal, is it moral to steal?" The fact that we have an inclination to steal does not make it moral as I'm sure you'd agree. Similarly, the fact that we have an inclination to reproduce, and the fact that most of us think that it is morally fine, does not show that it is.

To show that we have to agree on starting premises and reason from them. Now if, like Isaac, one of your starting premises is "Anything that leads to extinction is bad because preserving the human race is a worthy goal in and of itself" then of course having kids is fine and that's that. We go our merry ways. I don't share that premise so that's as far as the talk will get (unless you can derive it from a premise I DO share). However this method fails to show what was intended to be shown, that there is some actual error within AN.

That we do not tolerate certain behaviours under certain circumstances (e.g. allowing a person to die who can easily be saved) but are fine with others under other circumstances (not giving to charity at noon tomorrow) is sufficient to demonstrate that the the moral claim that all suffering is equivalent and any action or inaction that might yield or fail to quell it is as bad as terminal negligence is simply not a reflection of human morality — Kenosha Kid

In ethics you argue as to what should or should not be done. The fact that our current moral paradigm (supposedly) does not lead to antinatalism doesn't make antinatalism bunk. That would be like saying that the fact slavery existed for the longest time makes it right. This is no more than an argument from popularity.


The title of the post implies that there are things wrong with antinatalism. As in, even starting from the same premises that lead to AN you will not reach AN. Every time I talk to Isaac (or anyone really) about AN it goes like this:

1- They try to show an inconsistency
2- They fail at showing the inconsistency
3- They either add another premise to overwrite the conclusion (see above) OR just conclude "Your premises are unusual" which is very different from "Your reasonsing is wrong" (what they originally try to show)
4- Wait 5 posts
5- Repeat from 1 again for some reason.

I'm hoping if this is going to go on that that doesn't happen because it's just tiring for all parties envolved.

See above. People will continue to be born, either with the mission or at least inclination that they should or perhaps could better their fellow man and thus future selves in the process, or not. Regardless, births will continue. — Outlander

"People will be born therefore procreation is ethical" is a bad argument. The former says nothing about the latter. It's like saying "theft will occur therefore it is ethical".

"People will be born therefore procreation is ethical" is a bad argument. The former says nothing about the latter. It's like saying "theft will occur therefore it is ethica — khaled

No doubt. Meanwhile what I was saying was .. okay let's for a second go back to the OP. At least his stated definition "living causes suffering". Suffering is (or causes) a negative emotion .. therefore it is bad and is the main reason for anti-natalism. Inversely, pleasure is (or causes) a positive emotion, therefore a life with more pleasure than suffering is .. good? Otherwise, a life with simply more suffering than pleasure is bad. Unless the argument an individual adopts in anti-natalism is "I can experience a lifetime of pleasure however one moment of suffering makes it not worth living" which the rational person or even a non-rational person would toss aside as non-nonsensical rubbish. So, that means, if life can be made to be more pleasurable than it is suffering, it is good and worth living. And who will help to ensure and/or correct it's current state toward this? Those who identify the problem and therefore its potential solutions, or those who do not?

I'm asking "Okay, so due to [insert neurological, biological, evolutionary process here (no omniscience required)] we ended up with a desire to steal, is it moral to steal?" The fact that we have an inclination to steal does not make it moral as I'm sure you'd agree. Similarly, the fact that we have an inclination to reproduce, and the fact that most of us think that it is morally fine, does not show that it is. — khaled

Well it wouldn't make sense to use that terminology. We don't have a natural drive not to steal. We have a natural drive not to do to others that which we would not have done to us (empathy and altruism). If we were fine with others taking whatever they liked, we wouldn't have a sense of personal property or theft.

To show that we have to agree on starting premises and reason from them. Now if, like Isaac, one of your starting premises is "Anything that leads to extinction is bad because preserving the human race is a worthy goal in and of itself" then of course having kids is fine and that's that. We go our merry ways. I don't share that premise so that's as far as the talk will get (unless you can derive it from a premise I DO share). However this method fails to show what was intended to be shown, that there is some actual error within AN. — khaled

It's not that we have a moral imperative to perpetuate the human race, rather that we have evolved moral behaviours to perpetuate our genomes. Morality is the mechanism of longevity; longevity is not the ends of morality.

Where both antinatalism and the above position you quote are at fault are in specifying moral values in the absence of relevant living things. No life, no biology. No biology, no morality. Morality is existential: existence must precede it. If I and my partner end up being the last two humans alive tomorrow, we're under no moral duress to procreate.

In ethics you argue as to what should or should not be done. The fact that our current moral paradigm (supposedly) does not lead to antinatalism doesn't make antinatalism bunk. — khaled

The fact that it rests on a unjustifiable claim does. One can dismiss it with as little justification. The trend on this thread, in your contributions in particular, has been to demand a rigour in this dismissal that is very absent from the antinatalist argument.

That would be like saying that the fact slavery existed for the longest time makes it right. This is no more than an argument from popularity. — khaled

No, quite false. Slavery did not exist because of a pre-existing moral consensus that it was right. It existed because power attracts evil, including the power to shape moral consensus. Slavery has always been about a powerful minority exercising that power for personal gain, the very opposite of a moral position.

I'm hoping if this is going to go on that that doesn't happen because it's just tiring for all parties envolved. — khaled

Most counter-argument, including the OP, point to the fact that the antinatalist argument is simply not shown. The counter-counter-argument assumes the argument in countering this. The best you've got is a self-consistent argument. I would argue that antinatalism isn't even self-consistent, nor is it about actual morality. That to one side, you can employ this argument to defend a decision not to have children just fine, although it's rather over-the-top: no one could say you were wrong to not have children to avoid your offsprings' suffering. But antinatalism is a claim that *I* should morally judge someone for having children. For that, you need a compelling argument, not just a self-consistent one.

And who will help to ensure and/or correct it's current state toward this? — Outlander

If we all decide not to have kids tomorrow, no one will have to. You’re not addressing the actual question of whether or not procreation is moral

We don't have a natural drive not to steal. We have a natural drive not to do to others that which we would not have done to us (empathy and altruism) — Kenosha Kid

We also have a natural drive to take what we want. Yet we pronounced one drive good and one drive bad. All I’m trying to get at is that the mere fact that we have different, often contradictory drives is not in any way useful when talking about morals.

The fact that it rests on a unjustifiable claim does. One can dismiss it with as little justification. — Kenosha Kid

Agreed. One can dismiss the conclusion if one doesn’t accept the premises. That’s why I don’t peddle antinatalism, because usually people have different starting premises from mine.

But that’s not what Isaac and Benkei are trying to do. They are trying to find a contradiction even after accepting the premises, and failing.

I’d like to note though that this isn’t an AN specific thing. Any moral theory can be dismissed on the basis of unjustified claims. Unless you’re a moral objectivist, you’re going to have to admit that your starting point is unjustified.

The best you've got is a self-consistent argument. — Kenosha Kid

You can’t get better than that in ethics. “Compelling” is subjective.

For that, you need a compelling argument, not just a self-consistent one. — Kenosha Kid

I could try, though it is not usually my goal to peddle the belief. I’ll try some “intuition pumps”. Here goes:

First off, do you think there are situations where having children is wrong? If not, do you think malicious genetic engineering is wrong (genetically engineering an otherwise able child to be blind for example).

What is your justification for why that is wrong? (the situations or the genetic engineering. If you think the genetic engineering is fine there isn’t much I can do)

You’re not addressing the actual question of whether or not procreation is moral — khaled

It's neither moral nor amoral, intrinsically. It's a means not an end to a means, one that can result in either outcome. I could make a weapon that can be used to either end all criminality or end all justice and ensure the continuation of said criminality. Haste makes waste they say. Not paying attention and tossing caution to the wind resulting in offspring raised without proper guidance that will become a burden on society whether directly or indirectly through the welfare system or not being raised any better and ending up in prison sucking on the public taxpayer teat while another, possibly a victim of said person, has to work their fingers to the bone to put food in their mouth is of questionable morality, for starters. However, this is but one of many scenarios.