Any way you can restate all that in some less opaque language?
This,

we are largely inept primates bungling our ways through life, — ToothyMaw

for example, does not make sense. We are very "ept" primates. The eptest on the planet. And so forth. Try for three or maybe five well-crafted and simple sentences. Maybe then your thread will take off.

I wrote "inept" not "ept".

Can axioms that can be reasoned with be extracted from an evolutionary view of human nature? — ToothyMaw

What does "can be reasoned with" mean here? That they're intelligible, free of contradictions, or some other quality?

If humans are, for instance, compassionate towards those less fortunate than themselves in a way distinct from other animals, and sufficiently for being human, does that mean that this trait can be synthesized and used to develop behaviors for specific situations that are rational, with respect to human nature, for humanity? — ToothyMaw

Whether or not human compassion is "sufficiently distinct" to be a genuinely "human" trait seems to rest on a number of value judgements. We'd first need to show that these can be made in some non-arbitrary way.

Could these loose concepts be extracted and reasoned with to create rational behaviors, with respect to human nature, for specific situations for humanity? — ToothyMaw

How would you go from a behaviour to a rational behaviour? Where does rationality enter the picture?

First, thanks for responding.

Can axioms that can be reasoned with be extracted from an evolutionary view of human nature?
— ToothyMaw

What does "can be reasoned with" mean here? That they're intelligible, free of contradictions, or some other quality? — Echarmion

That they are Intelligible and sufficiently representative of humanity; the axioms need to be coherent with respect to human nature for any reasoning done with them to produce behaviors rational for humans.

If humans are, for instance, compassionate towards those less fortunate than themselves in a way distinct from other animals, and sufficiently for being human, does that mean that this trait can be synthesized and used to develop behaviors for specific situations that are rational, with respect to human nature, for humanity?
— ToothyMaw

Whether or not human compassion is "sufficiently distinct" to be a genuinely "human" trait seems to rest on a number of value judgements. We'd first need to show that these can be made in some non-arbitrary way. — Echarmion

I see no issue with what is sufficient for being human being arbitrary; human nature can still be objective. Furthermore, I think some aspects of human nature are observable. For instance: humans value the lives of loved ones over those of strangers much of the time. There are exceptions, but not many. It actually seems to me the nomological account is superior in this respect; evolutionary biology can provide some truths about what humans tend to be. Neuroscience too.

Could these loose concepts be extracted and reasoned with to create rational behaviors, with respect to human nature, for specific situations for humanity?
— ToothyMaw

How would you go from a behaviour to a rational behaviour? Where does rationality enter the picture? — Echarmion

I'm saying that since the behaviors are reached via reasoning they are rational - if they are anchored to human nature. According to another metric they might not be rational.

That they are Intelligible and sufficiently representative of humanity; the axioms need to be coherent with respect to human nature for any reasoning done with them to produce behaviors rational for humans. — ToothyMaw

Ok, that seems like a good start.

I see no issue with what is sufficient for being human being arbitrary; human nature can still be objective. Furthermore, I think some aspects of human nature are observable. For instance: humans value the lives of loved ones over those of strangers much of the time. There are exceptions, but not many. It actually seems to me the nomological account is superior in this respect; evolutionary biology can provide some truths about what humans tend to be. Neuroscience too. — ToothyMaw

But one could then argue that other species save loved ones too, and indeed what is peculiar to human nature is that we also help strangers, and even when the help is not reciprocal.

The practical question here is what kind of argument might be used to convince others that your take on human nature is the "objective" one.

I'm saying that since the behaviors are reached via reasoning they are rational - if they are anchored to human nature. According to another metric they might not be rational. — ToothyMaw

That seems like a low bar to cross though. Humans can reason themselves into all kinds of things, including behaviours usually considered extremely immoral. In fact, it's kind of a feature of the most egregious human conduct that it's the product of reasoning of some kind. Purely emotional reactions can be very violent, but are also usually limited.

The practical question here is what kind of argument might be used to convince others that your take on human nature is the "objective" one. — Echarmion

I would think that many people could be convinced of the objectivity of a more nomological view; it is empirical - but I suppose that anyone could make any claim about human nature, such as that we are born sinners in need of redemption in the face of eternal torment, or maybe that we have to be "monsters" in order to be self realized and competent. The real issues here are dogma and pseudoscience imo, along with the difficulties that would come with extracting axioms from human nature.

That seems like a low bar to cross though. Humans can reason themselves into all kinds of things, including behaviours usually considered extremely immoral. In fact, it's kind of a feature of the most egregious human conduct that it's the product of reasoning of some kind. Purely emotional reactions can be very violent, but are also usually limited. — Echarmion

I suppose someone like Hitler reasoned in such a way as to come to the conclusion that he was justified in mass murdering people; but if what is considered moral were voted on as a plurality then we wouldn't see despots or even tax increases on the middle class; the people usually know what is in their best interest imo.

This OP is related to another thread I started a while back about normative ethics. What grounds the ethics I created in rationalness is its predication upon behaviors (fitted to specific situations) outlined by reasoning with axioms extracted from human nature. Can axioms that can be reasoned with be extracted from an evolutionary view of human nature? Or does it have to be essentialist? I personally think we are largely inept primates bungling our ways through life with the ultimate goal of passing on our genes. But can such a view be reasoned with? Or does human nature have to be discoverable and distinct from chimps (for example)? — ToothyMaw

I think an evolutionary view of human nature will show that certain things like morality were offloaded from genes to culture precisely because we developed the ability for language, reason etc. Or put in another way, a specified morality isn't hardcoded in our genes, but the ability to develop one is. And from a evolutionary perspective this makes sense because culture is more adaptable than genes, which would make an organism more 'fit' in a host of different and changing environments.

You see this is why I think these kind of approaches of looking to human nature for ethics, or any objectivist/essentialist approach for that matter, is exactly the wrong approach, because it one of those things nature 'delegated' to culture. If anything, nature tells us to talk and debate about it and create and agree upon our own morals, as an ongoing process... and not to definitively code them in genes or stone, because the world changes.

I think an evolutionary view of human nature will show that certain things like morality were offloaded from genes to culture precisely because we developed the ability for language, reason etc. — ChatteringMonkey

I think that culture can be viewed from an evolutionary perspective; David Sloan Wilson describes this well; altruism, for example, allows for better outcomes for communities, and thus the individual - on a non-local level. Unless I'm mistaken the arcing transition towards altruism is like any other transition. The evolutionary view is not limited just to what our genes dictate.

from a evolutionary perspective this makes sense because culture is more adaptable than genes, which would make an organism more 'fit' in a host of different and changing environments. — ChatteringMonkey

:up:

You see this is why I think these kind of approaches of looking to human nature for ethics, or any objectivist/essentialist approach for that matter, is exactly the wrong approach, because it one of those things nature 'delegated' to culture. — ChatteringMonkey

I agree: a child raised in a caste system would be different, in some ways, from a child raised in a highly socially mobile environment. But isn't all this a confusion of terms? Isn't human nature just what we possess naturally? Unless you want to claim that culture is the result of, or interacts with, evolutionary traits, in which case you are submitting at least partially to the evolutionary, and potentially objectivist, view. And even if culture were partially responsible, with the evolutionary view of culture I think it could be understood as a natural process like any other, and, thus, human nature can be understood fully from a nomological perspective.

nature tells us to talk and debate about it and create and agree upon our own morals, as an ongoing process... and not to definitively code them in genes or stone, because the world changes. — ChatteringMonkey

I kind of agree; the morality that I outlined a while back left more than enough room for talking and debating; while rules would be made, they would only last until as long as the plurality would want them to.

I agree: a child raised in a caste system would be different, in some ways, from a child raised in a highly socially mobile environment. But isn't all this a confusion of terms? Isn't human nature just what we possess naturally? Unless you want to claim that culture is the result of, or interacts with, evolutionary traits, in which case you are submitting at least partially to the evolutionary, and potentially objectivist, view. And even if culture were partially responsible, with the evolutionary view of culture I think it could be understood as a natural process like any other, and, thus, human nature can be understood fully from a nomological perspective. — ToothyMaw

Okay I'm not sure I totally understand where you're coming from...

But first off, just to be clear, I think everything is a natural process, or maybe better a physical process.
Culture is a very specific one though, which only certain biological lifeforms make use of, lifeforms that are capable of creating and using language and meaning. Culture is transmitted by and is only possible for language-users. And evolution is a specific kind of natural process in its own right, namely one which applies to biological organisms which use DNA. So even though they are both natural processes in the widest sense, there is a difference.

What i'm saying is that the (evolved) ability to develop culture has had, in turn, an effect on our evolution. If culture can take over the role certain genetically hardwired behaviours play in terms of fitness, then those hardwired behaviours wouldn't be selected for anymore, because they became obsolete. This is something evolutionary biologist see time and again, certain new evolved traits making older traits become obsolete and atrophy (or not selected for anymore) as a result.

But this is all a bit besides the point I think. The point is that we happened to evolve the ability to develop culture and that replaced some of what one might call nature (as opposed to nurture or culture here), We are more malleable or plastic creatures than most because we have this ability. And I think it's is a feature (not a bug) of culture, and the reason for it's evolutionary success, that it can be changed more easily to changing circumstances.

What that tells me - if nature tells us anything - is that we should use this ability, and talk to each other to develop moralities that fit our circumstances (locally and in our time), instead of trying to define once and for all what morality should be (universally, a-temporally and objectively). That is what culture is after all, an ongoing dialogue between people about a changing set of agreements on meanings and mores... it's open-ended. Trying to extract the essences out of that is a bit of a flawed idea I think because you abstract away from the historical context that in part defines it.

I'm not sure you make this same mistake, but this is something philosophy often got wrong historically.

But first off, just to be clear, I think everything is a natural process, or maybe better a physical process.
Culture is a very specific one though, which only certain biological lifeforms make use of, lifeforms that are capable of creating and using language and meaning. Culture is transmitted by and is only possible for language-users. And evolution is a specific kind of natural process in it's own right, namely one which applies to biological organisms which use DNA. So eventhough they are both natural processes in the widest sense, there is a difference. — ChatteringMonkey

Actually it appears chimps have culture too if this is any good: https://www.unl.edu/rhames/courses/212/chimpculture/chimpculture.html

A call from a chimpanzee warning of danger I would argue has plenty of meaning. If all that separates culture from being the same as evolution is the ability to speak then this demonstrates otherwise; some chimps have evolved culture without language.

What that tells me - if nature tells us anything - is that we should use this ability, and talk to each other to develop moralities that fit our circumstances (locally and in our time), instead of trying to define once and for all what morality should be (universally, a-temporally and objectively). — ChatteringMonkey

I think you are discounting an entire ethic: normative ethics. Normative ethics prescribe moral actions that, according to some theories, transcend circumstance and are, if they are any good, non-arbitrary. What you describe is applied ethics, deciding how to put moral knowledge into practice. Applied ethics often times has to rely on normative theories, which you appear to disregard. What would real world moral actions mean if there were no standards for right or wrong?

Actually it appears chimps have culture too if this is any good: https://www.unl.edu/rhames/courses/212/chimpculture/chimpculture.html

A call from a chimpanzee warning of danger I would argue has plenty of meaning. If all that separates culture from being the same as evolution is the ability to speak then this demonstrates otherwise; some chimps have evolved culture without language. — ToothyMaw

Yeah ok, maybe language isn't strictly necessary for culture, depends on what you would want to call culture. It's a matter of degree, not an absolute cut-off probably... we can do more with culture than a chimp because we have language. You need some way to convey information at least, and abstract language can do that better than howling or screeching.

I think you are discounting an entire ethic: normative ethics. Normative ethics prescribe moral actions that, according to some theories, transcend circumstance and are, if they are any good, non-arbitrary. What you describe is applied ethics, deciding how to put moral knowledge into practice. Applied ethics often times has to rely on normative theories, which you appear to disregard. What would real world moral actions mean if there were no standards for right or wrong? — ToothyMaw

Yes I'm saying the standards come from culture, not from normative ethics. I'm a social contractarian. That's not to say normative ethics can't have some influence on the debate, they can and do, but they are not more than either, a part of the debate or one argument of many. Ultimately, real world moral actions get the meaning and force from implicit or explicit agreements in a certain society... a social contract if you want.

Yes I'm saying the standards come from culture, not from normative ethics. — ChatteringMonkey

But nothing makes those actions right or wrong; even if they fall in line with your descriptive ethics; those just describe what is believed to be wrong or right by people, they don't actually provide standards. You could say "this action is believed to be right by so and so, and they are going to act in accordance with that belief", but this doesn't make it right.

Ultimately, real world moral actions get the meaning and force from implicit or explicit agreements in a certain society... a social contract if you want. — ChatteringMonkey

I don't see how an agreement to give up freedoms for the greater good, or to cooperate, provide standards for right or wrong; some actions are in line with the contract, but that doesn't make them moral unless you already subscribe to an ethic that either explicitly or largely values cooperation and social order.

Yes I'm saying the standards come from culture, not from normative ethics.
— ChatteringMonkey

But nothing makes those moral actions right or wrong; even if they fall in line with your descriptive ethics; those just describe what is believed to be wrong or right by people, they don't actually provide standards. You could say "this action is believed to be right by so and so, and they are going to act in accordance with that belief", but this doesn't make it right.

Ultimately, real world moral actions get the meaning and force from implicit or explicit agreements in a certain society... a social contract if you want.
— ChatteringMonkey

I don't see how an agreement to give up freedoms for the greater good, or to cooperate, provide standards for right or wrong; some actions are in line with the contract, but that doesn't make them moral unless you already subscribe to an ethic that either explicitly or largely values cooperation and social order. — ToothyMaw

But there is nothing that makes moral actions right or wrong if you don't already subscribe to some value, even outside of social contract theory... you can't get an ought from an is regardless, unless you believe in God. This is typically the argument that is used against it, but I just don't see how this doesn't apply equally to all non-theist conceptions of morality.

But there is nothing that makes moral actions right or wrong if you don't already subscribe to some value, even outside of social contract theory... you can't get an ought from an is regardless, unless you believe in God. — ChatteringMonkey

No, you just aren't subscribing to any normative ethics. The is-ought problem is different from claiming that something is wrong or right with no standards; it is about the coherency of moving from descriptive to normative claims. You are not moving from descriptive to normative claims - you are making purely descriptive claims about people's beliefs and their intentions, desires, or plans to act on those beliefs.

But yes, the is-ought problem seems intractable to me too. Divine command theory works, but it still sucks, and there is, of course, no reason to believe god exists

No, you just aren't subscribing to any normative ethics. The is-ought problem is different from claiming that something is wrong or right with no standards; it is about the coherency of moving from descriptive to normative claims. You are not moving from descriptive to normative claims - you are making purely descriptive claims about people's beliefs and their intentions, desires, or plans to act on those beliefs. — ToothyMaw

Well I guess you're right to to some extend that I don't subscribe to any particular normative ethics, they can all have their uses in different instances.... so if i'd be pressed to give an answer to that question, it's say it's a mix of the big three, with deontology coming last. I think none of them gives the full story of how we evaluate morals. That's part of why I want to introduce the social contract, not only as a description of peoples beliefs, but also as a way we tend to evaluate morals... in a dialogue with other people and measured against values that are developed in a culture. I don't think there is one ultimate ground.

But yes, the is-ought problem seems intractable to me too. Divine command theory works, but it still sucks, and there is, of course, no reason to believe god exists — ToothyMaw

And if you don't believe in God, god is merely a way to give more weight to what is essentially a human creation or convention. Which is the other reason why I turn to the social contract, because without some kind of social convention, it risks ending in mere personal opinion because - however good the argument is - it has to at least assume some kind of prior value that cannot be shown to be objective.

Well I guess you're right to to some extend that I don't subscribe to any particular normative ethics, they can all have their uses in different instances.... so if i'd be pressed to give an answer to that question, it's say it's a mix of the big three, with deontology coming last. — ChatteringMonkey

Different normative ethics often times come into conflict; I don't see how one can ascribe to both deontology and, say, consequentialism. One dictates that all that matters is consequences, the other says that the act itself matters and we should follow rules. The two can't both be correct, even if one or the other might seem more expedient depending upon the situation. And I think that you are automatically disregarding deontology if you say circumstances matter, not merely putting it in last place.

That's part of why I want to introduce the social contract, not only as a description of peoples beliefs, but also as a way we tend to evaluate morals... in a dialogue with other people and measured against values that are developed in a culture. — ChatteringMonkey

Once again, that entails only descriptive elements. If you subscribe to an ethic that dictates that people should follow rules that tend to create cooperation and maintain social order then you can weigh whether or not people make moral actions in upholding the social contract. It sounds like you actually believe in a deontological morality if you think that an action's morality can bet determined by a set of rules dictated by a contract, especially if it is tacit.

It might seem as if I am misunderstanding the social contract, but I'm merely working with this:

a way we tend to evaluate morals — ChatteringMonkey

Morals are often measured in terms of rules, so I am saying you need to have rules, which you seem to imply, but these rules have to be normative in ethical terms, not just standards for behavior dictated by a contract if you want to use them to measure the ethics of an action. Or you could go the direction of making a consequentialist argument for the social contract.

No actually I'd say I'm most consequentialist if anything, I think ideally morals should serve a purpose, or better purposes.

The problem with consequentialism is that it is really only feasible in theory, because we value a plurality of different things and it's often not possible to fully calculate the consequences of certain actions in practice because the world is complex.

Which brings me to virtue ethics as providing generally more practical ideas about how to live your life and get good results.

Then there are certain extreme things I don't want to even think about, because they are just to awful instinctively, which bring in a deontological aspect. A more deontological approach can also be useful for children who don't yet have the ability to think about consequences... as a stepping stone to more mature ethics.

And yes finally, I do have to acknowledge that I live together with other people and, absent God and objective morality, don't necessarily have the same values and ideas about morality as others. And because at least some coordination has value in itself, I can see the reason behind ceding some of my freedom for personal moral convictions to societal developed rules... which I suppose is again a kind of deontology.

It might seem as if I am misunderstanding the social contract, but I'm merely working with this:

a way we tend to evaluate morals
— ChatteringMonkey

Morals are usually measured against rules, so I am saying you need to have rules, which you seem to imply, but these rules have to be normative in ethical terms, not just standards for behavior dictated by a contract if you want to use them to measure the ethics of an action. Or you could go the direction of making a consequentialist argument for the social contract. — ToothyMaw

I think they are measured against values, a plurality of values. We have no absolute grounding in the descriptive for those values, and people do disagree about them, but from those values you can derive, or at least evaluate, morals, i.e. if you value x, then moral y follows...

And I think in a functioning society people have discussions about all kinds of aspects of this process, from what to value, to how those values relate to eachother hierarchically, to figuring out what kind of consequences follow from what kinds of actions etc...

A good example of this process in action is the COVID-crisis I think. You have virologists saying what the consequence are going to be for the spread of the virus if you let people go about their business and how many people could possibly die because of it. You have economists saying what kind of consequences this could have for the economy and what the long term effects could be. And then you have psychologist warning about the psychological and mental health aspects of lock-down and social isolation etc etc... And then all of these different values get debated and weighed against eachother to determine what kind of rules you ultimately want people to follow to deal with the virus.

I will say that relative to a culture one can make the statement that "this is correct for us", and it can be true, but that's not really a normative statement about right and wrong.

The problem with consequentialism is that it is really only feasible in theory, because we value a plurality of different things and it's often not possible to fully calculate the consequences of certain actions in practice because the world is complex. — ChatteringMonkey

That's where infusing a level of intuition into the calculations comes into play; we can operate largely on intuition for most issues, but rely on a calculus for cases that can be reasoned through, are outside intuition, are incredibly important, can be disentangled from local factors, or any combination thereof. For instance: the ethics around kicking a dog are pretty intuitive: don't do it; you wouldn't want to be kicked. But something like waging illegal offensive wars that could kill hundreds of thousands of people because of circumstantial evidence of WMD's? Something like that should be reasoned through.

Then there are certain extreme things I don't want to even think about, because they are just to awful instinctively, which bring in a deontological aspect. A more deontological approach can also be useful for children who don't yet have the ability to think about consequences... as a stepping stone to more mature ethics. — ChatteringMonkey

Yes, infanticide, for example, is pretty fucked up, but just because something is awful instinctively that doesn't mean one should back down from it; that is part of why I like Peter Singer - he follows his own arguments to their conclusions, regardless of how awful they are. Sorry if mentioning infanticide ruffles your feathers; I am just using a well known example of an ethical conclusion most people find positively awful.

correction: basically everyone finds it awful

I think they are measured against values, a plurality of values. We have no absolute grounding in the descriptive for those values, and people do disagree about them, but from those values you can derive, or at least evaluate, morals, i.e. if you value x, then moral y follows... — ChatteringMonkey

I think that moral "rules" refer more to specific sets of regulations determining what is moral, while value is more about usefulness and worth. I think rules are more useful for assessing the morality of actions, while, as you say, values determine many of our moral beliefs. But this makes our moral beliefs entirely arbitrary; if they are derived purely from what each of us values then what is wrong or right depends entirely upon the actor; what is wrong for one person might be right for another person in the same situation. Literally anything could be considered moral, including something like pre-meditated killing.

This is actually similar to the main argument against divine command theory: anything could be considered moral if commanded by god.

Yes, infanticide, for example, is pretty fucked up, but just because something is awful instinctively that doesn't mean one should back down from it; that is part of why I like Peter Singer - he follows his own arguments to their conclusions, regardless of how awful they are. Sorry if mentioning infanticide ruffles your feathers; I am just using a well known example of an ethical conclusion most people find positively awful. — ToothyMaw

Well I'm not a big fan of Singer because he seems to want to do away with the emotional or instinctive component of morality. For instance I think one of the points he makes is that we shouldn't have a local bias, favouring the people we know over people across the globe we don't know. And I think that is a mistake, because this is in part what motivates me and other people to be moral in the first place. You might counter this by saying that motivation shouldn't play a role in determining what is moral, but I think we are ultimately human and not emotionless machines... so if you want a morality that works, that people are actually willing to follow, you'll have to take that into account.

You might say: "but all ethics are arbitrary". This is not true: while they might not be objective, ethics like consequentialism dictate that the actor should not matter; what is correct for me is correct for you in the same situation, personal predispositions and values mean nothing. Btw I just posted without tagging you, don't know if one can edit in tags.

if you want a morality that works, that people are actually willing to follow, you'll have to take that into account. — ChatteringMonkey

Totally agree.

I think that moral "rules" refer more to specific sets of regulations determining what is moral, while value is more about usefulness and worth. I think rules are more useful for assessing the morality of actions, while, as you say, values determine many of our moral beliefs. But this makes our moral beliefs entirely arbitrary; if they are derived purely from what each of us values then what is wrong or right depends entirely upon the actor; what is wrong for one person might be right for another person in the same situation. Literally anything could be considered moral, including something like pre-meditated killing. — ToothyMaw

Yeah that is why I described myself in the first place as social contractarian. Values are not arbitrary as mere personal opinions, but we get educated in a certain culture and that socio-cultural context is vital for the devellopment of those values and morals. They are intersubjective if you want.

↪ChatteringMonkey
You might say: "but all ethics are arbitrary". This is not true: while they might not be objective, ethics like consequentialism dictate that the actor should not matter; what is correct for me is correct for you in the same situation, personal predispositions and values mean nothing. Btw I just posted without tagging you, don't know if one can edit in tags. — ToothyMaw

I think I can agree to this. There are certainly some objective parts to the process of developing morals, I won't deny that.

How are values, if not descriptive, not arbitrary? If it isn't descriptive and it's a value it must be arbitrary it seems to me. Trying to ground it in the social contract does nothing; even if one enters into a contract to uphold certain values that doesn't make the values non-arbitrary. It just means you are contractually obligated to uphold values that, while useful, are, once again, not descriptive.

we get educated in a certain culture and that socio-cultural context is vital for the devellopment of those values and morals. — ChatteringMonkey

Are you saying that since culture provides a system of values that abide by reasoning of some sort, cultural values are not arbitrary?

I think I can agree to this. There are certainly some objective parts to the process of developing morals, I won't deny that. — ChatteringMonkey

It's more a principle of non-arbitrariness; the definition of objective you are using is the more common usage of the word, not the way it is used in most of the philosophy I've read, which is "independent of the mind".